Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute

Post-Graduate and Research Department Series, No. 23

MAHĀBHĀṢYADĪPIKĀ

OF

BHARTṚHARI

Fascicule II : Āhnika V

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भर्तृहरिविरचितायां

महाभाष्यदीपिकायां पञ्चममाह्निकम्

महाभाष्यदीपिकायां पञ्चममाह्निकम्

॥ ईदूदेद्द्विवचनं प्रगृह्यम् ॥ १. १. ११ ॥

[१] ईदादिषु यद्यपि विशेषवत्यो व्यक्तयः श्रूयन्ते, स्वरूपवि[धौ] च यद्यप्युच्चार्यमाण एव शब्दो[र्थ]प्रत्यायकः आश्रितद्विशक्तित्वात् प्रत्याय्यत्वेन गृह्यते, – अभिन्नश्रुति[त]या शब्दान्तरमनुकरणेनानुकर्तुं शक्यं – तथापि नान्तरीयकत्वात् उपात्तान् सतो विशेषान् परित्यज्य सामान्यमाश्रीयते। विशेषपरैव वा प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्। उभयं संभवति – तत्रेदं तपरकरणमाकृतिविवक्षायां वा भेदपरित्यागे सामान्याश्रयणात् अतिप्रसङ्गो(? ॰गे) भिन्नकालेभ्यो व्यक्त्यन्तरेभ्यः आकृते[र]वच्छेदकं स्यात्, व्यक्तिविवक्षायां वा भिन्नकालवदितरेष्वाश्रितेषु विशेषेषु, गुणान्तरयुक्तेषु व्यक्त्यन्तरेषु प्राप्त्यर्थमपि चेदमुपपद्यते। आकृतौ तावत् यत्नाधिक्यादेव ह्रस्वानां सिद्धा निवृत्तिः। प्लुतानां चेष्यते। एवं ह्यनिष्टार्थं तपरकरणमापद्यते। व्यक्तावप्यनङादीनां स्वशब्देनोपात्तवचनादुच्चारणेनाश्रितानामप्यभेदकत्वं साधितमुदात्तादीनामित्यत आह – **किमर्थमीदादीनां तपराणां प्रगृह्यसंज्ञोच्यते**। व्यक्तिविवक्षायां(? ॰क्षाम्) आश्रित्य भेदका एवोदात्तादय इत्याह – **तपरस्तत्कालस्य** (पा. १.१.७०) **इति तत्कालानां सवर्णानां ग्रहणं यथा स्यात्**। कथं पुनर्भेदकत्वमुदात्तादीनां यावतानङादीनामुदात्तवचनमभेदकत्वे ज्ञापकमुक्तम् चूर्णिकारेण ? तदुक्तं वार्त्तिककारेण "आकारस्य तपरकरणं सवर्णार्थं भेदकत्वात् स्वरस्य" इति (पा. १. १. १ वा. १३)। "अणुसवर्णस्येति स्वरानुनासिक्यकालभेदात्" इति (पा. १. १. ६९ वा. १) उक्तवतो भेदकत्वमेवाभिप्रेतम्। सूत्रकारस्य च सवर्णेऽण्ग्रहणात् स्वस्वरासङ्गाच्च भेदकत्वमप्यस्तीत्यनुमीयते। अनङादीनां तूदात्तानामाकृतिविवक्षायां स्यादिति अलिङ्गत्वमपि शक्यं गमयितुम्। **केषाम्**। अ[यम]भिप्रायः। नहि क्रियमाणे तपरत्वे कालान्तरयुक्त[स]वर्णान्तरप्रतिपत्तिरस्ति तत्कालस्येति वचनादिति। **उदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितानाम्**। अनुनासिकग्रहणमप्यन्येषां विद्यते। न त्वीदादयोऽनुनासिकाः संभवन्ति प्रगृह्यसंज्ञाविषयस्यानुनासिक्यस्य प्रतिषेधवचनादिति प्रसङ्गोच्चारितमेतत्॥

[२] **प्लुतानां तु प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा न प्राप्नोति**। नायं तपरकरणाद्दोषः। कुतस्तर्हि ? व्यक्तिपदार्थाभ्युपगमात्। **असिद्धः प्लुतः। तस्यासिद्धत्वात् तत्काला एव भवन्ति**।

ननु च प्लुतस्यासिद्धत्वात् त्रिमात्रता न स्यात्। तत्कालता तु पूर्वमेव निवर्तितत्वात् असती कथं पुनर्भवति ? नैष दोषः। शास्त्रासिद्धत्वविज्ञानात्। अनिवृत्तौ च तत्कालता विज्ञायते। शास्त्रनिमित्ता शब्देषु प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिबुद्धिः प्रतिपादकस्य शास्त्रस्याभावे प्राक्तेनैव प्रतिपाद्यरूपेणावतिष्ठते। प्राक्चादेशवचनादसिद्धशास्त्रेऽप्रवृत्ते स्थानी चानिवृत्तः आदेशश्चानुपजात इति प्रवृत्तमपि शास्त्रं यदा वचनादसिद्धतामापद्यते तदा तद्व्यापारसाध्ये लक्ष्ये विपर्ययेण बुद्धिः प्रवर्तमाना पुनरपि स्थानिनं च सत्त्वेनाश्रयति, आदेशं चासत्त्वेन। तथा च वक्ष्यति – मात् प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायां तस्यासिद्धत्वादयावेकादेशप्रसङ्गदोषो नोपपद्यते।

ननु चानिर्वृत्ते कार्ये यदा स्वार्थाभिनिर्वृत्त्यर्था शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिस्तदा शास्त्रं शास्त्रात्मनि प्रतिपादकत्वे व्यवस्थितमसिद्धं विज्ञायेत। शास्त्रप्रवृत्त्युत्तरकालं तु प्रतिपन्ने शास्त्रार्थे चरितार्थत्वादेव स्वभावतो निवृत्तं शास्त्रं कथं शक्यं वचनेनासिद्धं विज्ञातुम् ? कार्यं तदानीं विद्यत इति कार्यासिद्धत्वमाश्रयितुं युक्तम्। तथा च स्थान्यभावात् तत्कालत्वं न विद्यत इति। नैष दोषः। स्वमर्थं प्रतिपाद्य निवृत्तेऽपि शास्त्रे यदा तत् सिद्धत्वेनाश्रीयते, तदा शास्त्रप्रतिपादितमित्येवमवश्यं तदाश्रयितव्यम्। अन्तरेण हि शास्त्रानुगममयावादीनामपि साधुत्वमविशिष्टमिति न तेषामाश्रयः। एवं चेद्यथैव शास्त्रप्रवृत्त्यवस्थायामसिद्धत्वे शास्त्रस्य विज्ञायमाने निमित्ताभावात् शास्त्रकार्ये बुद्धिः निवर्तते, एवं यदा यदा शास्त्रानुगम्यत्वेन कार्यमपेक्ष्यते तदा तदा शास्त्रमप्यपेक्ष्यत इति युक्तं तस्यासिद्धत्वमाश्रयितुम्। अतः प्लुते विहिते प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायां विधीयमानायां प्लुतस्य प्रतिपादकं शास्त्रं यदापेक्ष्यते तदा तस्यासिद्धत्वात् अविहित इव प्लुते स्थानिरूपमव्यावृत्तमिति तत् [का]लत्वात् सिद्धा प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा ॥

[३] सिद्धः प्लुतः.... यदयं.... प्लुतस्य प्रकृतिभावं शास्ति। न चासति प्रकृतिभावे, असिद्धत्वे प्लुतस्य, [प्लुतस्य] स्वरसंधिः प्राप्नोति। तत्रावश्यं प्रकृतिभावो वक्तव्यः। न ब्रूमः प्रकृतिभावार्थो यत्नः कर्तव्य इति। असिद्धत्वात्तु पुनः "[प्लुतः] प्रकृत्ये"त्येवमाश्रयो नोपपद्यते, आद्रि(? °श्री) यते च। तस्मात् नूनं सिद्धः प्लुत इति संनिधानमनुमीयते।

ननु च यद्विषयं सिद्धत्वमन्तरेण प्लुतस्य कार्यविधानमनुपपन्नं तद्विषयमेवावश्यं सांनिध्यं शक्यमनुमातुम्। तेन प्रकृतिभाव एव प्लुतः सिद्धः स्यात्। न स्वरसंधिमात्रे। तथा च वक्ष्यति— "आश्रयात् सिद्धत्वं च यथा रोरुत्वे" (पा. १,

१.१२ वा. ४) इति। सत्यमेवम्, एवमेतावदिह त्रयः कल्पाः संभवन्ति, प्र[कृ]तिभावविषयं वा प्लुतस्य सिद्धत्वानुमानं, स्वरसन्धिप्रकरणविषयं वा, प्लुतभाविन एव स्थानिनः प्रकृतिभावो विज्ञायेतेति । अनुमानपक्षेऽपि वाक्येऽनुमीयमाने एकयोगसिद्धत्वविष[यं] वा वाक्यमनुमीयते, प्रकरणसिद्धत्वविषयं वा। विशेषदृष्टं चैव ह्यनुमानमस्ति सामान्यतोदृष्टं [च]। उभयथा प्लुतसंबन्धस्य मुख्यादभिधेयादप्रच्युतिः। एष विशेषः — एकयोगविषयत्वे नान्तरीयक एवार्थोऽनुमितो भवति। प्राकरणिके तु लिङ्गे यद्यप्यान्तरीयकस्य सामान्यवदनुमानं तथापि व्याप्तिराश्रिता भवति। प्लुतभावी इति तु विज्ञायमाने यद्यप्यमुख्येऽर्थे प्लुतशब्दस्य वृत्तिः तथापि न क्वचिदश्रुतमनुमातव्यं भवति। तदिह सामान्यतोदृष्टं लिङ्गमाश्रित्य प्रकरणविषयं वाक्यमनुमीयते “सिद्धः प्लुतः स्वरसन्धिषु” इति। लघुत्वमपि चास्यां कल्पनायामित्येतद्दर्शयति **“अप्लुतादप्लुत” इत्येतन्न वक्तव्यं भवति।** सिद्धे हि प्लुते अतत्कालत्वादुत्त्वे प्लुतस्य निमित्तत्वं न भविष्यति इति यथोद्देशं संज्ञापरिभाषमित्याह— **किमतो यत् सिद्धः प्लुतः स्वरसंधिषु?** नायं स्वरसंधिः, प्रकरणान्तरे हीयं प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा विधीयते इति ॥

[४] संज्ञाविधौ च सिद्धः। कथम्? कार्यकालं संज्ञापरिभाषमिति। कार्यप्रयुक्ता संज्ञाप्रवृत्तिरिति। कार्ये गुणभावमन्तरेण संज्ञायाः स्वार्थलाभो न विद्यते। भवतिपचतीत्येवमादिषु यद्यकारादीनां अजादिसंज्ञा न स्युः न किंचिदुष्येत। न चान्तरेण प्रयोजनं शास्त्रं प्रवर्तितुमर्हति इति नात्राजादिसंज्ञा भवन्ति। कार्यतन्त्राणामपि तु संज्ञानां भिन्नप्रदेशेषु बहुषु प्रधानेष्वङ्गभावप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं केनचिदसंयुक्ताः प्रकरणोत्कर्षेण सर्वार्थाः संज्ञा विधीयन्ते। अस्यास्तु प्रदेशविषय एवात्मलाभः। तेनान्यत्रापि पठ्यमाना प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा स्वरसंधिप्रकरणसंनिवेशिनी विज्ञायते। क्वचिद्विशेषाभावात् पृच्छति – **किं पुनः प्लुतस्य प्रगृह्यसंज्ञावचने प्रयोजनम्?** यत्र विशेषस्तमधिकृत्याह— **प्रगृह्याश्रयः प्रकृतिभावो यथा स्यात्।** पूर्वाभिप्रेतमेव क्वचिदविशेषं दर्शयति - **मा भूदेवम्** प्रगृह्यः प्रकृत्येति। **प्लुतः प्रकृत्येत्येवं भविष्यति।** न प्रकृतिभावे कश्चिद् विशेषः। यत्र प्लुताश्रयः प्रकृतिभावः निषिध्यते तत्रावश्यं प्रगृह्याश्रयः प्रकृतिभावः एषितव्य [इ]त्याह— **नैवं शक्यम्। उपस्थिते हि दोषः स्यात्।** अग्नी३इति। “अप्लुतवदुपस्थिते” (पा. ६.१.१२९) इति प्लुताश्रये प्रकृतिभावे प्रतिषिद्धे यदि प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा न स्यात् प्रगृह्याश्रयोऽपि प्रकृतिभावो नास्ति इति स्वरसंधिः प्रसज्येत। सत्यां तु प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायां प्रतिषिद्धे प्लुताश्रये

प्रगृह्याश्रयः प्रकृतिभावो भवति। तत्रैतत् स्यात् नैवात्रेष्यते प्रकृतिभाव इति तदर्थमाह– **पठिष्यति ह्याचार्यः। "वद्वचनं प्लुतकार्यप्रतिषेधार्थम्" "प्लुतप्रतिषेधे हि प्रगृह्यप्लुतप्रतिषेधप्रसङ्गोऽन्येन विहितत्वात्"** (पा. ६. १. १२९ वा. १, २) **इति**। यदि प्लुत एव प्रतिषिध्येत योऽपि प्रगृह्यः प्लुतः तस्यापि त्रिमात्रतायां निवृत्तायां द्विमात्रस्य श्रवणं स्यात्। प्लुताश्रये तु प्रकृतिभावे प्रतिषिद्धे य एवाप्रगृह्यः प्लुतस्तस्यैव स्वरसंधिर्भवति देवदत्ता३ इति देवदत्तेति। यस्तु प्रगृह्यस्तस्य प्लुतकार्ये प्रतिषिद्धेऽपि प्रगृह्याश्रये प्रकृतिभावे कृते त्रिमात्रश्रुतिरुपपन्ना भवति। तस्मादस्ति प्रयोजनं प्लुतस्य प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायाम्। सा च व्यक्तिपदार्थाभ्युपगमान्न प्राप्नोति॥

[५] यदि पुनर्दीर्घाणां [अ]तपराणां प्रगृह्यसंज्ञोच्येत। किं पुनरयं तपरत्वा[द्] दोष आगतो यत उच्यते – यदि पुनर्दीर्घाणामिति ? व्यक्तिपदार्थाभ्युपगमात्त्वयं दोषः। तत्र केचिदाहुः— एतदेवायमाह। परित्यज्य व्यक्तिं यद्याकृतौ पदार्थे दीर्घ उच्येत, यत्नाधिक्यात् ह्रस्वेष्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात् प्लुतस्य च स्यात् प्रगृह्यत्वं, तथा प्रतुय (? च ह्र)स्वनिवर्तकं(? °नं) स्यात् इत्यतपराणामित्याह। इतरस्तु व्यक्तावेव पदार्थे परेणेदमुक्तमित्याह – **एवमप्येकार [एव] एकः सवर्णा[न्] गृह्णीयात्। न त्वीकारोकारौ गृह्णीयाताम्। अनण्त्वात्** इति। अथ वा व्यक्तावेव पदार्थे कस्यचित् तावदस्ति सवर्णग्रहणं सामर्थ्यादित्याह 'यदि पुनर्' इति। इतर एवमपि कश्चिद्दोषो [न] निवर्तत इत्याह एवमपीति। अपर आह– दीर्घाणामपि "अणोऽप्रगृह्यस्य...." (पा. ८. ४. ५७) इत्येवमादिषु अच्कार्याणि दृष्टानि। तस्मात् तत् (? अण्) सवर्णस्य इत्यत्रापि तथैव भवितुमर्हति इत्युक्तं 'यदि पुनर्दीर्घाणामतपराणाम्' इति। अन्यत्राप्य[ण्]सवर्णस्येति अनेन दीर्घाः कार्याणि लभन्ते। ग्रहणशास्त्रे यदण्ग्रहणं तत्र नान्यत् ग्रहणशास्त्रमस्ति। तस्यैव चाण्ग्रहणस्य स्वात्मनि वृत्तिरयुक्ता। अन्तरेण चाण्ग्रहणं यत् परिशिष्टं तदपरिसमाप्तार्थत्वात् ग्रहणं प्रत्यसमर्थमित्याह– 'एवमप्येकार एक' इति। **यदि पुनर्ह्रस्वानाम्** .... इति। तपरत्वे अग्नी वायू इत्यत्र न स्यात्। अतपरत्वात् पुनः व्यक्तावपि पदार्थे 'अण् सवर्णान् गृह्णाति' इति दीर्घाणां प्लुतानां च सिद्धा प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा। ह्रस्वस्यापि तु प्राप्नोति। कथं पुनरत्र बहुवचनम्? केचिद्विरूपैकशेषमाहुः 'प्रथमयोर्' इति (पा. ६. १. १०२; ७. १. २८) यथा। उदाहरणभेदात् भेदमन्ये ब्रुवन्ति॥

[६] एवं तर्हि किं न एतेन [यत्नेन यत्] सिद्धः प्लुतः [स्वरसंधिषु] इति? कथं यत् [तत्] ज्ञापकमुक्तम्? ज्ञापकमन्यथा समर्थ्यते— प्लुतं

प्राप्नोतीति प्लुतभावी, प्लुतो भावी अस्येति वा। प्लुतभावेन (? °भाविनः)। स्थानिन एव प्रकृतिभावः। अस्यां कल्पनायाम् [अश्रुतं वाक्यं नानुमेयं भवति। असिद्धपरि]भाषायाश्चाबाधया [प्र]कृतिभावशास्त्रकल्पनया च द्वयमनुगृहीतं भवति। गुणशब्दकल्पनायाश्चैतदेव लिङ्गं, यदयम् " अप्लुतादप्लुत " इति प्रतिषेधं शास्ति। ननु च स्थानिनः प्लुतामपित्व(? प्लुतभावित्व)माश्रय[स्]तावत् उ(? अ)पेक्षितः। तस्य चासिद्धत्वादसतोऽपेक्षा न युज्यते। तत्र समाहुः – इह क्वचित् शास्त्रनिमित्तकेषु शब्देषु बुद्ध्या व्यवह्रियते, क्वचित् लौकिकं दर्शनमाश्रीयते। तथाहीतरेतराश्रयदोषस्तत्र तत्र परिह्रियते। "सिद्धं तु नित्यशब्दत्वात्" (पा १.१.१ वा. ९)। न हि वृद्धिसंज्ञयादैचो भाव्यन्ते, सतामादैचां साधक(? साधु)त्वमात्रमन्वाख्यायत इति असत्येव हि प्रतिपादके लक्षणे तेषां साध्य(? साधु)त्वमाश्रीयते। एवं कृत्वा "लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तयोर्" इत्येतत् स्यात्। क्वचित् अनाश्रयणं भवति। शास्त्रनिरपेक्षायां शब्दप्रवृत्तौ न किंचित् लक्षणोक्तं न प्रतिपदोक्तमस्ति। ननु च लोके स्थान्यादेश[भावा]भावात् प्लुतभावित्वमनुपपन्नम्। नैष दोषः। लोकेऽपि हि विषयाविषयभावः परिच्छिद्यते, स्वविषये अयं भवतीति। तथा चोक्तम्– "इजादियजादि[प्रवृत्ति]श्चैव हि लोके लक्ष्यत" इत्येवमादि। अनन्तरमेव च वक्ष्यति– "मार्थादीदाचर्थानाम्" इति। एतस्यां तु कल्पनायां भाविगतिविज्ञानमनर्थकं सांप्रतिकत्वमपि हि लौकिकदर्शने शक्यमाश्रयितुम्। को वा विशेषः, यदुपलक्षणार्थमाश्रितस्य प्लुतस्य सत्त्वं गृह्येत न कार्यिणः? तत्र केचिदाहुः —— सत्यं, वर्तमानत्वमपि संभवति भावित्वमपि। भावित्वं त्विहाश्रितं इति तन्न युक्तम्। सांप्रतिकाभावे हि सर्वत्र भावित्वमाश्रीयते। अपि चान्य एव पक्षः संभवति—— "यथोद्देशं संज्ञापरिभाषम्" आश्रयितव्यमिति॥

[७] एवमपि यत् सिद्धे प्रगृह्यसंज्ञाकार्यं तत् [प्लुतस्य] न सिध्यति, कार्यकाले हि संज्ञापरिभाषे। अनुनासिकपर्युदासदेशायां प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायां सिद्धः प्लुतः। तत्र त्रिमात्रा(? °त्र)त्वात् प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायामसत्यां अग्नी ३ इत्यत्रानुनासिकपर्युदासो न प्राप्नोति। **एवं तर्हि किं न एतेन [कार्य]कालं [संज्ञापरिभाषम्] इति। यथोद्देशमेव** भविष्यति। कथं पुनरि[द]मभ्युपगममात्रेण शक्यं लब्धुम्? तत्र केचिदाहुः — इहान्तरेण गुणं [प्रधानानि] संबन्धं प्रतिपद्यन्ते। उपकारभेदाच्च प्रधानानां द्वयी प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा। कदाचित् राजा हर्म्यो[? °स्त्या]दिदेश[मु]पाश्लिष्यति, कदाचित् हर्म्या*[? °स्त्या]दयो राजदेशमुपनीयन्ते। तत्र यदा स्वकाला[व]स्थिते संज्ञापरिभाषे गुणकालं कार्याण्युपनिपतन्ति, तदा प्रधानमपि गुणदेशवर्ति स्वकार्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं भवति*

यथा [यथा]निमित्तमुदकदेशगमनम्। तत्र यदा गुणदेशवर्ति प्रधानं तदा यथोद्देशत्वम्। यदा तु भिन्नेषु अङ्गभावप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमभिप्रे[तस्य] केनचित् प्रधा[ने]नासंयुक्तस्य सत्यामपि नानावाक्यविधेयतायां लब्ध्वर्थं भेदपरित्यागे सामान्याश्रयणलब्धेनाभेदकल्पे च (°त्वेन) तत्तदुपदेशे प्रकरणोत्कर्षेण क्रियमाणे प्रधानवियुक्तस्य [संज्ञापरिभाषस्य] स्वकालानुरोधेन [न] किंचित् कार्यमस्ति, यतः कस्यांचिदवस्थायामस्वातन्त्र्येणाश्रयणमर्हेदत औत्पत्तिकेनार्थव्यापारक्रमेण प्रधानगामित्वं, [तदा] प्रधानवाक्येनाविभागापत्तौ कार्यकालत्वम्॥

[८] अन्ये त्वन्यथैतत् द्वैतं समर्थयन्ते। अनेकप्रधानविषयेषु हि गुणेषु प्रतिप्रधानं च भे[दे]न प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा स्रगनुलेपनादिषु, अभेदेन च.... प्रतिपादि[ते]षु [गुणेषु] तु....। तत्र प्रतिप्रधानं भेदकल्पनायां स्वकालादप्रच्युतानामेव प्रधानानामनुग्रहे संभवति कार्यकालत्वम्। अभेदप्रवृत्तौ त्वसंभवो यदेकेन गुणेनानेकं प्रधा[नं] स्वस्मिन् काले व्यवस्थितमपि सम्बन्धं यायादिति। गुणे स्वात्मन्यवस्थिते विशिष्टेनात्मसंस्कारेणाधीने [सति] प्रधानानि युगपत् गुणकालमनुपतन्ति [इति] यथोद्देशरूप[तास्तु]। द्वयमपि नोपपद्यते। एवं हि वक्ष्यति— "यदि सपादायां सप्ताध्याय्यां पादो[नो]ऽध्यायोऽसिद्धो य इह पञ्चमीनिर्देशाः सप्तमीनिर्देशाश्च" तेषामसिद्धत्वात् 'तस्मिन्निति निर्दिष्टे पूर्वस्य' 'तस्मादित्युत्तरस्य'" इत्येष नियमो न प्राप्नोति। "नैष दोषः। यद्यपीदं तत्रासिद्धं तत्त्विह सिद्धम्। कथम्। कार्यकालं हि संज्ञापरिभाषम्" इति। तत्र यथैव कार्यकालानां गुणानां एकवाक्यभावे पूर्वपरव्यपदेशहानेन (? °ना)पृथक्कार्यत्वाच्चेदमस्मिन् सिद्धमित्येतत् [न] विद्यते, एवं गुणदेशत्वे प्रधानानामेकवाक्यभावे पूर्वपरव्यपदेशविधिर् [न] विज्ञायते॥

[९] एवमुभयस्मिन् दोषं परिकल्प्य दोषान्तरप्रयोजनांप(? °प्रदर्शनापे)क्षायां प्रश्नः। [अ] **ईदादयो द्विवचनं प्रगृह्या इति चेदन्त्यस्य विधिः** (वा. १)। ईदन्तादेः **पचेते इति**। योऽत्रेदादिर्न तद् द्विवचनम्। नैव कश्चिदेकारो द्विवचनमस्तीति मन्यमान आह— **वचनाद् भविष्यति**। द्विवचनावयवे द्विवचनशब्दो वर्तते इत्यभिप्रायः। यथा 'लिङ्सिचौ' इत्यत्रात्मनेपदावयवे आत्मनेपदमिति व्यपदिश्यते 'लिङः सीयुड्' (पा. ३. ४. १०२) इति। **अस्ति वचने प्रयोजनम्। [किम्]। खट्वे इति**। यद्यप्येतत् न मुख्यं द्विवचनं, तथाप्यत्रादिवद्भात्रेनास्ति द्विवचनव्यपदेश इति। त्रपुणी जतुनी इत्यादौ तु पूर्वभक्तत्वात् नुमः मुख्यमेव द्विवचनमितिं नोपन्यस्तम्। [आ] **ईदाद्यन्तामिति चेदेकस्य विधिः**।

(वा २) **खट्वे इति ।** ईदूतोः केवलयोरेव संभव इति न तावदाश्रीयते । कथं पुनरनन्यार्थमारभ्यमाणा आद्यन्तवत्परिभाषा नाश्रिता ? उच्यते । नावश्यं ग्रन्थगौरवमेव गौरवं भवति । किं तर्हि ? प्रतिपत्ति[गौरवं, प्रक्रिया-] गौरवमपि । तदेतस्मिन् पक्षेऽयमेव दोष उपादीयते प्रक्रियागौरवमभ्युपगन्तव्यं भवतीति । इतरस्तु यद्यन्यः प्रकारोऽस्ति निर्दोष एवं प्रक्रियागौरवं शक्यमनभ्युपगन्तुं, न त्वत्रास्ति अन्यः प्रकार इति तमाश्रयति **' न वाद्यन्तवत्त्वात् '** इति (वा. ३)

[इ] एतदपि तु नाश्रयिष्यामीत्याह— **अथवैवं वक्ष्यामि । ईदाद्यन्तं यद् द्विवचनान्तमिति ।** ननु च ' संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्तविधिर्नास्ति ' इति । सत्यम्, संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्तविधिः प्रतिषिध्यते । न त्विह द्विवचनं संज्ञित्वेनाश्रीयते, किं तर्हि ? ईदाद्यन्तम्, तद्विशेषणं द्विवचनं, ईदाद्यन्तं प्रगृह्यसंज्ञं भवति तच्चेद् द्विवचनान्तमिति । कथं पुनः श्रुत्या प्रकरणेन वा कार्यिणः संनिधानमन्तरेणेदादिभिस्तदन्तविधिः ? [न क]चिदस्ति । पूर्वस्तर्हि पक्षो नोपपद्यत ईदादयो द्विवचनमिति । केचिदाहुः – कार्यकालं हि संज्ञापरिभाषं यथो[द्दे]शं च । तत्र का[र्यका]ले पदाधिकारे प्रगृह्यसंज्ञाव्यापारात् पदं कार्यित्वेन संनिहितम् । तत्र यथा ' ष्यङः संप्रसारणम् ' (पा. ६. १. १३) इति सामर्थ्यलभ्यसंनियोगं पूर्वपदं कार्यित्वेनाश्रीयते, एवं पदस्य कार्यिणः ईदादिभिः तदन्तविधिरिति । यथोद्देशतायां तु प्रगृह्यकार्येषु अनपेक्षितेषु प्रधानं कार्यि[प]दं कार्यित्वे[न] नाश्रीयते । एवं पदस्य कार्यिणोऽभावात् यथाश्रुतपरिकल्पना । अथ वा कार्यकाल एव सतीदादीनां प्राधान्यात् तदन्तविध्यभावः, न त्विदमुपपद्यते । ' यथोद्देशं हि संज्ञापरिभाषम् ' अभ्युपगतम् । एवं तर्हि पूर्वं द्विवचनेन तदन्तविधिः ' प्रत्ययग्रहणे यस्मात् स विहित ' इति । न ह्यत्रावश्यं कार्यिणः सं[नि]धानमपेक्ष्यते । ततो द्विवचनान्तस्य संज्ञिनः ईदादिभिस्तदन्तविधिः । न हीदाद्यन्तं द्विवचनान्तमिति अयमुच्चारक्रमस्तन्त्रम् । द्विवचनान्तमीदाद्यन्तमेतद् भवति । एवं तु सति प्रत्ययरूपेण संज्ञिन आश्रयात् तदन्तविधिरप्यवसितो दर्शनमात्रात्, एवमिहापि । दृष्टो हि प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञायां तदन्तविधिः " कृत्तद्धितसमासाश्च " (पा. १. २. ४६) इति । चतुर्थ एव पक्षे तदन्तविध्यनुपपत्तिरुक्ता । सा इहापि द्रष्टव्या । दोषान्तरेण वा निवृत्ते(? त्तेर्) विहितत्वात् अयं दोषो नाभिहितः । **ईदाद्यन्तं ...... चेत् लुकि प्रतिषेधः ।** कथं पुनर्द्विवचनान्तस्य समासः, यावता " संख्याविशेषो व्यक्ताभिधानमुपसर्जनविशेषणं चयोग " इत्येकार्थीभावकृता विशेषा वर्णिताः ? तथा च " द्विवचनबहुवचनान्तानामसमास " इत्युक्तम् । तत्र केचिदाहुः — लुकेयम-

न्वाख्याता विभक्तिरिष्यते। न च सतः शब्दस्य लुकान्वाख्यानममस्ति। तत्र वाक्ये दृष्टस्य द्विवचनस्य वृत्तिविषये संख्याविशेषपरित्यागात्, यैवासौ स्वाभाविकी निवृत्तिः सा लुक्व्यापारेणान्वाख्यायते। तथा चाह– "अव्ययादापो लुग्वचना[न]र्थक्यं लिङ्गाभावात्। (पा. २.४.८२ वा. १)। किं पुनः कारणं भवानापो लुग्वचनं न मृष्यति, विभक्तेर्मृष्यति ? अस्त्यत्र विशेषः। प्रत्ययलक्षणमाचार्यः प्रार्थयमानो विभक्तेर्लुकमारभत " इत्युक्तम्। उभयं हि स्वभावतो निवर्तते। यस्य तु निवृत्तत्वाख्याने प्रयोजनमस्ति तस्य निवृत्तिराख्यायते इति। तत्तु न युक्तं प्रसङ्गाभावात्। प्रसक्तादर्शनं हि लोपसंज्ञम्। यत्तु समासार्थवाक्यं लोकेऽव्यक्तमदृष्टप्रयोगं समासस्य प्रतिपादकं तत्रैकार्थीभावविषये स्वार्थमात्रोपयोगिषूपसर्जनेषु स्वभेदेनानर्थिषु व्यपदेशार्थमभेदेनैकत्वसंख्यायामाश्रितायां भेदसंख्याविषयाणां वचनानामप्रसङ्गो मेतव (? भवेत्) यत् एकार्थीभावविषयाण्युपसर्जनपदानि अनाश्रितभेदसंख्यानि स्वपदार्थमात्रोपकारीणि विज्ञायन्ते। शब्दान्तरोपसंहितानां तूपसर्जनानां सत्यपि प्रधानार्थास्कन्दे संख्याविशेषव्यक्तावनिवृत्तायामेव सामर्थ्यात् [द्वि]शौर्पिकादिषु मूल्यपरिमाणावधारणार्थो हि द्विशब्दप्रयोगः संख्याविशेषस्यानाश्रये न स्यात्। न च प्रयोगनिमित्तापाकरणं युक्तम्। एवं मासजाते प्रयोगविशेषसंप्रत्ययः। गोषुचरेऽनवयवद्रव्यसंयोगार्थं विभक्त्युपादानम्। प्रत्याख्यानपक्षे 'जात्याख्यायाम्०' (पा. १. २. ५८) इत्येकवचनम्। व्यवस्थितविभाषया हि गविष्ठिर एकवचनमेव दृश्यते। वर्षासुजे रूढिशब्दसंप्रत्ययः। द्विपुत्र उभयभार्य इति पूर्वपदोपादानसामर्थ्यात्। तथा हि [प्र]त्य[य] एव तस्य स्वार्थः। तथा वृद्धिनिमित्तादिषु निमित्तशब्दोपादानसामर्थ्यं यथासंभवं द्रष्टव्यम्। तथा शब्दान्तरोपसंधानादव्यक्तविशेषेऽप्युपसर्जने संख्याविशेषोपादानसामर्थ्यं दृष्टम्। तद्यथा। गार्ग्यकुलादिषु प्रत्ययस्य भावाभावाभ्यां भेदव्यक्तिः। गोदौ वरणा इत्यतिदेशभाजिविकारदर्शनात्। यौष्माकस्तावकौ युष्मत्पुत्रः इत्यादेशरूपात्। तत्र कुमार्यगारेऽपि प्रकृतिभाव एव द्विवचनकार्यं संख्याविशेषोपादानव्यक्तिनि[मि]त्तं स्यात्। एतस्यां कल्पनायां राजपुरुषादिषु विशेषवाचिनः शब्दस्याभावात् विशेषो न [ग]म्यते। दास्याःपुत्रादिषु चैकवचनसंनिधानादेकत्वं गम्यते इत्यापन्नम्। तत्रैकार्थीभावकृतश्चायं संख्याविशेष इत्येतन्नोपपद्यते। यच्चोक्तं "ननु च नैतेनैवं हि [भवि]तव्यम्। न हि शब्दनिमित्तकेन नामार्थेन भवितव्यम्, अर्थनिमित्तकेन शब्देन भवितव्यम्। तदेवं दृश्यतामर्थरूपमेवैतदेवंजातीयकं येनात्र विशेषो न गम्यत इति। अवश्यं चैतदेवं विज्ञेयम्। यो हि मन्यते योऽसौ विशेषवाची शब्दस्तदसांनिध्यादत्र विशेषो न गम्यत इति" इह

तस्य विशेषो गम्येत -— अप्सुचरो [गोषुचरो] वर्षासुज इति। तत् विप्रतिषिध्यते। तस्मान्न शब्दविशेषकृते संख्यायाः परित्यागोपादाने, एकार्थीभावकृत एवायं विशेषः। तदेतत् समर्थवार्त्तिके एव निर्णेष्यते। **सप्तम्यामर्थग्रहणं (तु) ज्ञापकं...।** सप्तमीत्येव श्रूयमाणायाम्, लुका लुप्तायां तु प्रत्ययलक्षणेन सिद्धेऽर्थग्रहणं प्रगृह्यप्रकरणे प्रत्ययलक्षण-निवृत्त्यर्थम्। **एतर्त्तर्हि ज्ञापकार्थमर्थग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्।** आद्यन्तवत्परिभाषां चान्यार्थां सतीं मा शिश्रियमित्ययं पक्ष आश्रितः। तत्राकर्तव्य[प्र]क्रियाभ्युपगमो न युक्त इति।

[ई] एवं तर्हि **ईदादिभिर्द्विवचनं विशेषयिष्यामः।** तृतीये पक्षे ईदादीनां द्विवचनस्य च परस्परम[न]भिसंबन्धे समुदायं प्रति संनिपातः। इह तु प्राक् समुदाय-संबन्धादीदादिभिर्द्विवचनं विशेष्यते। ततो लब्धे तदन्तविधा[वी]दाद्यन्ततया **विशब्दे-[? विशिष्टे]न द्विवचनेन** समुदायः संबध्यते। 'प्रत्ययग्रहण' इति च द्वितीयस्तदन्त-विधिर्भवति। यद्येवम्, ईदादीनां समुदायेन साक्षात् संबन्धाभावात् **तदन्तमीदाद्यन्त-मिति** ईदादिभिः संबन्धप्रदर्शनं समुदायस्य नोपपद्यते। नैष दोषः। आक्षिप्ततदन्त-विधित्वादीदादिशब्दस्येदाद्यन्त[त्व]मेव प्रतिनिर्दिशति। तत्र यावदुक्तं स्यादीदादीति तावदीदाद्यन्तमिति। **एवमप्यशुक्ले वस्त्रे शुक्ले समपद्येतां शुक्ल्यास्तां वस्त्रे इत्यत्र प्राप्नोति।** कुमार्यगारे हि यद् द्विवचनम् 'ओस्' इति न तदीदाद्यन्तमिति, इह तु शुक्लशब्दात् सुबन्तात् च्विः, सुप्लुक्, ततः च्विलोपः, 'अस्य च्वौ' (पा. ७. ४. ३२) इति ईत्वं, तद्धितादव्ययादेकवचनं, तस्य 'अव्ययात्...' (पा. २.४.८२) इति लुक्, तत्र विभक्त्यादेश ईकारस्तेनेदाद्यन्तद्विवचनान्त एष समुदायः प्रत्ययलक्षणेन भवति। यस्त्वयमीकारः श्रूयते यणादेशप्राप्तिप्रदर्शनार्थमयमुदाह्रियते। तत्र येषां तावद् ग्रन्थः 'तत्र हि ईदादि च द्विवचनं, तदन्तं च भवति प्रत्ययलक्षणेन' इति, तेषामी-दाद्यन्तमीदादिशब्देनाभिधीयते इति द्रष्टव्यम्। ईदाद्यन्तं द्विवचनान्तमित्यर्थः। येषां तु ग्रन्थः 'अत्र हि ईदाद्यन्तं श्रूयते, द्विवचनान्तं च भवति प्रत्ययलक्षणेन' इति, तेषां यद्यपि ईदाद्यन्तस्य संप्रति श्रुतिर्न विद्यते, तथापि वाक्यशेषसमर्थनाददोषः। ईदाद्यन्तं च श्रूयते सूत्रे 'ईदादि द्विवचनम्' इति, ईदादिभिर्द्विवचनस्य सूत्रे तदन्तविधिर्नाश्रित इत्यर्थः। यश्चार्थः सूत्रे स एवं परिगृहीतः, तस्यानेन ग्रन्थेनोदाहरणे समवायं दर्शयति — 'द्विवचनान्तं च भवति प्रत्ययलक्षणेन'। अन्ये तु द्वयोः पक्षयोरिमं दोषनिमित्तोप-संहारमाहुः "एतद्धि ईदाद्यन्तं च श्रूयते"। कुमार्यगारमित्यत्र एव तृतीये पक्षे दोषः 'द्विवचनान्तं च भवति प्रत्ययलक्षणेन'। चतुर्थे पक्षे इह 'शुक्ल्यास्ताम्' इति

विशिष्टं दोषं प्रतिज्ञाय तदुपपत्त्य[न]भिधानादकृते शीभावे ईकारान्ततायामनुपजातायां [पू]र्वो लुग् भविष्यतीत्याह – **इदमिह संप्रधार्यम्** इति । ... **कृतेऽपि शीभावे लुक् प्राप्नोति, अकृतेऽपि** । न तु लुकि कृते शीभावस्य प्राप्तिरस्ति स्थानिनोऽभावात् । स्थानिवद्भावो [ह्ये]वंप्रकारेषु नास्ति । यद्यपि भूयिष्ठानि लोप एव स्थानिवद्भावोदाहरणानि, एवमपि यत्र तन्निमित्तमन्यस्य कार्यं तत्र स्थानिवद्भावो, न तु लोपस्यैव कार्यम् । " अन्तरङ्गमपि विधिं बहिरङ्गो लुक् बाधते " इति त्वन्तरङ्गत्वं शीभावस्य नोपन्यस्तम् । **अथापि कथंचित् नित्यो लुक् स्यात्** । यदि लक्षणमनपेक्षितविषयं (? °विशेषं) बाध्यते [इ]त्येष पक्षः, कार्यबाधापेक्षायां वा यदि भेदान् परित्यज्य [आ]कृतिविषये शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिः, एवं सत्यपि स्थान्यादेशभेदे सुप्जातिरविशिष्टेति तस्यैव लुग्विधानात् नित्यत्वम् । **एवमपि दोषः । वक्ष्यत्येतद्** इति । ननु चोक्तं कृत्तद्धितान्तं प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञायामाश्रयणीयमिति । सत्यम् । एवमेतत् । पक्षस्तु क्रियते– अर्थवद्ग्रहणानुवृत्तेरिदमेव प्रयोजनं लौकिकस्यार्थस्य प्रत्यासन्नता यथाश्रीयेतेति । अपि च, ईदाद्यन्तं द्विवचनमित्येष पक्षः आद्यन्तवद्भावं मा शिश्रियमिति प्रक्रियागौरवभयात् परित्यक्तः । अत्रापि च अग्नी इति वायू इति एवमर्थमस्य **आद्यन्तवद्भाव एषितव्यः** । अपरिहार्यं चैवं लोके । **स एव मध्यमः पक्षः** । तृतीयपक्षकल्पश्चतुर्थ इति द्वितीयो मध्यमः, चतुर्णामपि द्वितीयो मध्यम एव । अथास्मिन् पक्षे ' शुक्ल्यास्ताम् ' इति कथं प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा न भवति ? कार्यिणोऽभावात् । द्विवचनं चात्र कार्यि, न चासत् कार्यि वचनेनाप्याश्रयितुं [शक्यम्] । एवमेते चत्वारः पक्षाः —(अ) ईदादयो [द्विवचनम्] (आ) ईदाद्यन्तं द्विवचनं (इ) ईदाद्यन्तः समुदायो द्विवचनान्तः (ई) ईदाद्यन्तं द्विवचनान्तमिति ॥

॥ अदसो मात् ॥ १. १. १२ ॥

[१] मात् प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायाम् इति । विषयोपलक्षणं न्यासनिर्देशो वा । यद्यन्यो न्यासः क्रियेत, यत्र संबन्धीन्यदसो नाश्री[ये]रन्, यत्र च नेष्यते, तं विषयं पर्युदस्य प्रगृह्यसंज्ञोच्येत, न स्यादयं दोषः । एतस्मिंस्तु न्यासे निमित्तस्य कार्यिणश्चाप्यसिद्धत्वात् तमाश्रितस्य कार्यस्याप्यसिद्धत्वम् । **तस्येति** कृत्स्नमेव निमित्तनिमित्तिसमुदायमभेदेनाश्रयति । **तस्य ईत्त्वस्य ऊत्त्वस्य [च]** । चकारात् मत्वस्येति गम्यते । त्रयाणा**मसिद्धत्वात् अयावेकादेश**प्रसङ्गः । युक्तं तावत् ईदादीनामसिद्धत्वाद्यत् प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा न स्यात् । स्थानिनां तु पूर्वमेव निवर्तितत्वादयादीनां

कुतः प्रसङ्गः ? अपि च, यथैव प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायामीदादीनामसिद्धत्वम्, एवं सिद्धयणादिष्वपि। यणादेशादिप्रतिबन्धमात्रमेव च प्रगृह्यसंज्ञया प्रार्थ्यते इति मा भूत् प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा । नैतदस्ति । शास्त्रासिद्धत्वमाश्रीयते। शास्त्रनिमित्ता च शब्देषु बुद्धिपरिणतिः । बुद्धिप्रतिपादकशास्त्रस्यासत्त्वे प्राकृतेनैव रूपेण स्थान्यत्रतिष्ठते। तत्र स्थानिनो निवृत्तेरप्रतिपन्नत्वादयादयः प्राप्नुवन्ति । **अमी आसत** इत्ययादेशो, **अमू आसाते** इत्यावादेशः, **अमी अत्र** इति 'एङः पदान्तात्०' (पा. ६.१.१०९) इत्येकादेशः । ननु च द्विपदाश्रयत्वात् बहिरङ्गा अयादयः ईदादिष्वेकपदाश्रयेषु असिद्धास्तत्र पूर्व एव नास्ति यतोऽसिद्धत्वं विज्ञायते पूर्वत्रासिद्धपरिभाषया ॥

॥ शे ॥ १. १. १३ ॥

[१] श्रुतेरविशिष्टत्वाद्विशेषपरिग्रहाभावाच्च '**काशे**' इत्यत्रापि प्राप्नोति । तत्र प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः। तद्यथा। दाग्रहणादतिप्रसङ्गेऽदाप् इति प्रतिषेध उच्यते । प्रत्यासत्तेर्, अव्यभिचाराद्, असाधारणत्वाच्चान्तरेणापि रूपग्रहणं स्वग्रहणादेवार्थनिवृत्तौ रूपप्रतिपत्तौ सिद्धायां रूपग्रहणमत्र बहिरङ्गस्याप्यर्थस्य रूपवदङ्गीकरणार्थम् । तेन यथैव तुल्यार्थानां रूपान्तरसंयुक्तानामसंप्रत्ययः, तद्वत् तुल्येऽपि तद्रूपेऽनर्थकानामिति । तत्रानर्थकस्य शशब्दस्यार्थवता संयुक्तस्यैकवचनेन सहैकादेशे वैगुण्यादर्थवदनर्थकयोरर्थान्तरं न किञ्चिदुपजातमित्यनर्थकोऽयं शेशब्दः ॥

[२] **एवमपि हरिशे बभ्रुशे** इति। तत्र हि डिमत्वर्थीययोः प्रत्यययोः प्रत्ययार्थेनार्थवत्त्वादर्थवतोः संनिपाते समुदायानामवयवधर्मानुगमादवयवार्थेनार्थवत्त्वादयं समुदायोऽर्थवानिति। जहत्स्वार्थायां तु वृत्तौ प्रकृते[र]र्थपरित्यागात् प्रत्ययार्थ एव विभक्त्यर्थेन युज्यते। [ते]न प्रकृतिरनर्थिका। केवलप्रयोगनिवृत्त्यर्थे तु परवचने सति साधुत्वायैव प्रत्ययस्य प्रकृतिरवतिष्ठते इत्यर्थवशात् प्राप्नोति। लक्षणोक्तत्वाददोषः।

[३] **अथ वा** इति। सत्यप्यवयवयोरर्थ[व]त्त्वे समुदायस्य शेशब्दस्यान्योऽर्थो न विद्यत इत्यानर्थक्यम्। तत् कथमिह संख्याकर्मादयो हरिशशब्दवाच्यस्यार्थस्य विभक्त्याभिधीयन्ते, हरिशशब्देन वाभिहिताः पञ्च कथं विभक्त्या व्यज्यन्ते, तेना (? येन) विशिष्टस्य प्रत्ययार्थस्य संख्याकर्मादिभिर्योगः ? तत्र जहत्स्वार्थायामजहत्स्वार्थायां वा वृत्तौ "प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः" इति सप्रकृतिकः संघातः संख्याकर्माद्याधारमर्थं ब्रवीति। अतः केवलेन शेशब्देन योऽर्थ उच्यते तस्य विभक्त्यर्थेन संबन्धाभावात् शे

इत्येतस्य समुदायस्यानर्थक्यम्। तत्र यथैव सन्नपि केवलः प्रकृत्यर्थो विभक्त्यर्थेन नाभिसंबध्यते तथा केवलः प्रत्ययार्थोऽपि इति ॥

॥ निपात एकाजनाङ् ॥ १. १. १४ ॥

[१] निपात इत्यनेना[चि] विशेष्यमाणे तदन्तविध्यप्रसङ्गाद्दोषप्रसङ्गो नोत्तिष्ठति। विपरीते तु विशेष्यत्वे उत्तिष्ठति। **[निपात इति किमर्थम् ?]** समुदायस्यार्थे प्रयोगाद् प्रत्ययरूपावधिपरिग्रहे च नियमाभावाद् निपातस्यैवार्थवत्ता संभवति। प्रत्ययस्य रू[प]द्वयम्। अर्थप्रयुक्ते वर्णवदानर्थक्यं प्रत्ययानाम्। कदाचिच्च कश्चिदेव प्रत्ययरूपस्यावधिरभ्युपगम्यते। तद्यथा। विंशतिशब्दे शतिज्वा तिशब्दो वा, ऐकागारिकशब्दे इको वागारिको वा। तथा केषांचित् विकरणाः प्राक्कर्तरि उत्पद्यन्ते। विकरणान्तात् स्वार्थे सार्वधातुकस्यैत्यति (? °प्रत्ययो) भवति। अत्रोच्यते। सत्यम्। लौकिकस्यार्थस्योपादाने नित्यत्वात् शब्दानां तुल्यरूपपूर्वभागानां पदानां, वाक्यैकदेशपदसरूपावयवानां च समुदायानां, वर्णवदानर्थक्यमवयवानाम्। तेषां तु शास्त्रे तुल्यरूपत्वात् तत्त्वेनाश्रितानामन्वयव्यतिरेकसमधिगम्येनार्थेनार्थवत्ता कार्यार्थं परिगृह्यते। यदि तर्ह्यर्थवत्ता प्रत्ययानामाश्रीयते, व्याकरणे यदुक्तं "कृत्तद्धितान्तं चैव ह्यर्थवत्, न केवलाः कृत्तद्धिता" इति, तस्य व्याघातो भवति। नैष दोषः। प्रत्य[य]स्यार्थेन नित्ययोगाद् 'अर्थवत्' इत्यनुवृत्तेः पुनःश्रुतिरनर्थिका मा भूत् इति कश्चिदर्थः सन्नपि परित्यज्यते व्यभिचाराभावात्। शास्त्रीय एव चार्थः प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञायां निमित्तत्वेनाश्रीयते। इतरथा हि कृत्तद्धितान्तस्याप्यविभक्तिकस्य प्रत्ययेन तुल्यमानर्थक्यम्। तस्मात् प्रत्ययार्थेनार्थवत्त्वात् चकारात्र इत्यत्र णलः प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा प्रसज्येत। तथा 'अततेर्डः अः'। अ आगच्छेति।

[२] यदि **तत्पुरुषः समानाधिकरणः** निपातस्याचा तदन्तविधिर्विज्ञायेत, केवलोऽप्याद्यन्तवद्भावात् प्रतीयेत। एवं च [अजन्तेषु] निपातेषु प्रगृह्यसंज्ञाकार्यसंभवात् अच्ग्रहणमनर्थकं प्रसज्येत। अतोऽच्ग्रहणात् कश्चिदेव विशेष आश्रयिष्यते, कश्चित् परित्यक्ष्यते। तत्रान्यतरविशेषपरित्यागे यदि तदन्त उपादीयेत, केवलः परित्यज्येत, आङः प्रगृह्यसंज्ञाया असंभवात् पर्युदासोऽनर्थकः स्यात्। अतो लिङ्गविशेषादच्श्रुतिः केवलमेवाचमवरु[ण]द्धि, तदन्तं च निरस्यति। स्यादेवं यद्यक्रियमाणा- (? °णे)ऽज्ग्रहणे हलन्ताः प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायामभिसंबध्येरन्। अस्ति चेत् संज्ञा(? °ज्ञ)या हलन्तानां संबन्धः, हलन्तनिवृत्त्यर्थं स्यादज्ग्रहणम्। न खलु संज्ञासंबन्धमात्रादेव दोषो जायेत।

कार्येषु चासत्स्वपरार्था संज्ञा, मा भूदनर्थिका शास्त्रप्रवृत्तिरिति, सामान्याभिधानेऽपि तथाभूतं विषयं नावगाहते। तत्र कार्यार्थमभ्युपगच्छतः प्रगृह्यसंज्ञां, न किञ्चित् प्रयोजनमस्ति। दोषव्युदासार्थं वा विशेषमुपाददानस्य न कश्चित् दोषोऽस्ति यन्निवृत्त्यर्थं विशेष उपादीयेत। संहिताधिकारे हि प्रकृतिभाव आरभ्यते। तत्र च हलां न किञ्चित् कार्यमुच्यते यन्निवृत्त्यर्थः प्रकृतिभावः स्यात्। ननु चाधोऽगमन्नमोऽकार्षीदिति रोरुत्वे प्रकृतिभावः स्यात्। इह सतामादेशिनामादेशनिवृत्त्यर्थः प्रकृतिभावो, न चात्र रुर्विद्यते 'पूर्वत्रासिद्धम्' (पा. ८.२.१) इत्यसिद्धत्वात्। यदि न विद्यते, उत्त्वमपि न प्राप्नोति। आश्रयादुत्त्वे सिद्धत्वम्। इह तु विकारिणः प्रकृतिभाव इति स विकारी नास्ति यस्य प्रकृतिभावः क्रियेत। यश्चास्ति सकारः न तस्य किञ्चित् कार्यमुच्यते। ननु च समुदायस्य प्रकृतिभावादवयवस्यादेशो निवर्तेत। सत्यपि समुदायस्य प्रकृतिभावे स नास्ति यस्यादेश इति कस्यादेशो निवर्तेत। यश्चास्ति सकारो न तस्योत्त्वमुच्यते। एवं रोः प्रकृतिभावापेक्षायामविद्यमानत्वात् उत्त्वे चाश्रयासिद्धत्वात् सकारस्य च कार्यावचनात् उत्त्वमत्र न शक्यं निवर्तयितुम्। तस्मात् हलन्तेषु **न कश्चिद् [नैव] दोषो न प्रयोजनम्।**

[३] एवमपि अज्ग्रहणादन्यतरनिवृत्तौ क्रियमाणायामाद्यन्तवद्भावस्यान्ताश्रयविध्यधीनत्वात् निमित्तनिमित्तिभावात् तदन्तविधिना त्वेकत्र कार्याणामसिद्धत्वात् **द्वयोः परिभाषयोः सावकाशयोः** इति। निरवकाशस्य बाधनासंभवात्। येन विधिस्तदन्तस्येति परिभाषाया अवकाशः चयः जयः। आद्यन्तपरिभाषाया [अवकाशः] "धातोः", "अन्तः", "मिदचोऽन्त्यात्", "अचोऽन्त्यादि टि" (पा. ६.१.१६२; १५९; १.१.४७; १.१.६४) यत्र साक्षादन्तग्रहणमस्ति। **समवस्थितयोः** इति। इह प्राप्तयोः, स्वविषये वा समवस्थानात् समवस्थितयोः, येन विधिस्तदन्तस्येति संज्ञात्वेऽप्यस्य सामान्यशब्देनाभिधानम्। तद्यथा। 'अधिकारो नाम त्रिप्रकार' इत्यधिकारशब्दो न इदं विचारयामः कोऽत्र बुद्धिक्रमः कस्याश्चोपादानं युक्तमिति। आद्यन्तपरिभाषायास्तावत् तदन्तविधिनिमित्तत्वादसंनिधाने निमित्तस्योपादानं न संभवति। तस्माद् 'अच्' इत्येषा संज्ञा तदन्तान् तावत् संज्ञिनः प्रत्याययति। अच्ग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् अन्यतरनिवृत्तौ तदन्तविधेरुपसंप्राप्तस्यायुक्तः परित्यागः। सत्यम्, क्रमात् तदन्तविधिरेवोपादीयेत। क्रमात्तु लिङ्गं बलवत् इति लिङ्गविरोधिनस्तदन्तविधेराङ्पर्युदासेन निवृत्तौ कृतायामाद्यन्तपरिभाषयैव व्यवस्थानं भवति। भवेद् व्यवस्थानं यदि निमित्तमन्तरेण निमित्तवतां प्रवृत्तिर्लभ्येत। तदन्तविधौ त्वक्रियमाणे तन्निमित्तस्याद्यन्तवतोऽभावात् ततो व्यवस्थानम्। एवं तर्ह्यनेनोभयोरपि परिभाषयोर्व्यावृत्तसामान्ययोर्गृह्यमाणा एवाचः प्रगृह्यसंज्ञां लप्स्यन्ते। तावत् हि विधेयम्। तच्चैवं

सति सिद्धम्। भवेत् सिद्धम्, अयं तु ग्रन्थो नोपपद्यते **इयमिह परिभाषा भविष्यति आद्यन्तवदेकस्मिन्** इति। परार्थत्वात् परिभाषाणां तत्फलनिर्वृत्तौ सत्यां गृह्यमाणानां प्रगृह्यसंज्ञया संबन्धे, यदस्याः परिभाषायाः फलं तदस्तीति फलस्य भावात् परिभाषायाः भाव उपपद्यते। तद्यथा। 'एकं चेत् ङित् कितौ' इति। अथ वाज्ग्रहणादन्यतरपरित्यागे लिङ्गाच्च तदन्तविधिनिमित्तत्वाच्चाद्यन्तवत्परिभाषाया अप्रवृत्तौ तदन्तविधिरुपस्थानमात्रेणैवाद्यन्तपरिभाषामनुगृह्य कृतार्थो निवर्तते। तद्यथा। लिङ्गोपादानात् स्वार्थो तदन्तविधेः प्रवृत्तिर्न संभवति, तस्मिंश्चासति लिङ्गानुग्राहिण्याद्यन्तवत्परिभाषा नोपतिष्ठते, तस्मात् परार्थं तदन्तविधेरत्रोपस्थानम्। स तावता कृतार्थो लिङ्गविरोधात् स्वार्थं न निर्वर्तयति। अथ वा हलां कार्यमस्ति नास्तीति संज्ञाप्रदेशेष्वपिचाते तेष्वे(? °ष्वेव विचार्यते। तथै)वान्तरङ्गत्वादुभयोः परिभाषयोरुपस्थाने सति अज्ग्रहणादन्यतरनिवृत्तौ लिङ्गादाद्यन्तपरिभाषया व्यवस्थानं भविष्यति॥

[४] एवं तर्ह्येकग्रहणमच्समुदायनिवृत्त्यर्थं क्रियते, अनेन चैकग्रहणेन पराङ्गभूतेषु उपात्तसंख्याविशेषेषु वर्णग्रहणेषु अन्यत्राविवक्षितसंख्यात्वं ज्ञाप्यते। इहापि च प्रगृह्यसंज्ञाया विधीयमानत्वात् संज्ञां प्रति गुणभूतमज्ग्रहणम्। गुणभूतेषु च संख्या विवक्षिता भवति। तद्यथा। "पशुना यजेत" इति। ननु च संज्ञाया उपसर्जनत्वात् रूढसंबन्धिषु संज्ञिष्वेव प्राधान्यम्। तत्र युक्तैवाविवक्षा संख्यायाः। सत्यम्, प्रदेशे संज्ञिनां प्राधान्यं, विधीयमानत्वात् संज्ञायाः प्राधान्यं भवति। "शुक्लं पटं कुरु," "श्वेतं वायव्यमालभेत" इति। तत्राविवक्षितत्वे संख्याया अ इ उ अपेहीति निपातसमुदायस्याच्समुदायस्यैका प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा प्रसज्येत। कथं पुनर्निपातसमुदायो निपातग्रहणेन गृह्यते? अजनुरोधादच्समुदायस्य चैकनिपातत्वाभावात् निपातसमुदायस्य गतिः स्यात्। अस्तु, जातिनिर्देशात् प्रत्येकमपि भविष्यति। यद्येवं लभ्येत कृतं स्यात्। अच्समुदाये तु संज्ञयाभिसंबध्यमाने तयैवावयवानामपि कृतार्थत्वात् नास्त्यवयवेषु पुनःप्रवृत्तिः। तद्यथा समुदायैकाचो द्विर्वचने क्रियमाणे कृतार्थत्वात् समुदायस्य अवयवानां न भवति पुनर्द्विर्वचनं, तथाविशेषेण संयोगसंज्ञायां पुनर्द्वयोर्न भवति। यदि तर्हि समुदायाश्रयेण कार्येणावयवाः कृतार्थास्तेषां प्रगृह्यत्वात् प्रत्यवयवं प्रकृतिभावो भविष्यति। नास्त्यवयवेषु पुनः प्रकृतिभावः। समुदाये प्रकृतिभावस्य कृतार्थत्वात्। तेनान्त्यस्य यणादेशो न स्यात्। पूर्वयोराद्गुणा[या]देशौ स्याताम्। कथं तर्हि प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञायां समुदायस्यार्थवत्त्वे वर्णेष्वर्थवत्सु अन[र्थ]केषु चार्थवद्ग्रहणे प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञायामक्रियमाणे, वनं धनमिति प्रतिवर्णं विभक्त्युत्पत्तौ नलोपप्रसङ्गश्चोद्यते? अर्थवत्तायां तावत् भिन्नार्थत्वात्

यथायथं वर्णानामर्थाः प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञानिमित्तत्वाय कल्पन्ते। आनर्थक्येऽपि क्वचित् समुदायस्यापरिगृहीतत्वात्तेष्विदं समुदायकार्यं विज्ञायते। तत्राश्रितसंख्यत्वात् निर्देश्यगुणभूतस्याज्ग्रहणस्य विशेषणमेकग्रहणं क्रियमाणम् ' अन्यत्र वर्णग्रहणेषु गुणभूतेषु विशिष्टसंख्येष्वनाश्रितसंख्यत्वं जातेर्भवति ' इति ज्ञापकम्। **किमेतस्य ज्ञापने प्रयोजनम् ?** " हलन्ताच्च " (पा. १. २. १०) इति हल्ग्रहणे गुणभूतस्य हलः सनः कित्त्वातिदेशे न भवति संख्याविशेषस्य विवक्षेति। ननु चोक्तं " न सामान्येन पौर्वापर्यमस्ती"ति। नेदं वचनम्। आर्धधातुके हि भिन्नार्थानां युगपदेकस्याः प्रकृतेरङ्गत्वमस्तीत्यसंभवात्, एकार्थानां च प्रत्ययानामर्थस्य चरितार्थत्वात्, परदेशस्य व्याप्तत्वात् अनेकस्य प्रत्ययस्य परत्वसंबन्धो नास्ति इत्यतः सामान्येन पौर्वापर्यं नास्तीत्युच्यते। यत्र तुल्यरूपः प्रत्ययो भवति तत्र जातेः परत्वम्। तद्यथा। 'एका प्रकृतिः बहवश्च यञः ' इति। **दम्भेर्हल्ग्रहणस्य जाति**विवक्षितत्वादिक उत्तरत्वं न विरुध्यते॥

[५] **इह कस्मान्न भवति....आ एवं किल तत्।** अनुबन्धनिवृत्तौ श्रुतिविशेषाभावात्। यदि किंचित् अनुबन्धकाले विशिष्टमर्थरूपं संबन्धित्वेन निर्ज्ञातं, निवृत्तेऽप्यनुबन्धे तेनार्थेनानुबन्धसहचारिणा सानुब[न्ध]कत्वमनुमीयते। तत्रेषदर्थे सानुबन्धकस्य दृष्टो योग आङीषदर्थे। उपसर्गस्य च सानुबन्धस्य पाठात् क्रियायोगोऽपि सानुबन्धस्य प्रतीयते। " आङ्मर्यादाभिविध्योः " (पा. २. १. १३) इति च सानुबन्धक एव कर्मप्रवचनीयसंज्ञायां प्रतिनिर्दिश्यते। अतोऽत्रानुबन्धनिवृत्तौ सत्यामप्यनुबन्धस्य तत् सहचारिभिरेवार्थैरनुमीयते। **वाक्यस्मरणयोरङित्।** वाक्यविषये 'आ एवं नु मन्यसे ' इति। कश्चिदेव वाक्यार्थः पूर्वविधिविषयः प्रतिषेधविषयो वा व्यवस्थितः। तस्यान्यथाकरणे इदं प्रयुज्यते— आ एवं नु मन्यसे। नैवं पूर्वममंस्थाः, संप्रति त्वेवं मन्यस इति पूर्ववाक्यविषयोऽयमाकारः प्रयुज्यते। अन्ये त्वाहुः वाक्यप्रकरणो वाक्यावयवोऽत्र विवक्षित इति। अत्रानर्थकस्यैवाङोऽनुनासिकादेशवचनात् शुद्धस्यानर्थक्यं नोपपद्यते। 'आ एवं किल तद्'इति स्मर्तव्यार्थविषयः पूर्वमाकारः प्रयुज्यते। ततः स्मृतेरुत्तरकालम् ' आ एवं किल तद् ' इति निर्वचनं क्रियते॥

॥ ओत् ॥ १. १. १५ ॥

[१] [**निपातसमाहारोऽयम् ।**] अनेकार्थतायां सत्यां नियतमनेन निपातसमाहारेण भवितव्यम्। अथार्थभेदो नास्ति, व्यक्तमेकनिपातत्वम्। तत्र कथमेतत् विरुद्धमुभयमेकत्र संभवति इति ? उच्यते। ई[म्] कम् सीमित्येवमादीनामानर्थक्यादेकत्वे

समाहारत्वे वा नित्यमर्थस्याप्रादुर्भावात् अर्थभेदाभेदनिवृत्तोऽवधिपरिच्छेदो न संभवति इति शक्यं मन्यते तावत् प्रतिज्ञातुम्। 'ओ षु यातं मरुत' इति 'आ उ सु यातम्. . .'। तत्र 'निपात एकाच्' इति प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा प्राप्नोति। 'अनाङ्' इति प्रतिषेधः। तत्र परत्वात् प्रतिषेधानां बलीयस्त्वात् 'अनाङ्' इति प्रतिषेधेन भवितव्यम्। ननु च 'आङोऽन्यः' विधिराश्रीयते। भवति चात्रोकार 'आङोऽन्यः'। अन्तादिवद्भावात् व्यपदेशे नित्यं संनिहिते 'आङोऽयमन्यः' इत्यशक्यो व्यपदेष्टुम्। कथं तर्हि 'लूयते केदारेण' इति कर्तुरेव कर्मत्वादकर्मकव्यपदेशं धातुर्लभते? इह कर्मातिदेशे स्वाश्रयमकर्मत्वं कर्तुर्न निवर्तते। न चेह कर्माश्रयं किंचिदुच्यते। स्वाभाविकं चास्य कर्तुरकर्मत्वम्। तस्मात् तत्संबद्धस्य धात्वर्थस्यानाश्रीयमाणे कर्माश्रये युक्तो व्यपदेशः। तद्यथा। 'ब्राह्मणवदस्मिन् क्षत्रिये वर्तितव्यम्' इति स्वाभाविकस्य क्षत्रियत्वस्यानिवृत्तत्वाद् 'अब्राह्मणाय देहि' इति भवति स्वाश्रयिक्रियाविशेषैरभिसंबन्धः। यथा च 'ब्राह्मणको ग्राम आनीयताम्' इति संनिहितेऽपि तस्मिन् क्षत्रिये ब्राह्मणाश्रयस्यानयनस्य विधीयमानत्वात् तद्वतो ग्रामस्यानयनं भवति, एवमिह आदिवद्भावात् व्यपदेशस्य सांनिध्यादसकृत्पर्युदासो विज्ञातुं शक्यः॥

[२] एवमप्यगौर्गौः समपद्यत गोऽभवदित्यत्र प्राप्नोति। एवं तर्हि 'स्वं रूपं शब्दस्य' (पा. १. १. ६८) इति स्वग्रहणात् सिद्धे रूपस्यैव संप्रत्यये, रूपग्रहणं बहिरङ्गस्याप्यर्थस्य व्याकरणे रूपवत्संप्रत्ययार्थम्। तत्रानर्थकनिवृत्तावर्थपरिग्रहे सति **गौणमुख्ययोर् मुख्ये संप्रत्ययात्**। गुणादागतः गौणः, मुखमिव मुख्यः। तत्र नेदं वचनम्। लौकिकोऽयं न्यायः परिगृह्यते। इहायं गोशब्दो जातिद्रव्यलिङ्गसंख्याकर्मादिषु वृत्तो बाह्यैः प्रैषकुत्सनादिभिः संबध्यते, पदान्तराभिधेयानां चार्थानां विशेष्यभावं विशेषणभावं वा प्रतिपद्यते। तत्रान्तरङ्ग एवापदप्रतिबद्धेऽर्थेऽसंनिहितेऽयुक्ता पदान्तरविषयस्य बहिरङ्गस्यार्थस्य व्यपेक्षा। **गौरनुबन्ध्य** इत्यत्र वाहीकादिरर्थः पदान्तराभिधेयोऽसति पदान्तरप्रयोगे न तावत् प्रादुर्भूत इत्यसांनिध्यादशक्यमस्यापेक्षणं कर्तुमिति। नित्यानित्ययोः खल्वप्यर्थयोः संनिधावव्यभिचारित्वात् नित्यस्यार्थस्य युक्तः संप्रत्ययः। व्यभिचारी हि गोशब्दस्य वाहीकादिभिरभिसंबन्धः, यस्मात् कस्यचित् वाहीकादिष्वविवक्षितमपि गोत्वं भवति। तथा येऽपि रूढसंबन्धाः क्रियागुणाः मौढ्याशौचादिविपरीताः ते कदाचित् वाहीके विवक्षिता भवन्ति तैक्ष्ण्यपाटवादयः। तत्र विरोधिगुणविवक्षायां गौरित्यस्य शब्दस्यात्यन्तमप्रवृत्तिः। साधारणासाधारणयोश्चासाधारणो यो गोशब्दस्य पदार्थस्तस्य गोशब्देन प्रत्यायनं न्याय्यम्। वाहीके त्वनेकस्य गुणस्य समवायाद्यस्य यस्यार्थस्य रूढसंबन्धात् क्रियागुणास्तत्रोपलभ्यन्ते, तद्वाचिनश्च शब्दस्य तत्रास्ति

प्रवृत्तिरिति यस्य यद्गुणो वाहीको विवक्षितः, स तद्गुणवृत्तिं तत्र प्रयुङ्क्ते । तथा च ' गौरश्वो हस्ती ' इति ' शकुनिः ' इत्येवमादीनां प्रवृत्तेर्न शक्यमेतत् वक्तुं ' गौरेवायम् ' इति । तस्मात् गौरित्युक्तेऽन्तरङ्गोऽव्यभिचारी तत्रैव च प्रतिनियतो योऽर्थस्तस्य संप्रत्ययो भवति । तस्मात् **न वाहीकोऽनुबध्यते । कथं तर्हि वाहीके वृद्ध्यात्त्वे भवतः गौस्तिष्ठति, गामानयेति ? अर्थाश्रय एतदेवं भवति ।** गौणमुख्ययोरर्थयोराश्रये प्रातिपदिकस्य सामान्यवृत्तेरयं विवेको न शक्यते निवारयितुं किमत्र गौणोऽर्थ उत मुख्य इति । यद्यप्यत्र गौणस्यार्थस्य बीजमस्ति तत्त्वनाविर्भूतनिमित्तमस्य निवारणे । कस्मात् ? सविभक्तिको हि शब्दः शब्दान्तरेणार्थविवेकावधारणहेतुना यदा संबद्धो भवति, तदा शब्दान्तरोपजनितविभागस्य गौणस्यार्थस्य परिच्छेदको भवति । असति च शब्दान्तरप्रयोगे मुख्य एवार्थः प्रतीयते । तस्मात् प्रातिपदिकार्थस्य सत्यप्यनेकार्थबीजसंभवे व्यक्तभेदाभिधाने सामर्थ्याभावात् प्रातिपदिकाश्रयाणि कार्याणि श्रुतिमात्रमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तन्ते । अथ वा पूर्वं तावत् अन्तरङ्गेणासाधारणेन चाव्यभिचारिणा मुख्येनार्थेन प्रातिपदिकमभिसंबध्यते । मुख्यार्थवृत्तादेव च विभक्तिरुत्पद्यते । अप्रादुर्भूतत्वाच्चार्थान्तरस्य विभक्तौ मुख्यार्थवृत्तेरेव शब्दस्य कार्याणि क्रियन्ते । सविभक्तिकस्तु मुख्यार्थवृत्तिः शब्दो निर्वृत्तः स्वकार्ये, वाहीकादेश्च शब्दान्तरस्य भावे मुख्यार्थवृत्तिरेवार्थान्तरं परिणीयते । तत्रार्थान्तराभिसंबन्धे विरोधिनोऽर्था निवर्तन्ते । क्रियागुणानां तु रूढिसम्बद्धानामविरोधित्वादवस्थानं भवति । तस्मात् वृद्ध्यात्वविधानकाले गौणस्यार्थस्य बहिरङ्गस्यानुपजातत्वात् गौणमुख्ययोरित्यनुपसंप्राप्तनिमित्त एष न्यायो नैतं विषयमवगाहते । तस्मात् प्रतिद्वन्द्विनो अनुपसंप्राप्तनिमित्तस्यार्थस्यासंनिपातात् यद्येवं ज्ञापको (?) विरोधिनिमित्ताभावादर्थो मुख्यव्यपदेशं [न] लभते । संबन्धिशब्दत्वात् हि सति गौणे मुख्यव्यपदेशं लभते । अतो मुख्यव्यपदेशाभावात् **शब्दाश्रयं कार्यं शब्दमात्रे** विधीयते । विरोध्यर्थाभावाच्च गौणमुख्यव्यपेक्षायामसत्यां शब्दाश्रयत्वं वृद्ध्यात्त्वयोरिति ॥

॥ उञः ऊँ ॥ १. १. १७-१८ ॥

[१] ' उञ [ऊँ] ' इत्येकयोग आदेशविकल्पे शाकल्यश्रुतेरुपयुक्तार्थत्वात् यत्रादेशो नास्ति तस्मिन् विषये ' निपात एकाजनाङ् ' इति प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा विज्ञायते । योगविभागे तु आदेशस्याप्यनपेक्षितत्वात् शाकल्यश्रुत्या संज्ञाविकल्पो विज्ञायते । उञः संज्ञाविकल्पे चापि विज्ञायमाने यद्यनुनासिक आदेशो वावचनेनासंयुक्तो विधीयेतात्यन्तं स्थानिनो निवृत्तिः प्रतीयेत । तद्यथा ' अस्तेर्भूः ' (पा. २. ४. ५२) इति । योग-

विभागात्तु प्रगृह्यसंज्ञाविकल्पे निर्ज्ञाते .... पूर्वयोगे रूपद्वयं भवति, 'उ इति' च 'विति' च। उत्तरस्मिंश्च योगे नित्यमादेशे प्राप्ते वावचनेन संयुक्त आदेश उच्यमाने विभाषाश्रुतिसंयोगात् द्वे रूपे भवतः ऊँ इति उ इति च, योगद्वये त्रीणि रूपाणि सिद्धानि भवन्ति।

[२] येषां तु ग्रन्थः 'किमर्थो योगविभागः शाकल्यविभाषा मा भूत्'इति तेषां वावचनमन्तरेण निरनुनासिकस्यापाकृतत्वात् प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा नास्तीति कृतप्रकृतिभावस्य श्रवणं न स्यात् 'उ इति' इति। आदेशापेक्षायां च सत्यां संज्ञिषु रूढसंबन्धेषु गुणभूतापि संज्ञा वैगुण्यात् स्वरूपमात्रपदार्थिकैव न संज्ञिनां संबन्धमुपगच्छतीति ॥

॥ ईदूतौ च सप्तम्यर्थे ॥ १. १. १९ ॥

[१] इह 'संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्तविधिप्रतिषेधात्' सप्तमीशब्देनात्र प्रत्ययमात्रमुच्यते। तत्र यदा तावदीकारोकारयोः प्राधान्यं, सप्तम्या विशेषणभावस्तदैवं विज्ञायते ईकारोकारौ या सप्तमी तस्याः प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा भवति। यदा सप्तम्याः प्राधान्यमीकारोकारयोर्विशेषणभावः तदा ईकारोकारान्तायाः सप्तम्या अभावात् तदन्तविधेरत्राप्रवृत्तिः। तत्रार्थग्रहणमन्तरेण यत्रैव सप्तमी श्रूयते तत्र प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा स्यात् सरसी इति। **लुप्तायां तु सप्तम्यां** संज्ञिनोऽभावादविषया संज्ञा नैव प्रवर्तते। सत्यां च प्रगृह्यसंधानकल्पनायां सप्तमीसहचरितेऽर्थे यद्वर्तते तस्य सामर्थ्याभावादपि संप्रत्ययः स्यात्। **अर्थग्रहणात्तु** 'सोमो गौरी अधि श्रितः' (ऋ. ९. १२. ३) इति निवृत्तप्रत्ययस्यापि सप्तम्यर्थवृत्तेः प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा सिद्धा भवति।

[२] **नात्र सप्तमी लुप्यते।** पूर्वसवर्णं दीर्घत्वं च बाधित्वा आड्भावश्च आम्भावश्च प्रसज्येते। एवं तर्हि सर्वत्रैव लुकः प्रवृत्तिः। तत्र प्रधानासंभवे सप्तम्यर्थसंचारणात् ईकारोकारान्तस्य शब्दरूपस्य ग्रहणं विज्ञास्यामः। **नेदं वचनाल्लभ्यम्।** प्रधानकल्पनाविषये वचनात् गुणतः कल्पयितुमलभ्यम्। कथम्? इह हलन्ताद्या सप्तम्युत्पन्ना सा 'इयाडियाजीकाराणामुपसंख्यानम्' इति ईकारे विहिते 'सरसी' इति ईकारो या सप्तमीति मुख्या कल्पना संभवति। तत्संभवे च निवृत्तविभक्तिकेषु न प्रवर्तते प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा **सोमो गौरी अधि श्रित इति।**

[३] **तत्रापि सरसी यदि।** नार्थोऽर्थग्रहणेन। सरसीशब्दादुत्पन्नायाः सप्तम्या लुकि कृते मुख्यकल्पनाविषयाभावात् ईकारान्तं प्रत्ययलक्षणेन सप्तम्यन्तं, तत्र प्रत्यय-

स्यात्यन्तमसंभवात् नेदं प्रत्ययग्रहणम्। न चेत् प्रत्ययग्रहणं, सप्तम्यर्थवृत्तेरीकारोकाराभ्यां तदन्तविधिर्भविष्यति। प्रत्ययलक्षणेन वा सप्तम्यां परतो यावीकारोकारौ सप्तमीसहचरितौ ताविति। **ज्ञापकं स्यात्तदन्तत्वे।** ईदूदेद् द्विवचनं प्रगृह्यमित्यत्र तृतीयचतुर्थयोः पक्षयोः 'संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहण' इत्यनाश्रीयमाणे वाश्रीयमाणे वा ओसन्तत्वग्रहणे क्रियमाणे तस्मिंस्तदन्तत्वे सति ज्ञापकमेतद् भवति प्रत्ययलक्षणाभावस्य। 'स्यात् तदन्तत्वे' इत्यपेक्ष्योपदर्शनमेतत्। यदि तर्हि प्रत्ययलक्षणं प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायां ज्ञापकान्न भवति कोऽस्य सूत्रस्यावकाशः? अथ प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायां प्रत्ययलक्षणं भवति किमस्यारम्भे **प्रयोजनम्?** तस्मादयमारब्धव्यो योगोऽन्यत्र प्रत्ययलक्षणनिवृत्तिज्ञापनेन कृतार्थः। स्वविषये विधास्यत एव प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा इति सत्येव वा प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायां प्रत्ययलक्षणे।

[४] मा वा पूर्वपदस्य भूत्।... वाप्यश्वो नद्यामातिर्.... इति। 'संज्ञायाम्' (पा. २. १. ४४) इति समासे सप्तम्यर्थवृत्तेरीकारान्तस्य प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा प्राप्नोति, अर्थग्रहणात् न भवति। **अथ क्रियमाणेऽप्यर्थग्रहणे कस्मादेवात्र न भवति?** द्विविधायामपि वृत्तौ– **[अ]** जहत्स्वार्थायां तावत् कर्तृकर्मैकार्यसमवायिनीनां क्रियाणां द्रव्यान्तरसमवेतानां शक्तिरुपकारः प्रत्याश्रीयते, तस्यानिवृत्तत्वात्। **[आ]** अजहत्स्वार्थायामपि वृत्तौ उपसर्जनीभूतस्वार्थेषु विशेषणेषु [सत्सु], संबद्धत्वादभिसंबन्धीयमानस्यार्थस्य तिरोभूते संबन्धे [सति], यद्युपसर्जनं प्रधानार्थे न वर्तेत, प्रधानोपसर्जनयोरत्यन्तमुपकाराभावात् गुणोपादानमनर्थकं स्यात्। तस्मादुपसर्जनीभूतस्वार्थानि विशेषणानि प्रधानार्थोपादानानि व्यर्थानि संपद्यन्ते। तत्र मृत्पिण्डे पांशूदकवत् अनिवार्यमाणभेदस्य संमूर्छितस्वार्थात्मिन एकार्थीभावात् पूर्वमुपलब्धविवेकत्वात् समुदायत्वेनानुमीयमानस्याभिधानं भवति। तत्र 'सप्तम्यर्थे' इत्यर्थग्रहणेन समुदायार्थो नाभिधीयते।

[इ] अथ वा पञ्चके प्रातिपदिकार्थे संदिग्धानामनाविर्भूतानां पञ्चानामर्थानां द्योतिकास्वभिहितार्थानुवादिनीषु, त्रिके वा प्रातिपदिकार्थे संख्याकर्माद्यभिधायिनीषु विभक्तिषु आश्रितसंख्याविशेषस्यार्थसमूहस्याभिधानात् सप्तम्यर्थग्रहणेन संख्याविशेषयुक्तोऽर्थराशिरभिधीयते। समासे तु संख्याविशेषनिवृत्तावकृतस्वत्वात् तस्यार्थस्य न्यूनार्थवृत्तेः [सतः] सप्तम्यर्थस्य न भवति संप्रत्ययः। तस्मादर्थग्रहणं संव्यवहारोपात्तस्य परिकल्पितस्य शास्त्रीयस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्। यदि तर्हि निवृत्तसंख्याविशेषः सप्तम्यर्थोऽत्र न गृह्येत, लुक्यपि कृते संख्याविशेषस्यासंप्रत्ययात् 'सोमो गौरी अधि श्रित' इति

प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा न प्राप्नोति। तस्मान्नेदं शक्यं वक्तुं विशिष्टलिङ्गसंख्याभिधानार्थमर्थग्रहणमिति। एवं '— वाप्यश्वो नद्यातिर् ...' इत्यत्र समुदायार्थोऽभिधीयते। तत्राधिकरणसंज्ञानिमित्तगुणाश्रयस्य द्रव्यस्य न्यग्भूतशक्तरुपात्ताधेयविशेषत्वात् द्रव्यविशेषसमवायिना विशिष्टाख्य(?)प्रादुर्भावनिमित्तेन गुणेनागृहीतस्याधेयस्यापि भावे (?) अव्यपदेश्यकल्पः सप्तम्यर्थ आधेयविशेषात्मानमनुगतोऽनुमीयते। अव्यतिकीर्णे (?) चार्थान्तरेण मुख्ये सप्तम्यर्थे विद्यमाने (?) नैवंभूतस्य सप्तम्यर्थस्य परिकल्पना युक्ता। तत्र यथैव 'जात्याख्यायाम्' इत्याख्याग्रहणात् द्रव्यनिर्मुक्ताया जातेरुपादानं विज्ञायते, एवमिहाप्यर्थग्रहणादनुपात्ताधेयः स्वात्मन्येवावस्थितः सप्तम्यर्थो गृह्यत इति।

[ई] अथ वा 'सप्तम्यर्थे' इत्यर्थग्रहणात् लौकिकोऽर्थः परिगृह्यते। कुत एतत्? ये हि समुदायार्थाः शास्त्रे त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामनुमेयाः साधुत्वं प्रति निमित्तत्वेनोपादीयमानाः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययपूर्वपदोत्तरपदार्था न [ते] समुदायाः। लोके तु वर्णवदेषामवयवानामानर्थक्यम्। परिनिष्पन्नस्तु समुदायः स्वार्थादप्रच्युतोऽसंभिन्नमात्मानं प्रत्याययति।

[उ] अथ वा समुदायार्थ इति समुदायार्थप्रतिपत्तिहेतुः समुदायः प्रातिपदिकार्थतामुपपन्नो (?) निवृत्तव्यतिरेकभावः सत्त्वभूतो व्यपदिश्यत इति। तत्र सप्तम्यर्थग्रहणात् यथाभूतस्य ग्रहणम्। इह तु न तथाभूतो भवतीति न दोषो भवतीति॥

॥ दाधा घ्वदाप् ॥ १. १. २० ॥

[१] इहेयमङ्गीकृतरूपाणां दाधां घुसंज्ञा क्रियते। तच्च पुनरेषां रूपमवयव[द्व]यात्मकं दकारवतां ध[कार]वताम् (?)। [त]चैषामुच्चारणात् न श्रयथ (? तदाश्रयम्) पाघ्राध्मास्थाम्नामात्वभूतत्वेऽपि सति, दकारधकारयोरभावात् यथैव च दीङ्दडोः धीङ्धृङोश्च [द]कार[ध]कारयोरपि भावे शुद्धरूपत्वाभावात् दाधारूपविरूपत्वे घुसंज्ञा न भवति, एवं देङ्धेटोरपि शित्यात्वाभावात् दाधारूपविरूपत्वे सति घुसंज्ञा न स्यादित्यतः पठति **घुसंज्ञायां प्रकृतिग्रहणं शिदर्थम्** इति। प्र(? वि)कृतार्थम् इत्येतत्तु न पठति। एवं मन्यते— लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तपरिभाषायाः शे (? दो)ष[व]त्त्वात्। एष ह्यस्याः शे(? दो)षो 'गामादाग्रहणेष्वविशेष' इति। भारद्वाजीयाः पुनः अनुपदेश आत्त्वभूतयोरप्येतयोरतोऽन्यैरौपदेशिकात्वसमवेतैर्दाधारूपैर्घुसंज्ञाया अपहृतत्वात् अप्राप्तिं मन्यमानाः पठन्ति— 'शिद्विकृतार्थम्' इति। तेषामयमभिप्रायः — प्रकृतिभूतयोरदाधारूपत्वात् विकारभूतयोरनौपदेशिकत्वात् परिभाषा शे(? दो)षश्चैषां नास्ति

इति। अस्यैव चार्थवत्त्वद्योतनार्थ उपक्षेपः। प्रकृतिग्रहणे तु सति विकाराणां ‘स्थानिवदादेश...’ (पा. १.१.५६) इति वचनात् घुसंज्ञा भविष्यति। इतर आह– **किं प्रयोजनम्** इति। अस्यायमभिप्रायः–प्रणिद्दातियच्छतिदयतिदधातिधयतीनामनुकरणशब्दैः अनुक्रियमाणक्रियापदार्थकेनार्थवत्त्वादर्थवदिति प्रतिषेधशब्द (?) प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञैः ..... प्रागेव विभक्त्युत्पत्तेरनैमित्तिक आत्वे, शिति च प्रतिषेधे विहितैकशेषैरुपदेशादिहायं प्रकृतिग्रहणं कर्तव्यतया चोदयति–कथं प्रकृतीनां घुसंज्ञा स्यात्? प्रकृतिषु च लब्धघुसंज्ञासु प्रकृत्यन्वयाद्विकाराणां स्थानिवद्भावशास्त्राद्वा विकाराणामपि यथा स्यादिति। विकाराणां तु प्रकृतीनां न स्यात् विकारधर्मेण प्रकृतीनामनन्वयादिति। तत्र प्रकृतिग्रहणमन्तरेणापि तासामेव स्वरूपग्रहणात् घुसंज्ञासिद्धौ प्रकृतिचोदनानुपपत्तिः। अयं तु दातेस्त्येवमादिषु आर्धधातुकप्रत्ययपराणां प्रतिलब्धात्त्वानां स्वरूपं दाधा इत्यनेनानुकरणशब्देन अन्वाख्यातं मत्वा कृत्सु कारितां (?) मत्वा शब्दस्यावसायसामर्थ्यं घुसंज्ञाशास्त्रस्य संपादयिष्यन् प्रकृतिग्रहणं कर्तव्यतया चोदयति। न च प्रकृतिग्रहणमिति प्रकृतिशब्दस्यैव ग्रहणं कर्तव्यमिति विज्ञायते। किं तर्हि? आत्त्वभूतानां याः प्रकृतयस्तासामेव स्वरूपतो ग्रहणं तद्विकारापकर्षपूर्वकं कर्तव्यमिति। चूर्णिकारस्तु विकाराणां ग्रहणानपकर्षेण प्रकृतिग्रहणं चोदितं मन्यमानो विकारानपकर्षेण प्रकृतीनां स्वरूपतो ग्रहणमशक्यं प्रकृतिविकारमत्यभावप्रसङ्गादिति प्रकृतिशब्दस्वरूपमेव कर्तव्यतया चोदितमिति परिकल्प्य विवृणोति। इतर एकशेषोपदेशाश्रये प्रकृतिप्रकृतिचोदनानर्थक्यं प्रवक्ष्यन्नाह– किं प्रयोजनमिति। इतरो विकारनिर्देशे प्रकृतिग्रहणमलभ्य[मप]कर्षनिर्देशे शब्यते (?) इत्याह– **आत्त्वभूतानाम्** इति। आत्त्वं भूता आत्त्वभूताः। ननु च भवतेरकर्मकत्वात् आत्त्वं भूता इत्येतन्नोपपद्यते। न चास्य भवतेः प्राप्तिवचनत्वात् सकर्मकोपपत्तिः। अस्ति पुनरयं भवतिः क्वचित् प्राप्तिवचनः? अस्तीत्याह। तद्यथा। “एतेन वै भरद्वाजः प्रतर्दनं दैवोदासिं समनह्यत्। स राष्ट्रमभवत्। यं कामयेत राष्ट्रियमयं राष्ट्रं स्यादिति तमेतेन संनह्येद् राष्ट्रं ह भवति” (मैत्रायणीसंहिता ३.३.७)। तथा ‘महद्भूतश्चन्द्रमाः’ महत्त्वं प्राप्त इत्युच्यते। आत्त्वेन वा भूताः आत्त्वभूताः, आत्त्वेन प्राप्ता इत्यर्थः। **ननु [च] भूयिष्ठानि घु[संज्ञा]कार्याणि आर्धधातुके** उच्यन्ते। **तत्र चैत आत्त्वभूताः [दृश्यन्ते]**। कार्यतुषमेषामनार्धधातुकेऽल्पत्वात्, न च कार्यतुषेण परिकल्पनं प्रकृतिग्रहणस्य युक्तम्। न हि सप्तदशसु आदेशेषु स्थानेयोगं प्रयोजयन्त्याः षष्ठ्या अर्थान्तरपरिकल्पनमिडर्थं युक्तम्। यदपि च तत् कार्यतुषं तदपि णत्वविधौ मार्थस्य प्रकृतिग्रहणस्यावश्यकर्तव्यस्य पुरस्तादपकर्षात् सिध्यति। अतोऽनर्थकं प्रकृति-

ग्रहणमिति द्योतयति । यथा वा अर्थान्तरपरिकल्पने सति भूयिष्ठानामुपरोधो नैवं प्रकृतिग्रहणे सति, अतोऽयमसमाधिरित्याह– **शिदर्थं .... शित्यात्त्वं प्रतिषिध्यते।** घुप्रकृत्योर्देङ्धेटोः दाधारूपाभावात् असति घुत्वे घुकार्यं प्रणिदयते प्रणिधयतीति नेर्णत्वं न प्राप्नोति ।

[२] भारद्वाजीयाः पठन्ति। विकृतार्थमिति तेषामधिकम्। **प्रणिदाता प्रणिधाता।** देङ्धेटोरेते रूपे। प्रतिपदोक्तमाकारान्तत्वमत्र नास्तीत्याह– **लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तयोरिति।** कात्यायनस्तु ' गामादाग्रहणेष्वविशेष ' इत्यनेन समर्थ्यत्वान्नैतदुक्तवान्।

[३] अथ क्रियमाणेऽपि इति । एवं मन्यते– दाधासंनिधाने प्रकृतिग्रहणं श्रूयते। तत्र सामानाधिकरण्येन संबन्धः स्यात्, दाधाप्रकृतिभूतस्य घुसंज्ञा भवतु, सा तु विकृतिभूतानां मा भूत्, दाधां वानेवंभूतानां मा भूत् इति च कल्प्यमाना घुसंज्ञा सर्वविषया सती विशिष्टविषया क्रियमाणोपरुद्धा भवति, तस्मान्नैवं शक्यं विज्ञातुम्। कथं तर्हि द्वैतम्? उच्यते।

[अ] सामानाधिकरण्यकल्पनायां दाधाश्रुतेरपरार्थत्वादनुग्रहः । पारार्थ्यात्तु प्रकृतिग्रहणस्योपरोधः ।

[आ] षष्ठ्यर्थे तु दाधाश्रुतेः परार्थत्वादुपरोधः, प्रकृतिश्रुतेरनुग्रह इति तुल्यबलत्वाद्विचारः। ननु च दाधां प्रकृतयः इत्यस्मिन् निर्देशे बहुवचनेन न भवितव्यम्। दाधामित्येतेनैव प्रकृतिबहुत्वस्य गतत्वात्। यथा 'सूर्यं चक्षुर्गमयतात्' (मैत्रायणीसंहिता ४.१३.४) 'उरो वा पद्भिराहत' (तैत्तिरीयसंहिता ३. १. ४. ३) इति। न वादेशभेदेऽपि प्रकृतिभेदात्, जातित्वादेव त्वत्र बहुवचननिर्देशः प्रत्यादेशं प्रकृतिभेदप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्।

[४] नैवं विज्ञायत इति। अत्रायमभिप्रायः। चोदनैवं सति बहुकरी भवति, इतरथा त्वन्यतरोपरोध इति। ननु चैवमपि सति प्रकृतिमात्रस्य स्यात्। न, प्रकृतेः साकाङ्क्षत्वादन्यस्य च विकारस्यानिर्देशात् दाधामेव या प्रकृतिरिति विज्ञायते।

[५] ततो वक्ष्यामि दाधा घु अदाबर्थ इति। ननु दाधामर्थवत्त्वादेवानर्थकानामभावात् विशेषणानर्थक्यम्। अनुवृत्तिसामर्थ्यात् प्रथमानिर्दिष्टमर्थग्रहणं विज्ञास्यते। अर्थश्च घुसंज्ञो भवतीत्यर्थमात्रस्य च घुसंज्ञाप्रसङ्गो, दाधामेव निर्देशात् तेषां योऽर्थस्तस्य सम्बन्धो भविष्यति। अर्थे चासंभवात् तत्प्रत्यायकानां संबन्धो विज्ञास्यते। प्रकृतिविकारयोश्चासावर्थ इति सर्वस्य भविष्यति। अथवा सप्तमीनिर्दिष्टमेवानुवर्ततेऽर्थे इति, अर्थे

च यो वर्तते स च घुसंज्ञ इति। न सर्वस्य चार्थे वर्तमानस्य संज्ञाप्रसङ्गः। दाधा अनन्तरनिर्दिष्टाः संबध्यन्ते। इतरः सिद्धमिष्टम्, अनिष्टमपि तु प्राप्नोति इत्याह – **नैवं शक्यम्** इति।

[६] **शिदर्थेन तावन्नार्थः …. अवश्यं तत्र** इत्याह। भवतु, कृत्वापि **इह** प्रकृतिग्रहणं णत्वे पुनः कर्तव्यं, तदेव चोभयकारि भविष्यति। मा इत्येवंभूते विधीयमानं मेशब्दे णत्वं न प्राप्नोति इति तत्र प्रकृतिग्रहणं कर्तव्यं **तत् पुरस्तात् अपकक्ष्यते घुप्रकृतौ** इति। तदेव च मा इत्येतेन संभन्त्स्यत इति। इतरो णत्वशास्त्रगते प्रकृतिग्रहणे दोषमाह– **प्रनिमिनोति प्रनिमीनाति इत्यत्रापि प्राप्नोति** इति। एते अपि माप्रकृती भवतो “मीनातिमिनोतिदीङां ल्यपि च” (पा. ६. १. ५०) इत्यात्त्वस्य विधानात्। इतरः स्वमुखेनैव प्रतिपादयिष्यन्नाह– **अथाक्रियमाणेऽपि प्रकृतिग्रहणे** इति। यमेवायमत्र णत्वाभावे समाधिं वक्ष्यति प्रनिमाता प्रनिमातुमिति स एव मे प्रकृतिग्रहणेऽपि सति भवति इति समाधिमाह– **आकारान्तस्य ङितो ग्रहणं विज्ञास्यते।** इतरः स्वमुखेनैव प्रतिपाद्याह – **यथैव तर्हि अक्रियमाणे** इति।

[७] **समानशब्दानां प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः।** एवं मन्यते– दृङ्धृङोः वृद्धौ क्रियमाणायामाकारे सति दाधाशब्दौ निर्वर्त्येते। रेफश्चायं .. . ऋतः स्थाने योऽण् रपरतया विधीयमान आगमभूतः ‘ आगमानामपि [आगमि]ग्रहणेन ग्रहणात् ’ अर्थवत्त्वमङ्गस्य न विहन्तीत्यर्थवद्ग्रहण एव समानशब्दप्रतिषेध इदमुच्यते। अभक्तपरादित्वयो रेफेणार्थवत्त्वस्याविशेषात्। अथवा रूपग्रहणानुमितस्यार्थवद्ग्रहणस्य शास्त्रे बहुप्रकारत्वख्यापनार्थं प्रनिदारयति प्रनिधारयति [इति] रूप[द्व]यो[पक्षेपः] ।

[अ] **समानशब्दाप्रतिषेधः।** उक्तमेतत् ‘ स्वं रूपं शब्दस्य ’ (पा. १. १. ६८) इति ‘ स्वंरूप ’ ग्रहणाद् द्व्यात्मकः शास्त्रे शब्दो व्याप्रियते रूपात्मकोऽर्थात्मकश्चेति। तस्माद् दाधामर्थवतामेव घुसंज्ञा। दारिधार्योश्च दाधाशब्दौ अनर्थकौ। दा[र्]धा[र्]शब्दयोरर्थवत्त्वात्। ननु चागमास्तद्ग्रहणेन गृह्यन्ते। स्यादेतदेवं यद्ययं रेफो दाशब्दस्यागमः स्यात्। कस्य तर्हि ? ऋकारस्याण् रपरो भवति। अभक्तपरादिपक्षौ तु नैव स्त इति न तत्र प्रतिविधीयते।

[आ] **अनुपसर्गाद्वा** इति अयमिदानीमनर्थकस्यापि सतो दाशब्दस्य घुसंज्ञामाश्रित्य परिहारमाह – अस्त्वस्य घुसंज्ञा, तत्प्रकृतस्य तु कार्यस्य भावात् दोषः। न हि संज्ञामात्रं दोषाय। घुमादिषु हि ‘ नेः ’ ‘ उपसर्गात् ’ (पा. ८.४.१६; १४) इति णत्वं विधीयते। क्रियायोगे चोपसर्गसंज्ञा (पा. १.४.५९)। दाशब्दश्चेह न क्रियावचनः।

यं च प्रति गत्युपसर्गसंज्ञा (पा. १.४.५९-६०) स घुसंज्ञो न भवति। यस्य च संज्ञा तस्य क्रियावाचित्वाभावात् तं प्रति उपसर्गसंज्ञा नास्ति इति णत्वस्याभावः । इतरो यद्येवानर्थक्यादनुपसर्गाद्वा नित्यनिवृत्तिं मन्यसे, इष्टेऽपि ते विषये घुसंज्ञा न प्राप्नोति इत्याह **इहापि तर्हि न प्राप्नोति अत्रापि** हि दाप्शब्दस्यार्थवत्त्वं तमेव च प्रति क्रियायोगः, न दाशब्दस्यार्थवत्त्वं, न च तं प्रति क्रियायोग इति एकपरिहारेणोभयोर्निवृत्तिं करोति । स तस्य व्यतिरेकं करोति इति न तस्योपचयेऽपचये वा सति व्यपदेशव्यावृत्तिर्भवति । तद्यथा लोके लब्धदेवदत्तव्यपदेशहानं न भवति तथा तृच्सनोः प्रतिलब्धार्द्धधातुकव्यपदेशयोः प्रत्ययवशादिकारादिरवयवान्तरमुपजायते, अकारे वा सनो विगते नार्द्धधातुकव्यपदेशनिवृत्तिर्भवति । यदि हि स्यात् लविता पिपठिषिता .... (सति गुणेऽदाबार्द्धधातुकनिमित्तो न स्यात्, एवमिहापि दाधोः प्रतिलब्धघुव्यपदेशयोः प्रत्ययवशात् पकारेऽवयवान्तरे लोकशास्त्रयोरिवाव्यतिरेककर उपजाते विगते वा प्रणिदयते इति घुसंज्ञाव्यपदेशहानं न भवति। तत्रैवं सति दाधोः प्रतिलब्धघुसंज्ञयोरव्यतिरेककरे अवयवान्तरे पकारोपजनेऽनिवृत्तघुव्यपदेशयोः परतः 'उपसर्गस्थात्' इदमुच्यते **अर्थवत** इति। अनर्थकस्यापि तु लब्धव्यपदेशस्यावयवान्तर उपजायमानेऽव्यतिरेककरे व्यपदेशहानं न भवति । तथाहि आर्द्धधातुकनिमित्तो 'गुणो भवति वृद्धिर्भवतीति रेफशिरसाविकाराकारौ भवतः' इति। तथा दापयतिमुखेनेदं प्रस्तुतमिति 'अर्थवतो ह्यागमः' इत्युच्यते । लब्धव्यपदेशस्योपचये [ऽपचये वा]पि स्वव्यपदेशहननं न भवति । तथा ह्याद्यन्तमध्यानामपि शब्दानां स्वव्यपदेश[हानं न भवति])।

॥ तरप्तमपौ घः ॥ १. १. २२ ॥

[१] इहानुबन्धत्वात् पित्स्मृतिविषयावेव तरप्तमपौ। तरप्तमपाविति अनुकरणम् । तरप्तमपाविति अनुकरणानुकरणोऽयम् । दर्शनद्वयं चानुबन्धेषु । अनुबन्धश्चानुकरण एव क्रियते । कार्यं केवलमनुक्रियमाणं प्रतिपद्यते । अन्ये मन्यन्ते । तद्धर्मा एवायमनुकरणैः क्रियते । सर्वथा भूतपूर्वगतिरनुबन्ध इति इहापि नदीतर इति स्मर्तुं शक्यते । तस्मात् घसंज्ञा प्राप्नोति । अत्र द्वौ परिहारौ संभवतः । लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तयोरिति च साहचर्यं च 'अस्य गोर्द्वितीयेनार्थः' इति। तमपोऽत्यन्तादष्टापचारस्य प्रकर्षार्थीयस्तरप्शब्दो युक्त इति । तत्र साहचर्यमनाश्रितम् । लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तत्वं तु न संभवति। न हि लक्षणं 'तरप्' इत्यस्य प्रतिपादकम्। कस्य तर्हि ? 'तर'शब्दस्य । प्रतिपदोक्तश्चायं शब्दः । तस्मान्नेदं शास्त्रे रूपं न प्रयोगे रूपम् । निर्देशान्तरमेवेदमिति ।

परिहारान्तरमुपादत्ते । **घसंज्ञायां नदीतरेऽप्रतिषेधः** । न प्रतिषेधनं कर्तव्यम् । प्रतिषेधश्च प्रतिषेधनमिति क्रियारूपेणाश्रितो नञा संबध्यते । भाष्यकारस्तु द्रव्यभूतमाश्रित्य विवृणोति – **अनर्थकः प्रतिषेधोऽप्रतिषेधः** इति । प्रतिषेधोऽप्ययं कार्यस्याकरणात् न प्रतिषेध इति व्यपदिश्यते, प्रतिषेधमन्तरेण सिद्धत्वात् । **तरब्-ग्रहणं ह्यौपदेशिकम्** । उपदेशे प्रयुक्तम्, उपदेशे वा भवम् [औपदेशिकम्] । शास्त्रे यस्तरप्-शब्दः स गृह्यते अवयवार्थे इति एतद् व्याचष्टे । शब्दः सहचारिणोऽनुबन्धनार्थस्य संबन्धित इति । स चानुबन्धो यत्र समानशब्दत्वं तत्रार्थमन्यद्वा ध्रुवं निमित्तमुपलक्षयति । यत्र तु नास्ति समानशब्दत्वं तत्र शब्दमेव प्रतिपादयति । **यत्रास्यैतद्रूपं** भवति अनुबन्धसहितमिति, अर्थरूपवरणं च श्रुतिसंबन्धे भवति इति प्रयोगोऽभिसमीक्ष्यते । तत्र योऽव्यभिचारी नित्यः प्रधानार्थे प्रयुक्तः स आश्रयितव्य इत्याह– **रूपनिर्ग्रहश्च [शब्दस्य] नान्तरेण लौकिकं प्रयोगमिति** । एष न्यायः । सत्यनुबन्धे लौकिके प्रयोगे प्रवर्तेरन् । तत्र न कार्या लौकिकाः प्रयोगा इति लौकिकानुबन्धव्यवहारस्य निवृत्तत्वात् नायं तरप्-शब्दः । कस्तर्हि ? तरशब्द इति लौकिकात् प्रयोगान्निवृत्ता अनित्यं गुणभूतं द्वितीयं प्रयोगमुपास्महे । **कश्चासौ ? उपदेशो नाम** । उपदेशेऽप्शब्दो न तरप्शब्द इति । न लौकिके प्रयोगे एतद्रूपं, न शास्त्रे इति काल्पनिके रूपे प्राप्तिर्न विद्यते इति नास्ति घसंज्ञा ।

[२] अथ वास्त्वस्य इति । कार्यं दोषाय न संज्ञेति । **समानाधिकरणेषु घादिषु** । अयं तावत् नद्यास्तर इति व्यधिकरणः । प्रकर्षार्थीयौ च स्वार्थिकौ च कारकप्रकर्षे वर्तमानौ समानाधिकरणौ । **यदा तर्हि सैव नदी स [एव] तरः** । ननु च तीर्णिरिति भवितव्यम् । नैष दोषः । यदा तीर्यते इति तरः, तर इति सामान्यमात्रं प्राधान्येनाश्रीयते[यदा]पुनरतीर्यते नदीत्युत्तरकालं विशेषणं, तदा नास्ति प्रधानस्य लिङ्गस्य त्यागः, यथा मुखद्वितीया नासिका वचनमस्येति, न तु वचनी इति । अथवा रूढिः, तरो नद्या विशेष्यते । समुदायेषु हि शब्दाः प्रवृत्ता इति । **स्त्रीलिङ्गेषु घादिषु** (पा. ६.३. ४३) 'स्त्रियाम्' (पा. ६. ३. ३) इति च वर्तते । समुदायेषु हि लिङ्गयोगात् स्वार्थिकोऽपि स्त्रीलिङ्ग इति व्यपदिश्यते । **ब्राह्मणी रूपमिवेति** । ब्राह्मणीवेयमाकृतिः ब्राह्मणीरूपमिति । केचिदुदाहरन्ति– साम्नस्तरः सामतर इति । नाद्घस्य (पा ८. २.१७) इति नुट् प्राप्नोति । छान्दसत्वान्न भविष्यति इति प्रतिविधीयते ।

॥ बहुगणवतुडति संख्या ॥ १. १. २३ ॥

संख्यासंज्ञायां संख्याग्रहणम् । अधिकरणसप्तमी, संख्यासंज्ञासूत्रे संख्याग्रहणमिति । अथवा संख्यासंज्ञायां विधीयमानायां विधास्यमानायां विहितायां वा संख्या-

ग्रहणमिति। संख्याग्रहणं चास्मिन् योगे, ‘बहुगणवतुडतिसंख्याः संख्या’ इत्येवं पठितव्यमिति। एतत् प्रदर्श्यते– **संख्या च संख्यासंज्ञा भवतीति वक्तव्यम्।** अथ वा एवं पाठः कर्तव्यः – ‘बहुगणवतुडति संख्या’ ततः ‘संख्या च’ इति। **किं प्रयोजनम्?** अभिप्रायोऽयम्। यथा ‘पशुरपत्यं देवता,’ ‘प्राचां, उदीचां’ इति लौकिका एवोपादीयन्ते शास्त्रव्यवहारे– न ह्येषां शास्त्रान्तरेऽस्ति परिभाषणमिति – एवमेतेऽप्येकादयः शास्त्रान्तरेणापरिभाषिता लौकिका एव। लौकिकैश्चैवं व्यवह्रियते। अथ वा किं प्रयोजनमिति किमधिकार्थप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्। इहेदं संख्याग्रहणमेषामेव बह्वादीनां संचक्षाणानां संज्ञाप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं, वैपुल्यार्थस्य बहुशब्दस्य मा भूत् बहुरोदनः, बहुः सूप इति। पूगवचनस्य संघवचनस्य च गणशब्दस्य यथा न स्यात् —

“लेभिरे वारि सारङ्गा गणश्चात्र पिपासिताः” इतीदमेवं वर्ण्यते। [यदा] संख्या च बह्वादयः [च] तदा संज्ञा संख्या इति अध्यवसायार्थमिति प्रदर्शयति। **एकादिकायाः संख्यायाः संख्याप्रदेशेषु** इति। संज्ञायाः कार्यार्थत्वात् प्रदेशमेवोपादत्ते। न हि संज्ञिनां संज्ञाप्रतिलम्भार्थमुपादानम्। किं तर्हि? कार्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमिति। पशुरपत्यमिति यथा संप्रत्यय एवमिहापि भविष्यति इत्याह– **ननु चैकादिका [संख्या] लोके संख्या [इति] प्रतीता** इति। **इतरथा ह्यसंप्रत्ययोऽकृत्रिमत्वाद्यथा लोके।** कुतः? **कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसंप्रत्ययः।** यथैव लोकात् प्रतिपन्नो भवान् ‘एकादयः संख्याशब्दवाच्या’ इति, एवमिदमपि लोकेऽवस्थितं ‘कृत्रिमे संप्रत्ययः’ इति। कोऽयं न्यायो येनैवं लोके संप्रत्ययः इति? उच्यते। इह गोपालकशब्दोऽर्थविशेषनिमित्तमुपादाय प्रवर्तमानः प्रतिविधानं चोपाददीत यथा ‘पञ्चभिः हलैः कृषति’ इति। कर्तृत्वं वा ‘पालयत्येताः [गाः]’ इति जातिं वा। अथ वा रूढिर्निमित्तान्तरेणोपादीयमाना निमित्तान्तरमपसारयति यथा क्रिया जात्यादीनपसारयति इति। तुल्यजातीयविषय एव नियमो भवति, एवमिहापीति। बह्वादय एवात्र प्रकृता इति भावः॥ ....

TRANSLATION

TRANSLATION

"A dual (ending in) *ī*, *ū* and *e* (is technically named) *pragṛhya*". (P 1.1.11)

[1]

In the case of *ī* etc., individual (sounds) possessed of a particular character are heard; and one's own form (of a word) is of two kinds. Although a word, as soon as it is uttered, is a conveyor and is understood as the conveyed, because of the two potentialities residing (in it) — it is possible to quote another word by a quotation because of there being no difference in hearing — still those particulars already existing, which are admitted as being unavoidable, are (ultimately) given up and (only what is) universal is resorted to. Or the use may be for indicating the particular. Both possibilities are there. Alternately, when it is intended to convey the notion of class, if we have recourse to something universal by excluding the particular, (the defect of) over-application (ensues). (Under these circumstances) this (code-letter) *t* may serve to delimit the class from other individual sounds having different durations. Or, there may be an intention to convey the particular, and this (i. e. the addition of *t*) can be justified so as to arrive at (the technical name *pragṛhya*) in the case of other individuals endowed with other qualities (*udātta* etc.) which are accepted as specialities, themselves being different (but) having the same duration.

Now as far as (the alternative of) the notion of class is concerned, exclusion of short vowels is (already) achieved by the very fact of greater effort (involved in uttering a long vowel); (on the contrary) the name *pragṛhya* is desired in the case of the prolated vowels. The addition of *t* thus leads to unwanted result. Even on (the alternative of) individuality, owing to the fact that *anaṅ* and other *ādeśa*-s are taught by utterance of the very word (*udātta* etc.), the non-distinguishing nature of *udātta* and others is achieved even while figuring in the utterance. That is why the author of the *Bhāṣya* says: "Why is the name *pragṛhya* taught for *ī* etc. with *t* added after them ?"

Taking recourse to the intention of conveying individuals and (also) to the view that *udātta* etc. are certainly distinguishers, (the author of the *Bhāṣya*) says: "So that their homogeneous sounds (also) having the same duration should be understood (as having the name *pragṛhya*) on the strength

of the rule *taparas tatkālasya* (P 1. 1. 70)." But the author of the *Cūrṇi* has described the mentioning of the word *udātta* in the case of *anaṅ* etc. as a sign of the non-distinctiveness of *udātta* etc. Then whence this distinctiveness of *udātta* etc. ? (To this query, the reply is :) It has been said by the author of the Vārttikas : " The addition of *t* to the phoneme *ā* is for the purpose of including the homogeneous sounds, since the accent is distinctive (P 1. 1. 1 Vā 13) ". When he says : " (The rule) P 1. 1. 69 (is framed) because of the distinction made by accent, nasality and duration (1. 1. 69 Vā 1) " distinctiveness is definitely accepted by him. It is inferred that distinctiveness was also accepted by the author of the sūtras because of his reading *aṇ* in the rule (P 1. 1. 69) and because of his attaching respective accents (as code-sounds). In the case of *anaṅ* etc., however, the specific addition of the word *udātta* may be (for setting aside non-*udātta* individuals) on the class-alternative; and so it is possible to maintain that it is not a clue (of non-distinctiveness of *udātta* and others). " Of which (homogeneous sounds) ? " This is the idea (behind the question) : when addition of *t* is made, there is no understanding of its other homogeneous sounds having a different duration (i.e. *pluta*) because of the rule P 1. 1. 70. " Of *Udātta, Anudātta* and *Svarita.* " Here *anunāsika* also is read by some. But this can only be an incidental statement, because nasal *ī* etc. are not possible, since nasality is prohibited when it concerns (a sound which is) subject to the name *pragṛhya* (*Aṇo 'pragṛhyasyānunāsikaḥ* P 8. 4. 57).

[2]

" But the prolated (vowels) do not get the name *pragṛhya.* " This is not a defect (arising) out of the addition of *t*. Out of what then ? Out of the acceptance of the individual as the word-meaning. " The prolated (vowel) is (technically) non-existent. Because of its (technical) non-existence, (the prolated vowels) are (practically) of the same duration ". (Objection :) Granted that a three-mora duration may not be there, because of the (technical) non-existence of a prolated (vowel). But how can the equi-durativeness, (which is) non-existent, because previouly caused to cease, come back to life again ? (Reply :) This is no defect, because of the doctrine of (technical) non-existence (i.e. ineffectiveness) of the rule (in question). The equi-durativeness is understood, because there is no cessation (of the two-mora character). In the matter of words, the notion of proceeding or receding (of an operation) stands in the original form of the word to be derived in the absence of a (grammatical) rule teaching an operation. Before a substitution-rule, when the rule teaching (technical) non-existence has not proceeded, neither the original ceases to exist nor the substitute comes into existence. Such being the case, when a rule, which had proceeded,

becomes (technically) non-existent on account of some (meta-)rule, then the mind, proceeding in an opposite way towards the form to be derived by the operation of that (rule), resorts to the original as existing and to the substitute as not existing. (We accept *śāstrāsiddhatva* i. e. rule-invalidity.) That is why he is going to say : ' when the name *pragṛhya* (is given to *ī* and *ū* following) after *m* (of *adas*), since it (i.e. the pair *ī* and *ū*) is (technically) non-existent, the resulting of the substitutes *ay*, *āv* and a single (phoneme) should be prohibited. ' If we accept *Kāryāsiddhatva* i. e. operation-invalidity, the defect of the substitutes *ay*, *āv*, and a single (phoneme) is not justified.

(Objection :) But before an effect is achieved, when a grammatical rule proceeds to accomplish its objective, at that time the rule is firmly established in its injunctive character — the very soul of a rule — and so it may be (then) regarded as (technically) non-existent. But when, subsequent to the activity of a rule, its objective having been achieved, it has naturally ceased (to function) simply because of the fulfilment of the objective of that rule— how can it be then regarded as (technically) non-existent (merely) on the basis of a (meta-) rule ? What exists then is the effect (of the operation) and so, it is reasonable to maintain the (technical) non-existence of the effect (of the operation). This being the case, there is no equi-durativeness owing to the absence of the original. (Reply :) This is no defect. Even when a rule has ceased after propounding its content and when it is accepted as (techically) existent, (the effect) has to be necessarily accepted as enjoined by a rule. Without following a (valid) rule nobody accepts even (substitutes like) *ay*, *āv* etc. taking them as equally correct. If this is so, just as the mind recedes from a grammatical operation for want of a cause when (the technical) non-existence of a rule is known and when it is in the proceeding stage, similarly whenever an operation is sought to be in conformity with the rule, the rule also is sought to be (technically) existent. So it is proper to resort to the (technical) non-existence of a rule (rather than that of its operation). Therefore, when the name *pragṛhya* is being laid down when the prolated (vowel) is already laid down, and the rule teaching the prolated (vowel) is sought (to be existent), at that time, it being (technically) non-existent, the form of the original is unmodified – as if no prolated (vowel) had been laid down — and so the name *pragṛhya* is established on the ground of equi-durativeness.

[3]

" The prolated (vowel) is (technically) existent ... since he (Pāṇini) teaches maintenance of the original state. " And surely, vocalic euphony does not become due, unless the prolated (vowel) is (looked upon as) (technically) existent in the matter of the continuance of the original state.

Of course the continuance of the original state has to be taught; we do not say that (special) effort be done for (teaching) continuance of the original state. (What we say is that) referring to *pluta* as the subject in the rule *plutaḥ prakṛtyā* (6. 1. 125, 115) is not reasonable; but it is resorted to. Therefore, indeed, regarding the prolated (vowel) as (technically) existent, its presence is inferred.

(Objection :) But it will be possible to infer, of necessity, the presence of a prolated (vowel) only with reference to that matter where the teaching of an operation will be unreasonable without the (technical) existence (of a prolated vowel). In this way the prolated (vowel) could be (regarded as) (technically) existent only in the matter of continuance of the original state, (but) not in the matter of every vocalic euphony. Thus he (the author of the Vārttikas) will say : " [*ī*, *ū* and *m* can have] (technical) existence because of (their being) a substratum (of the name *pragṛhya*) as in the matter of substitution of *u* for *ru* (P 1. 1. 12 Vā 4) ". True, it is so. Thus there are, in all, three alternatives possible here : (1) Inference of the (technical) existence of the prolated (vowel) in the matter of the continuance of the original state, or (2) such an inference in the context of vocalic euphony (in general); or (3) continuance of the original state of the original (vowel) alone, which is going to be prolated (in future), may be understood. (Further) even on the alternative of inference, when a statement is being inferred, either a statement is inferred in the matter of the (technical) existence of a single rule, or in the matter of the (technical) existence of the whole topic. Moreover, there is an inference which has a particular application and one which has a general application. In both there is no loss (lit. falling off) of the connection of (the word) *pluta* [' prolated vowel '] with its primary meaning. (But) this is the difference : in the matter of a single rule, only the immediate item is inferred, while when the sign refers to the whole topic, although what is mediate is inferred in a general way, still the total connection is resorted to. When, however, a would-be *pluta* is understood, although the word *pluta* conveys a meaning which is not primary, still nowhere is anything to be inferred for which there is no word-authority. Thus taking recourse to (inference by) a sign seen in a general way, a statement with a whole topic as subject-matter is inferred viz. " a prolated (vowel) is (technically) existent in the matter of vocalic euphony. " He (the author of the *Bhāṣya*) shows that there is economy (of words) also in this alternative (when he says): " the words ' after a non-*pluta* when a non-*pluta* follows ' (P 6. 1. 113) can be dispensed with. " When the prolated (vowel) is (technically) existent there is no equi-durativeness and so, that prolated (vowel) cannot be the cause of *u*- substitution (taught in P 6. 1. 111). — Taking his stand on (the paribhāṣā) : *yathoddeśaṁ saṁjñāparibhāṣam* " *Saṁjñā*-s and *Paribhāṣā*-s remain where

they are taught," (the author of the *Bhāṣya*) says: "If the prolated (vowel) is (technically) existent in the matter of the vocalic euphony, so what?" This (i. e. naming as *pragṛhya*) is not a vocalic euphony, since the name *pragṛhya* is laid down in a different context.

[4]

"(It i.e. *pluta*) is (technically) existent also in the matter of a naming-statement. How? Because of (the paribhāṣā) *Kāryakālaṁ saṁjñāparibhāṣam* '*Saṁjñā*-s and *Paribhāṣā*-s are attracted by operation'". Teaching of a (technical) name is for (some) operation. (Therefore) there is no, fulfilment of the purpose of a (technical) name until it has become subordinate to operation. There is no harm whatsoever if (the vowels) *a* etc. in *bhavati pacati* etc. do not have names *ac* etc. (i.e. *aṇ*, *al*). The names *ac* etc. do not become (operative) here because it is not proper for a rule to proceed without a purpose. But even though the technical names are subordinate to an operation, they are laid down for all, as they are taken out of a (particalar) context, without being tied (down) to any topic so as to assume a subordinate nature to many principal (operations) taught in different places. But this (i.e. a name) takes its birth in the domain of operation only. So, the technical name *pragṛhya*, though read elsewhere (and not where it is taught), is deemed as having its location in the context of the vocalic euphony. Since no difference, in some examples, is made (by this name *pragṛhya*) (the author of the *Bhāṣya*) asks: "But what is the purpose in teaching the name *pragṛhya* for a prolated (vowel)?" Referring to where the difference lies, (he) says: "So that continuance of the original state, based on a *pragṛhya*, may be ailable". He demonstrates the absence of difference in some examples already in his mind (by saying): "Let it not be so" (i.e. let not a *pluta* stand in the original state because of its being a *pragṛhya*.) "It will be thus i.e. the prolated (vowel) (stands) in its original state". There is no difference in the continuance oj the original state as such. He says: where the continuance in the original state based on (the name) *pluta* is prohibited, there the continuance based on *pragṛhya* must, of necessity, be sought. "It is not possible this way, for there will be a difficulty when a non-Vedic word *iti* follows" (e.g.) *agnī* 3 *iti*. The continuance of the original state based on the name *pluta* having been prohibited by P 6. 1. 129: *aplutavad upasthite*, if the (name) *pragṛhya* is not there, then continuance of the original state based on the (name) *pragṛhya* will also not be there and so a vocalic euphony will be due. But if the (name) *pragṛhya* is there, continuance of the original state, based on the (name) *pragṛhya*, takes place when the one based on the (name) *pluta* is prohibited. If it is held that continuance of the original state is not at all desired here, (the author of the *Bhāṣya*) says (as a reply) to it: "Because

the Ācārya will read: 'The reading of *vat* is for prohibiting the operations (caused) by (the name) *pluta*'. 'If *pluta* (itself) is prohibited, there will result a prohibition of that *pluta* (i. e. three-mora character) also (which is technically) called *pragṛhya*, because (the continuance of the original state is) prescribed by another (part of the rule P 6. 1. 115; P 6. 1. 129 Vā 1, 2)." If *pluta* itself is prohibited, even that *pluta* (which is also named) *pragṛhya*, will lose its three-mora duration and then there will be the hearing of (a vowel) having two moras. But when continuance of the original state, based on (the name) *pluta*, is prohibited, only that *pluta* which is not a *pragṛhya* forms a vocalic euphony e. g. in *devadattā* 3 *iti* = *devadatteti;* while, even when the operation based on (the name) *pluta* is prohibited, the hearing of a vowel with three moras becomes justified in the case of a *pluta* which is (also named) a *pragṛhya*, when there takes place a continuance of the original state based on (the name) *pragṛhya*. There is, therefore, a usefulness of the name *pragṛhya* in the case of a *pluta*. And that (name) is not available when the individualistic view of word-meaning is admitted.

[5]

"How, then, if the name *pragṛhya* is taught for long vowels without the added *t*?" But is this difficulty (i.e. one under discussion) due to the addition of *t* that you are saying (this) 'How, then, if the name *pragṛhya* ... etc.?' This difficulty is due, however, to the acceptance of the individual as the word-meaning. Here some say: he is saying the same thing. If, giving up the individual, the class is accepted as the word-meaning, then, when a long (vowel) is uttered, there will not be an over-application to the short (vowels) because of the additional effort (involved in such an utterance). Also there will be the name *pragṛhya* of the prolated (vowel). In this way short (vowels) will be excluded. That is why he says '(of long vowels) without the added *t*'. Another (disputant), however, thinking that this is said by the opponent of the individualistic view of word-meaning, says: "Even then the phoneme *e* alone will include (its) homogeneous (sounds); but *ī* and *ū* will not include (their homogeneous sounds), because of their lack of *aṇ*-ness." Or, in the opinion of somebody, there is an inclusion of the homogeneous (sounds) on the individualistic word-meaning view itself, on (its own inherent) strength, (because of its superfluity otherwise), who (therefore) says 'How, then, if ... etc.' Another one, (thinking) that even so, no difficulty disappears, says 'even then, ... etc.'. Yet another says: operations laid down for *ac* are seen even in the case of long (vowels) in rules like P 8. 4. 57: *aṇo' pragṛhyasya* ... etc. It is reasonable, therefore, (to say) that the same should take place in the matter of the rule P 1.1.69 *aṇudit savarṇasya* ... etc. That is why it is said 'How, then, (if the name *pragṛhya*

is taught) for long vowels without the added *t*?' Elsewhere also the long (vowels) get operations by the rule P 1.1.69 : *aṇudit savarṇasya*... etc. (But) in the case of the word *aṇ* in the rule (P 1. 1. 69) there is no other valid rule which prescribes inclusion of the *savarṇa.* It is improper to employ the rule P 1. 1. 69 *aṇudit* ... for its own benefit (i. e. the word *aṇ* in that rule to be used to include its *savarṇas.* What is taught in respect of the word *aṇ* (by the rule P 1. 1. 69 *aṇudit*...) is incapable of inclusion of its *savarṇas* owing to the incompleteness of the meaning of the rule. So (the author of the *Bhāṣya*) says: "Even then the phoneme *e* alone ... ... etc." "If, then, of the short (vowels) ... etc.". When there is addition of *t*, (the name *pragṛhya*) is not available in (cases like) *agnī*, *vāyū.* But now in the absence of the addition of *t*, even when an individual is (accepted as) the word-meaning, the name *pragṛhya* is established for long and prolated (vowels), because an *aṇ* includes its homogeneous sounds. But it is (then) due for short (vowels). How (is there) the plural number? Some say that this is an *ekaśeṣa* of dissimilar (words) like *prathamayoḥ* (in P 6. 1. 102; 7. 1. 28); (while) others explain plurality on the basis of the plurality of (actual) examples (of *ī* and *ū*).

[6]

"If so, then what is the use of our effort for (showing that) the prolated (vowel) is (technically) existent in the matter of vocalic euphony? ... "How is it that that was said to be a clue?" The clue is being justified in another way. (The expression) *plutabhāvin* is to be explained as *plutaṁ prāpnoti* 'what reaches a *pluta*' or *pluto bhāvī asya* 'what is going to become a *pluta.*' There is a continuance of the original state of that original (sound) which is going to become a *pluta.* On this view no statement is required to be inferred which has no word-authority. Also since the metarule about (technical) non-existence is not superseded and the grammatical concept of the continuance of the original state is followed, both are fulfilled. And only this is the clue behind the assumption of the figuratively used word (*pluta*) that (the author of the sūtras) teaches prohibition by saying *aplutāt* and *aplute* (in the rule P 6.1.113). (Objection): The character of the would-be *pluta* belonging to the original is, of course, to be expected as the basis. That, however, is (technically) non-existent; (and hence) it is not proper to expect a non-existent (thing). With reference to this, some explain — Here with reference to words which are caused by the grammatical science, sometimes one acts according to one's inclination, sometimes popular usage is followed. To illustrate: the fault of mutual dependence is got rid of as in P 1. 1. 1 Vā 9: '(the goal) is achieved because of the eternal character of word. *Āt* and *aic* are certainly not produced by

the name *vṛddhi*; (all that is done is that) just the correctness of *āt* and *aic*, which (already) exist, is grammatically stated; for, even in the absence of the propounding rule, their correctness is resorted to. On this reasoning the metarule *lakṣaṇapratipadoktayoḥ* ... etc. "(When in a sūtra a word-form occurs) such as is directly mentioned and which is also derivable by a rule of grammar, (then that word-form) is to be understood which is directly uttered)" can be (justified). Sometimes it is not resorted to. The usage of a word being independent of grammatical science, there is neither something taught by a grammatical rule, nor something mentioned directly. (Objection :) This would-be nature of *pluta* is unjustified because of the absence of original substitute-relationship in (this mundane) world. (Reply :) This is no defect. Even in the world the domain and non-domain (of a thing) is clearly marked viz. (as in) 'this obtains in its own (i. e. respective) field.' Thus it has been said : 'Because the use of *ij* etc. and *yaj* etc. is (distinctly) observed in the world' and the like. Immediately later on he will say : 'The originals of (vowels) *ī* and *ū*, coming after the original of the phoneme *m*, (get the name *pragṛhya*).' On this alternative, however, understanding of the future course is meaningless. Because even the present (use) can be resorted to in the worldly parlance. What difference (is made by insisting) that the existence of the prolated (vowel) resorted to for the sake of (mere) indication should be understood and not that which (actually) undergoes the operation ? Some say in this regard : True, the present is possible, so also the future; but it is not proper that the future is here resorted to. Because everywhere the future is resorted to only in the absence of the present. Moreover, another view also is possible — the *yathoddeśa* view (remaining where they are taught) about the (technical) names and metarules should be accepted.

[7]

"Even then, an operation due to the name *pragṛhya* (taught) for a (technically) existent (*pluta*) is not achieved (in the matter) of *pluta*"; for, (technical) names and metarules (are valid only) in the region of operation. The prolated (vowel) is (technically) existent when the name *pragṛhya* is (present) in the place where nasalisation is prohibited. The name *pragṛhya* being invalid because of the three-mora measure (of the vowel), prohibition of nasalisation in the (dual form) *agnī* 3 is not available. "If so, then what is the use of accepting the *kāryakālaṁ saṁjñāparibhāṣam* view (i. e. saṁjñās and Paribhāṣās are attracted by operations) ? Let the *yathoddeśam* view (remaining where they are taught) (be accepted)." But how can this be obtained by mere assumption ? In this connection some say : here with respect to the subordinate, the 'principals become connected (or undergo

relation of some sort). And a twofold activity of the principals is seen according to the difference in service. (For example) sometimes the king goes to the place of the elephant etc., sometimes the elephant etc. are brought to the place of the king. There, when the technical names and metarules remain in their own region, operations accede to the region of the subordinate, then even the principal resides in the region of the subordinate for the accomplishment of its own purpose as one goes to the region of water on purpose. This being the case, when the principal resides in the region of the subordinate, then there is *yathoddeśa* view. But when (a subordinate), which is intended to undergo subordination to different (principals), is not (yet) connected with any principal; when, in spite of the plurality of enjoining sentences, the distinctions are ignored for the sake of brevity and thus unity (is secured) by resorting to generality; and when a statement of the various (technical names and metarules) is made after taking them out of their topical context, then the (technical) names and metarules, separated from their principals, have no purpose to serve in their own region, — since under any circumstance they deserve the position of subordination — and so they go to the principal in the natural course of the application of their meaning. Under these circumstances, when their non-separateness from the principal sentence takes place, is (held) the *kāryakāla* view.

[8]

Others, however, account for this duality in a different way. The activity of the subordinates, when they refer to many principals, is seen to be characterised in respect of each principal by separateness as for example, in the case of garlands, ointments and other things, and also by identity .... Of these two, on the view that there is a separateness (of the subordinates) with reference to each principal, rendering of service to the principals (by the subordinates), even without the principals leaving their region, is possible. Hence the *kāryakāla* view. When, however, the activity (of the subordinate) is characterised by identity, it is impossible for the many principals, established in their (respective) regions, to become connected with a single subordinate. The subordinate having established (itself) in its own self and having been subject to (or governed by) its own perfection, the principals present themselves simultaneously in the region of the subordinate; so let the *yathoddeśa* view be there. Both these (explanations) are unjustified. For, (the author of the *Bhāṣya*) is going to say later on (on P 8. 2. 1 *pūrvatrāsiddham*) : " If the *Tripādī* (last three quarters of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*) is (technically) non-existent with reference to the first seven Adhyāyas and the first quarter (of the eighth Adhyāya), then the statements involving Ablative and those involving Locative (made in the *tripādī*) will be (techni-

cally) non-existent and consequently the metarules *tasminniti nirdiṣṭe pūrvasya* (P 1. 1. 66) ' when locative is mentioned, (the operation which is taught applies) to what precedes ' and *tasmād ity uttarasya* (P 1. 1. 67) ' when ablative is mentioned, (the operation which is taught applies) to what follows ' will not be available. This is no defect. Although this (*tripādī*) is (technically) non-existent with reference to that (the first seven Adhyāyas and the first quarter of the eighth), that is (technically) existent with reference to this. How ? The technical names and the metarules belong to the region of the operation." Under these circumstances just as when the subordinates, occupying the region of the operation, form a single sentence (with the principal), designations viz. former and latter are lost — also there is no separate function (for the subordinates) — and consequently there is no (saying) ' this is (technically) existent with reference to that ', in the same way, when the principals are in the region of the subordinates and form a single sentence (with the subordinates), there is no enjoining of the designations viz. former and latter.

[9]

Having thus attributed fault to both these (arguments), a question (is raised) with a view to demonstrating another defect.

[A] " If the dual suffixes *īt* etc. (are named) *pragṛhya*, then the laying down (of this name) for the final (of a suffix) (will be necessary) (Vā I)." (Example) of *īt* etc. *pacete iti.* What is *īt* etc. here is not a dual ending. (The opponent) considering that there never can be an *e* as dual ending says : " (The name) will be effective (on the strength) of the injunction. " The idea is that the expression ' dual ending ' is used for ' a part of the dual ending '. It is just as in the rule *liṅsicau* (*ātmanepadeṣu*) (P 1. 2. 11), where the word *ātmanepada* is used for a part of the *ātmanepada*. Thus the rule ' *liṅaḥ sīyuṭ* ' (P 3. 4. 102 which says that *liṅ*-substitutes take the augment *sīyuṭ* '). " There is a purpose in (that) injunction." " What (purpose) ? " " *khaṭve.*" Although this is not a dual ending (in *e*) primarily, still it is called a dual ending (in *e*) by the convention of *ādivadbhāva* (i.e. a single substitute behaving as the initial of the following element). In (the examples like) *trapuṇī*, *jatunī* etc., however, *num* belongs to the preceding; they are thus examples of dual ending in *ī* in the primary sense and so are not adduced here.

[Ā] " If (dual-endings) ending in *īt* etc. (are named) *pragṛhya*, then the laying down (of this name) for the single (*īt* etc. will be necessary) (Vā 2) ". (For example) *khaṭve*. *Īt* and *ūt* are possible by themselves (as dual endings) and so (*tadantabhāva*) is not resorted to. But how is it that

the metarule *ādyantavat*, which is formulated for no other purpose, is not resorted to here? Here is the reply: Prolixity of the text is not necessarily the only prolixity. What then? Also prolixity of understanding, prolixity of process. So the only objection taken against this view is that prolixity of process has (got) to be accepted. The other (opponent), however, thinking that the prolixity of process can be avoided only if there is some other faultless way, while there is no other way in the present case, resorts to it (*ādyantavat*) saying: "Rather not, for, (operations taught) for the initial or final (element can be performed on a single partless element, as though it had an initial or a final part) (Vā 3)".

[I] Thinking 'I will not resort even to this' (he) says: "Or, I will explain thus: what ends in *īt* etc. and also (at the same time ends) in a dual ending (is named *pragṛhya*)." (Objection:) But 'when a suffix is mentioned in a rule enjoining a (technical) name, what ends (in that suffix) is not understood (P 1.4.14 Vā 1)." (Reply:) True. When, in a rule laying down a (technical) name, a suffix is mentioned, the understanding (by that suffix) of what ends (in that suffix) is prohibited. But here a dual ending is not resorted to as the named. What then (is so resorted)? What ends in *īt* etc. The dual ending qualifies it. (So the resulting meaning is:) what ends in *īt* etc. is named *pragṛhya* provided it ends in a dual ending. But how is it that by *īt* etc. what ends in *īt* etc. can be understood, when what undergoes the operation is not present either by word of mouth or by context? Such a *tadantavidhi* exists nowhere. ...(Here) some say: The (technical) names and metarules occupy the region of the operation (according to one view) and they remain in the region where they are taught (according to another view). Such being the case, since, on the view that names and metarules occupy the region of the operation, the (technical) name *pragṛhya* has its activity in the jurisdiction of the rule *padasya* (P 8. 1. 16-3. 54), (the word) *pada* is present as what undergoes the operation. There, just as (the word) *pūrvapada* 'the first member (of the compound)' whose presence is available on the force (of the word *tatpuruṣa*) in P 6.1.13: *ṣyaṅaḥ samprasāraṇam* ... ... as what undergoes the operation, similarly *īt* etc. are undertood as what end in *īt* etc. in connection with *pada*, which undergoes the operation. On the view, however, that (technical) names and metarules remain where they are taught, the operations, based on the name *pragṛhya*, are not expected and so the *pada*, which is the principal and which is what undergoes an operation is not resorted to as such. Since there is thus an absence of *pada* which undergoes an operation, (words) have to be taken i. e. interpreted as (they are) heard (i. e. literally). Or, on the *kāryakāla* view itself (i.e. on the view that technical names and metarules

occupy the region of the operation) *īt* etc. are the principals and so they do not mean 'what ends in *īt* etc.' But this is not reasonable. (The metarule) 'technical names and metarules remain where they are taught' has been accepted. Well, then, (there is) at first *tadantavidhi* in the case of dual ending (i.e. by dual ending is understood what ends in the dual ending) because (of the metarule) 'when a suffix is mentioned, what begins with that to which that (suffix) is laid down and ends with that (suffix itself) is denoted (P 1.4.13 Vā 7)'. Here what undergoes the operation is not necessarily expected to be present. After that, there is *tadantavidhi* in the case of *īt* etc. (so that *īt* etc. means what ends in *īt* etc.) which qualifies the named which ends in a dual ending. The sequence of utterance: *īdādyantaṁ dvivacanāntam* is not (strictly) intended; it is (really) *dvivacanāntam īdādyantam*. But this being so, since the named is resorted to in the form of a suffix, the *tadantavidhi* is decided at the mere sight (of the named). So here also. For, the *tadantavidhi* is seen in the name *prātipadika* as in the rule (P 1.2.46) viz. *kṛttaddhitasamāsāś ca* i.e., forms ending in *kṛt* and *taddhita* suffixes and compounds (get the name *prātipadika*). The unreasonability of the *tadantavidhi* has been stated in the fourth alternative only. It should be considered here also. Or, the defect is not pointed out here (in the *Mbh*) since the rejection (of the *tadantavidhi* alternative) has been indicated by (pointing out) another defect.

"If 'what ends in a dual-ending', is named *pragṛhya* if it ends in *īt* etc. then prohibition (of this nomenclature will be necessary) when there is a *luk*- dropping (of the dual-ending) (Vā 4)". But how is there (a possibility of) a compound in the case of (a nominal form) ending in dual, inasmuch as '1. (indication of) particular number, 2. clear expression (of meaning), 3. expression qualifying a subordinate word, and 4. construction with *ca* 'and' are said to be the specialities (of a sentence) caused by the single integrated meaning? Similarly it has been said: 'there is no compound of duals and plurals.' In this respect some say: It is desirable that this (disappearing) case-ending be accounted for by (the injunction of) *luk*-dropping. (Evidently) a word which continues (to be present) is not accounted for by the *luk*-dropping. Such being the case, what is a natural withdrawal of the dual-ending seen in a sentence because of the giving up of the particular number in the compound is accounted for by the activity of (the injunction of) the *luk*-dropping. That is why (the author of the Vārttikas) says: '(There is) a superfluousness in teaching the *luk*-dropping of (the feminine suffix) *āp* after an indeclinable because of the absence of gender (in an indeclinable) (P 2.4.82 Vā 1). But why is it that you do not tolerate the injunction about the *luk*-dropping of *āp* after an indeclinable, while you do

tolerate that of a case-ending ? There is a difference (between the two cases). The teacher, seeking (the operations) characterised (i.e. caused) by a case-ending, proceeds to teach its *luk*-elision, so it is said (in the *Mbh*). For, both (the case-ending and the feminine suffix *āp*) withdraw by nature. But the withdrawal of that alone is stated (in grammar) where there is some purpose in stating it.

But that is not proper, because of the absence of becoming due. Verily the disappearance of what has become due is termed *lopa* 'elision'. Now as regards that sentence which explains and demonstrates the meaning of a compound — a sentence which is not intelligible in the world and which is neither seen as used (there) -- there, when, in the matter of single integrated meaning, the subordinate words utilise their own meanings only and are not seeking their own specification, if singular number is resorted to, through identity, for the sake of specific mention, there would be no occasion for endings, dealing with duality and plurality; for the subordinate words, in the matter of single integrated meaning, are understood as not resorting to numerical difference and as helping (to keep) their own meanings. But in the case of those subordinate words, which are linked with other words, even though there is domination by the principal meaning even while the indication of the particular number has not withdrawn, the word *dvi* 'two' is used for specifying the exact measure of price in words like *dviśaurpika* 'bought by two measures (of corn in a winnowing basket)' it will not be (available for use) if particular number is not resorted to. And it is certainly not proper to deny the cause of the usage (itself). Thus in the case of *māsajāta* 'a month old' there is understanding of a particular (number; here 'one'). In *goṣucara* 'moving among cattle' the (plural) case-ending has been employed to convey the class. On the alternative that P 1. 2. 58 is rejected, the singular denotes the class. In *gaviṣṭhira* 'firm on an ox' (name of a ṛṣi) singular number alone (*gavi-*) is seen as (a result of) fixed option. In *varṣāsuja* 'born in rains i.e. rainy season' (a kind of insect), a word, used conventionally, is understood. In *dviputra* 'having two sons' and in *ubhaya-bhārya* 'having two wives' (the specific number is understood) on the force of the use of the first member of the compound; for that itself (i.e. duality) is its (= of the first member of the compound) own meaning.

Similarly in words like *vṛddhinimitta* (P 6. 3. 19; a suffix wherein there is a cause of *vṛddhi*), the force of the use of words like *nimitta* (cause) should be suitably seen. Similarly although a subordinate word (ordinarily remains) with the specific (number) unmanifested, still the power to convey a particular number is seen when there is a linking with another word. Thus, for example, there is a manifestation of the particular (number) by the presence or absence

of suffix in *gārgyakula* etc. ' the family of one Gārgya or of two Gārgyas '. In *godau* and *varaṇāḥ* (names of two villages) (it is) due to the word-modification which is seen, viz. the extention (of the original gender and number). In *yauṣmāka* ' belonging to you (du. or pl.) ', *tāvaka* ' belonging to you(sing.) ' and *yuṣmat-putra* 'son of you (du. or pl.)' by the form of the substitute. Such being the case, in *kumāryagāra* ' house of two maidens ' the continuance of the original state, effected by the dual, will be instrumental in manifesting the acceptance of the particular number. On this view it follows that in *rājapuruṣa* etc. particular (number) is not understood because there is no word expressive of the particular (number) while in *dāsyāḥputra* etc. the understanding of singular number will have to be accepted because of the presence of the singular ending. The statement, then, that this different number is the result of the single integrated meaning is not justified; further it contradicts what is said (viz.) " But it cannot be like this. Verily, meaning should not have word as its cause; (rather) word should have meaning as its cause. Look, it is like this. The meaning itself is of such a nature so that the particular (number) is not understood. And it must needs be so understood. For, he who thinks that the particular (number) is not understood because of the absence of the word which would express it, to such an one the particular (number) should be understandable in (words like) *apsucara*, *goṣucara*, *varṣāsuja* (but it is not) ". Therefore, the giving up or taking on of a (particular) number is not the result of a particular word ; this speciality is the result of the single integrated meaning itself. This will be decided in (the discussion on) the Vārttika (I) on P 2. 1. 1 : *samarthaḥ padavidhiḥ*.

" The reading of *artha* in the rule : *īdūtau ca saptamyarthe* (P 1. 1. 19) is an indication " (Vā 4). Since the (object) is achieved by merely (reading) *saptamī* ' locative ' — whether it is actually being heard or whether it has undergone a *luk*-elision, in which case (the object is achieved) by *pratyayalakṣaṇa* i. e. performing an operation (due to a suffix) even when the suffix has disappeared — the reading of the word *artha* is meant for (indicating) the absence of *pratyayalakṣaṇa* in the context of *pragṛhya*. " This word *artha*, then, has to be read so as to serve as an indication. " This alternative view is resorted to so that I will not have to resort to the metarule ' Operations (taught for a beginning or an end of a word-element) can be performed on a single partless (word-element) as if on its beginning or its end ', which is meant for other (purposes or cases). So it is not proper there to admit a process which should not be undertaken.

(Ī) Then, in that case, " we shall qualify the dual ending by *īt* etc. ". In the third alternative view, *īt* etc. and the dual ending, unconnected with each other, combine with the whole (i. e. the full inflected form). But here

(in the fourth alternative), dual-ending is made to be qualified by *īt* etc., before the combination with the whole. Then the *tadantavidhi* having been obtained, the whole is connected with the dual-ending, (itself) qualified by ending in *īt* etc. There is a second *tadantavidhi* by the metarule *pratyaya-grahaṇe* etc., ' when a suffix is mentioned, (a word-form) which begins with that to which the suffix has been taught and ends with the suffix itself is to be understood'. (Objection :) If so, since (now) there is no direct contact of *Īt* etc. with the whole, it is not justified to show the contact of the whole with *īt* etc. with the words *tadantam īdādyantan* (in the *Mbh*): ' ending in that i.e. ending in *īt* etc. ' This is no defect. By *īdādi* he mentions ending in *īt* etc., because *tadantavidhi* is implied. Such being the case, to say *īt* etc. is to say what ends in *īt* etc. " Even then, in (the phrase) *śukly-āstāṁ vastre* in the meaning of *aśukle vastre śukle samapadyetām*, ' Two non-white garments became white ' (the name *pragṛhya*) becomes due " (which is not desired). For in *kumaryagāra*, the dual-ending viz. *os* does not end in *īt* etc.; but here (this is the process :) *cvi* after the nominal form *śukla*; *luk*-elision of the case-ending; then the elision of *cvi*; substitution of *ī* (in the place of *a*) by *asya cvau* (P 7. 4. 32); singular number after the indeclinable, ending in the secondary suffix; its *luk*-elision by *avyayāt* ... etc. (P 2. 4. 82). At this stage the phoneme *ī* is the case-substitute; so the whole can be said to be ending in a dual-ending which (itself) ends in *īt* etc. by the *pratyayalakṣaṇa* (metarule). The phoneme *ī* which is actually heard is cited to show that the *yaṇ* substitute becomes due.

Here it should be understood that those who read (the *Mbh*) as : *tatra hi idādi ... pratyayalakṣaṇena*, according to them, the word *īdādi* means *īdādyantam*. In fine, it means *īdādyanta-dvivacanāntam* i. e. ending in a dual termination which ends in *īt* etc. But those who read as : *atra hi īdāyantaṁ śrūyate* ... ... ° *lakṣaṇena*, according to them, although what ends in *īt* etc. is not presently heard (in the sūtra), still there is no defect because justification (for it is got) from the remainder of the sentence. (The word) *īdādyantam* is read instead of *īdādi* (*dvivacanam*) in the Sūtra; (so) in the sūtra *tadantavidhi* is not resorted to in the case of *īt* etc. which qualify *dvivacana*. The idea which is there in the sūtra is thus adopted, (and the author of the *Mbh*.) shows its agreement with the particular illustration in the text : ' and (here) is (a word-form) which ends in a dual-ending, by the *pratyayalakṣaṇa* (metarule) '. Others say that ' for, this is also heard as ending in *īt* etc. ' is a summing up of the causes of objection in connection with both (third and fourth) alternative views. In the third view the defect is there only in the example *kumāryagāra* (viz.) ' and (this) ends in a dual ending by *pratyayalakṣaṇa*. ' On the fourth alternative view, in the

example *śuklyāstām* is enunciated a specific defect and is not logically explained. (So a way-out is shown thus:) before *śī* is substituted (for *au*) and (so) before (the whole) comes to end in *ī*, *luk*-elision (of *au*) will be the first to take place. To this (by way of reply) he says: "Here it is to be decided ..... ". "The *luk*-elision becomes due even when *śī* substitution is effcted, (also) even when not effected." On the other hand, when there is first *luk*- elision (of *au*), there is no possibility of *śī*-substitute for absence of any original. There is surely no extension of the original's status (to a substitute) in such cases. Although most of the examples of the extension of original's status (obtain) when the *lopa* (is the substitute), even then there is an extension of the original's status only there where the operation belongs to something else as a result of it, not where *lopa* itself has to undergo some operation. 'Even an external *luk* supersedes an internal operation' but the innerness of the *śī*-substitute is not put forth (in the *Mbh*). "Even if *luk* were somehow obligatory." If the view, that a rule which does not require any specific (item to act on) is superseded, were (to be accepted), or if a rule, giving up individual, proceeds in the domain of the (whole) class when the supersession of an operation is expected, even then, in spite of the difference between the original (*au*) and the substitute (*śī*) the universal case-endingness is common where *luk*-elision is enjoined and hence the obligatoriness of that (viz. *luk*) itself. "Even then, the defect (persists). (He) will tell later on ...... ". (Objection:) But it is already said that in the case of the name *prātipadika*, what is necessarily to be understood is *kṛttaddhitānta* (from the sūtra-wording *kṛt* and *taddhita*). (Reply:) True. It is so. Nevertheless, the point is made. The very object of bringing down the word *arthavat* into the next sūtra is this, viz. the nearmostness of the popular meaning should be resorted to. Moreover, the (second) view, viz. *īdādyantam dvivacanam* is rejected as it would involve taking recourse to *ādyantavadbhāva* (which one did not want) because of the fear of a lengthy process. Even on this (third or fourth alternative) "*ādyantavadbhāva* has to be desired," in cases like *agnī iti*, *vāyū iti* for the same reason. This is unavoidable in the world also. "(So let there be) that middle alternative view only." The fourth view is almost like the third view, as the second (is said to be) the middle one; even of four the second is the middle one. Well, now, on this (second) view, how is it that the name *pragṛhya* does not become due in *śuklyāstām*? Because of the absence of (the word-element) which would undergo the (naming) operation. For here a dual ending is to undergo the (naming) operation and where one does not exist, it cannot be accepted even on (the strength of) a grammatical injunction. There are thus four alternative views:

(1) *īt* etc., (if) dual endings, (are named) *pragṛhya*;

(2) a dual ending, ending in *īt* etc.;

(3) a whole ending in *īt* etc., (and also) ending in a dual ending; and (4) what ends in a dual ending which itself ends in *īt* etc.

* * *

" (*ī* and *ū*) following *m* of *adas* (are named *pragṛhya*)" (P. 1. 1. 12)

[1]

" If the name *pragṛhya* (is given to *ī* and *ū*) which follow *m* ... etc. (P 1. 1. 12 Vā 1)"

(This is) either indicative of the topic or a reference to the wording of the rule. This defect will not be there if a different wording of the rule is made where the elements connected with *adas* will not be resorted to, and also if the name *pragṛhya* is taught, excluding the domain where it is not desired. But with the wording as it is, since the cause (viz. *m*) and even the elements (*ī* and *ū*) which undergo the operation are (technically) non-existent, there is a (technical) non-existence of the operation (name *pragṛhya*) also depending on it. In saying " of it " he resorts to the whole gamut of the cause and the elements undergoing the operation as one entity. " ' of it ' means of *īt*-ness and *ūt*-ness ". By *ca* ' and ' is understood ' of *m*-ness '. Because of the technical non-existence of (these) three (*ī*, *ū* and *m*), there is the undesired contingency of the substitution *ay*, *āv* and the single substitute. It is right that *īt* etc., being (technically) non-existent, will not have the name *pragṛhya*. But the originals being already made to withdraw, where is the possibility of (their substitutes) *ay* etc.? Besides, just as there is (technical) non-existence of *īt* etc. with reference to the name *pragṛhya*, so is it with reference to (the substitutes) like *yaṇ*, which are (technically) existent (or taught in the *siddhakāṇḍa*). After all, what is sought through the name *pragṛhya* is just the prevention of substitutes like *yaṇ*. So let there be no name *pragṛhya* (it does not matter). (But) it is not so. (The view viz.) the technical non-existence of the grammatical rule is accepted. For, change in the understanding of words is caused by a grammatical rule. In the absence of a rule teaching a (different) understanding of a word, the original (word-form) continues to be in the natural form. Such being the case, *ay* etc. become due as the withdrawal of the original is not accepted : in *amī āsate* ' those sit ' the substitute *ay*, in *amū āsāte* ' those two sit ', the substitute *āv*, in *amī atra* ' those here ', a single substitute (*e*) by *eṅaḥ padāntād* ... ... (P 6. 1. 109).

(Objection :) But the substitutes *ay* etc. depending as they do on two inflected words are external and so technically non-existent with reference to *īt* etc. (P 8. 2. 80 *adaso'ser*...81 *eta īt*) which depend on a single inflected word; such being the case, there is no prior at all with reference to which technical non-existence would be understood by the rule *pūrvatrāsiddham* (P 8. 2. 1) ...

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" *Śe* (is named *pragṛhya*) " (P 1. 1. 13)

[1]

(The name *pragṛhya*) becomes due even in the case of *kāśe* because of the sameness of auditory perception and because of the absence of resorting to any particular (determinant). So a prohibition has to be laid down there. It is like this : prohibition viz. *adāp* (is resorted to) as there is (otherwise) an over-application (of the name *ghu* to *dāp* in P 1. 1. 20) because of the reading of *dā* (in general). (Here we say :) (in the rule P 1. 1. 68 *svam rūpam* ...) the withdrawal of ' meaning ' and the acceptance of ' form ' are already achieved, even without reading the word *rūpa* ' form ' by reading the word *sva* ' one's own ', itself, because of the proximity, invariable presence, and uncommonness (of the form); (still) the word *rūpa* is read, which is to indicate that here ' meaning ', though external, is to be accepted as well as the ' form '. Therefore, just as (words) synonymous but having a different form are not understood (as undergoing a particular operation), similarly, words having no meaning (are not understood) in spite of their having the same form of that (word). This being so, when the meaningless word-bit *śa*, connected with a meaningful one, combines with *i* (locative–) singular ending resulting into a single substitute (*e* in *śe*), no new meaning arises from the defective combination of meaningful (*i*) and the meaningless (*śa*). So this word *-śe* is meaningless.

[2]

" Even then in *hariśe, babhruśe* ... etc, " There, verily, *-ṅi* and the possessive suffix (*-śa*) (both) are meaningful, because of their suffixal meaning. When there is a combination of two meaningful (elements), the wholes also are meaningful through the meanings of the parts because (the wholes) follow the properties of the parts. Therefore this whole (viz. *-śe*) is meaningful. On the view that constituents give up their own meanings in the derived formation, however, the base gives up its meaning and so only the suffixal meaning — and not the meaningless stem — is combined with the meaning of the case-ending. On the view that the word *paraḥ* (in P 3. 1. 2) is meant to rule out the use of suffix alone, the base continues to be there verily for the sake of correctness of the suffix; so (the name *pragṛhya*) becomes due because of the meaningfulness . (However), (since *-śe* in *hariśe* etc. is) secondarily derived by the grammatical rules (and so different from *śe* which is directly uttered in P 7. 1. 39), there is no defect.

[3]

"Or". Although the two constituents are meaningful, the whole viz. the word *śe* has no other (separate) meaning, hence (its) meaninglessness. How

is it then that here the number, (case-relation) like object etc. belonging to the referent of the word *hariśa* are either expressed by the case-ending or the five, expressed by the word *hariśa* are (secondarily) indicated by the case-ending so that the meaning of the suffix qualified (by the meaning of the base) would be connected with number, (case-relation) object etc. ? In this respect, irrespective of whether the constituents give up their own meanings or they do not give up their own meanings in a derived formation since " the base and the suffix express conjointly the sense which is understood (from the word) ", the whole, including the base, expresses the referent which is the substratum of number, (case-relation) object etc. Therefore since the meaning expressed by the isolated word *śa* has no connection with the meaning of the case-ending, the whole *śe* is meaningless. Such being the case, just as the isolated meaning of the base, even when it is there, does not get connected with the meaning of the case-ending, so the isolated meaning of the suffix also.

* * *

" A *nipāta*, consisting of a single vowel, except *āṅ* (is named *pragṛhya*)" (P 1. 1. 14)

If *nipāta* is made to qualify *ac* ' vowel ' there is no possibility of what ends in *ac* being understood, and consequently no contingency of a defect results. In the inverse (construction), viz. in the event of *nipāta* as the qualified, however, (the defect) arises. " For which purpose is (the word) *nipāta* (read) " ? The whole is used to convey a meaning ; (and as to its parts) there is no restriction as to the acceptance of the boundaries of the form of a suffix; therefore only a *nipāta* can be meaningful (and so can be dispensed with in the rule). There are two aspects of a suffix. (The use of words being) for conveying meaning, the suffixes are as meaningless as the phonemes. And sometimes only some boundary of the form of a suffix is admitted. To illustrate : (Is the suffix) *-śatic* or the word-bit *-ti* in the word *viṁśati* ? *Ika* or *agārika* in *aikāgārika* ? Similarly, (in the view) of some, stem-building suffixes (*vikaraṇa*) first come into being in the sense of the agent. The *sārvadhātuka* suffix comes in redundantly after (the stem) which ends in the stem-building suffix. To this we say : true. Where the popular meaning is concerned the words being eternal, there is a meaninglessness of parts, just like that of phonemes — whether of the *pada*-s, whose prior portion is similar in form (to their counterparts), or of their groups whose parts are similar in form with *padu*-s (which themselves are) parts of (another) sentence. In grammar, however, meaningfulness of the (parts) is accepted for the sake of (grammatical) purpose, on the basis of meaning available through (the twin processes of) invariable presence (*anvaya*) and absence (*vyatireka*) when they (parts)

are looked upon as identical because of identity of form. But if meaningfulness of suffixes is thus accepted, what is said in grammar viz. ' Certainly what ends in *kṛt* or *taddhita* alone is meaningful, not isolated *kṛt* or *taddhita* (suffixes)' is contradicted. This is no defect. There is an eternal connection of suffix with meaning; therefore, the restatement of *arthavat* ' meaningful ' through its continuation (from P 1. 2 45 into 46 to qualify *kṛt* etc.) would be superfluous, to avoid which, some meaning, though present because of absence of departure, is given up. Only the grammatical meaning is accepted as the cause of the name *prātipadika*; for, otherwise there will be as much a meaninglessness of even what ends in a *kṛt* or *taddhita* (suffix) unaccompanied by a case-ending as of a (mere) suffix. Therefore, there will be the contingency of the *ṇal* getting the name *pragṛhya* because of its meaningfulness on account of the suffixal meaning. Similarly in *a* + *āgaccha* = *āgaccha*, where *a* is a nominal form (meaning ' wandering, a wanderer ') in vocative case from the verb *aṭ* ' to wander ' with the addition of the suffix *ḍa*.

[2]

" If (*ekāc* is understood as) a *tatpuruṣa* compound, having coreferential members " a *nipāta* ending in a vowel will be understood by *tadantavidhi*; also (a *nipāta* consisting of) a vowel alone will be understood by *ādyantavadbhāva*. Thus the effect of the name *pragṛhya* will be possible in *nipāta*-s ending in a vowel (e.g. *pra*) and so the reading of the word *ac* ' vowel ' (in the rule) will prove to be useless. Therefore, on the strength of the word *ac*, only one particular (interpretation) will be resorted to, the other will be rejected. Now, when one of the two particular (interpretations) is to be rejected, if the *nipāta*, ending in a vowel, is accepted and the one consisting of a vowel alone is rejected, then the exclusion (of *āṅ*) will be meaningless, because then there is no possibility of *āṅ* having the name *pragṛhya*. As a result of this particular clue the reading of *ac* holds fast to a mere *ac* and rules out what ends in *ac*.

Perhaps it may be argued thus : If *ac* is not read, (*nipāta*-s) ending in consonants will be connected with the name *pragṛhya*. If there is a connection of the (*nipāta*-s) ending in consonants with the name *pragṛhya*, then the reading of *ac* will be for the withdrawal of (the *nipāta*-s) ending in consonants. (But this is not reasonable.) No defect will ensue simply because of a mere connection with a name. When there are no operations, a name, when it does not serve a purpose of something else, does not proceed in such a domain even when there is a statement in general, simply in order to avoid the uselessness of the activity of a grammatical rule. (Here are two possibilities) (For a person) who admits the name *pragṛhya* for the sake of some

operation, there is no purpose. For one who accepts this particular (word *ac*) in order to exclude a defect, there is no such defect to ward off which such a particular (word *ac*) should be resorted to. For, continuation of the original state is introduced under the rule *saṁhitāyām* (P 6. 1. 72) (in the topic of euphony). And there, no operation for consonants is taught to prevent which continuation of the original state would be necessary.

(Objection :) The continuation of the original state may be due in *adho'gamat* '(he) went down ', *namo'kārṣīt* '(he) saluted '. (Reply :) Here the continuation of the original state is meant to ward off substitutes for those originals which exist ; and here *ru* does not exist, as it is technically non-existent by *pūrvatrāsiddham* (P 8. 2. 1). (But) if it (*ru*) does not exist, *ut*-substitution also does not become due. (No :) There is technical existence (of *ru*) because in the rule laying down *ut* (P 6. 1. 113), *ru* is resorted to as original. In the present case, however, the continuance of the original state is for that which is to undergo a modification. But there is no (technically existent element i. e. *ru*) which is to undergo a modification which may be made to continue in the original state. And as for *s* which (technically) exists, no operation is taught for it. (Objection :) But since the continuance of the original state is for the whole, the substitute for the part may withdraw. (Reply :) Even if continuance of the original state is for the whole as such, there is not that (original element) for which there would be a substitute. So whose substitute would withdraw ? As for *s* which (technically) exists, *ut* is not taught (as a substitute) for it. Thus because of non-existence of *ru* in the matter of continuance of the original state, and because of (*ru* being) technically existent in the matter of *ut*- substitution, being its basis, and because of the absence of teaching of an operation for *s*, it is impossible to ward off *ut*-substitution here. Therefore, in the case of (*nipāta*-s) ending in consonants, " there is neither any harm nor any purpose (served) (by the name *pragṛhya*). "

[3]

" Even thus " (means) as (the rule) reads *ac*, one of the two metarules is being set aside; since *ādyantavadbhāva* is dependent on the operation relating to the final phoneme, there is a relation of cause and effect (between the two); but because operations on a single vowel are impossible by the *tadantavidhi*. " Of the two metarules which have found scope " — because what has no scope somewhere cannot be superceded. The scope for the metarule *yena vidhis tadantasya* (P 1. 1. 72) is (the forms like) *caya* ' collection ', *jaya* ' victory '. The (scope) for the metarule *ādyantavat* (is the rules like) *dhātoḥ* (P 6. 1. 162), *antaḥ* (P 6. 1. 159), *mid aco'ntyāt* ...,

(P 1. 1. 47), *aco'ntyādi ṭi* (P 1. 1. 64) where the word *anta* 'end' is directly mentioned. "Being present" (means) which are present here (i. e. in this *sūtra* : P 1. 1. 14); or they are called 'well-established' because of their presence in their own (respective) domains. Although *yena vidhis tadantasya* is a *saṁjñā* (-rule), it is expressed by a general term here (viz. *paribhāṣā*); it is like (expressing) by the word *adhikāra* (in the *Mbh.* passage) : 'An *adhikāra*, as is well-known, is of three kinds.'

We consider here as to which is the sequence of the understanding (of the two metarules) and admission of which is proper. The *ādyantavat* metarule has *tadantavidhi* as its cause, and so its admission is not possible when the cause is not present. Therefore, this name, viz. *ac*, conveys, to start with, (word-forms) that end in it. When the setting aside of one of the two becomes due on the force of reading of the word *ac*, the *tadantavidhi* (naturally) presents itself, and so its setting aside is not proper. True. From sequence, the *tadantavidhi* alone will have to be admitted. But *liṅga* (i. e. capacity to express meaning) is stronger than sequence. So when the *tadantavidhi*, which is opposed to *liṅga*, is set aside on the strength of the exclusion of *āṅ*, a decision is there on (the strength) of the *ādyantavat* metarule. (Yes :) A decision will be there if the effects are seen as taking place without a cause. How can there be a decision when the *ādyantavat* (metarule) is not there, caused as it is by the *tadantavidhi*, which is not effected ?

If so, then by this decision both the metarules having withdrawn equally only the *ac* sounds which are mentioned will get the name *pragṛhya*. Only that much is to be laid down. And that is achieved this being so. (Oh, sure) it may be achieved, but (in that case) this text : 'This metarule viz. *ādyantavad ekasmin* will be (operative) here' is not justified. (Reply :) The metarules are meant for others; so, when its (i. e. of the metarule *ādyantavat*) fruit is realised (even without its application) and (the *ac* sounds) read (in the rule) are connected with the name *pragṛhya*, whatever the fruit of the metarule it is there. Since the fruit is there, the presence of the metarule is justified. It is like (the *Mbh.* text) : 'If (the fruit) is the same, why (two different kinds of affixes) some having *ṅ* and others having *k* as the code-letters ?'

Or, because the word *ac* is read and because there is a clue for setting aside one of the two and also because the metarule *ādyantavat* depends upon the *tadantavidhi*, the *ādyantavat* metarule does not proceed. At this stage the *tadantavidhi* favours the *ādyantavat* metarule by merely being present and then it withdraws, its object having been achieved. It (happens) like this : The proceeding of the *tadantavidhi* for its own sake is not possible on account of the mention of the clue (*āṅ*). When it (*tadantavidhi*) is not there,

the *ādyantavat* metarule, benefiting from the clue, does not present itself. Therefore, the presence of the *tadantavidhi* here is for the sake of another. That (operation of *tadantavidhi*), finding fulfilment (of its presence), does not bring about its own object, because of the contradiction with the clue.

Or, whether the *hal*-sounds undergo an operation or not will be considered in those rules themselves where technical names are read (in connection with an operation). And thereby, when the two metarules are present because of their being internal and when one of the two has to withdraw because of the word *ac*, the decision will be made on the basis of the clue, by the *ādyantavat* metarule.

[4]

Well, in that case, the word *eka* ' one ' is read in order to preclude a cluster of vowels (being called *pragṛhya*). It is also indicated by this reading of the word *eka* that elsewhere when phonemes, which are subordinated to something else, are read with a specific number, that number is not (really) intended to be stressed. In the present case also the word *ac* is subordinated to the name (*pragṛhya*) because the name *pragṛhya* is taught here. And in items, which have become subordinate, the (specific) number is intended, as e.g. in (the injunction) : ' One should offer a sacrifice with a (single) animal '.

(Objection :) But the name being subordinate (to the named), the principal position (naturally) belongs only to the named, both (i.e. *saṁjñā* and *saṁjñin*) having fixed relations. So it is in the fitness of things that number is not intended there. (Reply :) True. The named are principal where a name is employed (as a means), (but in a rule where) it is taught, a name has a principal position. *śuklaṁ paṭaṁ kuru* ' make a white cloth '; *śvetaṁ vāyavyam ālabheta* ' one should immolate a white animal dedicated to Vāyu '. Such being the case, if the number were not intended, then in the case of the vocalic cluster *a i u apehi*, (which constitutes) a *nipāta*-cluster, a single (undesired) name *pragṛhya* will result (for the whole.).

But how is a cluster of *nipāta*-s understood by the word *nipāta* ? In view of (the reading of) *ac* and because of the fact that a cluster of *ac*-phonemes does not form a single *nipāta* a cluster of *nipāta*-s will be understood. Let it be so. Because of the mention of class-word each single (*ac*) also will be named (*pragṛhya*). (Well,) the purpose would be served, if (the name *pragṛhya*) could be secured thus (for each single *ac*). But, as it is, when the cluster of *ac*-phonemes thus gets connected with the name, the purpose is served by that (name) itself in the case of parts also; and so (the name) does not proceed again towards the parts. It

is like this : When reduplication of a monosyllabic cluster is being carried out, the parts of that cluster do not again undergo reduplication, because the purpose is served; similarly, when there is the name *saṁyoga* (for the whole cluster) in a general way, it is not there again for pairs (individually).

If the purpose of parts is served by the operation belonging to the whole, then, there will be a continuance of the original state of every part as it is a *pragṛhya*. (No.) There is again no continuance of the original state with reference to parts, because the continuance of the original state has secured its purpose with reference to the whole.

As a result, there may not be a *yaṇ* substitute (P 6. 1. 77) in the place of the final (*u* in *a i u*); but for the two preceding sounds (*a* and *i*) there will be *guṇa* according to *ād guṇaḥ* (P 6. 1. 87) and *ay* substitute (P. 6. 1. 78). How is it, then, that in the case of the name *prātipadika*, irrespective of whether phonemes are meaningful or meaningless, it is urged that consequent on the appearance of a case-ending after every phoneme in words like ***vana***, ***dhana***, dropping of ***n*** (P 8. 2. 7) will result undesiredly, if the word ***arthavat*** ' meaningful ' is not read in (the definition of) the name *prātipadika* (P 1. 2. 45) ? On the view of meaningfulness (of phonemes) for that matter, there being a separate meaning (of different phonemes), these meanings of phonemes provide the cause for the name *prātipadika*. On the view of (their) meaninglessness sometimes a whole is not accepted and hence the operation in connection with the whole is understood as applying to those parts. Such being the case, since a specific number is resorted to, the word ***eka*** which is made to qualify the word *ac* (which is, in turn,) subordinate to the subject (viz. *nipāta*) indicates that ' elsewhere, when phonemes, which are subordinated, are read with a particular number, that (particular) number is not intended in the case of (a phoneme looked upon as) a class. ' " What is the purpose in indicating this ? " In the case of the word *hal* in ' *halantāc ca* (P 1. 2. 10), where there is an extension of the *kit*-character to *san*, there is no intention of conveying a particular number of the subordinated *hal*. (Objection :) But it has been said that, there is no relation of the preceding and the following with the universality (Bhāṣya on P 2. 4. 35. 5). (Reply :) That is not an authoritative statement. When (a suffix named) *ārdhadhātuka* (follows), since one base cannot simultaneously be subordinated to many suffixes with different meanings, and since the meaning is satisfied in the case of synonymous suffixes and (finally) since the following region is (already) occupied (by one suffix), so, many suffixes cannot have the relation of the following (with the base). So it is said that ' there is no relation of the preceding and the following with the universality '. Where there is a suffix with an identical form, there the class can be said to follow, as in ' (there is) one

base, many *yañ* (suffixes) ' (Bhāṣya on P 1. 2. 64. 25). As the word *hal* in the case of the verb *dambh* is intended in its generic aspect, the being after an *ik* (required for a *hal*) is not contradicted.

[5]

" Why is there no (prohibition of the name *pragṛhya*) in *ā evaṁ kila tat* ' Oh, so indeed it is ' ? (The question is asked) because after the withdrawal of the code-letter there is no difference in the audition. If some speciality of meaning is (already) grasped as related (with the element concerned) while the code-letter is still there, then later on even when the code-letter has withdrawn itself, (the element) as accompanied by the code-letter is inferred on the basis of that meaning associated with the code-letter. There i.e. in " *āṅ īṣadarthe* ", *ā*, having the code-letter, is seen to have been used in the sense of *īṣad* ' a little ' since the preverb is read along with the code-letter, so the connection with an activity also is understood with reference to that (*ā*) which has the code-letter. In the rule also *āṅ maryādā°* (P 2. 1. 13) and also in the rule *āṅ maryādāvacane* (P 1. 4. 89) where the name *karmapravacanīya* is taught (P 1. 4. 83), the one (*ā*) with the code-letter alone is mentioned. Therefore, in these cases, even after the withdrawal of the code-letter, it (as possessing the code-letter) is inferred on the strength of the meanings associated with it. " In connection with a sentence and recollection, (*ā* is) without the code-letter *ṅ*. " (The example) in connection with a sentence : *ā evaṁ nu manyase* ' Oh, that is how you think now ! ' A certain sentence-meaning, concerning a previous injunction or concerning (a previous) prohibition, happens to be fixed. When that is changed, this (*ā* without *ṅ*) is used. ' Oh, that is how you think now. You did not think so previously, but presently you think so. ' This *ā* is here used with reference to the previous sentence. Others, however, say : In the context of a sentence, a part of the sentence is meant. Here, since the *ā* that has no meaning is taught to be replaced by a nasal (*ā̃*), meaninglessness of a pure (i. e. non-nasal *ā*) cannot be accounted for. In *ā evaṁ kiḷa tat* ' Oh, it is verily like that ' the phoneme *ā* is used at the beginning as referring to the subject to be remembered. Then, subsequent to the time of remembrance, one makes a definite statement : *ā evaṁ kila tat.*

* * * *

" (A *nipāta*) ending in *o* (is named *pragṛhya*) " P 1. 1. 15.

[" This is a cluster of *nipāta*-s. "] If there is a plurality of meanings (for an expression like *āho*), it must, of course, be a cluster of *nipāta*-s. If, on the other hand, there is no plurality of meanings, evidently there is only a single *nipāta*. How are these two contradictory

(positions) possible in a single (thing)? The reply is: (The *nipāta*-s) like *īm, kam, sīm* are meaningless. Therefore, irrespective of whether (*āho* etc.) are unitary or clusters no meaning is ever produced and so he thinks it possible to declare that ascertainment of the boundaries (of the *nipāta*) based on singularity or plurality of meanings is not possible. *o ṣu yātaṁ marutaḥ* is analysed as *ā u su yātam marutaḥ.* Here by the rule *nipāta ekāc* ... (P 1. 1. 14) the name *pragṛhya* becomes due (for *o* is taken as *u* on the basis of *antādivadbhāva.*) (But) it is prohibited by (the word) *anāṅ* (read in P 1. 1. 14). There, because it is subsequent and because prohibitions are more powerful (Bhāṣya on P 1. 1. 63. 6), the prohibition *anāṅ* has to take place, (P 1. 1. 15 *Ot* is necessary.). (Objection:) But *anāṅ* can be looked upon as an operation (of exclusion), meaning 'other than *āṅ*'; and here is (the phoneme) *u* which is other than *āṅ*. When the designation is ever present because of (the principle) of *antādivadbhāva*, it is impossible to call (*o*) as other than *āṅ*. How is it then that in the example *lūyate kedareṇa* 'a field is being reaped' the verbal root (*lū*) is termed intransitive when the agent himself has the status of an object? (Reply:) Here when (the status of) an object is extended, an agent's inherent non-objectness does not cease. Nor is any (operation), depending on the object, stated. And non-object-ness of this agent is natural. Therefore, when the meaning of the root (i.e. activity) connected with that agent is not yet looked upon as residing in the object, such a designation (viz. intransitive) is proper. It is as in the case of the expression 'One should behave towards this Kṣatriya as towards a Brāhmaṇa' where the natural status of a Kṣatriya does not cease and therefore when it is said 'give to a non-Brāhmaṇa' there is a connection (of this particular Kṣatriya) with particular acts which are inherent in him. Or just as when it is said 'Bring a village of Brāhmaṇas', inspite of that Kṣatriya being there, the village, having him, is brought; because what is enjoined is the bringing of a village which is the resort of Brāhmaṇas. Similarly here, because of the *antādivadbhāva* designation being always present, it is possible to understand exclusion (of *āṅ*) more than once.

[2]

"Even then in *go'bhavat* which means 'a non-bull became a bull' (the name *pragṛhya*) becomes due". Well then in the rule *svaṁ rūpaṁ śabdasya*... (P 1. 1.68) the understanding of the form alone of a word is already established by the word *svam* 'one's own'; still the word *rūpam* 'form' is used, (which is intended to convey) that in grammar, meaning, although something external, has to be understood like the form. Such being the case, when the meaningless (word-element) has retired and the meaningful one is accepted,

then " among the two words – one with a primary sense and the other with a figurative one – the one with a primary sense is understood ". *Gauṇa* means what has come from (i.e. is due to) *guṇa* (property) i.e. subsidiary and *mukhya* (means) like *mukha* (face) i.e. principal. Now, this is not a rule. (Still) it is a popular maxim, that is resorted to. In the present case, this word *go* first conveys universality, individual, gender, number and case-relations like the object and then it is connected with external (things) like affection (i.e. praise) and censure, and it attains the status of being the qualifier or the qualified of meanings expressed by other words (in the sentence.)

Such being the case, when the inner meaning, linked with the nominal stem, is alone present, a consideration of an external meaning, concerning a different *pada*, is not proper. In (cases like) 'a bull should be immolated', the meaning such as a *vāhīka* (a dullard) which is to be conveyed by other words just does not arise when other words are not used and so because of its absence, it is not possible to consider it. Even if, indeed, both, an invariable and a variable, meanings are present, the understanding of the invariable meaning alone is proper because of its unfailing character. The connection of the word *go* with *vāhīka* is, indeed, of a variable character, since in the case of someone, the bullness may not be intended by *vāhīka* etc. Similarly actions and qualities like sharpness, dexterity etc. opposed to conventional qualities like stupidity, impurity etc. (in a *vāhīka*) become intended, (so to say) in a *vāhīka*. Under these circumstances when there is an intention of the opposite qualities (like sharpness etc.) the word *go* will not proceed at all. It is proper that between a general and a special meaning of the word *go*, the word *go* should convey the special meaning. There is an assemblage of many qualities in a *vāhīka*; so the actions and qualities, conventionally connected with whatsoever an object, are found in him, a word expressive of that (object) applies to him (i. e. the *vāhīka*). This being the case, whatever quality one intends in the *vāhīka*, he (the speaker) uses the word expressive of that quality with reference to him (i.e. the *vāhīka*). Since there is an (equal) application of words like *go* 'bull', *aśva* 'horse', *hastin* 'elephant' as also *śakuni* 'bird' it is not possible to say that he is verily a bull. Therefore, when the word *gauḥ* is uttered, that meaning, which is inner, invariable and linked with it alone, is understood. Therefore " the *vāhīka* is not immolated. How then do the *vṛddhi* and the substitution of *ā* take place (respectively) in *gaus tiṣṭhati* 'the bull is standing', *gām ānaya* 'bring the bull' when the *vāhīka* is meant (by *go*)? This is so with reference to (an operation) based on meaning." Since a nominal stem expresses equally the

substratum of a figurative and a primary meaning, is it not possible to consider this distinction? (Certainly) the meaning in the present case is figurative and not primary. Even though here is a seed of a figurative meaning, it has not yet manifested itself and so (it is) not a cause in the matter of considering this (distinction). Whence? Because, when a word with a case-ending gets connceted with another word, itself a cause of determining the distinction in meaning, then it becomes the delimiter of the figurative meaning whose distinctiveness is caused by the other word (in the sentence). And when no (such) other word is used, only the primary meaning is understood. Therefore (the nominal stem) is unable to express clearly the different meanings although there is a potentiality of many meanings in the meaning of the nominal stem; so the operations, pertaining to a nominal stem, proceed depending on the auditory form alone.

Or, a nominal stem gets connected, in the first place, with the primary meaning which is inner, uncommon and invariable. The case-ending comes into being after (a nominal stem) which expresses only the primary meaning. Since no other meaning has come into being when the case-ending follows, operations (like *vṛddhi* and *ā*-substitution) are performed pertaining to a word which expresses primary meaning only. The word with the case-ending, which conveys its primary meaning, having undergone its own operation, is (then), while still conveying its primary meaning, transferred to another meaning when another word like *vāhīka* is present. Under these circumstances, when there is a connection with another meaning, the meanings, which are opposed, withdraw. But the actions and qualities, which are conventionally connected, continue to be, because there is no contradiction. Therefore, the figurative meaning, which is external, is yet to come into being when the *vṛddhi* and the *ā*-substitution are to be executed; so the maxim *gauṇamukhyayoḥ* etc., not having found an occasion, does not enter into this matter. Therefore, as a rival meaning is not present because of absence of an occasion, the meaning does not get the designation 'primary'. Being a relative term, the meaning is designated 'primary' only when the figurative meaning is there. So in the absence of designation 'primary', an operation which is based upon the mere (form of the) word, is executed with reference to the mere word as such (without consideration of the meaning). And *vṛddhi* and *ā*-substitution must be (looked upon as) based on the word (alone) when there is no consideration of the figurative and the primary for want of a contradictory meaning.

* * *

"(The name *pragṛhya* is optional before *iti* in the case) of *uñ*" P 1. 1. 17.

" u̐ (is an optional *pragṛhya*-substitute of *uñ* before *iti*) " (P 1. 1. 18).

If *uña u̐* is (looked upon) as one rule, then the use of the word *śākalya* is exhausted, being utilised in making the substitute optional; so when the substitute (optionally stated) is not exercised, the name *pragṛhya* is understood (as compulsory) by *nipāta ekāj anāṅ* (P 1. 1. 14). When, however, the rule is split (into two), substitution being irrelevant (in P 1. 1. 17) the option of the name (*pragṛhya*) is understood by the word *śākalya*. Even when the option of the name is understood in the case of *uñ*, if the nasal substitute is laid down without a word conveying option then the original will be (understood as) set aside totally as in the case of *aster bhūḥ* (P 2. 4. 52). However, when, owing to the splitting of the rule, the option of the name *pragṛhya* is understood definitely ... ... two forms result owing to the first rule : *u iti* and *v iti*. In the following rule the substitute (u̐) becomes due obligatorily; (but) when the substitute is uttered in combination with the word expressive of option, two forms result : *u̐ iti* and *u iti*, because of the combination with the word of option. Thus with two rules, three forms are established.

[2]

But those who read : ' What is the purpose in splitting the rule ? (For, anyway) the option (intended by the mention) of *Śākalya* may not be there ', — they mean that in the absence of the word *vā* (expressive of option) the non-nasal (*u*), because it is being kept out, does not have the designation *pragṛhya*. So (the form) *u iti*, where the original state is maintained, will not be heard (i.e. will not be available).

A name, even when it has become subordinate to the named with which its connection is established, still conveys its own form (and not the named) when a substitute is expected; so (in this rule, the name *pragṛhya*) does not enter into a connection with the named (mentioned so far, and consequently does not denote them).

* * *

" (Words ending in) *īt* and *ūt* and having the meaning of locative (get the name *pragṛhya*) " (P 1. 1. 19).

[1]

Here (i.e. in grammar) the *tadantavidhi* is forbidden when an affix (*pratyaya*) is mentioned in a rule which defines a grammatical technical name; so a mere affix (and not what ends in an affix) is understood by the word *saptamī* ' locative case-ending ' here. Such being the case, when the

phonemes *ī* and *ū* are the qualified and locative is the qualifier, then it is understood that *ī* and *ū*, which constitute a locative case-ending, have the name *pragṛhya*. When the locative is the qualified and *ī* and *ū* have the status of a qualifier then also there is no occasion for *tadantavidhi*, because there is no locative which ends in *ī* or *ū*. In these circumstances, if *-arthe* is not read in the sūtra (after *saptamī*) then the name *pragṛhya* will be there where only the locative case-ending is (actually) heard, as in *sarasī iti*. " If, however, the locative is elided " the name, not having any scope (for operation), does not proceed, because of the absence of the named. And if it is assumed that the name still persists, then what(ever) conveys the meaning associated with the locative will be understood even in the absence of the force (of the rule). When, however, *-arthe* is read, in *somo gaurī adhi śritaḥ* (RV 9.12.3) ' Soma resting on (the hide of) a cow ' the name *pragṛhya* is established in the case of (the word-element) whose suffix (locative) is elided and which conveys the meaning of a locative.

[2]

" The locative is not elided here ". Superseding the homogeneous sound of the preceding (P 7. 1. 39) and the lengthening (P 6. 1. 101) *āṭ* (P 7. 3. 112) and *ām* (P 7. 3. 116) become due (undesiredly). Well, in that case *luk*-elision will be due everywhere. (The locative) being thus impossible in the primary sense, we shall understand word-form ending in *ī* and *ū*, by associating the meaning of locative. " This is not available on the strength of injunction ". Since the injunction is (meant for use) in the notion of the primary sense, it is not possible to understand it in the secondary sense. How ? Here in the word *sarasī* ' in the lake ' where *ī* is laid down (as a substitute for) the locative case-ending which comes into being after (the word *saras*) which ends in a consonant by (P 7. 1. 39. 1) *iyāḍiyājīkārāṇām upasaṁkhyānam*, the primary meaning viz. ' the phoneme *ī* which is a locative ending ' is possible. When such a possibility (of the primary meaning) is there, the name *pragṛhya* does not apply to cases like *somo gaurī adhi śritaḥ* where the case-ending has withdrawn.

[3]

" Even if (the word) *sarasī* is there," no purpose is served by reading the word *artha*. When the locative, which had come into being after the word *sarasī*, is made to undergo the *luk*-elision, there is no domain for the notion of the primary sense (of locative); so what ends in *ī* is (to be regarded) as ending in locative by *pratyayalakṣaṇa* (P 1.1.62). Since an affix under these circumstances is extremely impossible, this cannot be regarded as the reading of an affix. If (thus) there is no reading of an affix, then *tadantavidhi*

with *ī* and *ū* will be (there) (with the word) which conveys the meaning of locative. *ī* and *ū* which are followed by a locative (which is understood) by *pratyayalakṣaṇa* or those (i. e. *ī* and *ū*) which are associated with a locative (which is understood likewise) (get the name *pragṛhya*). " It (i. e. reading the word *arthe* in the sūtra) would be a clue to (the third and fourth alternatives) of the *tadantatva* (P 1. 1. 11). " Under the rule *īd ūd ed dvivacanaṁ pragṛhyam* (P 1. 1. 11), when, on the third and the fourth alternatives, (by *os*) is understood what ends in *os* — irrespective of whether the metarule *saṁjñāvidhau pratyayagrahaṇe* is resorted to or not — when this *tadanta* character is there, this will be a clue to the absense of *pratyayalakṣaṇa* (P 1. 1. 62). The words *syāt tadantatve* are used (in the Vār.) with reference (to the third and fourth alternatives) as a minor view.

If then *pratyayalakṣaṇa* does not take place in the matter of the name *pragṛhya* by this clue, where is the scope for this sūtra ? If, on the other hand, the operation caused by an affix *does* take place in the matter of the name *pragṛhya* then what is the use of framing this rule ? Therefore, this rule, which is to be framed, finds its scope by suggesting the absence of the operation due to an affix elsewhere. The name *pragṛhya* will, of course, be stated in its own domain; or, even though *pratyayalakṣaṇa* is there in the name *pragṛhya*.

[4]

" Or, (the word *arthe* is used) so that (the name *pragṛhya*) be not there for a first member of a compound (ending in ī or ū) ... (e.g. in) *vāpyaśva* (name of a contrivance like a horse on a well), *nadyāti* (name of an aquatic bird in a river) ... ". When a compound is formed by (the rule) *saṁjñāyām* (P 2. 1. 44), the name *pragṛhya* becomes due in the case of (a first member of a compound) which has conveyed the meaning of a locative and which ends in *ī*; it does not materialize because of the word *arthe* (read in the rule). " Now, even when the word *arthe* is read, what is the reason that (the name *pragṛhya*) does not materialize ? " Even in the two-fold mode of complex formation : (A) On the view that (components) give up their meaning (in a complex formation) for that matter, power (i. e. help) of activities inhering in the agent, the object (etc.) for a common objective is admitted as inherent in other substances, because it (the power) has ceased (i. e. the name *pragṛhya* does not materialize).

(Ā) Even on the view that (components) do not give up their own meaning (in the complex formation), when the qualifying (components) have their own meaning subordinated (to that of the principal component) and when the connection has disappeared in respect of the

meaning being brought into relation because of the connectedness, if the subordinate one does not convey the meaning of the principal one, then (in that case) since there is no complete assistance between the principal and the subordinate one, the use of the subordinate (word) will be meaningless. Therefore the qualifying words, whose own meanings are subordinated, assume the meaning of the principal one and become conveyors of many meanings. Such being the case, what is (now) expressed is the meaning whose distinctness is unrecognizable, as of dust and water in a lump of clay, which has increased its own meaning and which is inferred as a conglomeration, because, previous to the emergence of a single integrated meaning, the distinctness (of the two word-meanings) was known. As such the meaning of the whole is not expressed by the word *arthe* in the expression *saptamyarthe.*

(I) Or, when the case-endings, on the view that a nominal stem has a fivefold meaning, which are (merely) co-signifiers of the five meanings that are (previously) vague and unmanifest, repeat the meaning which is already expressed (by the nominal stem), or, when, on the view that a nominal stem has a three-fold meaning, they (i.e. the case-endings) express (for the first time) the number and (case-relations like) the object, the totality of meanings, that are expressed, includes a particular number (which is intended). Therefore, by reading *saptamyarthe* (in the rule), a conglomeration of meanings including a particular number is expressed. In a compound, on the other hand, when the particular number has withdrawn, the meaning is deficient owing to the fact that it has not made its own mark; so there is no perception of the meaning of locative. Therefore, the reading of the word *arthe* is meant for the understanding of the fictitious technical meaning, which is admitted (only) for the working of grammar.

If, then, locative-case-meaning, in which a particular number has ceased to be, is not understood here (i.e. P 1. 1. 19), then, even when a *luk*-elision is effected there is no comprehension of a particular number, and so the name *pragṛhya* will not be available in *somo gaurī adhi śritaḥ*. So it is not possible to say that the word *arthe* has been read to express a particular number. Similarly, in *vāpyaśva, nadyāti* the meaning of the whole is expressed (by the first i. e. subordinate member). There the power of the substance, a substratum of quality, which is the cause of the name *adhikaraṇa* (i.e. place) 'substratum', is subordinated because of the admission of a particular *ādheya* (i. e. attributive) and its locative meaning is practically indescribable (as being such and such) because there is, in addition, the *ādheya* which is favoured by the quality which inheres in a particular substance and is the cause of the origination of a particular name (viz. *ādheya*) — (and so this

locative meaning) is inferred as following an entity, viz. the particular *ādheya*. And when a principal locative meaning, not mixed with another meaning, exists (e. g. *somo gaurī* ... etc), it is not proper to assume such a (mixed) locative meaning (e. g. *vāpyaśva*). Such being the case, just as in the rule *jātyākhyāyām* etc. (P 1. 2. 58) acceptance of a universality, free from an individual, is understood, similarly here also a locative meaning, which has not taken any *ādheya* and which remains only in itself, is understood.

(Ī) Or, by the word *arthe* in *saptamyarthe*, the popular meaning is understood. Whence this ? What are the meanings of wholes (are alone popular). The meanings, on the other hand, of base, affix, first member (of a compound), second member (of a compound) which are inferred in grammar, on the basis of invariable presence and absence and are being accepted as the cause in respect of correctness (of words) — they are not (meanings of) wholes. In the world, however, these parts are as meaningless as the phonemes. Only the whole, when fully formed and not deviating from its own meaning, conveys its own unmixed (i.e. pure) meaning.

(U) Or, the word *samudāyārtha* means the whole cause of the understanding of the meaning of the whole, which has attained the character of the meaning of a nominal stem whose mixed character has ceased and which has become a concrete one. Such (a meaning) is to be understood in the rule, because of the word *saptamyarthe*. Here (i.e. in *vāpyaśva* etc.), however, it is not like that and so there is no defect (of the name *pragṛhya* attaching to it).

* * *

" *dā* and *dhā* (get the technical name) *ghu*, excepting *dāp* " (P 1. 1. 20).

[1]

In this rule the technical name *ghu* is prescribed for all those roots which assume the forms *dā* and *dhā*. This form of theirs, further, has two parts '*d*' or '*dh*' (and *ā* after each of them). The forms of roots *dā* and *dhā* are dependent on the utterance of these two parts. The roots *pā*, *ghrā*, *dhmā*, *sthā* and *mnā* have (all of them) *ā*, but they have neither *d* nor *dh*; just as, in *dīṅ* and *dṛṅ* (with *d* in them) and in *dhīṅ* and *dhṛṅ* (with *dh* in them), although there are *d* and *dh* in them, they do not exactly conform to the forms *dā* and *dhā*; hence they are different in form from them; and so they do not get the technical name *ghu*; in like manner, in the case of *deṅ* and *dheṭ*, when followed by a with a suffix code-letter *ś*, their final vowel *e* does not undergo the change to *ā* (P 6. 1. 45), there will be no technical name *ghu* when we have these forms (*deṅ* and *dheṭ*) which are different from *dā* and *dhā* (in the rule). (So in order that the name *ghu* should be

available and) hence the Vārttikakāra reads: "In this sūtra prescribing the technical name *ghu*, (the word) *prakṛti* should be inserted (so as to mean that *dā* and *dhā* and their *prakṛtis* get the technical name *ghu*) for the sake of *śit* (affixes)." But the Vārttikakāra does not read the word *vikṛtārtham* 'for the sake of the modified one'. He thinks that (it is because of this that it is) as an exception to the *lakṣaṇa-pratipadokta* paribhāṣā, which says: '(whenever a term is employed which might denote) both something original and also something else resulting from a rule (of grammar), such a term should be taken to denote only that which is original, (and so some other paribhāṣā must be deemed to operate); and its exception is the following paribhāṣā viz. *gāmādāgrahaṇeṣv aviśeṣaḥ*. The roots *gā*, *mā*, and *dā* when they are employed (in grammar) denote both the original roots *gā*, *mā*, *dā* and also the roots which are changed to *gā*, *mā*, *dā* by rules of grammar.

The *Bhāradvāja* school of grammarians, on the other hand, holds that the name *ghu* of both *deṅ* and *dheṭ*, although they have secured the *ā* ending (when arriving at the proper grammatical form) outside the *upadeśa* (i.e.the *dhātupāṭha*) is taken away by other forms ending in *ā* in the *upadeśa* itself and so (the name *ghu*) is not available. That is why they (i.e. the *Bhāradvāīya*-s) read *śidvikṛtārtham* (instead of mere *śidartham*). Their opinion is as follows: the original roots not having the forms *dā* and *dhā* and the modified roots not having found a place in the *upadeśa* (i. e. *dhātupāṭha*), there is no exception (viz. *gāmādāgrahaṇeṣv aviśeṣaḥ*) of the paribhāṣā *lakṣaṇapratipadoktayoḥ* ... ... in the opinion of the *Bhāradvāja* school of grammarians. The insertion of the (very) word (viz. *vikṛtārtham*) is meant to suggest the meaningfulness of (*prakṛti*). But when the word *prakṛti* is read, the modified forms will get the name *ghu* in accordance with the rule '*sthānivad ādeśaḥ*...' (P 1. 1. 56) i. e. the substitute becomes like the original. The other (disputant) says — 'what is the object (of including the word *prakṛti*) ?' The purport of this question is as follows — the (quoting) verbal forms like *praṇidadāti*, *yacchati*, *dayati*, *dadhāti* and *dhayati* get the name *prātipadika*, because they are meaningful (*arthavat* ... *prātipadikam*, P 1. 2. 45) on account of the meaningfulness of the verbs quoted (corresponding to the quoting words above *dā*, *dā*, *deṅ*, *dhā*, *dheṭ*) ... The change to *ā* (prescribed by the rule P 6. 1. 45) does not expect any cause but at the same time it is prohibited when followed by an affix, characterised by a code-letter *ś*; hence it is that it has to take place before the addition of the case-termination, afterwards *dā*, *dhā* and others undergo *ekaśeṣa* (P 1. 2. 64) and because (the name *ghu*) is prescribed. Here the *Vārttikakāra*, anxious as to how the originals get the name *ghu*, enjoins that the word *prakṛti* must be mentioned. When originals of *dā* and *dhā* get the name *ghu*, even their modi-

fications may get the name *ghu* in as much as they are eternally connected with their originals or in accordance with the *sthānivadbhāva* rule. But (if we give the name *ghu*) to the modifications, then it will not be in the case of the originals, because the properties of the modifications have no connection with their originals. Now even without including the word *prakṛti* (in the rule), by accepting only their (originals') own forms, if we achieve our purpose (i. e. the name *ghu*), it is unreasonable to state that we should include the word *prakṛti*. But this one (i. e. the *Vārttikakāra*) thinks that *dā-dhā*, the quoting word (in P 1. 1. 20 *dādhā ghu adāp*) refers to (lit. explains) the form in *dātā* etc. (of roots) after which an *ārdhadhātuka* affix follows and which have acquired (i. e. undergone) a change to *ā*; and he further thinks that in cases where *kṛt* affixes are added ... ... and wishing to secure, for the *ghu*-name rule, the ability to decide (things) in the matter of words, (practically) drives one to include the word *prakṛti* in the rule (under consideration). It need not be understood that when it is said that the word *prakṛti* should be included (in the rule), we are to understand that only the word *prakṛti* should be included. What more (should be thought of)? We mean to say that only the originals of the roots which have undergone the change to *ā* (at the end) should be accepted exactly as they stand and that also, after removing their modifications beforehand. *Cūrṇikāra*, on the other hand, thinks that the word *prakṛti* has been prescribed to be included in the rule, without setting aside the modifications; he further holds that it is (next to) impossible to take the originals as they are, without setting aside the modifications, the reason being that we will incur the defect of non-discrimination between the original and the modification; and therefore he (i. e. the *Cūrṇikāra*) explains (the whole passage) imagining that what is driven home is the necessity of reading the real form of the word *prakṛti*. The other (disputant) (who denies the necessity of the *Vārttika*) is going to observe that the statement about the necessity of the inclusion of the word *prakṛti* is meaningless, if the utterance by way of *ekaśeṣa* rule (is resorted to); hence he questions: "What is the purpose?" The other one (who wants the *Vārttika*) thinks that in the event of the mention of the modifications, it is impossible to accept the originals, because their mention turns out to be contrary ... ... and hence he says: "(roots) which end in *ā* (in the first instance) get the name *ghu*." (The compound) *āttvabhūtāḥ* should be split up as *āttvaṁ bhūtāḥ* (i. e. those roots which end in *ā* in the *updeśa* i. e. the *dhātupāṭha*). (Objection:) But the root *bhū* being intransitive, the splitting *āttvaṁ bhūtāḥ* is not justifiable; nor can the transitive character be justified on the ground that *bhū* means 'to obtain'. Is there any instance (in literature) where it is used in the sense of acquisition? (Reply:) (Yes,) there is; for instance (in the *saṁhitā* text of the *Maitrāyaṇī* Śākhā 3. 3. 7 of the

Yajurveda) we read : ' Verily, by means of this (*vaiśvakarmaṇa* sūkta or *ṣoḍaśagṛhīta* sūkta) the sage *Bharadvāja* made *Pratardana*, the son of *Divodāsa*, ready for war. He (i. e. *Pratardana*) got his kingdom. One who desires that a Kṣatriya should be a rāṣṭra (i. e. a Kṣatriya should get a kingdom) should make him ready for war by means of this; (by doing this) he surely gest his kingdom. Similarly, when we say ' the moon has become great ' we mean to say ' the moon has attained greatness '. Or we should dissolve *āttvabhūtāḥ* as *āttvena bhūtāḥ āttvabhūtāḥ*, that is, *āttvena prāptāḥ* [i. e. secured (in the *upadeśa* or *dhātupāṭha*) as accompanied by *ā*].

" Most of the operations based on the name *ghu* are with reference to *ārdhadhātuka* (suffixes). These (roots that do not radically end in *ā* i. e. *de, do, dhe*) end in *ā* there ". These roots have (so to say) a trifle of operation when followed by suffixes other than the *ārdhadhātuka* ones (i. e. the *sārvadhātuka* ones) and so to imagine the mention of *prakṛti* (in the rule) is not proper in view of this trifle of an operation. (In view of the foregoing observation) it is not proper for the sake of mere *iṭ* (ending of the 1st person singular *ātmanepada*) to imagine quite a different (i. e. in the form of ' part ' and ' whole ') meaning of the genitive form *lasya* (P 3. 4. 77) causing us to understand the meaning of the word *sthāneyoga* (in the rule P. 1. 1. 49 *ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā*) in the matter of the seventeen substitutes (except one *iṭ* out of the eighteen substitutes formulated in the rule P 3. 4. 78 : *tip, tas, zi ... ... mahiṅ*). Even that trifle of an operation can be achieved by shifting back the word *prakṛti* whose mention is necessary for the root *mā* in the rule (P 8. 4. 17) laying down *ṇatva*. So he suggests the mention of the word *prakṛti* (as ordained by the *Vārttikakāra*) is superfluous. Or, if we imagine a different meaning, there is difficulty experienced in the case of most (not only a single one) substitutes; while there is no such difficulty if we add the word *prakṛti* in the rule; consequently, the analogy of the seventeen substitutes and the like does not hold good here; so he (the *Vārttikakāra*) says: ' for the purpose of the *śit* suffix (the word *prakṛti* must be inserted); the *āttva* is prevented (from operating) in places where *śit* suffixes are enjoined '. The roots *deṅ* and *dheṭ*, the originals of the roots *dā* and *dhā* technically called *ghu*, do not have the forms *dā* and *dhā* and therefore do not get the name *ghu* and so the result of (the name) *ghu* i. e. the change from *n* to *ṇ* in the preverb *ni* in the examples *praṇidayate* (*deṅ*) and *praṇidhayati* (*dheṭ*) is not available.

[2]

' (Grammarians) of the school of *Bhāradvāja* read. ' They add one word more viz. *vikṛtārtham* (in the *Vārttika*). ' *Praṇidātā, praṇidhātā* ' : these are forms (respectively) of roots *deṅ* and *dheṭ*. The *Bhāṣyakāra*

quotes (the *paribhāṣā*): '*Lakṣaṇapratipadoktayoḥ* [*pratipadoktasyaiva*]" (to show that the name *ghu* is not available here) because here (the roots *deṅ* and *dheṭ*) do not end in a directly uttered *ā* (in the Dhātupāṭha). But Kātyāyana (the *Vārttikakāra*) thinks that it is possible to justify the name *ghu* (for *deṅ*, *dheṭ* etc.) by the aid of (the *paribhāṣā*) *gāmādāgrahaṇeṣv aviśeṣaḥ* and hence he has not read the (word *vikṛtārtham* in his *Varttika*' as the Bhāradvājīyas have done).

[3]

"Now even if we add the word *prakṛti*". The *Bhāṣyakāra* thinks thus: In the proximity of *dā* and *dhā*, the word *prakṛti* is heard. Under these circumstances, all (the three) might be related coreferentially. Let *dā* and *dhā*, which are *prakṛti*, get the name *ghu* but not *dā* and *dhā*, which have become *vikṛti*; or let not *dā* and *dhā*, which are not *prakṛti*, get the name *ghu*. If we imagine the above in this light, then this name, (though) applicable to all *dā*-s and *dhā* s, becomes restricted as applied to strictly fixed regions. Hence it is not possible to understand thus. Then how is the alternative (possibility) (to be explained)? Here is the reply:

[A] In the alternative of the *sāmānādhikaraṇya* (i.e. *dādhāḥ prakṛtayaḥ* the *karmadhāraya* compound), the words *dā* and *dhā* are not for others (i. e. not dependent on others) and hence get the benefit (of the name *ghu*); while mention of *prakṛti* being for others and therefore subordinate, *prakṛti*-s do not get (the advantage of) the name *ghu*.

[Ā] On the other hand, if we take the meaning of the genitive case (i. e. *dādhāṁ prakṛtayaḥ* as in a *tatpuruṣa* compound), the words *dā* and *dhā* being subordinate do not receive (the advantage of) the name *ghu*, while the word *prakṛti* gets the advantage (of the name *ghu*). Thus both the alternatives being of equal validity, this consideration has been put forward. (Objection:) But in the statement *dādhāṁ prakṛtayaḥ*, there ought not to be (the word *prakṛti*) in plural; by the mere statement of *dādhām*, we have already secured the plurality of *prakṛti*, as for instance, in the statement (*Maitrāyaṇī Saṁ*. 4. 13. 4) '*sūryaṁ cakṣur gamayatāt*' (i. e. send the eye to the Sun) and (*Taittirīya Saṁ*. 3. 1. 4. 3) '*uro vā padbhir āhata*' (i. e. the breast was struck by the feet); nor can it be that the difference in the substitutes (of roots) leads to the differentiation in their *prakṛti* and hence the plural. In this particular case, however, there is the idea of universality; hence plurality is used in order that for every substitute a different *prakṛti* be understood.

[4]

"So, then, we do not understand it thus". Here this is the gist: in this way (i. e. *dādhā* and *prakṛti*) the injunction achieves much; otherwise, either

of the two is restrained. (Objection :) Even then, the name *ghu* will be due to one and all *prakṛti*-s. No, (this difficulty will not arise); the word *prakṛti* is a relative one and there is no statement of any other modification (i. e. different from *dādhā*); hence the *prakṛti* of *dā* and *dhā* alone is understood.

[5]

" Therefore we shall say that *dā* and *dhā* get the name *ghu* and also those roots having the same meanings, but not the roots *dāp* and *daip.* " (Objection :) *dā* and *dhā* are verily meaningful and there is no possibility of their taking meaningless forms; hence there is no point in qualifying (them by the word *artha*). (Reply :) The word *arthe* (read in P 1. 1. 19) modified into the nominative form (i. e. *arthaḥ*) will be understood (here) on the strength of continuation. And then the meaning will be getting the name *ghu* and consequently the undesired contingency of meaning in totality being named *ghu* (will result); (but) because of the very mention of *dā* and *dhā,* their meaning will be connected (with the name *ghu*). And it being impossible (to attach the name *ghu*) to meaning (as opposed to the form of the word), it is the denotators of this (meaning i. e. *dā* and *dhā*) that will be (finally) understood as connected (with the name *ghu*). And that meaning belongs to both the original and the modified root-forms and hence all (i. e. both) will get (the name *ghu*).

Or, (it should be understood that) the word *arthe* (mentioned in the locative) is carried forward and it means that word, which makes out sense, gets the name *ghu.* And that does not mean, however, that all words, which express meanings, will get the name *ghu.* Only *dā* and *dhā,* which are closely mentioned, are connected (with the word *arthe*). Here the other (disputant), thinking that what is desired is achieved but (thereby) something undesirable also becomes due, says : ' This is not possible. '

[6]

" As for the *śit* (affixes), it is not necessary (to read *prakṛti* in P 1. 1. 20) ... ... There necessarily ... ... ". Even though we use the word *prakṛti* in this rule, in the rule laying down change from *n* to *ṇ* (i. e. P 8. 4. 17 *ner gada ... ghumā ... ca*) we shall have to take the word *prakṛti* again. That itself (the word *prakṛti* in P 8. 4. 17) will achieve both the purposes (i. e. *prakṛti* of both *ghu* and *mā*); the word *prakṛti* has to be read in that rule, because otherwise the change from *n* to *ṇ* prescribed in the case of (the form) *mā,* will not be available in the case of (the form) *me* ; " that (word *prakṛti*) will be taken up before (*mā*) so that it can be read as *ghu-prakṛti.*" The same (word *prakṛti*) will be connected with the word *mā.* The

other (disputant) points out the defect in taking the word *prakṛti* in the rule prescribing change of *n* to *ṇ* saying, " In the examples *praniminoti* and *pranimīnāti* also the change to *ṇ* will become due." These (the roots *mi* and *mī*) also are the originals of the form *mā*; because the rule P 6. 1. 50 *mīnātiminoti-dīṅām lyapi ca*) prescribes (the substitute) *ā* (to their finals). The other (disputant), wishing to make (his opponent) himself speak out (the solution), says : " Even if the word *prakṛti* is not used "; ' whatever solution he will offer to ward off the change of *n* to *ṇ* in the examples *pranimātā* and *pranimātum* that itself will be of service to me even though the word *prakṛti* is taken in the rule ',— this is his idea. (The other one) gives the solution. " In the rule (P 8. 4. 17) the root *mā* ending in *ā* with the code-letter *ṅ* will be understood (as intended to be read.) " The other man, having made (the opponent) speak (the solution) himself, says : " Just as then, when the word *prakṛti* is not read ... ".

[7]

" (Roots) which are phonetically similar to *dā* and *dhā* should be ruled out (i. e. they do not get the name *ghu*). " The *Bhāṣyakāra* opines — when *vṛddhi* is being made in the case of roots *dṛṅ* and *dhṛṅ* the words *dā* and *dhā* result after the substitution of *ā*. And this *r*, being prescribed (in the rule P 1. 1. 51 *ur aṇ raparaḥ*) as following the vowels *a*, *i* and *u* coming in place of *ṛ* (giving the forms *ar*, *ir*, and *ur*), is an augment and as such does not destroy the meaningfulness of the (crude) base because of the *paribhāṣā* : ' *āgamānām api* [*āgami-*] *grahaṇena grahaṇāt* ' (i. e. when the *āgamins*, i. e. the bases to which the *āgama*-s or augments are joined, are uttered, the augments naturally are included). Such being the case when only meaningful (words) are taken, prohibition of similar words is advocated. In both the alternatives (1) *r* does not form part of another) and (2) it is an initial of the succeeding word, there is no difference in the matter of meaningfulness because of this *r*. Or, in order to proclaim the manifoldness of the expression *arthavat* ' meaningful ', in grammar, inferred from the word *rūpaṁ* ' form ' read in P 1. 1. 68, are mentioned the two verbal forms *pranidārayati* and *pranidhārayati*.

[A] " The name *ghu* should not be prevented from taking place in words having similar forms. " It is already said that from the words *svaṁ rūpam* in the rule *svaṁ rūpaṁ śabdasya* (P 1. 1. 68) (it should be understood that) a word is used two-fold i. e. one consisting of the form (of the word) and the other consisting of the meaning (of the word) in the science (of grammar); therefore the roots *dā* and *dhā* get the name *ghu* only when they convey a meaning. The (word bits) *dā* and *dhā* in (the causatives) *dāri* (*dṛṅ*+ *ṇic*) and *dhāri* (*dhṛṅ*+ *ṇic*) are meaningless; for the words *dār* and *dhār*

(alone) are meaningful. (Objection :) But are not the augments understood by the mention of the base to which they are joined ? (Reply :) It will be so as you say, if this *r* (in the words *dār* and *dhār*) is an augment of the (corresponding) words *dā* and *dhā*, (but it is not that). Then whose (augment is it) ? (Of) *aṇ* (here, *ā*) which is a substitute of *ṛ*, followed by *r*. The alternatives of *abhakta* and *parādi* (mentioned above) are not (accepted); hence nothing is required to combat them.

[A] " Or, because (in forms such as *praṇidārayati* etc.) (*pra* and *ni*) are not preverbs (of *dā* and *dhā*). " This (i. e. the *Vārttikakāra*) thus tries now to remove (the defect) by assuming that though the words *dā* (and *dhā*) are meaningless they get the name *ghu*. Let these (*dā* and *dhā*) get the name *ghu*. (We do not object.) Still there is no defect because of the absence of operation caused by it (the name *ghu*). Any name as such is no (cause for) defect. The *n* of the preverb *ni*, followed by any root from among roots such as *ghu*, *mā* etc. and preceded by *r* in any preverb, is changed to *ṇ* (P 8. 4. 17; 14); and (only) when it is related to action, (*prādayaḥ* P 1. 4. 58) get the name *upasarga* (preverb), (P 1. 4. 59). (In the examples quoted) here (*praṇidārayati*, *praṇidhārayati*) the words *dā* and *dhā* do not convey any action. That, in view of which (*dār* and *dhār*) the names *upasarga* and *gati* take place (P 1. 4. 59-60), does not get the name *ghu*. (On the other hand) that which gets the name *ghu* does not denote action and so there is no name *upasarga* with reference to it (*dā* and *dhā*); hence there is absence of *ṇ*.

The other (disputant) thus objects : If you think that the name *ghu* is debarred from taking effect, either because of meaninglessness (of *dā* in *dār*) or because it (*pra*) is not an *upasarga*, then the name *ghu* will not be available for you even in regions where you desire it (and consequently there will be no change of *n* to *ṇ*). " It will not be available even here (in *praṇidāpayati* and *praṇidhāpayati*)." " Even in this (example) " the word *dāp* is meaningful and the same has connection with verbal action. (On the contrary) the word *dā* is meaningless and has no relation with any verbal action.

(Reply :) Thus by one rebuttal the *Vārttikakāra* accomplishes both (i.e. absence and presence of the name *ghu* in *praṇidārayati* and *praṇidāpayati* respectively.) Because of the fact that the augment does not effect any change in it (i.e. the base to which it is attached), its nomenclature does not cease to be operative whether there is an increase or decrease in it. This is as in worldly affairs; when a man gets the name *devadatta*, it never leaves him (thereafter); or just as in grammar), after the suffixes *tṛc* (P 3. 1. 133 : *ṇvultṛcau*) and *san* (P 3. 1. 5 : *san* and 7 : *dhātoḥ...icchāyāṁ vā*) get the name *ārdhadhātuka*, (*tṛc*) being a suffix (beginning with *val*), a separate part, *i*, (P 7. 2. 35) is added before it; and even if the *a* in the suffix *san* vanishes, the name *ārdhadhātuka*

does not cease to operate. If it ceases to operate, then the examples *lavitā*, and *pipaṭhiṣitā* (will not be valid). ... There being *guṇa* the word *dāp*, having for its cause an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix, will not be there. Similarly, here, once *dā* and *dhā* get the name *ghu*, then, even if subsequently a *p* in the form of other parts comes into being owing to a suffix, or goes – a part which makes no difference as in the world or in grammar – there is no loss of the name *ghu* in *praṇidayate*; such being the case, *dā* and *dhā*, which have got the name *ghu* and whose name *ghu* has not ceased when an additional part, viz. a *p*, which does not make a difference, has come into being, follow (*r*) belonging to a preverb. That is why this viz. *arthavataḥ* 'of a meaningful one' is read (in the *Vārttika*). Even in cases of meaningless words, which have got some designation, it does not cease when another part, making no difference, comes into being. To illustrate : Owing to the *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes, *guṇa* takes place, *Vṛddhi* takes place and *a* and *ā* followed by *r* (i. e. *ar* and *ār*) come (as substitutes). Moreover through the formation of the word *dāpayati* this (topic) is introduced and hence it is that the *Vārttikakāra* observes : *arthavato hy āgamaḥ*, i. e. 'for, an augment (attached) to a meaningful (word)'. When something once gets a name, it does not cease even if there is some increase in it or decrease in it (i. e. its original name continues). Similarly, words, whether in the beginning, at the end, or in the middle, do not lose their special designation.

* * *

"(The two suffixes) *tarap* and *tamap* (get the name) *gha*" (P 1. 1. 22).

[1]

In this rule, because of the character of the code-letter *p*, *tarap* and *tamap* call to our mind only what is furnished with *p* as the code-letter. (The words) *tarap* and *tamap* (read in P 5.3.55, 57) are quotes (of those in real language); (the words) *tarap* and *tamap* (read in this rule) are quotes of the quote (in P 5. 3. 55, 57). In the matter of code-letters there are two points of view : a code-letter is joined only to a quote. A word which is quoted (in popular use) receives the operation. Others hold the view : this (word in popular use) is endowed with the properties of it (i. e. the code-letter) by the (grammatical) quotes. Anyhow (i. e. whether we take this view or that view) in the case of a code-letter we are reminded of only what formerly existed. This being the case, it is possible to remember (the code-letter *p*) even when we utter the word *nadītara* (the crossing of a river); and hence the possibility of the name *gha* presenting itself there. Here there are two solutions possible. One is (the metarule) *lakṣaṇapratipadokta* and the other *sāhacarya* (association), as expressed in 'this ox is in want of a second' (Bhāṣya on

P 1. 3. 19). The word *tamap* being never found used (in a different sense) it is but proper to take (its associate word) *tarap* in the sense of intensity. Of the two, association is not resorted to; and (that of) the metarule *lakṣaṇa-pratipadokta* is not possible. The rule (P 3. 3. 57 : *ṝdor ap* laying down that roots ending in *ṝ* and *u* get the suffix *ap*) does not teach the formation of *tarap*. Then what does it teach ? (The formation) of the word '*tara*'. This word (i. e. *tarap*) is directly mentioned in the rule (P 5. 3. 57 : *dvivacanavibhajyopapade tarabīyasunau*). Therefore (it can be said that) this *tarap* character of *tara* (in *nadītara*) is neither in the science (of grammar) nor in use; (on the contrary) it is quite a different word.

(The Vārttikakāra) takes up yet another solution : 'In respect of the name *gha*, no prohibition in relation to the word *nadītara*'. There should be made no prohibition. Prohibition means the act of prohibiting. It is resorted to in the form of an action and (so) is connected with the negative particle *nañ*. The *Bhāṣyakāra*, on the other hand, taking recourse to a substantivised (prohibition) explains thus : "*Apratiṣedha* (means) meaningless *pratiṣedha*.' Although this is *pratiṣedha* it is said to be no *pratiṣedha*, as it has no purpose (to serve), because (the desired object) is achieved without prohibition. 'That *tarap*, which is found in the *upadeśa* (P 5. 3. 57) is taken up (in this rule)." (The word *aupadeśika* in the *Bhāṣya* is thus derived) : That which is used in the *upadeśa* or that which exists in the *upadeśa*. That word *tarap*, which is (found) in (rules of) grammar, is to be taken (here); so the *Bhāṣyakāra* explains it (the code-letter *p* in *tarap*) as a part of it (*tarap*) thus : (We get to know) the related meaning by the code-letter associated with the word. And that code-letter, where the words are similar in form, suggests some (special) meaning or any other fixed sign (Bhāṣya on P 1. 1. 26); but where there is no similarity (in the form) of words, that code-letter expresses only that word (coupled with the code-letter). "Where that form of it (is found) "; (that form) means the one associated with the code-letter. Popular usage (of a word) is closely observed, for the definiteness of the meaning-aspect takes place (only) when there is an auditory connection. Under these circumstances, in order that a word, which is invariable, eternal, principal and used to convey meaning, should be resorted to, the *Bhāṣyakāra* says : "The firm grasp of the form of a word is not possible without recourse to its popular use. " This is a customary rule. If there had been a code-letter in popular use, the rules would proceed (to give names). The popular usages are not produced in grammar; therefore this word *tarap* is non-existent, the usage of a code letter being thus absent in the popular usage. Which, then, (is seen in the popular language) ? The word *tara*. So we desist from (looking into) the popular word, and have recourse to an

impermanent, subordinate and secondary use of the word. "What is this (other usage)? It is the *upadeśa*'. In the *upadeśa* (about the word *nadītara*) the word *ap* is found in the rule (*ṝdor ap* : P 3. 3. 57) and not *tarap*. So the word *tarap* is neither in popular use nor in the science of grammar; so naturally there cannot be any name *gha* for a (totally) imaginary form.

[2]

"Or let there be (the name *gha*) for (the segment *tara* in the word *nadītara.*)". There is defect if there is (some) operation (to be performed); (mere) name is not so. "(Shortening takes place) only when *gha* etc., if they are coreferential, follow". This phrase *nadyās tara*, on the contrary, does not have the same referent. The two (suffixes) denoting excess and denoting own meaning (of the stem, without adding any new meaning), which convey excess are coreferential. "Still if *tara* has the same referent as *nadī* (the defect will still be there)." (Objection:) (in that case) the form of the word (from the root *tṝ*) ought to have been *tīrṇiḥ*. (Reply:) there is no such fault (in what we say). When the word *tara* is derived as *tīryate iti taraḥ* (by the rule P 3. 3. 57)- 'the object of crossing'- it is resorted to, in its universal character, as substantive, but not *nadī* (as an object of crossing); and then the adjective (viz. *nadī*) is (added) later; then the principal (substantive) word (viz. *taraḥ*) does not abandon its gender. This is so as in the example - (that phoneme), whose place of articulation is the *nāsikā* (nose) along with *mukha* (mouth), where although the word *nāsikā* is in feminine gender, the *vacanam* is not turned into *vacanī*. Or, (*tara*) can be considered as conventional; *nadī* is the qualifier of the qualified *tara*. We should know that words tend (generally) to express a collective meaning. (The stems, which precede, become shortened) "if *gha* etc. in feminine gender follow" (P 6. 3. 43 : *gharūpa* ...). The rule P 6. 3. 34 ...*striyām*...is available by *anuvṛtti*. Gender being connected with the collective word, (the affix,) having no other meaning than that of the stem itself, is designated the feminine gender. (The word) *brāhmaṇīrūpam*, which is dissolved as *brāhmaṇī rūpam iva* will get shortened. (This is a defect, which will creep in if *strīliṅgeṣu* is not inserted.) The meaning of the word *brāhmaṇīrūpam* is: figure like a *brāhmaṇī* (a brāhmaṇa lady).

Some (grammarians) give the following example. In the compound *sāmatara* (which is dissolved as) *sāmnas taraḥ*, the augment *nuṭ* will be due (which is not desired) by the rule *nād ghasya* (P 8. 2. 7). But the difficulty can be got over by observing that there will be no (*nuṭ*), the word *sāmatara* being a Vedic word.

* * * *

"(The two words) *bahu* and *gaṇa* and words ending in suffix *vatu* and *ḍati* get the name *saṁkhyā*" (P 1. 1. 23).

" In the name *saṁkhyā*, the word *saṁkhyā* should be added ". (*Saṁkhyāsaṁjñāyām*) is locative denoting substratum. (The *Vārttika*) means in effect that in the rule laying down the name *saṁkhyā*, the word *saṁkhyā* should be read (in addition).

Or, (it means) when the name is being prescribed, is going to be prescribed, or has been prescribed, the word *saṁkhyā* should be added. In this rule the word *saṁkhyā* may be added and the rule be read as : '*bahugaṇavatuḍatisaṁkhyāḥ saṁkhyā*' – which is explained (in the *Mbh*) as : *saṁkhyā ca ... vaktavyam* : ' One should say *saṁkhyā* i. e. a numerical gets the name *saṁkhyā* '.

Or one should thus read : *bahugaṇavatuḍati saṁkhyā* and then add *saṁkhyā ca.* " What is the purpose in all this (to be achieved) ? " The intention (of the questioner) is this : Just as in the science of grammar words, well known among people, such as *paśu* (beast), *apatya* (progeny), *devatā* (deity), and *prācām* (in the opinion of the eastern people), *udīcām* (in the opinion of the northern people) are used (in this ordinary sense); these are not defined (differently) in other rules–even so, these also i. e. *eka* (one) and other numerals, not defined in other rules, are verily used in popular parlance; people, in general, use (these words) thus.

Or, the question *kiṁ prayojanam* (what is the purpose ?) is meant (to ask) what more (additional) meaning is to be understood. Here the mention of *saṁkhyā* is made so that these very words *bahu* and others should get the name *saṁkhyā* only when they express a number and not the word, *bahu*, meaning abundance, as in sentences : *bahur odanaḥ* (ample boiled rice), *bahuḥ sūpaḥ* (ample soup); similarly the word *gaṇa* in the rule, if it means a cluster or union, should not get the name *saṁkhyā*. There is a description (in literature) : ' a lot of thirsty *sāraṅga* birds got water (for quenching their thirst) '. The *Bhāṣyakāra* says this in order to show that the word *saṁkhyā* is put there in the rule to tell definitely that the words *bahu* and others, when they express number, get the name *saṁkhyā*.

" In regions of the name *saṁkhyā* (i. e. in those places where numerals are given some operations) the popular numerals one, (two) etc. (should be understood) ". A technical name being meant for operations, the *Bhāṣyakāra* only mentions the regions (where they are meant for operation). Surely, the named are not mentioned, so that they should get the technical name; then what for ? So that (the named) should undergo an operation.

(Objection :) just as one understands (easily) the popular words *paśuḥ*, *apatyam* etc., in the same manner one will also understand here (the numerals *eka* and others). So the *Bhāṣyakāra* says : " Is it not a fact that in worldly parlance the numerals one, two, three etc. are too well understood as numerals ?" (Reply :) " Otherwise, (i. e. if, in the present rule, the word *saṁkhyā* is not added) the name *saṁkhyā* will not denote ordinary numerals one, two etc., being non-technical as in the worldly usages." Why is it so ? " Of two (words having the same form), one with a technical and the other with a non-technical meaning, the operation is understood with reference to the technical one ". Just as you know from worldly usage that one, two and other numbers are expressed by the numerals, in the same way it is settled that the technical (word) should be understood. What is this settled fact by which there is such an understanding in the world ? It is said : for example, take the word *gopālaka* which has come into vogue taking a particular meaning as the cause (of its usage); it may take on (another meaning viz.) providing (the necessaries for agriculture), as for instance, in the sentence *pañcabhir halaiḥ kṛṣati*, ' he farms (his field) with five ploughs '. Or, it may convey man's active role or his caste as a cowherd, when we refer to him as ' one who tends these cows '. Or convention, being accepted on account of one *nimitta* i. e. cause, drives out another *nimitta* (cause) just as action drives out class and others. A restriction comes into existence which is intended for the things of the same kind; even so in the present rule also. In short, (one can say that) only words *bahu* etc. are relevant in this discussion.

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NOTES

(1) *p.* 1, *l.* 2 : प्रगृह्य, name of the final vowels (see P. 1.1. 11–19) which, when followed by other vowels, do not undergo any change. It literally means 'fit to be held up or kept as it is, without any saṁdhi or euphonic combination'. It is said of a vowel, which is not combined with the following vowel by rules of saṁdhi. Its प्रदेश or field of operation is e. g. P 6. 1. 125 : प्लुतप्रगृह्या अचि नित्यम् and others. This name in the technical sense occurs in *Prātiśākhya* and other grammatical literature.

The *Bhāṣya* on this Sūtra gives examples like पचेते इति, पचेथे इति from the तिङन्त class and खट्वे इति, माले इति from the सुबन्त class, but genuine examples, which are abundant in Vedic literature, can thus be given ।

(a) i ऋ 8. 10. 2d : ईन्द्राविष्णू अश्विनावाशुहेषसा ।

ii ऋ 3. 6. 4cd : अस्के सपत्नी अजरे अमृक्ते सबर्दुघे उरुगायस्य धेनू ।

(b) i ऋ 2. 41. 6c : सचेते अनवह्वरम् ।

ii ऋ 8. 5. 2c : सचेथे अश्विनोषसम् ।

(c) iii ऋ 5. 45. 4b : इन्द्रा न्वग्नी अवसे हुवध्यै ।

[1]

(1) *p.* 1, *l.* 2 : Read the first line of *Dīp.* as thus emended । ईदादिषु विशेषवत्यो व्यवतय: श्रूयन्ते । स्वं रूपं द्विविधं च । This latter sentence obviously refers to P 1. 1, 68 : स्वं रूपं शब्दस्य ... । The *Bhāṣya* (I. 175. 21–22) on this reads । न ह्यन्यत् स्वं शब्दस्यास्त्यन्यदतो रूपात् । एवं तर्हि सिद्धे सति यद्रूपग्रहणं करोति तज्ज्ञापयत्याचार्योऽस्त्यन्यद्रूपात् स्वं शब्दस्य । किं पुनस्तत् । अर्थः ।

In this connection see the following from the वाक्यपदीय :—

1. 56cd अर्थरूपं तथा शब्दे स्वरूपं च प्रकाशते ।

3. 14. 583 स्वं रूपमिति चैतस्मिन्नर्थस्यापि परिग्रहः ।
रूपवज्ज्ञापितस्तस्मादासन्नोऽर्थो ग्रहीष्यते ॥

(2) *p.* 1, *l.* 3 : आश्रितद्विशक्तित्वात्. This is illustrated in the *VP.* 1.55 as :

ग्राह्यत्वं ग्राहकत्वं च द्वे शक्ती तेजसो यथा ।
तथैव सर्वशब्दानामेते पृथगवस्थिते ॥

The *Dīp.* uses the words प्रत्याय्य and प्रत्यायक as synonyms for ग्राह्य and ग्राहक.

(3) *p.* 1, *l.* 4 : अभिन्नश्रुतितया शब्दान्तरं अनुकरणेन अनुकर्तुं शक्यम् ... Take, for example, the word अग्नि in the popular usage; this is taken up in the Sū. P 4. 2.

33 : अप्रेढंक्; the hearing of these words (the अनुकरण and the अनुकार्य) is not different; it is the same. Therefore it so happens that शब्दान्तर i. e. the word in popular usage (अग्नि in the present case) is mentioned by quoting it, so to say, in the grammatical rule. This is made clear in *VP* 1.60 :

अग्निशब्दस्तथैवायमग्निशब्दनिबन्धनः ।
अग्निश्रुत्यैति संबन्धमग्निशब्दाभिधेयया ॥

The वृत्ति on this कारिका:— ... तस्मात् अग्निशब्दो येन अर्थभूतेन अभिन्नरूपेण अग्निशब्देन अर्थवान् तम् अग्निशब्दान्तराभिधेयस्य तुल्यश्रुतेः अग्निशब्दस्य संज्ञाभावं प्रतिपादयति इति।

(4) *p.* 1, *l.* 4 : नान्तरीयकत्वात्. This word is already used, probably first, by पतञ्जलि in his महाभाष्य on the following Sūtras : 1. 1. 56 (it is obvious that प्राधान्य is placed in juxtaposition with नान्तरीयकत्व); 1.2 39; 3.3.18 and 4. 1. 3.

P 6. 3. 75 : नभ्राण्नपात् ... नाकेषु प्रकृत्या does not read this word नान्तरीयक. But गणरत्नमहोदधि (155) has expanded the list and included it there. About the grammatical formation of the word नान्तरीयक, कैयट on P 3. 3. 18 referred to above states : नान्तरीयकत्वादिति । अन्तर (अन्तरा ?) शब्दो गहादिषु (P 4. 2. 138 : गहादिभ्यश्च) पठ्यते, स च विनार्थे वर्तते । अन्तरे (अन्तरा ?) भवम् अन्तरीयम् । तत्र नञ्समासे कृते पृषोदरादित्वात् भाष्यकारवचनप्रामाण्याद्वा नलोपाभावः । ततः स्वार्थे कन्प्रत्ययः ।

नागेश on this is illuminating :—

विनार्थे इति । एवं च यद्विना यन्न भवति तन्नान्तरीयकमित्यर्थः । See also his comment on P 1. 2. 39 : विनार्थकान्तराशब्दात् भवार्थे छो गहादित्वात् । स्वार्थे कः, नञ्समासो, नलोपाभावश्च पृषोदरादित्वात् नान्तरीयकशब्दे ।

(5) *p.* 1, *l.* 6 : उभयं संभवति. Cf. *Mbh.* (I. 6. 8–11) : किं पुनराकृतिः पदार्थ आहोस्विद् द्रव्यम् । उभयमित्याह । कथं ज्ञायते । उभयथा हि आचार्येण (= पाणिनिना) सूत्राणि पठितानि । आकृतिं पदार्थं मत्वा 'जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन् बहुवचनमन्यतरस्याम्' (1. 2. 58) इत्युच्यते । द्रव्यं पदार्थं मत्वा 'सरूपाणाम् – –' (1. 2. 64) इत्येकशेष आरभ्यते । Cf. also the *Vārs* 35 and 36 on P 1. 2. 64 and the *VP* 3. 1. 2.

(6) *p.* 1, *l.* 7 : अतिप्रसङ्ग, 'over-application'. This is a defect which is thus defined by the *Nyāsa* (on the *Kāś.* on P 8. 2. 4) : अनिष्टेऽपि विषये प्रवृत्तिः अतिप्रसङ्गः ।

(7) The *Dīp.* ईदादिषु (line 1)... अत आह (line 11) : This introductory part of [1] falls into three divisions :

(i) from ईदादिषु to उभयं संभवति where the two views, आकृतिविवक्षा and व्यक्तिविवक्षा, are scientifically treated and explained.

(ii) from तत्रेदं to चेदमुपपद्यते, where the justification of तपरकरण (i.e. ईत्,

ऊत् and एत्) in the present सूत्र from both points of view has been similarly dealt with.

(iii) from आकृतौ तावत् to इत्यत आह, the propriety of पतञ्जलि's question : ' किमर्थं ... उच्यते ' has been explained, which is succinctly put by कैयट in the following manner although he seems to have ignored it at 2) above as being unnecessary :

" ... ईदूतोरनण्त्वात् भिन्नकालनिवृत्त्यर्थं नोपपद्यते तपरत्वम्। उदात्तादीनामभेदकत्वात् **गुणान्तरयुक्तानां सवर्णानां ग्रहणार्थमपि नोपपद्यते** । जातिपक्षेऽपि दीर्घोच्चारणात् **प्रयत्नाधिक्यात्** ह्रस्वानां न भविष्यति, प्लुतानां च इष्यत एव इति इष्टव्याघातं प्रत्युत तपरत्वं करोतीति प्रश्नः किमर्थमिति ।

One notices that the words, in bold type above, are taken by कैयट from भर्तृहरि's दीपिका, a fact which justifies the claim he has made in the introductory part of his प्रदीप when he observes :—

' भाष्याब्धिः क्वातिगम्भीरः क्वाहं मन्दमतिस्ततः ।
तथापि **हरिबद्धेन** सारेण ग्रन्थसेतुना ।
क्रममाणः शनैः पारं तस्य प्राप्तास्मि पङ्गुवत् ॥

The काशिकाकार, about two centuries later than भर्तृहरि and about five centuries earlier than कैयट, uses the word गुणान्तरयुक्त on P 1. 1. 70.

विध्यर्थमिदं in the *Kāś*. explicitly states that this is a विधायकसूत्र, and not a नियामक सूत्र.

(8) *p*. 1, *ll*. 9–10 : आकृतौ तावत् ... ... । व्यक्तावपि ......

One should bear in mind these pairs :

(1) आकृति or जाति vs व्यक्ति or द्रव्य.
(2) सामान्य vs विशेष.

In view of the above, विशेष and व्यक्ति go together; this is expressed in विशेषवत्यः व्यक्तयः; आकृति (or class) includes all the व्यक्तिs (or individuals) as the *Bhāṣya* (I. 18. 23) puts it : अवर्णाकृतिरुपदिष्टा सर्वमवर्णकुलं ग्रहीष्यति । तथा इवर्णाकृतिः । तथा उवर्णाकृतिः । See also काशिका on पा 1. 1. 9 : तुल्यास्यप्रयत्नं सवर्णम् which explains in detail thus : अ अ॒ अ॑ इति त्रयोऽकारा उदात्तानुदात्तस्वरिताः प्रत्येकं सानुनासिका निरनुनासिकाश्च ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतभेदात् अष्टादशधा भिद्यन्ते । तथा इवर्णः तथा उवर्णः, तथा ऋवर्णः । ऌवर्णस्य दीर्घा न सन्ति तं द्वादशभेदमाचक्षते । संध्यक्षराणां ह्रस्वा न सन्ति तान्यपि द्वादशप्रभेदानि ।

(9) *p*. 1, *ll*. 10–11 : अनङादीनां स्वशब्देन ... उदात्तादीनाम् ।

Here the Sūtras like the following are meant ;

(i) 1) as for उदात्त, see P 7. 1. 75 : अस्थिदधिसक्थ्यक्ष्णाम् अनङ् उदात्तः। and
2) P 7. 1. 98; चतुरनडुहोराम् उदात्तः as also P. 3. 4. 103; 4. 4. 108; 6. 4. 71

(ii) as for अनुदात्त, see P 2. 4. 32 : इदमोऽन्वादेशेऽश् अनुदात्तः.

(10) *p.* 1, *ll.* 13–14 : तत्कालानां सवर्णानां ग्रहणम्. For the definition of सवर्ण, see P 1. 1. 9 : तुल्यास्यप्रयत्नं सवर्णम्।

(11) *p.* 1, *l.* 18 : सूत्रकारस्य च ... स्वस्वरासङ्गाच्च भेदकत्वं ... अनुमीयते. For arrangement of roots according to the three Padas i.e. Ātmanepada, Parasmai° and Ubhya°, the सूत्रकार has attached vowels endowed with Udātta and other accents to roots ending in consonants e. g. in 'एध वृद्धौ' (धापा 2), the अ after ध् in एध is अनुदात्त and अनुनासिक as धापा puts it : एधादयः उदात्ताः अनुदात्तेतः आत्मनेभाषाः; in 'अत सातत्यगमने' (धापा 38) the अ after त् in अत is उदात्त and अनुनासिक as धापा puts it : अतादयः उदात्ताः उदात्तेतः परस्मैभाषाः; similarly, in 'डुपचष् पाके' (धापा 996) the अ after च् in डुपचष् is स्वरित and अनुनासिक as धापा puts it : पचादयोऽनुदात्ताः स्वरितेतः उभयतोभाषाः. The use of accents to indicate the Pada is taught in P. 1.3.12, 72. and 78. Incidentally, as Palsule puts it in his *Sanskrit Dhātupāṭhas : A Critical Study* (1961; p. 15, n. 43) : "... The Pada in this Dhātupāṭha is indicated, in the case of roots ending in consonants by means of the accent on the Anubandha vowel. So all that is needed is to say that so many roots are *udāttetaḥ*, so many *anudāttetaḥ* etc. The further addition of *ātmanebhāṣāḥ* etc. is quite superfluous." So, because Pāṇini, the सूत्रकार, has appended Udātta and other accents endowed with special qualities, for a special purpose, it can be said that he also endorsed this view that the Guṇas are distinctive; otherwise the entire arrangement will collapse.

(12) *p.* 1, *ll.* 18–19 : अनङादीनामुदात्तानां ... गमयितुम्। In Sūtras like अस्थिदधि ... अनङ् उदात्तः (P. 7. 1. 75), in order to read *anaṅ* as Udātta it is not enough to pronounce *anaṅ* as Udātta, because Guṇas like Udātta etc. are अभेदक (not distinctive). The words like Udātta etc. have to be used in addition in the sūtras, so the objector to the statement that Guṇas are not distinctive and are accepted as such by the सूत्रकार says in effect : If we accept the आकृतिपक्ष (class view), it is impossible to exclude Anudātta and Svarita by merely pronouncing *anaṅ* as Udātta and therefore the words Udātta and others are specifically read in the sūtras. In this manner it is possible to say that the words Udātta and others are not a clue (लिङ्ग or ज्ञापक) of the non-distinctiveness.

(13) *p.* 1, *ll.* 21–22 : अनुनासिकग्रहणं ... प्रतिषेधवचनादिति। The *vacana* in question is P. 8. 4. 57 : अणोऽप्रगृह्यस्यानुनासिकः। What Bhar. says is echoed by Kaiy. : क्वचिदनुनासिकग्रहणमप्यस्ति। तद् गुणप्रसङ्गेनोच्चारितम्। न हि प्रगृह्योऽनुनासिकः संभवति 'अणोऽप्रगृह्यस्यानुनासिकः' इति निषेधात्।

[2]

(1) *p.* 1, *l.* 25 : सिद्ध and असिद्ध. असिद्धत्व means invalidity (or technical non-existence) by the Sūtra पूर्वत्रासिद्धम् (P 8. 2. 1) which makes a rule in the Tripādī (the second, third and fourth quarters in the eighth chapter of the *Aṣṭ*) invalid when any preceding rule in the सपादसप्ताध्यायी (first seven chapters and the first quarter of the eighth) is to be applied. As the काशिका explains succinctly :

तत्र येयं सपादसप्ताध्यायी अनुक्रान्ता, एतस्यामयं पादोनोऽध्यायोऽसिद्धो भवति । इत उत्तरं च उत्तर उत्तरो योगः पूर्वत्र पूर्वत्र असिद्धो भवति । असिद्धवद् भवति, सिद्धकार्यं न करोतीत्यर्थः ।

(2) *p.* 2, *l.* 1 : त्रिमात्रता – State of having three मात्राs or morae as it is called in prosody. See the *Kāś.* on P 1. 2. 27 : ऊकालोऽज्झ्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतः । ऊ इति त्रयाणामयं मात्रिक-द्विमात्रिक-त्रिमात्रिकाणां प्रश्लिष्टनिर्देशः । ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुत इति द्वन्द्वैकवद्भावे पुंलिङ्गनिर्देशः । उ ऊ ऊ३ इत्येवंकालोऽच् यथाक्रमं ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतः इत्येवंसंज्ञो भवति । ... कालग्रहणं परिमाणार्थम् । ...

(3) *p.* 2, *l.* 2 : शास्त्रासिद्धत्व as opposed to कार्यासिद्धत्व. शास्त्रासिद्धत्व is the supposed invalidity or technical non-existence of a rule (शास्त्र) or a set of rules by virtue of the dictum laid down in P 8. 2.1 : पूर्वत्रासिद्धम्. See the *Bhāṣya* (III. 66.5–7) on P 6. 1. 86 : षत्वतुकोरसिद्धः ॥ Vā 5 : स्थानिवद्वचनानर्थक्यं शास्त्रासिद्धत्वात् ॥ स्थानिवद्वचनमनर्थकम् । किं कारणम् । शास्त्रासिद्धत्वात् । नानेन कार्यासिद्धत्वं क्रियते । किं तर्हि । शास्त्रासिद्धत्वमनेन क्रियते । एकादेशशास्त्रं [P 6. 1. 10 : एङः पदान्तादति] तुक्शास्त्रे [P 6. 1. 71 : ह्रस्वस्य पिति कृति तुक्] असिद्धं भवतीति ।

(4) *p.* 2, *ll.* 3–4 : Kaiy. on असिद्धः प्लुतः says : शास्त्रासिद्धत्वाश्रयणाच्च प्लुतबुद्धौ असत्यां प्रगृह्यत्वे विधीयमाने द्विमात्रविषया बुद्धिः प्रवर्तते । ... In this case शास्त्र is responsible for प्लुतबुद्धि. So, in the absence of प्लुतबुद्धि, instead of 3 मात्राs, you have 2 मात्राs.

(5) *p.* 2, *ll.* 5–6 : ... प्रवृत्तमपि शास्त्रं यदा वचनात् ... तदा तद्व्यापारसाध्ये लक्ष्ये ... Here शास्त्र is the same thing as लक्षण. See *Vār* 14 : लक्ष्यलक्षणे व्याकरणम् (Paspaśā). The *Bhāṣya* explains thus : लक्ष्यं च लक्षणं च एतत् समुदितं व्याकरणं भवति । शब्दो लक्ष्यः सूत्रं लक्षणम् ।

(6) *p.* 2, *ll.* 7–8 : तथा च वक्ष्यति...प्रसङ्गदोषो नोपपद्यते । The MS (p. 103a) reads...अयावेकादेशप्रसङ्गदोषो नोपपद्यते । and the printed text (*p.* 2, *ll.* 7–8) reads the same. But it does not agree with the context; it is, therefore, emended thus; ... एकादेशप्रतिषेधः ' । कार्यासिद्धत्वेऽयावेकादेशप्रसङ्गदोषो नोपपद्यते and is translated accordiingly. The omission in the MS is most probably due to haplology. In this connection attention is drawn to the following two Sūtras, viz P 8. 2. 80 : अदसोऽसेर्दादु दो मः । and 81 : एत ईद् बहुवचने । The relevant portion of the

Kāś on them is as follows :— 80 : अदसो असकारान्तस्य दात् परस्य वर्णस्य उवर्णादेशो भवति । दकारस्य च मकारः । 81 : (अदसो दकाराडुत्तरस्य) एकारस्य ईकारादेशो भवति । दकारस्य च मकारः । बहुवचने बहूनामर्थानामुक्तौ । बहुवचने इति अर्थनिर्देशोऽयम् । The *Sid-kau.* pertinently remarks on उ in the Sūtra thus : उ इति ह्स्वदीर्घयोः समाहारद्वन्द्वः (उ + ऊ = उ) for the two forms of अदस् —अमुना, अमूभ्याम्.

(7) *p.* 2, *ll.* 9–12 : In this passage the objector says : It is not proper to accept शास्त्रासिद्धत्व; on the contrary it is consistent to accept कार्यासिद्धत्व. What the objector wants to say is this : the very soul of a शास्त्र is to lay down a rule. A statement, about a particular topic, made by any rule after it proceeds towards a लक्ष्य (i. e. the word form to be derived) naturally falls off when its purpose has been achieved. Under these circumstances, the operation effected by the rule about its लक्ष्य being in existence, it will be consistent to say that the कार्य (operation) is असिद्ध.

This objection has been refuted in the *Dīp* beginning with the words नैष दोषः । स्वमर्थम्. ... In effect it is thus : first a शास्त्र makes a statement; after that, at the time when the शास्त्र proceeds towards its लक्ष्य it can be deemed असिद्ध on the strength of another शास्त्र (पूर्वत्रासिद्धम् P 8. 2. 1), which renders the former शास्त्र असिद्ध; for even if we accept कार्यासिद्धत्व, it is first necessary to understand the शास्त्र laying down the कार्य. Such being the case the शास्त्र being deemed असिद्ध, it fails to be operative in its लक्ष्य, which reamains in its original state. For instance, in the example अग्नी इति the long ई in अग्नी (which is द्विमात्रिक) is ordained to be प्लुत (i.e. त्रिमात्रिक) by the rule 8. 2. 84: दूराद्धूते च, which is mentioned in the असिद्धकाण्ड (8. 2. 1 : पूर्वत्रासिद्धम्); but for the Sūtra 1. 1.11 ईदूदेद् द्विवचनं प्रगृह्यम् mentioned in the सिद्धकाण्ड (P 1.1.1–8. 1.74), दूराद्धूते च (P 8. 2. 84) is असिद्ध; hence we understand that ईकार does not become प्लुत (i. e. त्रिमात्रिक) but remains दीर्घ (i. e. द्विमात्रिक) and therefore the name प्रगृह्य can be applied to that दीर्घ-ईकार. But if we accept कार्यासिद्धत्व, we must first have recourse to कार्य (changing दीर्घ ई into प्लुत ई३), then this change can be deemed असिद्ध. In this way, although प्लुत (त्रिमात्रिक) is असिद्ध, its स्थानी i.e. original (ईकार द्विमात्रिक) vanishes after its replacement by प्लुत, the सूत्र giving the name प्रगृह्य to long ईकार (i.e. P 1. 1. 11 ईदूदेद्द्विवचनं प्रगृह्यम्) will not come into effect and the expected प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा will not be available. Hence we should adopt शास्त्रासिद्धत्व alternative rather than the कार्यासिद्धत्व one. The वार्त्तिक 1.1. 12. 1 मात् प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायां ... प्रतिषेधः : also leads one to infer that the शास्त्रकार is in favour of the शास्त्रासिद्धत्व alternative. The above reasoning will be clear from the following examples.

1) अमी आसते 2) अमू आसाते 3) अमी अत्र.

In these undesired saṁdhi operations viz. अय्, आव् and एकादेश respecti-

vely become due; the वार्त्तिक enjoins their prohibition; the undesired संधिs become due thus: When the case terminations जस् (nom. pl.), औ (nom. dual) and जस् (nom. pl.) are added to the word अदस्, the last consonant स् in अदस् gets the substitute अ acc. to the Sūtra 7. 2. 102 : त्यदादीनामः; that is, their respective position is like this : 1) अद् + अ + जस्, 2) अद् + अ + औ, and 3) अद् + अ + जस्; after this by the Sūtra P 6. 1. 97 : अतो गुणे, the final अ in अद् and the अ, the substitute of स्, undergo एकादेश and become अ; then by the Sūtra P 7. 1. 17 : जसः शी, जस् is replaced by ई; then by P 6. 1. 87 : आद् गुणः we get the form अदे (अद+ई); similarly in the case of the termination औ, by P 6. 1. 88 : वृद्धिरेचि we get the from अदौ (अद + औ). The final vowels in the two forms अदे and अदौ get respectively the substitutes ई (by the Sūtra P 8. 2. 81 : एत ईद् बहुवचने) and ऊ by the Sūtra P 8. 2. 80 : अदसोऽसेर्... दो मः and the substitute म for द्. So we get the desired forms अमी and अमू. After this the jinal vowels ई and ऊ of these forms get the name प्रगृह्य by P. 1. 1. 12 : अदसो मात्; hence it is that there is no स्वरसंधि according to P 6. 1. 125 : प्लुतप्रगृह्या अचि. To this the वार्त्तिककार thus objects : The Sūtras P 8. 2. 81 : एत ईद् ... and P 8. 2. 80 : अदसोऽसेर् ... enjoining substitutes ई and ऊ are in the असिद्धकाण्ड and therefore to the Sūtras laying down vocalic euphony the forms are 'visible'— in the language of the traditional Pandits — only as अदे and अदौ and hence in the three examples the substitutes अय् and आव् by the Sūtras P 6. 1. 78 एचोऽयवायावः (in the first two examples of the three) and एकादेश by the Sūtra P 6. 1. 69 : एङः पदान्तादति become due. Being undesired they should be prohibited, observes the वार्त्तिककार (P 1. 1. 12 Vā 1). If we accept the alternative कार्यासिद्धत्वं the substitutes ई and ऊ will be deemed असिद्ध; but their originals ए and औ having already vanished, there is no possibility of their replacement by undesired substitutes. Such being the case, the defect that undesired substitutes become due (as pointed out by the वार्त्तिककार) cannot be held to be consistent. If we accept the other alternative viz. शास्त्रासिद्धत्व the rules (P 8. 2. 81 and P 8. 2. 80 एत ईत् ... and अदसोऽसेर् —) laying down the substitutes ई and ऊ are असिद्ध and their originals ए and औ appear as they are to the Sūtras in the सिद्धकाण्ड and hence the स्वरसन्धि सूत्रs become available; this stands to reason and consistency. In short, the alternative शास्त्रासिद्धत्व stands vindicated from the premisses of undesired result of अय्, आव् and एकादेश enunciated by the वार्त्तिककार. The प्लुत vowel in सुश्लोक३ इति सुश्लोकेति has taken place according to P 8. 2. 84 : दूराद्धूते च. But it is असिद्ध in the region of P 6. 1. 125 : प्लुतप्रगृह्या अचि. Since it is असिद्ध, there will be no प्रकृतिभाव required by P 6. 1. 115 : प्रकृत्या ... and there will be गुणसंधि according to the rule P 6. 1. 87 : आद् गुणः

At the end of this longish note we refer to the following summing up of कैयट, succinctly, briefly and to the point of what the *Dīp* has said abstrusely :

असिद्धत्वे हि 'प्लुतः प्रकृत्या' (P 6. 1. 125 & 115) इति एवमाश्रयणायोगात् कार्यित्वेन असिद्धत्वाभावोऽनुमीयते। सामान्येन च स्वरसंधिप्रकरणविषयं सिद्धत्वं ज्ञाप्यते, न तु प्रकृतिभावे एव। यथा 'शेत्त्वे' (P 1. 1. 12 Vā 4) एव। 'सोत्सर्गं सापवादं च प्रकरणम्' इति प्रकृतिभावेऽपि प्रगृह्यत्वहेतुके सिद्धत्वमुच्यते।

[3]

(1) *p.* 2, *l.* 22: remove the comma after प्रकृतिभावे. The *anvaya* of the sentence न चासति ... प्राप्नोति will be thus : प्रकृतिभावे प्लुतस्य असिद्धत्वेऽसति प्लुतस्य स्वरसन्धिः न च प्राप्नोति and will be translated accordingly, "In the matter of the continuance of the original state, if the prolated vowel is not invalid i. e. if it is valid (it is a case of द्वौ नञौ प्रकृतार्थं गमयतः i. e. two negatives make one positive), only then vocalic euphony does not become due in respect of the rule P. 6. 1. 125 : प्लुतप्रगृह्या अचि. (The Translation follows the corrected text.)

(2) *p.* 2, *ll.* 25, 27 : संनिधानं and सांनिध्यं are भर्तृहरि's special words, which mean, in effect, a ज्ञापक or clue.

(3) *p.* 3, *ll.* 3-5 : In this section, एकयोगविषयं is the same thing as विशेषदृष्ट (here प्रकृतिभावविषयं. See P. 6. 1. 125 प्लुतप्रगृह्या अचि) and स्वरसंधिप्रकरणविषयं same as सामान्यतोदृष्टं. The word सामान्यतोदृष्टं used by दीपिका here has nothing to do with the threefold division of अनुमान i. e. पूर्ववत्, शेषवत् and सामान्यतो दृष्टम् of गौतमन्यायसूत्र (1. 1. 5).

(4) *p.* 3, *l.* 5 : उभयथा प्लुतसंबन्धस्य मुख्यादभिधेयात् अप्रच्युतिः It would have been better if प्लुतसंबन्धस्य had been read as प्लुतशब्दस्य. About the meaning of the word प्रच्युति see the *Bhāṣya* (Vol. I, 102, 5-10) on P. 1.1.44 : न वेति विभाषा। *Vār* 3 : इतिकरणोऽर्थनिर्देशार्थः —तद्यथा लोके गौरित्ययमाहेति गोशब्दादितिकरणः परः प्रयुज्यमानो गोशब्दं स्वस्मात् पदार्थात् प्रच्यावयति ... एवमिहापि नवाशब्दादितिकरणः परः प्रयुज्यमानः नवाशब्दं स्वस्मात् पदार्थात् प्रच्यावयति (See Bhar's *Dīp.* LA, pp. 248-249 (1971) where many views about प्रच्युतिः or प्रच्यवनम् are given extensively)

(5) *p.* 3, *l.* 7 : प्लुतभावी. Kaiy. explains : प्लुतो भावी यस्य स प्लुतभावी। स्थानी प्रकृतः, तस्यैव प्रकृतिभावः। प्लुतभावी is a बहुव्रीहि compound and not a कर्मधारय one.

(6) *p.* 3, *l.* 10 : लघुत्वमपि चास्यां कल्पनायाम् ...। लघुत्वं here is the same as लाघवं of the last परिभाषा 122 (of the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* of Nāg.) : अर्धमात्रालाघवेन पुत्रोत्सवं मन्यन्ते वैयाकरणाः।

(7) *p.* 3, *ll.* 10, 11 : Before 'अप्लुतादप्लुते इत्येतन्न वक्तव्यं भवति' the *Bhāṣya* reads : किमेतस्य ज्ञापने प्रयोजनम्? Kaiyaṭa observes : प्रकृतिभावे एव आश्रयात् सिद्धत्वमस्तु इति प्रश्नः। इतरो लाघवं दर्शयति - 'अप्लुतादिति'। सिद्धे (हि) प्लुते 'अतः' 'अति' इति तपरत्वादेव उत्वाप्रसङ्गः। It will be useful to quote here what the *Kāś*

says on the relevant rule P. 6. 1. 113 : अतो रोरप्लुतादप्लुते । 'अति' (from P 6. 1. 109 : एङः पदान्ताद् अति), 'उत्' (from P 6. 1. 111 : ऋत उत्) इति वर्तते। अकारात् अप्लुतात् रोः उत्तरस्य रेफस्य उकारानुबन्धविशिष्टस्य अकारे (अति) अप्लुते परतः उकारादेशो भवति। ... रुत्वस्याश्रयत्वात् 'पूर्वत्रासिद्धम्' (P. 8. 2. 1) इति असिद्धं न भवति। ... अत्र प्लुतस्यासिद्धत्वात् उत्वं प्राप्नोति इति 'अप्लुतादप्लुते' इत्युच्यते।

[4]

(1) *p.* 3, *l.* 15 : कार्यकालम्. Kaiy. explains thus : कार्यार्थत्वाद् गुणानां कार्यस्य प्राधान्यात् प्रधानदेशत्वस्य न्याय्यत्वात्। Nāg. on कार्यार्थत्वाद् of Kaiy. : तदेकतापन्नं 'संज्ञासूत्रं' तत्प्रकरणस्थमिति भावः। he explains the word कार्यकालम् grammatically thus in his *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* (Pari 3) : कार्येण काल्यते स्वसंनिधिं प्राप्यते। कार्येण स्वसंस्काराय स्ववृत्तिलिङ्गचिह्नितपरिभाषाणामाक्षेप इति यावत्। (स्वसंस्काराय is explained by Kielhorn as 'for the fulfilment of its own purpose'). Nāg. further says : अत एव 'पूर्वत्रासिद्धम्' (P. 8. 2. 1) इति सूत्रे भाष्ये त्रिपाद्या असिद्धत्वात् तत्र सपादसप्ताध्यायीस्थपरिभाषाणामप्रवृत्तिमाशङ्क्य 'यद्यपीदं तत्रासिद्धं तत्तु इह सिद्धम्' इत्युक्त्वा तावताप्यसिद्धिरित्यभिप्रायके कथमिति प्रश्ने कार्यकालं संज्ञापरिभाषं यत्र कार्यं तत्रोपस्थितं द्रष्टव्यमित्युक्तम्।

(2) *p.* 3, *ll.* 19-20 : केनचिदसंयुक्ताः प्रकरणोत्कर्षेण सर्वार्थाः संज्ञा विधीयन्ते। A comma should be put after असंयुक्ताः. केनचित् does not go with प्रकरणोत्कर्षेण; it (i. e. केनचित्) should be followed by कार्येण प्रकरणेन वा in brackets; and प्रकरणोत्कर्षेण ... विधीयते should form a single statement.

The words सर्वार्थ and प्रकरण are reminiscent of जैमिनि-मीमांसा-सूत्र 3. 6. 1 : सर्वार्थमप्रकरणात् and others. शबर explains :— अनारभ्य किञ्चिदुच्यते। 'यस्य खादिरः स्रुवो भवति स च्छन्दसामेव रसेनावद्यति। सरसा अस्याहुतयो भवन्ति।' 'यस्य पर्णमयी जुहूर्भवति न स पापं श्लोकं शृणोति' इत्येवमादि। तत्र संदेहः। किं खादिरता स्रुवे पालाशता जुह्वां प्रकृतौ निविशते उत प्रकृतौ विकृतौ चेति। किं प्राप्तम्। सर्वार्थमप्रकरणात्। प्रकृतिविकृत्यर्थमेवंजातीयकम्। कुतः ? अप्रकरणात्। न कस्यचित् प्रकरणे श्रूयन्ते तानि वाक्यानि, सर्वत्र भवेयुरिति। Kumārila's *Vār.* on this briefly : इदानीमनारभ्याधीतानां प्रकृतिलिङ्गसंयुक्तानां प्रकरणसम्बन्धे सति किं प्रकृतिप्रकरणसंबन्धः उत सर्वार्थत्वमिति विचारः। ... तत्र अनारभ्यवादत्वादेव स्रुवादिसम्बन्धस्य प्रकृतिविकृतिषु अविशेषात् सर्वार्थत्वमिति पूर्वः पक्षः। (See also *Mīmāṁsākoṣa* of Kevalānanda, Vol. I, p. 373.)

(3) *p.* 3 *l.* 24 : मा भूदेवम् i. e. प्रगृह्यः प्रकृत्या इति। प्लुतः प्रकृत्या इत्येवं भविष्यति। Let there be no प्रकृतिभाव by the statement 'A प्रगृह्य remains in the original state'; प्रकृतिभाव will be there by the statement 'A प्लुत remains in the original state'. There are two parts of the rule P. 6. 1. 125 : प्लुतप्रगृह्या अचि। 1) प्लुताः (प्रकृत्या) अचि and (2) प्रगृह्याः (प्रकृत्या) अचि. While (2) has been stated by दीपिका, the *Bhāṣya* has stated (1).

(4) *p.* 3, *l.* 26 उपस्थित. This word occurs only once in the *Aṣṭ* (6. 1.

129): अप्लुतवदुपस्थिते. The *Bhāṣya* reads उपस्थिते इत्युच्यते। किमिदमुपस्थितं नाम। अनार्षं इतिकरणः। सुश्लोका ३ इति सुश्लोकेति।

In this connection see P 1. 1. 16: सम्बुद्धौ शाकल्यस्य इतावनार्षे। Kaiy. on the *Bhāṣya* above: अनार्ष इति। पदस्य इयत्तापरिज्ञानाय स्वरूपेऽवस्थापनार्थं यः इतिः प्रयुज्यते इत्यर्थः। Nāg. on above: ऋषिर्वेदः। तत्र भवः (P 4. 3. 53) आर्षः। 'इति वा इति मे मनः[1]' [ऋ 10. 119. 1a; the entire *ṛc* has four इतिs:

इति वा इति मे मनो
गामश्वं सनुयामिति।
कुवित् सोमस्यापामिति ॥]

ततोऽन्योऽनार्षः। स कुत्रेत्यत आह पदस्येति। 'प्रयुज्यते' इत्यस्य 'पदकारैः सोऽपि' इति शेषः। For more details see 'Critical Studies on the *Mahābhāṣya*' (1974, pp. 492–4).

(4) *p.* 4, *l.* 3: ... अन्येन विहितत्वात् (part of *Vār*. 2 on P 6. 1. 129). The *Bhāṣya* on this reads: अन्येन हि लक्षणेन प्लुतप्रगृह्यस्य प्रकृतिभाव उच्यते 'प्रगृह्यः प्रकृत्या' इति। (6.1.115; 6.1.129); here one must remember that there are two different readings of the Sūtra P 6. 1. 115: नान्तःपादम् ... and प्रकृत्याऽन्तःपादम्। Kaiy. has not taken any notice of this, although the *Kāś*. has done so when it says on प्रकृत्याऽन्तःपादम्...'केचिदिदं सूत्रं "नान्तःपादम्—" इति पठन्ति ते संहितायामिह यदुच्यते तस्य सर्वस्य प्रतिषेधं वर्णयन्ति।' Nāg, however, does: 'प्रकृत्याऽन्तर्...' इति पाठे तु नायं विचारः। तत्र हि प्रकृतिशब्दः स्वभावे कारणे वा। — He explains अन्येन in the *Vār*. as follows: प्रगृह्याश्रयस्यापि कुतो न निवृत्तिरित्यत आह — अन्येन इति। 'प्रगृह्यः प्रकृत्या' इत्यनेन इत्यर्थः।

[5]

(1) *p.* 4, *l.* 15: अनण्त्वात्, lit. because of the absence of *aṇ*-ness. In the Sū. 1. 1. 69: अणुदित् सवर्णस्य ... the word *aṇ* expresses only the vowels and semi-vowels mentioned in the Śiva-sūtras; hence long vowels (*ī ū ṝ*) are not covered in this सूत्र.

(2) *p.* 4, *ll.* 21-22: ग्रहणशास्त्रे...ग्रहणशास्त्रमस्ति। तस्यैव...स्वात्मनि वृत्तिरयुक्ता। It is not proper to apply the Sū. 1. 1. 69: अणुदित् सवर्णस्य ... in its own case and for its own benefit i.e. to take the word in that Sū. to mean its homogeneous sounds, i.e. to include the homogeneous sounds of *aṇ* in the word *aṇ*. In this connection see Kaiy. on the *Mbh.* on the *Vār*. 5. स्वरेऽवधारणाच्च on P 2. 1. 2: सुबामन्त्रिते पराङ्गवत् स्वरे ॥ ... 'स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधात् अतिदेशान्तराभावाच्च यथोक्तं हरिणा 'ग्रहणाग्रहणे ग्रहणाभावः इत्यादि'। which is thus rendered into

1 The printed text (Nirṇ. Ed.) reads: इळा इति मे मनः।

English (see *Patañjali Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, Avyayībhāvatatpuruṣāhnika* P 2.1 2–2. 1. 49, edited by S. D. Joshi and J.A.F. Roodbergen, University of Pune, 1969, p. 23) :

"... because we do not have another *atideśa* [here the *atideśasūtra* P 2. 1. 2], and because it is contradictory (to take the help of the principle of TPFW [i. e. treatment of a part of the following word]) for (the application of the principle of TPFW) itself. As has been stated by Bhartṛ(Hari) in the passage *grahaṇāṅgrahaṇe grahaṇābhāvaḥ* : '(one can) not (apply the principle of *grahaṇa* to the term *aṆ* in the *grahaṇa*(-rule) (itself.)" See also notes 127–130 cited below :

127. The principle of *grahaṇa* means that all vowels included in the *pratyāhāra aṆ* stand for themselves and their corresponding homo-organic varieties also.

128. The *pratyāhāra aṆ* includes all vowels, semivowels and *h*.

129. P 1. 1. 69 is always referred to by the grammarians as the *grahaṇa* rule.

130. The quotation [*grahaṇāṅgrahaṇe grahaṇābhāvaḥ*] is probably from the lost part of Bhar.'s *Dīp*. ... Now if P 1. 1. 69 is applied to P 1. 1. 69 itself, it would give the meaning that the vowels included in *aṆ* and their *savarṇa* (homo-organic) varieties stand for their *savarṇa* varieties. This means that the vowels *ā* etc. also represent the corresponding short varieties.

(3) *p.* 4, *ll.* 22–23 : अन्तरेण चाण्ग्रहणं ... अपरिसमाप्तार्थत्वात् ... असमर्थम् । what is taught (*pariśiṣṭam*) in respect of (*antareṇa*) the word *aṇ* is incapable of inclusion of *savarṇa-s* owing to the incompleteness of the meaning of the rule.

See the *Mbh.* on *Vār* 4 : वाक्यापरिसमाप्तेर्वा on P 1. 1. 10 : नाज्झलौ:— किमिदं वाक्यापरिसमाप्तेरिति । वर्णानामुपदेशस्तावत् । उपदेशोत्तरकाला इत्संज्ञा । इत्संज्ञोत्तरकाल: 'आदिरन्त्येन सहेता' (पा. 1. 1. 71) इति प्रत्याहार: । प्रत्याहारोत्तरकाला सवर्णसंज्ञा । सवर्णसंज्ञोत्तरकालं 'अणुदित् सवर्णस्य चाप्रत्यय:' (पा 1. 1. 69) इति सवर्णग्रहणम् । एतेन सर्वेण समुदितेन वाक्येन अन्यत्र (Kaiy. नापि स्वात्मनि) सवर्णानां ग्रहणं भवति । न चात्रेकार: शकारं गृह्णाति 1, See also the *Dīp.* on this Sū. ed. Abhyankar/Limaye BORI, 1970, p. 153 and also Kaiy.

(4) *p.* 4, *l.* 26 : कथं पुनरत्र बहुवचनम् ? Bhar. is referring to the word *hrasvānām* in the *Mbh.* Although only the first two of *i*, *u* and *e* are short, according to the maxim प्राधान्यात्तु व्यपदेश:, we get that designation for all the three (i. e. ह्रस्वयो:+दीर्घस्य=ह्रस्वानाम्). This is called एकशेष of the विरूपs (or dissimilars) by Bhar. Kaiy. puts it differently : ह्रस्वसाहचर्याद् एकारोऽपि ह्रस्वशब्देन अभिधीयते इति 'ह्रस्वानाम्' इति बहुवचनम् ।

(5) *p.* 4, *l.* 27 : उदाहरणभेदात् भेदमन्ये ब्रुवन्ति. Although only two vowels i.e.short *i* and short *u* are referred to in this Sū, the plural form *hrasvānām* is justified owing to the multiplicity of examples of words ending in short *i* and short *u*. *Bheda* in the two words (°भेदात् and भेदम्) is to be interpreted as बहुत्व (plurality).

[6]

(1) *p.* 5, *l*, 1 : Remove the Daṇḍa after प्लुतभाविन:.

(2) *p.* 5, *l*, 6 : समाहु: : It would be better to take this as समाघु: सम् + आ + √धा 'they remove the difficulty'.

(3) *p.* 5, *l.* 7 : split तथाहीतर° into two words : तथा हीतर°.

(4) *p.* 5, *ll.* 9–10 : असत्येव ... आश्रीयते. What Bhar. wants to say is this : without being conversant with the science of grammar, educated and cultured men in a society use words which are taken as correct and standard speech by the rest of the society; in this connection, see the following observations of the author of the *Mbh.* on P 6. 3. 109 : पृषोदरादीनि यथोपदिष्टम् (III. 174. 4–15): के पुन: शिष्टा:। वैयाकरणा:। कुत एतत्। शास्त्रपूर्विका हि शिष्टि:। वैयाकरणाश्च शास्त्रज्ञा:। ... एवं तर्हि निवासत आचारतश्च। स चाचार आर्यावर्त एव। एतस्मिन् आर्यनिवासे ये ब्राह्मणा: कुम्भीधान्या अलोलुपा अगृह्यमाणकारणा: किंचिदन्तरेण कस्याश्चिद् विद्याया: पारगास्तत्रभवन्त: शिष्टा:। ... शिष्टज्ञानार्थाऽष्टाध्यायी। ... अष्टाध्यायीमधीयानोऽन्यं पश्यत्यनधीयानं येऽत्र विहिता: शब्दास्तान् प्रयुञ्जानम्। स पश्यति। नूनमस्य दैवानुग्रह: स्वभावो वा योऽयं न चाष्टाध्यायीमधीते ये चात्र विहिता: शब्दास्तांश्च प्रयुङ्क्ते। अयं नूनमन्यानपि जानाति। एवमेषा शिष्टज्ञानार्थाऽष्टाध्यायी ॥

(5) *p* 5, *ll.* 10–11 : लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तयो: ... This is a part of the metarule लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तयो: प्रतिपदोक्तस्यैव ग्रहणम् ॥ (Paribhāṣa 105 in the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara* of Nāg. —" ...प्रतिपदोक्तस्यैव ग्रहणं शीघ्रोपस्थितिकत्वात्। द्वितीयो हि (i.e. लाक्षणिक:) विलम्बोपस्थितिक:। पै शोषणे (*P. Dhātup.* I. 920) इत्यस्य पा इति रूपं लक्षणानुसंधानपूर्वकं (P 6. 1. 145 : आदेच उपदेशे ...) विलम्बोपस्थितिकं, पिबतेस्तु तच्छीघ्रोपस्थितिकम् (P 7. 3. 78 : पाघ्रा ... सदां पिबजिघ्र ... सीदा:) इदमेव हि एतत् परिभाषाबीजम्। ... " they [i.e. प्रतिपदोक्त] alone are denoted...because they present themselves to us at once...while others [लक्षणोक्त so to say] present themselves to us later. (Similarly when we hear the term पा) the form पा of पै does not present itself to us until (पै), after the application (to it) of the rule (P VI. 1. 45, has been changed to पा), whereas पा 'to drink' presents itself to us at once. For it is this very circumstance (that one thing presents itself to us at once when we hear a particular term, and that another thing does not present itself till later), which gives rise to the present परिभाषा". (Kielhorn's trans. p. 487). This is used many times in *Mbh.* e.g. on P 1. 1. 13 : शे, P 1. 1. 15 : ओत् and so on.

(6) *p. 5, l.* 14 : तथा चोक्तं 'इजादियजादि ... लक्ष्यते' इत्येवमादि. This is a quotation from the *Mbh.* on P. 1. 1. 45 : इग्यणः संप्रसारणम् (Vol. I. 112. 14-17); following is a complete, relevant extract : "अथ वा इजादियजादिप्रवृत्तिश्चैव हि लोके लक्ष्यते, यजाद्युपदेशात्तु इजादिनिवृत्तिः प्रसक्ता। प्रयुञ्जते च पुनर्लोका 'इष्टम्' 'उप्तम्' इति। ते मन्यामहेऽस्य यणः स्थाने इममिकं प्रयुञ्जते इति। तत्र तस्य असाध्वभिमतस्य शास्त्रेण साधुत्वमवस्थाप्यते किति साधुर्भवति ङिति साधुर्भवतीति। See also the *Vāk.* (2. 178) of Bhar. : 'भिन्नाविजियजी धातू नियतौ विषयान्तरे। कैश्चित् कथंचिदुद्दिष्टौ चित्रं हि प्रतिपादनम्'"॥ Puṇyarāja on this :—

"अन्यो यजिरन्य इजिरिति नियतौ बोद्धव्यौ। इजिः कित्येव, यजिस्तु तदितरस्मिन्निति। आचार्यैः [पुनः क्वचिद् भेदाश्रयेण निर्दिष्टौ क्वचिदभेदेन इति ... क्वचिद् यजेः किति संप्रसारणं शास्ति 'इष्टः, इष्ट्वा' इति। तृजादौ तस्य तन्नेच्छति 'यष्टा, यष्टुम्, [यष्टव्यम्' इति। क्वचिदिजिमेवोपदिशति। तस्य तृजादौ यादेशं विदधाति। इति प्रतिपादनवैचित्र्यम्।

(7) *p. 5, l.* 15 : अनन्तरमेव च वक्ष्यति 'मार्थात् ईदाद्यर्थानाम्' इति। अनन्तरम्, immediately i.e. in the *Mbh.* on P. 1. 1. 12 : अदसो मात्. There is a doubt as to whether this is a part of the *Mbh.* itself or one of the 3 वार्त्तिकs; 1) वचनसामर्थ्याद्वा, 2) योगविभागाद्वा, and 3) मार्थादीदाद्यर्थानां वा as Nāg. observes on 1) एतत् 'वचनसामर्थ्याद्वा' इति वार्त्तिकं तद्व्याख्यानभाष्यं च इत्यर्थः। 2) 'योगविभागाद्वा' इति वार्त्तिकं व्याचष्टे। 3) 'मार्थादीदाद्यर्थानां वा' इति॥ [Kielhorn does not accept these as Vārttikas.] मार्थ and ईदाद्यर्थ respectively mean (1) those which are for म् and (2) those which are for ईत् and ऊत् (i. e. their originals), एत् being excluded.

(8) *p.* 5. *ll.* 17-19 : तत्र केचित् ... आश्रीयते. To avoid the defect of mutual dependence (इतरेतराश्रय) Pat. has resorted to the use of popular words in many places. Even in the case of *pluta*, if one resorts to the popular use of the word, there will be no necessity to adopt, in a round-about way, the notion of भाविगतिविज्ञान, which is to be taken note of only when the present is not possible. Under these circumstances, it seems that Pat. has not accepted the simple, direct path of the लौकिकदर्शन (i. e. सांप्रतिकत्व) and has sought to accept the भाविगतिविज्ञान; this is not proper (according to *kecit* mentioned by Bhar.) Instead of combating or refuting this objection, the author of the *Dīp* has diverted the students' attention to another item by introducing it thus : अपि च अन्य एव पक्षः संभवति and so on.

[7]

(1) *p.* 5, *l.* 22 : अनुनासिकपर्युदासदेशायां प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायाम्. Bhar. here obviously refers to P 8. 4. 57 : अणोऽप्रगृह्यस्यानुनासिकः.

(2) *p.* 5, *ll.* 27-28 : कदाचिद्राजा ... उपनीयन्ते. We have emended the reading in the Ms viz. हर्म्यादयः to हस्त्यादयः. In this example राजा is obviously principal (प्रधान). His twofold activity (प्रवृत्ति) is : he moves out to some-

thing which may be a हर्म्य (palace) or a हस्तिन् (elephant); but when he stays where he is and some- one or something is brought to him, it must be movable and therefore it cannot be a हर्म्य but it must be something like हस्तिन्.

(3) *p.* 5, *ll.* 28-29 : स्वकालावस्थिते संज्ञापरिभाषे (सति) is a locative absolute construction. गुणकालं serves as the object of उपनिपतन्ति where काल has to be taken to mean देश (i. e. region) as in fact the author has himself done in the next part of the sentence viz गुणदेशवर्ति भवति. This interchangeability of काल (time) and देश (space) is hard to comprehend. The *Aṣṭ* was and is a continuous recitation; the technical terms and their injunctions naturally were in different regions and were recited and heard at different time in (con –)sequence.

(4) *p.* 5. *ll.* 28–29 : गुणकालं कार्याणि उपनिपतन्ति । — उपनिपतन्ति is a rare word; we first find it used in *Chānd. Up.* 4. 7. 2 : तं हंस उपनिपत्य अभ्युवाद ... 'The swan *flying low near him* said to him'.

(5) *p.* 6, *l.* 1 : One यथा seems to have been lost due to the universal phenomenon of haplology and has been, hence, restored in brackets.

(6) *p.* 6, *ll.* 2–7 : यदा तु ... कार्यकालत्वम्. In this abnormally long and cumbersome sentence of involved construction the when and the why of कार्यकालपक्ष has been sought to be explained. संज्ञाs and परिभाषाs get their reward (चारितार्थ्य), so to say, only in those places or regions where they are used for laying down some operation. Such places are scattered here and there. They are prescribed or laid down independently (cf. अनारभ्याधीत of the Mīmāṁsakas) without being tied down to a particular place, and for use wherever they are required. Their natural meaning is understood in their own places. Although they are thus independent and meaningful, they are not independent of any prescribing rule and are, therefore, subservient to it. Cf. the famous lines, still untraced but often used in many grammatical and other treatises :

गुणः कृतात्मसंस्कारः प्रधानं प्रतिपद्यते ।
प्रधानस्योपकारे हि तथा भूयसि वर्तते ॥

Being thus subordinate and helpful to the principal, they are required and move to places where they are required and where they merge, so to say, in their principals. Under these conditions, although their natural meaning is understood in their own places, their special property of helping and being subordinate to others is known only when they identify themselves with there principals and therefore their region is known to be the same as that of the injunctive rules; this is, in short, what is meant by कार्यकालपक्ष.

(7) The परिभाषाs (1) यथोद्देशं संज्ञापरिभाषम् and (2) कार्यकालं संज्ञापरिभाषम् (Nos. 2 and 3 of Nāg.) seem to be a contribution of Pat. to the

interpretation of Pāṇini's rules. If व्याडि is prior to Pat. who refers to him in his *Mbh.*, then in व्याडिकृतपरिभाषासूचन we get the परिभाषा 'कार्यकालं संज्ञापरिभाषम्' (50) with व्याख्यान on it for the first time (see pp. 23–24 *Paribhāṣāsaṁgraha* by K. V. Abhyankar, BORI 1967).

[8]

In this section it seems that the author has tried to give some new justification of these two views as appears from the introductory words अन्ये तु ... But what exactly the different explanation is meant by the author we fail to understand. In the Ms. there is some lacuna in the text, which, perhaps, is responsible for the vague and obscure character of the entire section.

(1) *p.* 6, *ll.* 9–10 : In the translation, the words प्रतिपादितेषु गुणेषु तु are left untranslated. Translate : " But in respect of subordinates that are propounded ".

भेदेन प्रवृत्तिर्दृष्टा स्रगनुपलेपनादिषु अभेदेन च. In this connection see the following general principles enunciated in मीमांसा :—

1. गुणानुरोधेन प्रधानं न आवर्तनीयम् ।

2. प्रधानानुरोधेन गुणावृत्तिः उचिता एव । quoted from *Nyāyasudhā* (1133).

(2) *p.* 6, *ll.* 14–18, 18–20 :

(i) एवं हि वक्ष्यति — "यदि सपादायां सप्ताध्याय्यां ... कार्यकालं हि संज्ञापरिभाषम्" इति । This long passage is from the *Mbh.* on P 8. 2. 1 : पूर्वत्रासिद्धम् (Vol. III, p. 385, ll. 2–8).

(ii) तत्र यथैव ... न विज्ञायते । This is echoed by Kaiy. in his introductory remarks on the *Mbh.* on P 8. 2. 1 : पूर्वत्रासिद्धम् ।

[9]

[A] (1) *p.* 6, *ll.* 24–26 : द्विवचनावयवे ... 'लिङः सीयुट्' (P. 3. 4. 102) इति. By the Sūtra (P 1. 2. 11 : लिङ्सिचावात्मनेपदेषु) it is prescribed that suffixes *liṅ* and *sic* should be considered as having a code-letter *k* (by *anuvṛtti* from P 1. 2. 5 : असंयोगात् लिट् कित्). *Sic* being an independent Aorist marker in cases like अ+भिद्+स्+त and अ+बुध्+स्+त the Sū. P. 1. 2. 11 becomes due and when *Ātm.* suffix follows *sic* becomes *kit* and therefore according to P 1. 1. 5 : क्ङिति च, there is prohibition of Guṇa. So we get the forms *abhitta* and *abuddha*. But in the case of the suffix *liṅ* the statement that *liṅ* should become *kit* when followed by an *Ātm.* ending does not stand to reason. Because *liṅ* gets in the middle voice the substitutes त, आताम् etc. and itself disappears. Under this circumstance how can we justify that लिङ् should get कित्त्व when followed

by *Ātm.* suffixes ? Here the author says : आत्मनेपदावयवे आत्मनेपदम् इति व्यपदिश्यते 'the word *ātmanepada* should be understood to mean a part of *ātmanepada.*' So when the root *bhid* gets the suffix *liṅ* (i. e. भिद् + त), by P 3. 4. 102 : लिङः सीयुट्, we get the augment *sīyuṭ*, when the position becomes भिद् + सीय् + त; afterwards by P 3. 4. 107 : सुट् तिथोः there is the augment *suṭ* (i.e. स्) before त and then the position is : भिद् + सीय् + स् + त; then by P 6. 1. 66 : लोपो व्योर्वलि the य् in सीय् is elided; then by P 8. 3. 57 : इण्कोः and 8. 3. 59 : आदेशप्रत्यययोः *s* (of the augment) is replaced by *ṣ* and finally the *t* (of the ending *ta*) becomes *ṭ* by P 8. 4. 41 : *ṣṭunā ṣṭuḥ* [*bhid* > *bhit* P 8. 4. 55]. In the case of the root बुध् one more Sū. i.e. P 8. 2. 37 : एकाचो बशो भष् ... is pressed into service to give us the form भुत्सीष्ट. In the position भिद् + सीय् + त, the ending त becomes a part of *sīy-ta.* Then the rules concerned apply and we get the ultimate forms *bhitsīṣṭa* and *bhutsīṣṭa.* To sum up, in the context of the suffix *liṅ* the word *ātmanepada* requires to be undersood as part of an *Ātm.* ending, because *sīyuṭ* is not an independent suffix (विकरण) unlike *sic.* It is an augment of *liṅ.* Here the author has merely mentioned the Sū. लिङः सीयुट्. Its purport is this : सीयुट् is टित् and hence it is an आगम and not an independent suffix like सिच् and therefore merely literal meaning of *Ātm.* will not serve our purpose and hence it has to be taken as आत्मनेपदावयव.

(2) *p.* 6, *ll,* 27–28 : अत्रादिवद्भावेन अस्ति द्विवचनव्यपदेशः । In the example खट्वे given in the *Bhāṣya*, the ending *e* is not originally a dual termination. It goes through the following process : खट्वा + औ (by P 4. 1. 1 : ङ्याप् प्रातिपदिकात् and 4. 1. 2 : स्वौजसमौट् ...). Then by P 7. 1. 18 : औङ आपः we get the substitute *śī* for *auṅ* (as the *Kāś.* explains it : आबन्तात् अङ्गात् उत्तरस्य औङः शी इति अयम् आदेशो भवति). We get खट्वा + ई; then by P 6. 1. 87 : आद् गुणः we have खट्वे. That means that *ā*, the final of the word *khaṭvā* and *ī* of the suffix *śī* together go to make *e.* P 6. 1. 85 : *antādivac ca*, coming immediately after the single substitute rule (6. 1. 84), prescribes that the single substitute should be treated as the end of the former or the beginning of the latter. Thus the single substitute *e*, if looked upon as the initial of the following ending *ī* (i.e. as *ī* itself by *vyapadeśivadbhāva*), becomes the dual ending. Here it will be useful to quote the relevant portion of the *Kāś.* : 'एकः पूर्वपरयोः' (P 6. 1. 84) इति योऽयमेकादेशो विधीयते स पूर्वस्यान्तवद् भवति, परस्यादिवद् भवति ।

(3) *p.* 6, *ll.* 28–29 : त्रपुणी जतुनी इत्यादौ तु पूर्वभक्तत्वात् नुमः ... In *trapuṇī jatunī* etc. the infix *n* (*numāgama*) comes in by P 7. 1. 72 : नपुंसकस्य झलचः; this *num* becomes *pūrvabhakta* 'a part of the preceding' i. e. *trapu* and *jatu* become *trapun* and *jatun* respectively, according to the final upshot of the *Mbh.* on P 1. 1. 47 : मिदचोऽन्त्यात् परः which is put briefly by *Kaiy.* on the above at the end of the discussion thus : तदत्र निर्दोषत्वात् पूर्वान्तपक्षः (and not

परादिपक्षः and अभक्तपक्षः) स्थितः । Therefore dualness of this *ī* is principal i. e. it is got by no roundabout way.

The word पूर्वभक्त, as such, used by the *Dīp.* is not found in *Mbh.* which uses पूर्वान्त instead; see the *Mbh.* on P 1. 1. 47 *Vār* 4 (where we get अभक्तः) " किं पुनरयं पूर्वान्तः, आहोस्वित् परादिः, आहोस्विदभक्तः । ... अथ उभयं (i. e. पूर्वान्तः and परादिः) निवृत्तं ततोऽभक्तः ।

[Ā] (1) *p.* 7, *ll*, 1–2 : ईदूतोः केवलयोरेव संभवः ... Kaiy. has cleared the whole thing, echoing the *Dīp.* word by word as it were : एकस्य असहायस्येत्यर्थः । ईदूतोः केवलयोरेव संभवः इति वचनसामर्थ्यात् (i. e. प्रगृह्यसंज्ञाविधानात्) तयोरेव सिध्यति एकारान्तस्य तु 'पचेते' इत्यादौ संभवात् खट्वे इत्यत्र न सिध्यतीति दोषः । 'येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य' (P. 1. 1. 72) इत्यत्र 'स्वस्य च रूपस्य' इति नाश्रितमिति दोषोपन्यासः । —Nāg. नाश्रितमिति । वार्तिककृता इति शेषः । — अनन्यार्थम् = असहायार्थम्.

This आद्यन्तवत्-परिभाषा is meant for the असहाय or एकाकिन् to be considered as तदादि or तदन्त.

* * * *

(2) *p.* 7, *ll.* 2–6 : There are here three kinds of *gaurava* mentioned : 1) ग्रन्थगौरव, 2) प्रतिपत्तिगौरव and 3) प्रक्रियागौरव. गौरव i. e. superfluity is a defect. The first is meant when more than necessary words are used (and not only words but even letters or moras). The second is when a reader or listener fails to understand the purport of a statement easily, and the third and last is when to arrive at a particular formation you are required to make use of many sūtras i. e. rules of grammar.

[I] (1) *p.* 7, *ll.* 8–9 : 'संज्ञाविधौ ... नास्ति...प्रतिषिध्यते । refers to *Vār* 1 on P 1. 4. 14 : सुप्तिङन्तं पदम् । " पदसंज्ञायामन्तवचनमन्यत्र संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्तविधिप्रतिषेधार्थम् । The *Mbh.* on this : पदसंज्ञायामन्तग्रहणं क्रियते ज्ञापकार्थम् । किं ज्ञाप्यम् । एतज्ज्ञापयत्याचार्यो 'ऽन्यत्र संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्तविधिर्न भवति ' इति ।

Here follow some minor changes in interpretation of the text.

p. 7, *l.* 10 : Read द्विवचनम् for द्विवचनं.

p. 7, *l.* 12 : न क्वचिदस्ति । पूर्वस्तर्हि ... इति । This line makes no meaning.

p. 7, *l.* 13 : Have a comma after कार्यकाले.

(2) *p.* 7, *ll.* 13–14 : पदाधिकारे प्रगृह्यसंज्ञाव्यापारात् । In the कार्यकाल alternative, the Sū. P. 1. 1. 11 : ईदूदेद् द्विवचनं प्रगृह्यम् presents itself in the region of operation (i. e. in P. 6. 1. 125 : प्लुतप्रगृह्या अचि) and we get the meaning by coordinating these two rules; hence it is that we get the word *pada* by continuation from a preceding Sū. (P. 6. 1. 109 : एङः पदान्तादति) as the qualified of *idūdet*, which can be interpreted as *īdādyanta* by the metarule P. 1. 1. 72 : येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य, which lays down *tadantavidhi* for the qualifier.

It remains to be noted that the *pada* in P. 6. 1. 109 is made to travel a long distance to P 6. 1. 125 by skipping over so many rules (called, in grammar, मण्डूकप्लुतिन्याय).

(3) *p.* 7, *ll.* 16-18 : यथोद्देशतायां तु ... यथाश्रुतपरिकल्पना । The passage means, in effect, as follows : But in the यथोद्देश alternative, while interpreting the Saṁjñā rules we do not expect the *uddeśya* of the respective technical names (as for example, प्रकृतिभाव etc.). Here *uddeśya* means ' subject ' as contrasted with *vidheya* ' predicate '. Here the word *pada* which is the *kāryin* (i.e. on which some operation is to take place) cannot be treated as the qualified or the substantive and therefore *ī*, *ū*, *e* cannot be regarded as विशेषण, with the result that there is no *tadantavidhi* and so these are to be taken literally as *ī*, *ū*, *e* and not as what ends in *ī* etc.

(4) *p.* 7, *l*, 19 : Exchange the places of the comma (after °*bhāvaḥ*) and the *daṇḍa* (after °*padyate*). In translation (*p.* 40, *l.* 2), *for* (The metarule) *read* For (the metarule).

(5) *p.* 7, *ll.* 19-20 : एवं तर्हि etc. प्रत्ययग्रहणे यस्मात् स विहितः is a part of the Pari. 23. In the third alternative the Bhāṣyakāra has recourse to the *tadantavidhi* in the case of both *īdādi* and *dvivacana* and thus he understands these as equivalent to *īdādyanta* and *dvivacanānta.* If we treat *īdādi* as the qualifier and *dvivacana* as the qualified, then by the metarule (P 1. 1. 72 : येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य) we get *īdādyanta* according to the said rule. But since the word *dvivacana* denotes an ending and since the Sū. (P 1. 1. 11; ईदूदेद् द्विवचनं प्रगृह्यम्) gives *dvivacana* the name *pragṛhya,* it cannot be interpreted as द्विवचनान्त according to *Vār.* on P 1. 4. 14 सुप्तिङन्तं पदम् (viz. पदसंज्ञायाम् अन्तवचनम् अन्यत्र संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्तविधिप्रतिषेधार्थम्) which means: suffixes in other *saṁjñā*-rules (except P 1. 4. 14), if they are the named, do not undergo *tadantavidhi.* If this is so, then how is it that the Bhāṣyakāra takes the प्रत्यय (here द्विवचन) as द्विवचनान्त ? To this the reply is : Here we should have recourse to कार्यकाल alternative, that is to say, the word द्विवचन should be treated as the qualifier of ईदादि and the word पद, present in the region of operation, should be treated as the qualified of ईदादि and thus get तदन्तविधि for both ईदादि and द्विवचन. For, according to this arrangement, द्विवचन, being विशेषण of ईदादि, cannot be the named (संज्ञिन्) of the name (संज्ञा) प्रगृह्य, and so cannot be termed as प्रगृह्य, the result being there is no bar to the *tadantavidhi*; similarly ईदादि, being a qualifier of पद as stated above, can be interpreted as ईदाद्यन्त according to the metarule (P 1. 1. 72 : येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य); therefore, we can say that the Bhāṣyakāra is justified in having तदन्तविधि both for ईदादि and द्विवचन and take them respectively as ईदाद्यन्त and द्विवचनान्त.

But now the difficulty arises : the Bhāṣyakāra has rejected the कार्यकाल alternative and has stuck firmly to the यथोद्देश alternative when he says : एवं तर्हि किं न एतेन कार्यकालं संज्ञापरिभाषमिति । यथोद्देशमेव संज्ञापरिभाषम् । In this fixed view of the Bhāṣyakāra how is it possible to justify the तदन्तविधि for both ईदादि and द्विवचन ? Having raised this objection, Bhar. tries to meet it by एवं तर्हि and so on.

The word द्विवचन is expressive of a प्रत्यय or suffix; in case of प्रत्ययs the परिभाषा — 'प्रत्ययग्रहणे यस्मात् स प्रत्ययो विहितस्तदादेस्तदन्तस्य च ग्रहणं भवति' (see *Bhāṣya* on *Vār*. 7 on P 1. 4. 13) should be resorted to; it means : a suffix denotes, whenever it is tought in grammar, a word-form which begins with that to which that suffix has been laid down and ends with that suffix itself. Under this arrangement, द्विवचन, though a प्रत्यय, can be taken as द्विवचनान्त, because the prohibition as stated specifically in *Bhāṣya* on Vār. 1 on P 1. 4. 14 : सुप्तिङन्तं पदम् — अन्यत्र संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्तविधिर्न भवति — becomes operative only in cases where the तदन्तविधि takes place, according to the metarule P 1. 1. 72 : येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य; similarly it does not become operative in cases where there is तदन्तविधि because of the metarule प्रत्ययग्रहणे etc. So, as soon as the word द्विवचन is heard, it strikes you as a प्रत्यय and you get the तदन्तविधि and then ईदादि becomes its qualifier and in the end you get ईदाद्यन्त by P 1. 1. 72 : येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य; hence it is that even though we have recourse to the यथोद्देश alternative of the Bhāṣyakāra, we get तदन्तविधि for both ईदादि and द्विवचन.

(6) *p*. 7, *ll*. 22–23 : न हीदाद्यन्तं द्विवचनान्तमिति अयमुच्चारक्रमस्तन्त्रम् । द्विवचनान्तमीदाद्यन्तमेतत् भवति. Here तन्त्रम् means विवक्षितम् or अभिप्रेतम्. The order ईदाद्यन्तं द्विवचनान्तम् is not intended; it ought to be the other way round i. e. द्विवचनान्तम् ईदाद्यन्तम् for द्विवचनान्तम् is विशेष्य and ईदाद्यन्तम् is विशेषण; and the भाष्य style is : विशेष्य first and विशेषण afterwards. See Kaiy on ईदादयो यद् द्विवचनमिति । ईदादयो यदि संज्ञिनः, तद्विशेषणं तु द्विवचनं तदा द्विवचनान्तत्वमीदादीनां न संभवति...'

(6 A) *p*. 7. *l*. 24 : we should rearrange the line thus : दृष्टो हि ... कृत्तद्धितसमासाश्च ... । एवमिहापि । A *dṛṣṭānta* or instance should be adduced first and then 'in a similar manner, here also' should follow.

(7) *p*. 7, *l*. 26 : दोषान्तरेण, i. e. the defect pointed out in the *Vār*. ईदाद्यन्तम् ... लुकि प्रतिषेधः ।

अयं दोषः = तदन्तविध्यनुपपत्तिः ।

(8) *p*. 7, *l*. 27 — *p*. 9, *l*. 3 : कथं पुनर्द्विवचनान्तस्य समासः, ... तदेतत् समर्थवार्त्तिक एव निर्दैश्यते । This *Dīp*. contains a general discussion on the possibilities of the particular number of the subordinate member being known even in a compound, based on the *Mbh*. in the *Samarthāhnika*.

द्विवचनान्तस्य समासः। This refers to कुमार्योरगारं कुमार्यगारम् etc. of the *Mbh.*

(8A) *p.* 7, *ll.* 27–28 : संख्याविशेषो...चयोग is apparently the second part of a big *Vār.* (*Mbh.* I. 362. 13) which lists peculiarities of a sentence which are absent in the corresponding compound because of the एकार्थीभाव which characterises it.

(9) *p.* 7, *l.* 29 : द्विवचनबहुवचनानामसमासः is a quotation from the *Mbh.* (III. 141. 18) under P 6.3.1 *Vār.* 3.

(10) *p.* 7, *l.* 29 — *p.* 8, *l.* 7 : तत्र केचिदाहुः। लुकेयम् ... निवृत्तिराख्यायते इति contains reply to the question raised in *Dīp. p.* 7, *ll.* 27–29. The use of the word *kecit* indicates that this is going to be refuted.

(11) *p.* 8, *ll.* 3–7 : अव्ययादापो लुग्वचनानर्थक्यं ... °राख्यायते refers to the *Mbh.* I. 498. 1–7. The quotation is not verbatim. — The प्रत्ययलक्षण refers to the name *pada* taught by P 1. 4. 14, which is available by P 1. 1. 62 even when here the case-ending is dropped by P 2. 4. 82.

(12) *p.* 8, *ll.* 7–23 : तत्तु न युक्तं ... व्यक्तिनिमित्तं स्यात्। This *Dīp.* accepts उभयं हि स्वभावतो निवर्तते but refutes the propriety of the plea in यस्य तु निवृत्तत्वाख्याने प्रयोजनमस्ति तस्य निवृत्तिराख्यायते on the ground *prasaṅgābhāvāt.*

(13) *p.* 8, *l.* 8 : यत्तु समासार्थवाक्यं ... प्रतिपादकम् is the same as what is technically called अलौकिकविग्रहवाक्य.

(14) *p.* 8, *ll.* 9–10 : अभेदेनैकत्वसंख्यायामाश्रितायाम्. Bhar. has expressed the idea of अभेदैकत्वसंख्या in the *Vāk.* 3.14.101–103 also:

अभेदैकत्वसंख्या वा तत्रान्यैवोपजायते।
संसर्गरूपं संख्यानामविभक्तं तदुच्यते॥ 101

यथौषधिरसाः सर्वे मधुन्याहितशक्तयः।
अविभागेन वर्तन्ते तां संख्यां तादृशीं विदुः॥ 102

भेदानां वा परित्यागात् संख्यात्मा स तथाविधः।
व्यापाराज्जातिभागस्य भेदापोहेन वर्तते॥ 103

According to the first interpretation (101–102), all the three numbers are included in the अभेदैकत्वसंख्या, while according to the second (103), this अभेदैकत्वसंख्या is above the numbers. Kaiy. has quoted these three stanzas in his *Prad.* on the *Mbh.* (I. 362. 13–15) which runs thus:

वाक्ये उपसर्जनपदानि विभक्त्यर्थाभिधायित्वात् संख्याविशेषयुक्तं स्वार्थं प्रतिपादयन्ति। समासे त्वन्तर्भूतस्वार्थं प्रधानार्थमभिदधतीत्यभेदैकत्वसंख्यां गमयन्ति। संख्याविशेषाणामविभागेनावस्थानमभेदैकत्वसंख्या। यथोक्तम् – "यथौषधिरसाः सर्वे ..."। अथ वा परित्यक्तविशेषसंख्यासामान्यमभेदैकत्वसंख्या। तदुक्तं — "भेदानां वा परित्यागात् ..."।

(15) *p.* 8, *l.* 13 : The word *dviśaurpika* (= *dvābhyāṁ śūrpābhyāṁ krītaḥ*) is formed acc. to P 5. 1. 37 and 5. 1. 18, 26. The *Vāk* 3. 14. 127 and Kaiy., however, here mention the word *śaurpika* (where, by *śūrpa*, one *śūrpa* is understood).

(16) *p.* 8, *l.* 15 : The comp. *māsajāta* is formed acc. to P 2. 2. 5. Here in the compound, *māsa* = *ekamāsa.* If this singular number of *māsa* were not understood, the use of the compound would be meaningless. — गोषुचर is a cock. अनवयवद्रव्य = जाति. The plu. (in *goṣu–*), says *Dīp.*, is used to indicate the class of cows. Cf. Kaiy (under *Mbh.* I. 362.21) गोषुचरः कुक्कुट उच्यते। एकस्यां गवि द्वयोर्बहुषु वा यश्चरति स सर्वोऽस्ञावविशेषेणोच्यते। जातौ चेदं बहुवचनमिति व्यक्तिगतसंख्याभेदानवगमः।

(17) *p.* 8, *l.* 16 : प्रत्याख्यानपक्षे। Scil : जात्याख्यायामेकस्मिन् ... (P 1. 2. 58) इति सूत्रस्य. The Vārs. 5 and 6 on this Sū. refute it as being superfluous.

(18) *p.* 8, *l.* 17 : On वर्षासुजः, read Kaiy (*op. cit.*) : इन्द्रगोपः। अत्रापि एकस्मिन्नप्यृतौ अवयवबहुत्वापेक्षो बहुवचनान्तो वर्षाशब्दो वर्तते। न त्वत्र ऋतुबहुत्वं प्रतीयते इत्यत्राप्यभेदैकत्वमुपजायते। Here Bhar. uses the word रूढिशब्द to explain why the plurality of *varṣā* is not understood inspite of the plu. ending.

(19) *p.* 8, *l.* 19 : वृद्धिनिमित्तादिषुः. This refers to P 6. 3. 39 : वृद्धिनिमित्तस्य च तद्धितस्यारक्तविकारे. Here it is maintained that the word *vṛddhi*, which forms a compound with *nimitta,* is to be understood in plu. (वृद्धीनां निमित्तम्), so as to indicate all the three Vṛddhis (*ā ai au*). If a secondary suffix causes only one Vṛddhi (as e. g. the suffix *vatu* which produces only *ā* in *tāvat* etc.), then this rule (P. 6. 3. 39) does not apply and consequently there is no prohibition of the *puṁvadbhāva.* Hence forms like *tāvadbhārya* 'having so many wives'. Read *Padam.* on this rule : इह निमित्तग्रहणं न कर्तव्यम्। वृद्धेस्तद्धितस्येत्येव वक्तव्यम्। वृद्धेर्यस्तद्धितः। कश्च वृद्धेस्तद्धितः? यस्तस्या निमित्तम्। एवं सिद्धे निमित्तग्रहणाद् व्यधिकरणपदो बहुव्रीहिः। अपर आह। षष्ठीसमासादर्शआद्यच् प्रत्यय इति। यद्वा निमित्तग्रहणाद् बहुवचनान्तस्य समासः, वृद्धीनां तिसृणामपि निमित्तं वृद्धिनिमित्तमिति। वतुस्त्वाकारस्यैव निमित्तम्। Read also Kaiy. on *Mbh* I. 37. 23–24.

(20) *p.* 8, *l.* 21 : गार्ग्यकुलादिषु. The word *gārgyakula* can only mean either a family of one descendant of Garga or of two descendants of G. If a family of more than two descendants of G. is to be denoted the proper word is *Gargakula,* the patr. suffix *yañ* being dropped by P 2. 4. 64 : यञञोश्च. In the *Dīp.*, प्रत्ययस्य = यञः.

(21) *p.* 8, *l.* 21 : गोदौ वरणाः .... Godau and Varaṇāḥ are two place names, derived from *godau* 'two lakes of this name' and *varaṇāḥ* 'Crataeva Roxburghii' (?) respectively in the sense of 'not far from it' (*adūrabhavaś ca* : P 4. 2. 70) with the derivative suffix dropped (P 4. 2. 82). A peculiarity

of this elision, called *lup*, is that after the suffix is thus dropped the gender and number are retained (P 1. 2. 51), even though the referent now is different. Hence the dual in Godau and plu. in Varaṇāḥ, although objects denoted by these two words are singles in each case.

अतिदेश: extension (of the original gender and number) viz. युक्तवद्व्यक्तिवचने (P 1. 2. 51). Of course no compound is involved here. The examples concerned represent a secondary (*taddhita*) formation. Still *Vṛtti* (a complex or derived formation) is there all the same and the examples serve to show how the number of a basic stem, though usually suppressd in the *Vṛtti*, may be sometimes brought out by some extraneous factors.

(22) *p*. 8, *l*. 22 : यौष्माकस्तावको युष्मत्पुत्रः. Again the first two are Taddhita formations while the last is a compound. In the formation (1) युष्मद् + अण्, the stem युष्मद् is replaced by युष्माक in dual and plu. but by तवक in the singular (P 4. 3. 2, 3). Similarly युष्मद् is replaced in sing. by त्वत् when a second member follows (P 7. 2. 98). Thus here also the substitute stems betray the number of the original stem.

(23) *p*. 8, *ll*. 22-23 : तत्र कुमार्यगारेऽपि... °व्यक्तिनिमित्तं स्यात्। Here प्रकृतिभाव: is the subject, द्विवचनकार्यं (= द्विवचनस्य कार्यभूत:) a noun in apposition with it, and °निमित्तं स्याद् the predicate. The *prakṛtibhāva* (*कुमारीअगार) pointing at the name *pragṛhya* will further hint at original dual. This concludes the reply to the question : कथं पुनर्द्विवचनान्तस्य समास: (*p*. 7, *l*. 27) ?

(24) *p*. 8, *l*. 23 – *p*. 9, *l*. 3 : एतस्यां कल्पनायां ... समर्थवार्त्तिके एव निर्णेष्यते। This *Dīp*. passage rejects the arguments made above. This is done on the authority of the *Mbh*. I. 362.17–21 (ननु च नैतेनैवं हि भवितव्यम्। ... एकार्थीभावकृत एवायं विशेष:।).

(25) *p*. 9, *l*. 3 : तदेतत् समर्थवार्त्तिके एव निर्णेष्यते। It must have been seen that Bhar. has so far only raised some questions and argued both for and against two sides of them. The questions raised are :

(1) Pat. has said that even though a case ending withdraws naturally after an indeclinable or in a compound, because it has no longer any purpose to serve, still Pāṇini teaches this elision in order to secure a continued effect (*pratyayalakṣaṇa*), viz the securing of the name *pada*. The *Dīp*. has apparently challenged this position here as illogical. You cannot teach elision of something which is not there. (2) Even though the original number of a subordinate member of a compound is lost in the compound, there apparently do remain a small number of cases where the original is known even in a compound e.g. द्विशौर्पिक, मासजात, गार्ग्यकुल, यौष्माक, युष्मत्पुत्र etc. How exactly is this part of the meaning known ? If we say a particular word-

element conveys the meaning, will it not run counter to Pat.'s statement : न हि शब्दनिमित्तकेन नामार्थेन भवितव्यम् etc. ? Also, how is then one to explain the absence of understanding of plurality in cases like अप्सुचर, गोषुचर etc. where a plu. ending is there ? (3) Bhar. here simply mentions अभेदैकत्वसंख्या without explaining what exactly it means.

About the other controversial points mentioned above Bhar. simply says : तदेतत् समर्थवार्त्तिके एव निर्णेष्यते. We do not know whether Bhar. actually wrote anything in the *Dīp.* after the first seven Āhnikas. But for those interested in this topic we may refer to the *Vāk.* 3. 14. 100–128 where the same topic is discussed. Here Bhar.'s own conclusion seems to be ;

रूपाधिभूता या संख्या प्रकृतौ समवस्थिता ।
आदेशैः संज्ञया वापि विभक्त्या व्यज्यते विना ॥ १२६

(26) *p*. 9, *l*. 3 : सप्तम्यामर्थग्रहणं ज्ञापकं प्रत्ययलक्षणप्रतिषेधस्य is the full text of the *Vār*. This is a reply to the previous *Vār*. Also see below, *p*. 19, *ll*.3–6.

(27) *p*. 9, *l*. 5 : एतत्तर्हि ... । The *Mbh.* reads तत्तर्हि.

(28) *p*. 9, *ll*. 5–6 : Read Kaiy. : आद्यन्तवद्भावानाश्रयणाय तृतीयः पक्षः परिगृहीतः । तत्र च दोषप्रतिविधानार्थमधिकमर्थग्रहणं ज्ञापकार्थं कर्तव्यं भवतीति सुतरां गौरवं भवतीत्यर्थः ।

(Ī) (1) *p*. 9, *l*. 7 : ईदादिभिर्द्विवचनं विशेषयिष्यामः । The full text of the *Mbh.* here is : ईदादिभिर्द्विवचनं विशेषयिष्यामः, ईदादिविशिष्टेन च द्विवचनेन तदन्तविधिर्भविष्यति — ईदाद्यन्तं यद् द्विवचनं तदन्तमीदाद्यन्तमिति । This clears the case of कुमार्यगार, because the first member in dual ends in *os*, not in *ī* etc. so no, danger of the name *pragṛhya.* On the 3rd alternative (ईदाद्यन्तं द्विवचनान्तम्) ईदादि was directly connected with द्विवचनान्त. (समुदाय = प्रत्ययान्त, Nāg.) Here, on this 4th alternative, ईदादि is connected with द्विवचन.

(2) *p*. 9, *ll*. 10–11 : द्वितीयस्तदन्तविधिः. So finally ईदादि = ईदाद्यन्तान्तम् (Kaiy.) = ईदाद्यन्तं यद् द्विवचनं तदन्तम् ।

(2a) *p*. 9, *ll*. 11–14 : यद्येवम् ... तावदीदाद्यन्तमिति । An objection and a reply to Pat.'s use of the word ईदाद्यन्तम् in the *Mbh.* quoted above (Note 1). Since *īt* is not directly connected with the whole (*samudāya*, which ends in *śī*), but with *dvivacana*, how can Pat. qualify the whole by the expression *īdādyantam* ? The idea is that he ought to have said *īdādyantāntam.* The reply given is on the basis of the implied *tadantavidhi.* The expression *īdādi* (in *īdādyanta* of the *Mbh.*) = *īdādyanta*. One does not know whether ईदाद्यन्तम्, the current text of the *Mbh*, is not an old corruption for ईदाद्यन्तान्तम्.

(3) *p*. 9, *l*. 15 : प्राप्नोति. The subject प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा is understood.

(4) *p*. 9, *ll*. 15–19 : इह तु शुक्लशब्दात् ... प्रत्ययलक्षणेन भवति । The *Dīp.* here points out that even this fourth alternative is not free from defect, for in शुक्लयास्तां वस्त्रे (= अशुक्ले वस्त्रे शुक्ले समपद्येताम्) the name *pragṛhya* will still become due and will thus prevent the *yaṇ*-Saṁdhi in *śuklyāstām*.

Here the *prakriyā* is as follows :

śukla (> *suklī* P 7. 4. 32 > *śulky* P 6. 1. 77) + *au* (> *śī* P 7. 1. 19, > dropped P 2. 4. 71) +*cvi* (P 5. 4. 50, > dropped P 6. 1. 67) +*sup* (P 1. 2. 45, 46; 4. 1. 1, > dropped P 2. 4. 82 [: *avyayād āp supaḥ*] + *āstām*.

Here *ī* (i.e. *śī*) is dual and still effective by *pratyayalakṣaṇa*. Since the word-element ends in a dual ending which itself ends in *ī* (ईदाद्यन्तद्विवचनान्त एष समुदायः), the name *pragṛhya* is unavoidable.

(5) *p*. 9, *l*. 19 : यस्त्वयमीकारः ... उदाह्रियते । Bhar. makes it clear that *ī* which is actually heard (i. e. the substitute of the final *a* in *śukla*) is cited merely to point out the possibility of the *yaṇ* substitute. It should not be confused with the other *ī*, i.e. *śī*, which is responsible for the name *pragṛhya*.

(6) *p*. 9, *l*. 21 : Correction ! For ईदाद्यन्तं द्विवचनान्तम्, read ईदाद्यन्तद्विवचनान्तम् in the Text.

(7) *p*. 9, *ll*. 21–22 : येषां तु ग्रन्थः ... 'अत्र हि ... ... °लक्षणेन ' इति । This *v. l.* mentioned by Bhar. (also by Kaiy. who reads ईदाद्यन्तं च श्रूयते etc.) says that ' here (*atra*) a dual ending in *īt* etc. is heard '. This presents a difficulty. The *ī* which is actually heard (in *śuklī*) does not belong to a dual ending, while the presence of *śī* is controversial, (and even if admitted, it could lend only the character of a dual ending, not the phonetic character of *ī* also, by *pratyayalakṣaṇa*). A solution to this difficulty is attempted in lines 23–26. The solution offered is however clumsy. It proposes to supply a word (*vākyaśeṣa*) viz. *sūtre* in the *Mbh*. v. l. cited : ' *Īdādi* has been read in the Sūtra (P. 1. 1. 11). '

(8) Correction ! In the text (*p*. 9, *l*. 24), for तदन्तविधिर्नाश्रित, read तदन्तविधिराश्रित. Similarly in the Translation (*p*. 43, *l*. 32), drop ' not '. Similarly in the Translation (*p*. 43, *l*. 29) for ' sūtra ', read ' example, viz. *śuklyāstām* '.

(9) *p*. 9, *l*. 27 : The word *eva* be better read after तृतीये पक्षे.

(10) *p*. 10, *ll*. 1-2 : इत्याह be better read as इत्यत आह. ' He says, by way of reply ' [to what is said before viz. अकृते शीभावे (repeated from the *Mbh.*) ईकारान्ततायामनुपजातायां पूर्वो लुग्भविष्यति]. लुक् means औ-प्रत्ययस्य लुक्.

(11) *p*. 10, *l*. 2 : इदमिह संप्रधार्यम् । After this, the *Mbh*. (not mentioned by Bhar.) runs as follows : लुक् क्रियतां शीभाव इति । किमत्र कर्तव्यम् । परत्वाच्छी-

भावः । नित्यो लुक् । The elision of the case-ending is obligatory on the maxim : क्वचित् कृताकृतप्रसङ्गमात्रेणापि नित्यता (Pari. 46). The elision is bound to take place.

After the above, it is pleaded in the *Mbh.* that the elision is not obligatory on the strength of the Pari. (43) शब्दान्तरस्य प्राप्नुवन् ... etc. The *Dīp.* न तु लुकि कृते ... नोपन्यस्तम् explains this *Mbh.*

(12) *p.* 10, *l.* 7 : अथापि कथंचित् नित्यो लुक् स्यात् । The Pari. कृताकृतप्रसङ्गेनापि नित्यता, which would bestow obligatoriness on the elision, is itself not universal as the very word *kvacit* ' sometimes ' incorporated in it will show. But even if the Pari. were somehow (*kathaṁcit*) granted as universal — that is the idea. The following *Dīp.* is not quite clear. We have emended °विषयं to °विशेषं. बाध्यते seems to be a scribal error for बाधते. The gist of the argument is that the injunction of elision proceeds towards a case-ending in general (*sub-jāti*) irrespective of whether what is to be elided is *au* or *śī*.

(13) *p.* 10, *l.* 10 : एवमपि दोषः । वक्ष्यत्येतद् । The *Mbh.* referred to by this *pratīka* runs thus : ... वक्ष्यत्येतत् — ' पदसंज्ञायामन्तवचनमन्यत्र संज्ञाविधौ प्रत्ययग्रहणे तदन्तविधिप्रतिषेधार्थम् ' इति । इदं चापि प्रत्ययग्रहणम्, अयं चापि संज्ञाविधिः । अवश्यं खल्वस्मिन्नपि पक्षे आद्यन्तवद्भाव एषितव्यः । Here the subject of *vakṣyati* is ' Vārttikakāraḥ ' understood. पदसंज्ञायाम् ... ... तदन्तविधिप्रतिषेधार्थम् is *Vār.* on P 1. 4, 14. The purport is that the otherwise superfluous reading of the word *-anta* in in P 1. 4. 14 serves to indicate that elsewhere *tadantavidhi* is not available where a technical name is taught with the mention of a suffix. As a result of this we cannot explain *dvivacana* as *dvivacanānta* which is necessary for this (third and) fourth alternative. Hence *evam api doṣaḥ.*

(14) *p.* 10. *ll.* 10-12 : ननु चोक्तं कृत्तद्धितान्ते ... ... यथाश्रीयेतेति । This contains an objection to the view expressed in the *Mbh.* quoted above (Note 13) and a reply to it. Bhar. is here reminding of the objection (*nanu coktam*) taken in the *Mbh.* (I. 319. 2-4) on P 1. 4. 14 : यद्येतज्ज्ञाप्यते, ' सनाद्यन्ता धातवः ' (3. 1. 32) इत्यन्तग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । ' कृत्तद्धितसमासाश्च ' (1. 2. 46) इत्यन्तग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । The point is that if the view of Kātyāyana put forth in his *Vār.* on P. 1. 4. 14 is accepted one will have to read actually *kṛdanta-* and *taddhitānta-* instead of *kṛt-* and *taddhita-* in P 1. 2. 46 (कृत्तद्धितान्तं प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञायामाश्रयणीयमिति as the *Dīp.* says). Since this is not permissible, Vārttikakāra's suggestion is to be refuted. Consequently, in our present case the *tadantavidhi is* permissible and the alternative No. four (under P. 1. 1. 11) can stand. There is no *doṣaḥ.*

The *Dīp.* : सत्यम् । एवमेतत् etc. now reminds of the reply given there itself (*Mbh.* I. 319. 5-6). The *Mbh.* there runs as follows : यदप्युच्यते कृत्तद्धितसमासाश्चेत्यन्तग्रहणं कर्तव्यमिति । न कर्तव्यम् । अर्थवदिति वर्तते । कृत्तद्धितान्तं चैवार्थवन्न केवला

कृतस्तद्धिता वा । The *Mbh.* means that we can understand कृत् and तद्धित in the sense of कृदन्त and तद्धितान्त even without the help of the *tadantavidhi.* This is how it is done. The word *arthavat* is carried down from P 1. 2. 45 into 46 with the result that only a *meaningful kṛt* and a similar *taddhita* will be called *pada.* And what is a meaningful *kṛt* or *taddhita* ? Of course a *kṛdanta* or *taddhitānta* nominal stem which alone carries a real meaning in the popular language (and not just a *kṛt* or *taddhita* suffix which carries only a technical meaning). This part of the *Mbh.* argument is referred to in the present *Dīp.* : सत्यम्, एवमेतत् । ... यथाश्रीयेतेति ।

This means that the *Vār.* on P 1. 4. 14 stands; consequently here (under P 1. 1. 11) the *tadantavidhi* is not available, since here a technical name (viz. *pragṛhya*) is taught with reference to a *suffix* (viz. dual); therefore, objection against the fourth alternative : ईदाद्यन्तं यद् द्विवचनम् तदन्तम् stands.

(15) *p.* 10, *ll.* 12–14 : अपि च ... एषितव्यः clinches the argument. The 2nd alternative was rejected as it required *ādyantavadbhāva*, thus leading to prolixity. But it is indispensable for cases like *agni iti* etc.

(16) *p.* 10, *l.* 15 : मध्यमः पक्षः = ईदाद्यन्तं द्विवचनम्. The *madhyama* from the point of view of the Vārttikakāra who suggested only three alternatives. Bhar's explanation (चतुर्णामपि द्वितीयो मध्यम एव) is not quite satisfactory. Or since the third and the fourth are practically the same (since both are based on the *tadantavidhi* in the case of the ending), the 2nd is called मध्यम.

(17) *p.* 10, *ll.* 19-20 : Correction ! For ईदाद्यन्तं द्विवचनान्तमिति, read ईदाद्यन्तद्विवचनान्तमिति.

* * * *

P. 1. 1. 12 : *adaso māt.*

(1) *p.* 10, *l.* 22 : मात् प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायाम् । This is only a part of the *Vār.* — an *ākṣepa-Vār.* — its full wording being : मात् प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायां तस्यासिद्धत्वादयावेकादेशप्रसङ्गः । The whole of the *Dīp.* available here is devoted to explain the *Vār.* The point made in the *Vār.* is this : *amī* (Nom. pl. masc,) and *amū* (dual) are the final forms of *adas.* Here, after we arrive at the form *ade*, the consonant *d* is replaced by *m* (P. 8. 2. 20) and *e* by *ī* (P. 8. 2. 81). In *amū*, original *au* (of *adau*) is replaced by *ū*. The rules P. 8. 2. 80–81, which teach these replacements occur in the *asiddhakāṇḍa*, It is therefore claimed that as far as the saṁdhi operations are concerned, in cases like अमी+आसते, अमू+आसाते, and अमी+अत्र, the forms अमी and अमू being technically non-existent, their earlier, theoretical forms will have to undergo the Saṁdhi (since they do not have the name *pragṛhya*). Consequently the *e* (of *ade*) will have to be replaced by *ay* (P 6. 1. 78) before *āsate* and it will undergo a single *pūrvarūpa* substitution

before *atra* (109); similarly the *au* (of *adau*) will have to be replaced by *āv* (P 6. 1. 78) before *āsāte*. Since this is undesirable, says the Vārttikakāra, a special rule prohibiting this will have to be formulated.

(2) *p.* 10, *l.* 22 : Correction ! (1) Remove the *daṇḍa* after *iti*. (2) मात् प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायाम् is *śabdapara*, not *arthapara* (as wrongly translated). Translate ! " *māt pragṛhyasaṁjñāyām* is either indicative of the topic ... " etc.

(3) *p.* 10, *ll.* 23–24 : यद्यन्यो न्यासः ... न स्यादयं दोषः । In order to avoid the defect pointed out in the *Vār*, Bhar. suggests a different wording (अन्यो न्यासः). Let the Sū. be so framed that there will be no mention of elements connected with *adas* (यत्र संबन्धीन्यदसो नाश्रीयेरन्) — viz *m*, *ī* and *ū* (which are all *asiddha*). Secondly let the vowel *a* be excluded, as the name *pragṛhya* is not desired for it (यत्र च नेष्यते तं विषयं* पर्युदस्य). The suggested wording then is : अदसो दात् । Read *Uddy*. : यदि त्वदसो दाद् इत्युच्यते, दात्परश्च पूर्वोत्तरसाहचर्यादवर्णभिन्नोऽच् औकारैकाररूप एव, तदा न स्याद्दोष इति भावः । As explained lucidly by Nāg. the suggested rule *adaso dāt* would mean that the vowel following *d* of *adas*, *au* [in *adau*] and *e* [in *ade*] get the name *pragṛhya*. Thus instead of *ī* and *ū* getting the name *pragṛhya* after *m*, now *au* and *e* following *d* get it. Thus all references to the *asiddha* elements are avoided and *au* and *e* (of *adas*) get the designation *pragṛhya* directly, precluding any possibility of the substitutes *ay* etc.

Observation : This suggestion about a different wording made by Bhar. does not appear in the *Prad.*** Still Nāg. explains it ! Does this mean that Nāg. had direct access to the *Dīp.* ?

(4) *p.* 10, *ll.* 25–27 : The तस्य of the *Vār*. is paraphrased in the *Dīp.* by निमित्तस्य कार्यिणश्च, further clarified by *kṛtsna nimittanimittisamudāya*. Here by *nimitta* is meant the substitute *m*, and by *kāryin* the substitutes *ī* and *ū* (the probable claimants of the title *pragṛhya*).

(5) *p.* 10, *l*, 27 – *p.* 11, *l.* 1 : युक्तं तावत् ... कुतः प्रसङ्गः । This *Dīp.* raises an objection against the possibility of the substitutes *ay* etc. against which the *Vār*. seeks to provide. Granted that the substitute endings like *ī* (1 pl.) will not have the name *pragṛhya*. But the originals they have replaced (like *e* coming from the stem-final *-a* + the ending *-śī*) etc. are replaced for ever. They cannot reappear even when the final *ī* etc. (of *amī* etc.) are technically

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* अदसोऽकारम् ।

** Evidently Kaiy. looked upon मात् प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायाम् as only विषयोपलक्षणम्, not न्यासनिर्देशो वा also, unlike Bhar.

not existent — as the well known *Devadatta-hata-hantṛ-nyāya* says. Since there is no final *e*, where is the possibility of *ay* etc. ? Nāg. puts this objection shortly as : नन्वीत्त्वादीनामसिद्धत्वेऽपि तन्निवर्तितौकाराद्यभावेन कथमयादिप्राप्तिः ?

(6) *p.* 11. *ll.* 1–2 : अपि च, यथैव ... मा भूत् प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा । Another objection. This is the point : The purpose of the name *pragṛhya* is to prevent Saṁdhi operations. That purpose is achieved already here. The case-ending substitution *ī* etc. are technically non-existent with reference to Saṁdhi rules like P. 6. 1. 77 : इको यणचि. Since these rules do not apply here, there is no danger of substitutes like *ay*, even in the absence of the name *pragṛhya*.

(7) *p.* 11, *ll.* 2–4 : नैतदस्ति । ...अयादयः प्राप्नुवन्ति । This contains reply to the above objections and confirms the argument of the *Vār*. The reply is given on the alternative of *śāstrāsiddhatva* ' technical non-existence of the grammatical rule ' as against *kāryāsiddhatva* ' technical non-existence of the grammatical operation '. The objector took for granted that the originals *e* and *au* (of *ade* and *adau*) are actually replaced (स्थानिनां तु पूर्वमेव निवर्तितत्वात्). The reply now given denies this : the originals are not replaced (स्थानिनो निवृत्तेरप्रतिपन्नत्वात्), because the rules teaching the substitutes are *asiddha*, and so the mind refuses to recognize the substitutes.

(8) *p.* 11, *ll.* 6–8 : The *Dīp.* ननु च द्विपदाश्रयत्वात् ... पूर्वत्रासिद्धपरिभाषया again raises an objection against the *Vār*. There is no reply, evidently because the text was already lost in the original MS from which our MS was copied; or the copyist of our MS may have dropped it through negligence. Since the remaining text of the *Mbh.* under this sūtra runs into 41 lines in Kielhorn's edition (one and half page) it is clear that there is quite a considerable gap in the MS of the *Dīpikā* here.

The point made here is that the Vārttikakāra looks upon the substitutes *ī* etc. as *asiddha* by P 8. 2. 1; but the substitutes *ay* etc. with reference to which *ī* etc. are believed to be thus *asiddha*, are themselves *asiddha*, being *bahiraṅga* while *ī* etc. are *antaraṅga*.

We do not know what reply Bhar. gave to this objection, as the whole of the *Dīp.* on the *Mbh.* on P 1. 1. 12 up to the end is lost. To judge from what Kaiy. says, it may have been like this : the substitutes *ay* etc. are not *bahiraṅga* on the strength of the Pari (51) : *nājānantarye bahiṣṭvaprakḷptiḥ*. Nāg.'s own solution is that the *bahiraṅga* metarule does not apply if the *antaraṅga* operation happens to be taught in the *tripādī* (त्रैपादिकेऽन्तरङ्गे बहिरङ्गपरिभाषाया अप्रवृत्तेर्विसर्जनीयसूत्रे भाष्ये वक्ष्यमाणत्वान्न दोष इति परे).

* * * *

P. 1. 1. 13 : *śe*.

[1]

(1) *p.* 11, *l.* 9 : *śe* (i. e. *e*) is one of the Vedic substitutes of case-endings taught in P 7. 1. 39, accounting for the forms *yuṣme*, *asme*.

(2) *p.* 11, *ll.* 10–16 : The *Vār.* on which this *Dīp.* comments, reads as : शेऽर्थवद्ग्रहणात् । The *Vār.* is supposed to be answering the question, why there is no name *pragṛhya* in words like *kāśe*, *kuśe* (which are loc. sing. of *kāśa* and *kuśa*). The *Dīp.* explains how sometimes even meaning, though usually irrelevant in grammatical operations, has to be taken into consideration in ascertaining a particular linguistic element which is to undergo some grammatical operation. Kaiy. quotes almost verbatim a part of the *Dīp.* Read : 'स्वं शब्दस्ये'त्येवान्तरङ्गत्वादहेयत्वादसाधारणत्वाच्च रूपपरिग्रहे सिद्धे रूपवदर्थस्याप्यङ्गीकरणार्थं रूपग्रहणं कृतम् ।

Cf. the Pari. (14) : अर्थवद्ग्रहणे नानर्थकस्य । *Correction* ! In the text (*l.* 11), for प्रतिषेध उच्यते । read प्रतिषेधः । उच्यते । In the Translation (*l.* 7), remove the brackets on both sides of the words : Here we say.

[2]

(1) *p.* 11, *l.* 17 : Supply the predicate : अत्र प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा प्राप्नोति । The element *śa* in *hariśa* and *babhruśa*, being a secondary suffix (taught in P 5. 2. 100) has a meaning : it is possesive (P 5. 2. 94). This was not the case with *śa* in *kāśe* etc.

(2) *p.* 11, *ll.* 17–21 : Here Bhar. shows that whether one follows the *jahatsvārtha* view (wherein a subordinate constituent gives up its meaning in favour of the meaning of the principal constituent) or the *ajahatsvārtha* view (where it retains its meaning) about a derived formation, the element *śe* (= *śa* + *i*) is meaningful. Lines 17-19 argue on the *ajahatsvārtha* view (so an expression *ajahatsvārthāyāṁ vṛttau* is understood after तत्र हि in *l.* 17), the rest on the *jahatsvārtha* view.

Correction ! Read simply न (as in the MS.) for [ते]न in *l.* 20. The clause न प्रकृतिरनर्थिका is connected with the preceding word युज्यते as its predicate. (So translated). The *Dīp.* केवलप्रयोग ... अवतिष्ठते explains why a stem (*prakṛti*) has to be used inspite of its meaninglessness.

(3) *p.* 11, *l.* 21 : अर्थवशात् = (समुदायस्य) अर्थवत्त्वात्. The subject of *prāpnoti* is *pragṛhyasaṁjñā*. — The *Dīp.* लक्षणोक्तत्वाददोषः is just a summary of the *Mbh* : एवं तर्हि 'लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तयोः प्रतिपदोक्तस्यैव' इत्येवं न भविष्यति । On the strength of this Pari. (105), the case-ending substitute *śe*, taught specifically in P 7. 1. 39, will be understood as getting the name *pragṛhya*, and not the

homophonous *-śe* in *hariśe* etc. since the latter is not directly mentioned in the *Aṣṭ*; it can be produced only by assembling the parts *śa* and *i* (i. e. *ṅi*) and combining them according to P 6. 1. 87.

[3]

(1) *p.* 11, *l.* 22 — p. 12, *l.* 2 : अथ वा (which is commented upon in this section [3]) is only a *pratīka* of the *Mbh.* which reads as : अथ वा पुनरस्तु, अर्थवद्ग्रहणे नानर्थकस्येत्येव । कथं हरिशे बभ्रुशे इति ? एकोऽत्र विभक्त्यर्थेनार्थवान्, अपरस्तद्धितार्थेन ।

Here Pat. again falls back on the first reason, viz. अर्थवद्ग्रहणे ... etc. Naturally the retort follows : How do you prevent the name *pragṛhya* in *hariśe* etc. ? The final reply is that even the element *śe* in such words is strictly meaningless as a whole, since apart from the meanings of the constituents, no new meaning emerges (सत्यप्यवयवयोरर्थवत्त्वे समुदायस्य शेशब्दस्यान्योऽर्थो न विद्यत इत्यानर्थक्यम् as Bhar. says).

(2) *p.* 11, *ll.* 23-25 : तत्कथमिह ... कर्मादिभिर्योगः ? This raises an objection against the *Mbh.* given above. The case endings are looked upon as either expressing the number and case relations (on the *trikaṁ prātipadikārthaḥ* view) or indicating them secondarily (on the *pañcakaṁ prātipadikārthaḥ* view). If the base (including the secondary suffix *-śa*) is meaningless, whose meaning does the case-ending either express or indicate secondarily ?

(3) *p.* 11, *l.* 26 : प्रकृतिप्रत्ययौ प्रत्ययार्थं सह ब्रूतः is *Mbh.* II. 58.11 (P 3. 1. 7).

(4) *p.* 11, *l.* 27 : शशब्देन would be better.

* * * *

P. 1. 1. 14 : *nipāta ekaj anāṅ.*

[1]

(0) *p.* 12, *l.* 3 : The Nipātas are enumeraled in P. 1. 4.56–97.

(1) *p.* 12, *ll.* 4-5 : निपात इत्यनेन ... उत्तिष्ठति । These two lines have nothing to do with para [1] and have everything to do with para [2] and hence they should be bodily taken over before यद्रि तत्पुरुषः समानाधिकरणः and translation (p. 47) read in its proper place.

(2) *p.* 12, *l.* 4 : In the MS (p 113 a, line 1) there is a word वार्तिक before विपरीते which we have dropped as there is no *Vār.* on this Sū.

(3) *p.* 12, *ll.* 4-20 : The whole discussion in section [1] centres round the necessity or otherwise of reading the word *nipāta* in this Sū. (निपात इति

किमर्थम् ? *Mbh*). The underlying idea in asking the question is that, of *ekāc* words, only the *nipāta*-s are meaningful. So by reason of the Paribhāṣā *arthavadgrahaṇe nānarthakasya*, the *nipāta a* alone, for example, will have the name *pragṛhya*, and no other *a*, because of its meaninglessness. The reply is that even *pratyaya*-s are in a way meaningful. They therefore cannot be ruled out by the Paribhāṣā in question, and so the specific mention of the term *nipāta* is necessary.— For प्रत्ययरूपावधिपरिग्रहे नियमाभावात्, cf. the *Vāk* 2. 170.171 :

अन्वाख्यानानि भिद्यन्ते शब्दव्युत्पत्तिकर्मसु ।
बहूनां संभवेऽर्थानां निमित्तं किंचिदुच्यते ॥ 170
वैरवासिष्ठगिरिशास्तथैकागारिकादयः ।
कैश्चित् कथंचिद् व्याख्याता निमित्तावधिसंकरैः ॥ 171

(4) *p.* 12, *l.* 7 : MS (p. 113a, 2) reads प्रत्ययस्य रद्वयम्. We have assumed the reading as रूपद्वयम्. Of these 'two aspects' one is grammatical and the other is popular. The author wants to say that the suffixes are meaningless like the phonemes in popular usage. About the grammatical aspect it can be said that it is, more or less, an assumed one for a particular purpose or objective, as Kaiy. puts it : ... प्रत्ययस्य केवलस्य प्रयोगाभावात् आनर्थक्यात् कल्पितरूपत्वात् कल्पनायाश्च नियमाभावात् ...

(5) *p.* 12, *l.* 7 : वर्णवदानर्थक्यं प्रत्ययानाम् । The phonemes are meaningless; see *Bhāṣya* on *Vār.* 14 on the शिवसूत्र 5 : हयवरट् : अनर्थकास्तु वर्णाः । कुतः । प्रतिवर्णमर्थानुपलब्धेः । न हि प्रतिवर्णमर्था उपलभ्यन्ते । किमिदं प्रतिवर्णमिति । वर्णं वर्णं प्रति प्रतिवर्णम् । ...

(6) *p.* 12, *l.* 8 : विंशतिशब्दे शतिज्वा तिशब्दो वा । For the word विंशति along with others, see P 5. 1. 59 : पङ्क्तिविंशति...शतम्. The Bhāṣyakāra leaves out the consideration of the word पङ्क्ति and concentrates on विंशति and others when he observes : इमे विंशत्यादयः सप्रकृतिकाः सप्रत्ययकाश्च निपात्यन्ते । तत्र न ज्ञायते का प्रकृतिः कः प्रत्ययः कः प्रत्ययार्थ इति । तत्र वक्तव्यमियं प्रकृतिरयं प्रत्ययोऽयं प्रत्ययार्थ इति । इमे ब्रूमो द्विशब्दादयं दशदर्थाभिधायिनः स्वार्थे शतिच् प्रत्ययो निपात्यते विन्भावश्च । द्वौ दशतौ विंशतिः (*Mbh.* II. 355.3–6) । He really wants to say : विंशत्यादयो ऽव्युत्पन्नानि प्रातिपदिकानि 'they cannot be derived'. The *Kāś.* practically says the same thing when it says : विंशत्यादयो गुणशब्दाः ते यथाकथंचिद् व्युत्पाद्याः । नात्र अवयवार्थे अभिनिवेष्टव्यम् । ...

(7) *p.* 12, *ll.* 9–10 : ऐकागारिकशब्दे इको वागारिको वा । The *Vār.*, the *Mbh.* and the *Prad.* are all in favour of deriving ऐकागारिक from the word एकागार 'one house', whether aimed at by a चौर or a भिक्षु ; nobody is in favour of Bhar.'s alternative आगारिको वा. P definitely says चौरे and by implication 'not भिक्षौ.' Kaiy.'s comment is pertinent : एकशब्दोऽसहायवाची । असहायं गृहमस्य

मुमुषिषोः प्रयोजनं स ऐकागारिकः । ससहायं तु गृहमनेकपुरुषाधिष्ठानान्मोषितुमशक्यम् । ... नियमार्थमेतत् । एकामेव यो भिक्षां गृह्णीते न द्वितीयां तस्य (भिक्षोः) अभिधानं मा भूत् ...

The code-letter *ṭ* in ऐकागारिकट् shows its feminine in ई according to P 4.1.15 : टिड्ढाणञ् ... and gives the form ऐकागारिकी.

It is interesting to note that the *Vāk.* II. 171 (quoted above, Note 3) also mentions, among other words, *aikāgārika* as of controversial derivation. The *Vṛtti* on this stanza is corrupt. Raghunatha Sharma infers it to be : एकागारं सोढा, एकमसहायमगारं प्रयोजनमस्य जिघांसोरैकागारिक इति वा ... If the reconstruction of the text is correct, it will mean that there is no difference in the formal analysis (एकागार + इक); only the meaning differs : in one case it is ' one who has put up with a solitary house ', in the other ' one who is looking for a solitary house '. One thing is sure : the two ways of formal analysis stated in the *Dīp.*, viz. (1) एकागार + इक, and (2) एक + आगारिक do not find a place in the *Vāk.* and also in the *Vṛtti.*

(8) *p.* 12, *ll.* 9–10 : तथा केषांचित् विकरणाः ... उत्पद्यन्ते । विकरणान्तात् स्वार्थे ... प्रत्ययो भवति । While arriving at the verbal forms, *laṭ* and other suffixes are added to the root in the sense of agent, object and *bhāva* (impersonal action) by P 3.4.69 : लः कर्मणि च भावे चाकर्मकेभ्यः । Afterwards by P 3.1.68 : कर्तरि शप् and by other rules the *vikaraṇa* suffix *śap* (i.e. *a*) intervenes between the root and *l*, this suffix being स्वार्थे i.e. having no other or different meaning. According to Bhar., however, some other grammarians held that at first the *vikaraṇa* suffixes, in the sense of agent etc. are added to the root and then the *lakāra*-s or their substitutes *tip* etc. (see P 3.4.77 : लस्य and 78 : तिप् ... महिङ्) are added on without any change of meaning. In substance, it can be said that we cannot definitely state that suffixes are meaningful.

In this connection Bhar. refers to ' some ' grammarians who hold that at first *vikaraṇa*-s should be joined to roots in the sense of agent etc. and then *tip* and other suffixes should be added *śvārthe*. This is obviously contrary to the procedure adopted by the Pāṇinian school; but it seems that such a school of grammarians was in existence at the the time of Bhar. who has thus referred to them. It is needless to add, that according to the modern Western grammarians, in Sanskrit the tense-stem is formed (root + the *vikaraṇa*) as the first step. The personal endings are added afterwards.

(9) *p.* 12, *ll.* 11–13 : For the apparent similarity between words and parts of (other) words, and for the method of *anvayavyatireka* resorted to in grammar for the purpose of assigning meaning to linguistic elements, cf. *Vāk.* II. 11–12 :

वर्णान्तरस्वरूपत्वं वर्णभागेषु दृश्यते ।
पदान्तरसरूपाश्च पदभागा व्यवस्थिताः ॥

भार्गैरनर्थकैर्युक्ता वृषभोदकयावकाः ।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ तु व्यवहारनिबन्धनम् ॥

(10) *p.* 12, *ll.* 14–15 : कृत्तद्धितान्तं चैव ... कृत्तद्धिता is *Mbh.* on P 1. 4. 14 (I. 319. 6). The exact text is : कृत्तद्धितान्तं चैवार्थवन्न केवलाः कृतस्तद्धिता वा ।

(11) *p.* 12, *ll.* 15–20 : प्रत्ययस्यार्थेन नित्ययोगात् ... आगच्छेति । The first सूत्र laying down the name Prātipadika is P 1. 2. 45 : अर्थवदधातुरप्रत्ययः प्रातिपदिकम्. Here the qualifying word अर्थवत् 'meaningful' goes by *anuvṛtti* into the next Sū. (P 1. 2. 46 : कृत्तद्धितसमासाश्च); This *Dīp.* maintains that the *Mbh.* statement : कृत्तद्धितान्तं चैवार्थवत्, न केवलाः कृतस्तद्धिता वा is not to be taken in an absolute sense. It is to be understood only relatively. It is only a finished form that is really meaningful. All the elements got by analysis have only a technical meaning, which is imaginary. A primary nominal stem (*kṛdanta*) or a secondary one (*taddhitānta*) is as much meaningless as a mere suffix. At best it can be said that the meaning of a nominal stem is not as imagined as that of a suffix, as it comes nearer to that of a finished word. (See Note 14 under P. 1. 1. 11 above). Since a suffix is never without its technical meaning, some special meaning — nearer to the popular meaning — has to be resorted to on the strength of the *anuvṛtti*. This results into the *tadantavidhi* rendering *kṛt* = *kṛdanta* etc. True, the meaning of even a *kṛdanta* etc. is not wholly real (as compared to that of a finished word)— it is *śāstrīya* all the same — still the suffix is a meaningful unit in a limited sense. So to exclude an *ekāc* suffix from getting the name *pragṛhya* the reading of *nipāta* in the Sū. is necessary.

(12) *p.* 12, *l.* 19 : चकारात्र इत्यत्र णलः प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा प्रसज्येत. णल् is the ending अ of the 1st and 3rd person singular of Perfect (P 3. 4. 82 : परस्मैपदानां णल् अतुस् उस् ... णल्वमाः ।)

(13) *p.* 12, *ll.* 19–20 : तथा अततेर्डः अः । अ आगच्छेति । *Correction* ! In the text, for अ आगच्छेति, read अ आगच्छ आगच्छेति । Cf. Kaiy ! साम्यमेव निपातप्रत्यययोः । अततेर्डः अः । अ आगच्छ आगच्छेत्यपि प्रत्युदाहरणम् ।

In this example, where अ + आगच्छ coalesce into आगच्छ, the first word viz. अ is a vocative of अ- supposedly meaning 'a wanderer', as it is ingeniously shown to be derived from the verb *at* with the Uṇādi suffix *ḍa* (i. e. *a*). If the expression *nipāta* is not read in the Sū., the euphony of *a* + *āgaccha* into *āgaccha* cannot be explained.

Bhar. has evidently drawn on the following passage in the *Mbh.* on *Vār.* 4 : उगिद्वर्णग्रहणवर्जम् on P 1. 1. 72 : येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य । — 'अत इञ्' (P 4. 1. 95) दाक्षिः प्लाक्षिः । अस्ति चेदानीं कश्चित् केवलोऽकारः प्रातिपदिकम् यदर्थो विधिः (i. e. Sū. 4. 1. 95) स्यात् । अस्तीत्याह । अततेर्डः अः । तस्यापत्यम् । अत इञ् इः ।

[2]

From here onwards the expression *ekāc* is discussed — whether it is a Bahuvrīhi or a Karmadhāraya. Section [2] discusses the results if *ekāc* is taken as a Karmadhāraya.

(14) *p.* 12, *l.* 21 : निपातस्याचा तदन्तविधिर्विज्ञायेत । The translation should be read thus : " a *nipāta* should be understood as ending in a vowel by the (qualifying) *ac* (vowel) according to the rule (P 1. 1. 72 : येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य).

(15) *p.* 12, *l.* 22 : आद्यन्तवद्भाव refers to the परिभाषासूत्र (P 1. 1. 21 : आद्यन्तवदेकस्मिन्). [अजन्तेषु] has been supplied by us in brackets, as otherwise the statement will be purposeless; for clarification, a further word एव should be read after अजन्तेषु. अनर्थक in अनर्थकः स्यात् is really ' purposeless ', where अर्थ does not mean ' meaning ' but ' purpose ' (प्रयोजन).

(16) *p.* 12, *ll.* 23–24 : अतोऽच्ग्रहणात्... परित्यक्ष्यते । अन्यतरविशेषपरित्यागे–The author wants to say : even if we do not have the word अच् in the Sū. P 1. 1. 14 : निपात एकाज् अनाङ्, no defect will arise as an operation is possible in the case of *ac* (vowels) and not in the case of *hal* (consonants) when we deal with the name *pragṛhya*. But we have *ac* already in the Sū. which we can interpret in two ways : either a *nipāta*, consisting of a vowel only (i. e. अज्रूप), or a निपात which ends in a vowel (i. e. अजन्त). It is necessary to discard one of the two interpretations; we cannot accept both. If we decide to give the name *pragṛhya* to a *nipāta* which ends in a vowel and not to one which is अज्-रूप, we can never give the name *pragṛhya* to the *nipāta* *āṅ* which consists of a vowel only; but in the latter part of the Sū. we have *anāṅ* which prohibits that name. The Sūtrakāra thinks that *āṅ* will get that name which is not desired and hence he prohibits it. It is because of this ' special clue ' (लिङ्गविशेषात्) (of prohibition) that the Sūtrakāra's intention, that the name *pragṛhya* should be given to अज्रूप निपातs and not to अजन्त ones, is inferred.

(17) *p.* 12, *l.* 26 : A fresh para from स्यादेवम् should be understood in the text also as is done in the translation.

(18) *p.* 12, *ll.* 27–28 : Repetition of the same idea as is contained in *ll.* 26–27.

(19) *p.* 13, *ll.* 1–2 : सामान्याभिधानेऽपि ... नावगाहते । If we do not have the word *ac* in the Sū. the *nipāta*-s of both the kinds (i.e. whether ending in a vowel or in a consonant) will come within the scope of the name *pragṛhya*; but since in the case of *nipāta*-s in consonants no question of vocalic euphony arises, the Sū. will not, so to say, dive deep into that kind of *nipāta*-s.

(20) *p.* 13, *l.* 8 : आश्रयादुत्त्वे सिद्धत्वम् । This refers to the *Vār.* 4 on P 1. 1. 12 : अदसो मात् । 'आश्रयात् सिद्धत्वं च यथा रोरुत्वे' । see Kaiy. : प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायां कार्यित्वेन आश्रयणात् असिद्धत्वाभावात् ईत्त्वादीनाम् ।

(21) *p.* 13, *l.* 8 : स विकारी नास्ति = स (रुः) विकारी न (सिद्धः) अस्ति ।

(22) *p.* 13, *l.* 12 : Correction ! In the text, for आश्रयासिद्धत्वात्, read आश्रयात् सिद्धत्वात्.

[3]

This section discusses the relative strength of the two metarules (1) *yena vidhis tadantasya* (P 1. 1. 72) and (2) *ādyantavad ekasmin* (P 1. 1. 21) in the present context and finally shows how *tadantavidhi* does not apply here.

(23) *p.* 13, *l.* 14 : अज्ग्रहणादन्यतरनिवृत्तौ क्रियमाणायाम् । This is in the context of the *Mbh.* suggestion that, on the view that *ekāc* is a Karmadhāraya, we can simply read *ac* instead of *ekāc*. The name *pragṛhya* can be given either to the *ac* sounds, pure and simple (by *ādyantavadbhāva*) or to linguistic elements ending in *ac* (by *tadantavidhi*).

(24) *p.* 13, *ll.* 14–15 : आद्यन्तवद्भावस्यान्ताश्रयविध्यधीनत्वात् । To explain : (1) Let us say that a Nipāta *a* gets the name *pragṛhya* by this rule. (2) Then P 1. 1. 72 will come in and by the *tadantavidhi*, the linguistic element ending in *a* will get the name in question. (3) But *a* here does not end in *a*; it is just *a*. So (4) P 1. 1. 21 will have to be invoked, and then by *ādyantavadbhāva*, our *a* will finally get the desired name. It will be seen that in such cases, *ādyantavadbhāva* cannot come in unless it is required by the *tadantavidhi*. — एकत्र = असहाये.

(25) *p.* 13, *l.* 17 : चयः, जयः । These are formed by P 3. 3. 56 : एरच् ।

(26) *p.* 13, *l.* 20 : Read a *daṇḍa* instead of the comma.

(27) *p.* 13, *l.* 21 : Correction ! For इत्यधिकारशब्दो न इदं, read इत्यधिकारशब्देन । इदं. The Translation presupposes this correction.

(28) *p.* 13, *l.* 25 : लिङ्गम्, viz. आङ्पर्युदासः । The exclusion of *āṅ* in the definition (P 1. 1. 14) is a clue : only single *ac* sounds, and not elements ending in them, are to get the name *pragṛhya*.

(29) *p.* 13. *l.* 25 : Correction ! For ततो, read कुतो (translated accordingly).

(30) *p.* 13, *l.* 29 : गृह्यमाणा एवाचः, the *ac* sounds just as they are uttered, i. e. without the तदन्तविधि and the आद्यन्तवद्भाव.

(31) *p.* 14, *l.* 3 : यदस्याः परिभाषायाः फलम्, viz. the absence of the तदन्तविधि. — परिभाषायाः = आद्यन्तवदेकस्मिन् इत्यस्याः ।

(32) *p.* 14, *l.* 4 : 'एकं चेत् ङित्-कितौ'। The citation cannot be traced exactly in the *Mbh.* It seems to refer to *Mbh.* I. 192. 13 (under P 1. 2. 1) : अथ किमर्थं पृथङ् ङित्कितौ क्रियेते न सर्वं किदेव वा स्याद् ङिदेव वा ।

(33) For the two alternatives suggested by Bhar. in the *Dīp. p.* 14, *ll.* 2–4 (फलस्य भावात् परिभाषाया भावः) and *ll.* 4–9 (परार्थं तदन्तविधेरत्रोपस्थानम्), read Kaiy. : आद्यन्तवदित्यस्योपस्थानाय तदन्तविधिः प्रथमं संनिधीयते, पश्चात्तु लिङ्गात् परित्यज्यते । अथ वा लिङ्गादज्ग्रहणं निपातेन विशेष्यते इति विशेष्येण तदन्तविधेरभावादतिदेशस्यापि मा भूत् प्रवृत्तिः, तत्फलसंपत्त्या तूक्तं 'परिभाषा भविष्यति' इति ।

(34) *p.* 14, *l.* 7 : लिङ्गानुग्राहिणी. We have translated this as 'benefiting from the clue.' Perhaps it will be better to understand it as 'favouring or supporting the clue'.

(35) *p.* 14, *ll.* 9–11 : The last alternative explanation, based on the *yathoddeśa* view. We do not consider here whether consonants get the name *pragṛhya*, and whether it is desirable or not. Both the Paribhāṣās, being *antaraṅga* (i. e. essential for the literal understanding of the rule), operate. So the primary meaning is : The *nipāta*-s ending in vowels, and those consisting of vowels, get the name *pragṛhya*. Then finally the *tadantavidhi* is set aside on the basis of the clue *anāṅ*.

[4]

This section is a comm. on the *Mbh.* portion which states that the use of *ekāc* instead of *ac* (which latter would have covered all desired cases and avoided undesired ones) in the Sū. is meant to be a clue (*jñāpaka*) : it suggests that ordinarily there is no stress on the singular number in which a qualifying phoneme is used; it is taken as representing the whole class. In the present case, however, singular number is definitely intended, to convey which Pāṇini had to say *ekāc* instead of simply *ac*. The utility of this clue is seen e. g. in the Desid. of *dambh*, viz. *dhipsati* (*danbh* > *dinbh* P 7. 4. 56, > *dibh* P 6. 4. 24, > *dhip* P 8. 2. 37; 8. 4. 55) + *san* + *ti*), where the elision of the nasal takes place although *san* does not immediately follow the consonant (nasal) which follows *i*. This is so because the word *hal* 'consonant' in this rule (P 1. 2. 110) is said to be expressive of the class (*halgrahaṇaṁ jātiparam*).

Since in the present case *ac* is *not* to be taken as expressing the whole vowel class, all the three constituents in *aiu* get the name *pragṛhya* individually. So there is no danger of *a* + *i* contracting into a Guṇa etc.

(36) *p.* 14, *ll.* 12–15 : एवं तर्हि ... पशुना यजेत, इति । Ordinarily, the number of a subordinate word is specifically intended, as in the injunction *paśunā yajeta*, which lays down the offering in sacrifice of a single animal; you cannot offer more than one. In Grammar, on the other hand, there is generally no stress on the number of such an expression; there is *avivakṣita saṁkhyātva*. The only exception is our rule P 1. 1. 14. That is why Pāṇini prefixes here *eka* to *ac* thereby hinting at the unintended number elsewhere.

(37) *p.* 14, *ll.* 15–16 plead for the principality of the named, but this is rejected in *ll.* 16–19. The named may be principal in the *pradeśa*-rules; in the *saṁjñā*-rules the names are principal, the named subordinate.

(38) *p.* 14, *ll.* 19–20 : If *eka* is not read in this rule, then even a cluster of vowels, whose members happen to have the name *nipāta* individually, will get the name *pragṛhya*. This name will be for the whole as such, and not for different individuals. The name *pragṛhya* becomes inevitable for the cluster of vocalic *nipāta*-s as a whole, because of the impossibility of a *nipāta* consisting of a cluster of vowels. Cf. Kaiy. : अच्समुदायपरिग्रहानुरोधाच्च निपातसमुदायो गृह्येत, एकनिपातस्याच्समुदायस्याभावात् ।

(39) *p.* 14, *ll.* 27–29 : कथं तर्हि ... नलोपप्रसङ्गश्चोद्यते । It is maintained above that once an operation is performed with reference to a whole, it does not again become due with reference to parts (नास्त्यवयवेषु पुनः प्रवृत्तिः). Now the opponent cites *Mbh.* on P 1. 2. 45 (I. 217. 1–2) in the context of the name *prātipadika* which seems to indicate the opposite conclusion viz. अस्त्यवयवेषु पुनःप्रवृत्तिः.

(40) *p.* 15, *l.* 2 : निर्देश्य = उद्देश्य, i. e. the *nipāta* in the present case.

(41) *p.* 15, *l.* 6 : ननु चोक्तं, 'न सामान्येन पौर्वापर्यमस्ती' ति । This refers to the *Vār.* 4 on P 2. 4. 35 and the *Mbh.* on it. Read : 'पौर्वापर्याभावाच्च सामान्येनानुपपत्तिः' (वा.)। पौर्वापर्याभावाच्च सामान्येन जग्ध्यादीनामनुपपत्तिः । न हि सामान्येन पौर्वापर्यमस्ति । This is the point : Although in *dhipsati* the Desid. suffix *san* does not immediately follow that consonant (viz. *n*) which follows the *ik* vowel (viz. *i*) as required by P 1. 2. 10, still *san* is looked upon as following the class of consonants (*hal-jāti*) in -*nbh*- which is regarded as sufficient for the extension of *kittva* to *san* there. Now a question is raised against it here : Does this not run counter to the *Mbh.* statement : न हि सामान्येन पौर्वापर्यमस्ति? How can you speak of the suffix *san* as *following* the *class* of consonants ?

The context of this statement is as follows : P 2. 4. 35 : *ārdhadhātuke* is an *adhikāra* rule in which context certain root-substitutes are taught, such as *as* >*bhū* etc. Here the *Vārttikas* 1 and 2 raise a point : *ārdhadhātuke* is a

para-saptamī. So it has to come first after the root concerned. When it is in the following position, only then, and not before it has come, a root-substitue (say *bhū*) can replace the original root (*as*). But which particular suffix is to follow, say, to form a potential participle? While *as* is stll there, P 3. 1. 124 : ऋहलोर्ण्यत् must apply, necessitating the suffix *ṇyat*. When because of this *ārdhadhātuka* suffix the root-substitute *bhū* comes in, then P 3. 1. 97 : अचो यत् can apply, giving you *bhavya*, But *ṇyat* which has already come in will result into an incorrect and undesired form (* *āsya*), for which, therefore, prohibition will have to be made. This objection is refuted in *Vār*. 3, which says that the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix, which will come in at the outset after the original root will not be any particular suffix, (like *ṇyat*), but a suffix in general — SUFFIX. The particular suffix which, will replace it, will come in only after the root-substitute has come in (*sāmānyāśrayatvāt viśeṣasyānāśrayaḥ*). This reply, in its turn, is challenged in *Vārttikas* 4 and 5. Leaving *Vār*. 4 for the time being, *Vār*. 5 (*paurvāparyābhāvāc ca sāmānyena* ......) points out that the relation of the preceding and the following is possible only between two concrete objects. If even one of them is abstract, like the generality (*jāti*) as in the present case, this relation is ruled out (*na sāmānyena paurvāparyam asti*). So the explanation that an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix in general comes at the outset after *as* etc. cannot stand.

Applying this very logic, says the objector, we cannot accept in the present case (*dhipsati*) that a *hal-jāti* (generality of consonants) intervenes between *i* and *san*. This is replied to in the following lines (7–10).

(42) *p*. 15, *ll*. 7–10 : 'नेदं वचनम्। बहवश्च यञः' इति। This refutes the dissimilarity between the two situations. (We have translated नेदं वचनम् by 'That is not an authoritative statement'. But this is only a makeshift translation. One cannot be sure that some portion is not lost after वचनम्, thus making *vacanam* also a part of the subject). The *paurvāparya* is denied in the case of the verbal root and the Taddita suffix because suffixes with different meanings cannot present themselves simultaneously after a root; so also synonymous suffixes for reasons stated. But this is not an absolute rule. Plurality of suffixes can follow a single stem as in the case of गर्ग+य +य+य (where the suffix is *tulyarūpa*) meaning 'many descendants of Garga', where by *ekaśeṣa* and after the elision of the patronymic suffix (P 2. 4. 64), one arrives at *gargāḥ*. (एका प्रकृतिर्बहवश्च यञः is *Mbh*. under *Vār*. 20 [not 25 as wrongly printed in the Translation] on P 1. 2. 64 [I. 238. 21]).

[5]

(43) *p*. 15, *ll*. 12–13 : After अनुबन्धनिवृत्तौ श्रुतिविशेषाभावात्, supply प्रश्नः as Kaiy. does.

(44) *p.* 15, *ll.* 12–18 : The indeclinable *ā*, when not characterised by the code-letter *ṅ*, is *pragṛhya*. But *ṅ* belongs only to the grammatical system and it disappears at the first step in the formative process. How is then one to know where *ā* is *ṅit*, where it is not ? By association of meaning with the code-letter, is the reply given. In connection with three different meanings *ā* is read as *āṅ* in the authoritative texts : (i) *āṅ īṣadarthe. āṅ īṣadartha iti vaktavyam* (*Mbh.* under P 2. 2. 18 *Vār.* 4; I. 416. 17), (2) *āṅ* read in the Gaṇapāṭha under *prādayaḥ, upasargāḥ kriyāyoge* (P 1. 4. 58-59) and (3) *āṅ maryādābhividhyoḥ* (P 2. 1. 13) and *āṅ maryādāvacane* (P 1. 4. 89). From this association of meaning and the code-letter one concludes that *ā* is *āṅ* when meaning *īṣat* etc. and consequently not *pragṛhya*; elsewhere it is *anāṅ*, hence *pragṛhya*.

(45) *p.* 15, *l.* 18 : We may supply an expression like भूतपूर्वं सत्त्वम् ' previous existence ' after अनुबन्धस्य, and look upon तत्सहचारि° as a compound.

(46) *p.* 15, *ll.* 22–23 : अत्रानर्थकस्यैवाङो ... नोपपद्यते । This passage is not quite clear. It seems to mean that *āṅ* is meaningless while *ā* (*śuddha*) is not so. We have translated *śuddha* by ' pure (non-nasal *ā*) ', but it may indicate an *aṅit ā*.

* * * *

P. 1. 1. 15 : *ot*.

[1]

(1) *p.* 15, *ll.* 27–28 : एतद् विरुद्धमुभयम् = अर्थभेदो नास्ति, निपातसमाहारश्च.

(2) *p.* 16, *l.* 1 : Correction ! For °निवृत्तो, read °निर्वृत्तो (translated accordingly).

(3) *p.* 16, *l.* 2 : The MS reads वत् which we have reconstructed as तावत्. But it could be तत् originally.

(4) *p.* 16, *ll.* 2ff : From ओ षु यातं मरुत etc. a new argument commences. Previously the need of this rule P 1. 1. 15 was challenged in the *Mbh.* on the ground that *āho* etc. are compound *nipāta*-s. The reply then given was : एवं तर्ह्येकनिपाता इमे. From here onwards another justification is advanced : प्रतिषिद्धार्थोऽयमारम्भः. In ओ षु यातं मरुतः etc. the name *pragṛhya* is desired for *o*. (In the citation we do not see any utility of this nomenclature, but Kaiy. points out : क्वचिच्छाखायाम् ' ओ अयातम् ' इति पाठे प्रकृतिभावः. Also when *iti* follows in the Padapāṭha there is no Saṁdhi). But the difficulty is that *o* is a combination of *ā* + *u*. By *antādivadbhāva*, *o* is equivalent to *ā* (*āṅ*) which is prohibited from getting the name *pragṛhya* (on the view that *anāṅ* in P 1. 1. 14 is *prasajya-pratiṣedha*). Hence this Sū.

The rest of the *Dīp*. in this section considers the possibility that *anāṅ* is a *paryudāsa*, making P 1. 1. 15 redundant.

(5) *p*. 16, *ll*. 4–5 : 'आङोऽन्यः' विधिः = पर्युदासः. That is *anāṅ* in P 1. 1. 14 is not to be interpreted as a प्रसज्यप्रतिषेध.

(6) *p*. 16, *ll*. 5–6 : An objection. अन्तादिवद्भावात् = पूर्वान्तवद्भावात् । व्यपदेशे = ओकारस्य आङ्त्वेन व्यपदेशे. Here and below the MS. reads व्यपवर्गे. But in view of the intended meaning we have emended it into व्यपदेश-. As long as *āṅ*-character of *o* is there by virtue of *pūrvāntavadbhāva*, you cannot look on *o* as *anāṅ*.

(7) *p*. 16, *ll*. 6–9 : A counter-objection based on the impersonal (*bhāve*) construction *lūyate kedāreṇa* taught by P. 3. 1. 88 : कर्मवत् कर्मणा तुल्यक्रियः and a reply to it. This is the objection : *o* (in *o ṣu yātam* etc.) is a single substitute for *āṅ* + *u*. By *pūrvāntavadbhāva o* can be looked upon as *āṅ*, and so *o* cannot have the name *pragṛhya*. Accepted. But by *parādivadbhāva* why should *o* be not regarded as *u*, and so something different from *āṅ* ? What is there to prevent it from having *āṅ-bhinnatva* also (side by side with *āṅtva*) ? The objector gives the parallel of the *karmavadbhāva* (extension of the status of the grammatical object) taught in P 3. 1. 88. Let us take an example. कर्षकः केदारं लुनाति ' the farmer reaps the field ' is a basic sentence. Here the act of reaping may be so swift and almost automatic that you could ignore the real agent, i. e. the farmer and attribute the activity to the field itself and say : लूयते केदारः (स्वयमेव) (reflexive) or लूयते केदारेण (impersonal) both roughly meaning ' the field reaps itself '. Here by P 3. 1. 88, the status of a grammatical object is extended to *kedāra* which we have chosen to look upon as the agent. Thus *kedāra* possesses two properties, *kartṛtva* i. e. *akarmatva* which is its own (*svāśraya*; of course based on our *vivakṣā*) and *karmatva* which is extended (*atidiṣṭa*) by the grammatical rule. In spite of this *karmātideśa*, we count on the original agentness, i.e. non-objectness of the *kedāra*. That is why the action can be looked upon as intransitive, and as such justifies the impersonal construction लूयते केदारेण. Now the objector says that just as you look upon the activity here as intransitive because of the own agentness of *kedāra*, in spite of the extended objectness, similarly why not look upon *o* as *different-from-āṅ* by reason of its being *u* by *parādivadbhāva* (although it is also *āṅ* itself by *pūrvāntavadbhāva*) ?

The reply is given on the basis of difference between the two cases. In the first place, the agentness (i.e. non-objectness) of the *kedāra* in the parallel cited by the opponent is natural or inherent (of course based on the *vivakṣā*). The extension of the status of an object does not dislodge

it. (Pāṇini merely says *karmavat*, and not *karma*). Secondly here no operation is taught for an object as such in this rule. So by counting on the natural agentness (= non-objectness) we can look upon the action as intransitive and thus have the impersonal construction (*lūyate kedāreṇa*). (By utilising the extended status of an object on *kedāra* we can also have the reflexive (*karmakartari*) construction : *lūyate kedāraḥ*).

Lines 9–12 (तद्यथा । ब्राह्मणवदस्मिन् ... °नयनं भवति) furnish a parallel for the optional use of two different properties (in this case one natural and the other extended). A particular Kṣatriya is looked upon as a Brāhmaṇa because of his eminent qualities. So when something becomes due to a Brāhmaṇa, this Kṣatriya is eligible for it. Also when something is to be presented to a non-Brāhmaṇa, this Kṣatriya is eligible for it by reason of his inherent Kṣatriyahood.

Line 13 (एवमिह आदिवद्भावात् ... विज्ञातुं शक्यः) sums up the conclusion. Although it looks so simple, this is an extremely ambiguous and obscure line. The difficulty is caused firstly by the corruptness of the MS, secondly by the difficulty in ascertaining what exactly Bhar. is driving at.

(1) The MS actually reads : भवति एव इह त्वंतादिवद्भावात् व्यपदेशस्य [1]नित्यसांनिध्यादसत्तत्पर्युदासो विज्ञातु. It will be seen that the most important part, viz. the predicate, is missing. The translation ('Similarly here ... it is possible to understand exclusion [of *āṅ*] more than once') is based upon a supplied predicate शक्यः (and of course on the reconstruction of विज्ञातु as विज्ञातुं). This is done in the belief that Bhar. is accepting (apparently against the *Mbh.*) the *paryudāsa* (of a particular kind) here (thus making the present Sū. superfluous). The fact that Kaiy., who usually follows Bhar, seems to lend support to such an understanding was also responsible for this interpretation. That is why we emended एव इह into एवमिह and त्वंतादिवद्भावात् into आदिवद्भावात् (a rather violent emendation). By आदिवद्भावात् of course परादिवद्भावात् is understood. So the intended idea was that *o* can be looked upon as *u* i. e. as *āṅbhinna* (व्यपदेश meaning अनाङ्त्वेन व्यपदेश).

(2) But we are far from satisfied with this interpretation, which was of course given tentatively. There are three reasons for its non-satisfactoriness. Firstly, that Bhar. should hold a view against that of Pat. does not seem very likely. Secondly, in the phrases अन्तादिवद्भावात् व्यपदेशे नित्यं संनिहिते (*ll.* 5–6) and अन्तादिवद्भावात् व्यपदेशस्य नित्यसांनिध्यात् (*l.* 13), the expressions अन्तादिवद्भाव and व्यपदेश should reasonably have one and the same interpretation in both passages. In our translation we have understood अन्तादिवद्भाव

[1] In the printed text (*p.* 16, *l.* 13) नित्य has been dropped inadvertently.

in the sense of पूर्वान्तवद्भाव and व्यपदेश in the sense of आङ्त्वेन व्यपदेश in their first occurrence but in the sense of परादिवद्भाव and उत्वेन=(अनाङ्त्वेन) व्यपदेश in their second occurrence. We would now like to remove this sort of *ardhajaratīya*. Thirdly, the emendation of त्वंतादिवद्भावात् (1.13) into आदिवद्भावात् is rather violent, as said above. We would now like to stick to the MS reading त्वंतादिवद्भावात्. Fourthly, the word *tu*, now restored, definitely points out to the dissimilarity of the two situations, thus denying here the concession available in the case of लूयते केदारेण.

(3) Here are the two points which make the two situations dissimilar: (i) In लूयते केदारेण, the agentness (i. e. the non-objectness) of *kedāra* is natural or inherent while its objectness is extended; in the present case, however, both *āṅtva* and *anāṅtva* (or *āṅbhinnatva*) are equally extended; there is no chance for the property of *anāṅtva* to operate because *āṅtva* is ever present (*nityasaṁnihita*). In the so-called parallel case, the natural non-objectness can first operate and then we can connect the extended objectness with the *kedāra*. This facility is not available in the present case. (ii) In लूयते केदारेण no operation is taught in the Sū. 3. 1. 88 for the object as such (whose status is extended) while the extended property *anāṅtva* is involved in the name *pragṛhya*.

(4) Considering all these things it seems necessary to have a word of negation in the predicate. Of course it is possible to supply a negative particle *na* (beside the already supplied *śakyaḥ*). But we do not know if some text is really lost and if so, how much. Besides we have reconstructed असत्तत् of the MS as असकृत्. Though this could somehow be explained (*o*=1. *anāṅ* in its own rite and *o* = 2. *anāṅ* by reason of *parādivadbhāva*) still it does not look satisfactory. Could this असत्तत् by any chance be a corruption of अशक्यं / क्यः? If so that would save the addition of न शक्यः, giving at the same time the intended meaning.

(5) As a second alternative, then, we would like to read the text as ... भवति एव[1]। इह त्वन्तादिवद्भावात् व्यपदेशस्य नित्यसांनिध्यादशक्यं (or °क्यः) पर्युदासो विज्ञातुम्। Translate accordingly : 'Here, however, since the designation (viz. *āṅ*) is ever present (in the case of *o*) because of the *antādivadbhāva*, it is not possible to understand (*o* as) different (from *āṅ*)'. As P 1. 1. 14 is unable to confer the name of *pragṛhya* on *o* in *o ṣu yātam* etc., P 1. 1. 15 is necessary.

We do not claim that this is wholly satisfactory. But it does justice

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[1] Why एव was written separately in the MS without observing the usual saṁdhi (= भवत्येव) is not clear,

to the expression *iha tu*, assigns a uniform meaning to the words *antādivadbhāva* and *vyapadeśa* and does not go against the *Mbh* (which states that present rule is *vipratiṣiddhārtha*).

Correction ! In the translation (p 54, l. 27), *for* Or, *read* And.

[2]

This section is headed by the *Vār.* : *otaś cvipratiṣedhaḥ* 'the name *pragṛhya* should be prohibited in the case of the *nipāta* in *o* if it ends in *cvi.*' This suggestion is meant to account for the saṁdhi in *ado'bhavat* (= *anadaḥ adaḥ abhavat*). The *Mbh* refutes this suggestion on the strength of the Pari. *lakṣaṇapratipadoktayoḥ pratipadoktasyaiva.* The *o* in *ado* is a result of grammatical operations (*adas* > *adar* > *adau* > *ado*). As it is *lakṣaṇokta*, P 1. 1. 15 will not apply to it. Since there is no possibility of the name *pragṛhya* here, there is no need of its prohibition. The *Mbh.* एवमप्यगौगौंः समपद्यत etc. comes in at this stage. एवमपि = लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तयोः इत्यादिपरिभाषया अदोऽभवत् इत्यत्र प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायां निवारितायामपि ।

(8) *p.* 16, *l.* 14 : In अगौगौंः समपद्यत गोऽभवत्, the Pari. *lakṣaṇapratipadoktayoḥ* etc. does not help, as the *o* in *go* is *pratipadokta* ('गमेर्डोस्' *Uṇ*). Read Kaiy. : ओकारस्यात्र प्रतिपदोक्तत्वमस्ति, गमेर्डो इति साक्षादुच्चारणात् । यस्य हि साक्षादुच्चारणं नास्ति, 'आद्गुणः' इत्यादिसामान्यलक्षणेन यद्रूपं निष्पाद्यते तल्लाक्षणिकमुच्यते ।

(9) *p.* 16, *ll.* 14-17 : Here Bhar. is preparing the ground for the Pari. गौणमुख्ययोः etc. which is to follow. This argument which lays stress on the meaning of the word (although grammar is primarily a *śabdaśāstra*) has already occurred above at *p.* 11, *ll.* 11-13. — After संप्रत्ययात्, something like प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा न भविष्यति is to be supplied. — Perhaps अर्थवत्परिग्रहे would have been a better text than अर्थपरिग्रहे.

(10) *p.* 16, *l.* 18 — *p.* 17, *l.* 4 : The main point in this rather lengthy passage is that the *mukhya* (primary) meaning is the first meaning, it is the basis of the *gauṇa* (figurative) meaning, and is always fixed, whereas the *gauṇa* meaning is secondary, is based on the *mukhya* one, and is not fixed. That is why the *mukhya* meaning is always preferred, whenever possible, to the *gauṇa* one. गोऽभवत् is a case of a secondary meaning (गौः = गोसदृशः as suggested by *cvi*). So the Pari. *gauṇamukhyayoḥ* ... will effectively prevent the name *pragṛhya* here.

(*l.* 17) The explanations गुणादागतः गौणः, मुखमिव मुख्यः borrowed by Kaiy. — (*ll.* 18-19) Correction ! For प्रैष-, read प्रिय-. गोशब्दो जातिद्रव्यलिङ्गसंख्याकर्मादिषु वृत्तः represents the *pañcakaṁ prātipadikārthaḥ* view. कर्मादिषु = कारकेषु. A nominal stem denotes, as soon as formed, the five constituents

of a *go*, viz. the class etc.; the good (*priya*) and bad (*kutsana*) connotations, which are a result of the contact with other words in the sentence, come in subsequently. The idea expressed here, including the word *priya-kutsana*, is found in the *Mbh* on P 5. 3. 74 : कुत्सिते. Read :

स्वार्थमभिधाय शब्दो निरपेक्षो द्रव्यमाह समवेतम् ।
समवेतस्य च वचने लिङ्गं वचनं विभक्तिं च ॥
अभिधाय तान् विशेषानपेक्षमाणश्च कृत्स्नमात्मानम् ।
प्रियकुत्सनादिषु पुनः प्रवर्ततेऽसौ विभक्त्यन्तः ॥ [II. 424. 4-5]

(*l.* 20) अपदप्रतिबद्धे, not linked with any fullfledged word in the sentence, i.e. the meaning of the nominal stem (*prātipadika*). — Correction ! For ऽसंनिहिते, read संनिहिते. — (*ll.* 23-26) It is not that all people look upon a Vāhīka as being dull like a bull. The meaning 'bull-like, dullard' will not come to their mind when *gauḥ* is uttered. On the contrary there may be people who look upon a Vāhīka as being sharp and clever. (The construction of the sentence तथा येऽपि रूढसंबन्धाः ... भवन्ति तैक्ष्ण्यपाटवादयः is clumsy. What is intended is : तथा येऽपि ... ... मौख्याशौचादयः, तद्विपरीता ये ते कदाचित्... ... पाटवादयः ।) — (l. 26) विरोधिगुण° refers to तैक्ष्ण्यपाटवादयः which are opposed to मौख्याशौचादयः, traditionally associated with a Vāhīka. — (*p.* 17, *ll.* 3-4) तस्मात् गौरित्युक्ते ... ... न वाहीकोऽनुबध्यते । Just as Vāhīka, who forms only a secondary denotation of the form *gauḥ*, does not undergo *anubandhana*, even so in *go 'bhavat* the word *go*, which conveys here a figurative meaning, does not get the name *pragṛhya* by P 1. 1. 15. The metarule *gauṇamukhyayoḥ* ... takes care of it. Hence no need of framing a new prohibition.

(11) *p.* 17, *ll.* 4-22 : A pertinent question and a reply to it. If an operation, whether ritual or grammatical, is not to be performed when the meaning is figurative (and so a Vāhīka does not undergo *anubandhana* and the word *go* in *go'abhavat* does not get the name *pragṛhya*), how is it that Vṛddhi and *ā*-substitution take place, yielding the forms *gauḥ* and *gām*, when used in the figurative meaning of Vāhīka (कथं तर्हि वाहीके ... गामानयेति) ? The *Mbh* reply is : अर्थाश्रय एतद् भवति । This is followed in the *Mbh* by यद्धि शब्दाश्रयम्, शब्दमात्रे तद् भवति । शब्दाश्रये च वृद्ध्यात्वे (not quoted by Bhar.). There are operations and operations. In some, consideration of meaning is essential; in others not. The name *pragṛhya* is an *arthāśraya* affair. So the consideration of meaning viz. whether it is primary or figurative is unavoidable. The suffixing of case-endings is a *śabdāśraya* operation. You do not stop there to consider whether the nominal form, when effected, is going to be used in a primary or a secondary sense. This is the difference between the two cases. Bhar. hastens to add that Pat's statement that Vṛddhi and *ā*-substitution in *go-* is a *śabdāśraya* operation is not to be taken literally. All that is meant is that the noun, in the process of formation, has an in-

determinate meaning, having various possibilities about its use when it gets a finished form. But this consideration of meaning does not come in when an inflected noun is being formed from a nominal stem.– (l. 5) एतदेवं भवति = गौणमुख्यपरिभाषा न्याप्रियते ।

(*ll.* 5–7) Correction ! For निवारयितुं, read विचारयितुं and for निवारणे, read विचारणे. In *l.* 7, read तत्त्वनाविर्भूतमनिमित्तमस्य. The seed of distinction is अनाविर्भूतम्, hence अनिमित्तमस्य विचारणे. In the translation (*p.* 56, *ll.* 1–3), *for* is it not possible to consider this distinction ? (Certainly) the meaning in the present case is figurative and not primary *read* it is not possible to consider this distinction viz. whether the meaning in the present case is primary or figurative,

(*l.* 11) The *Dīp.* प्रातिपदिकाश्रयाणि कार्याणि श्रुतिमात्रमाश्रित्य प्रवर्तन्ते is the paraphrase of the *Mbh.* यद्धि शब्दाश्रयं शब्दमात्रे तद् भवति ।

(*ll.* 11ff.) As the expression *atha vā* indicates, an alternative explanation (of the fact that the metarule *gauṇamukhyayoḥ* does not apply in the case of the forms *gauḥ, gām* when referring to Vāhīka) follows. Actually, however, there is no material difference between the two. Whatever difference there is between the two, it is very slight. In the preceeding explanation the seed of the figurative meaning existing in the nominal stem was accepted. Only, being undeveloped, it was regarded as insufficient for the consideration of the kind of meaning. Now it is absolutly denied. In fact, Bhar here says that the meaning of a nominal stem cannot even be called *mukhya* in the absence of a rival meaning which could be called *gauṇa* (विरोधिनिमित्ताभावादर्थो मुख्यव्यपदेशं न लभते). Kaiy. (who, incidentally, gives this second interpretation alone) calls the meaning of the nominal stem merely *svārtha*. Read : स्वार्थे वृत्तात् प्रातिपदिकाद्विभक्तावुत्पन्नायां कार्येषु कृतेषु शब्दान्तरसंनिधानाद्गौणत्वं प्रतीयते । तस्य च स्वार्थस्य मुख्यव्यपदेशो नास्ति, गौणापेक्षया संबन्धिशब्दत्वात् मुख्यशब्दस्य ... ।

In *ll.* 14–15, निर्वृत्तः स्वकार्ये is equivalent to निवृत्तस्वकार्यो (was this the original reading ?), cf. कार्येषु कृतेषु of Kaiy.

* * * *

P. 1. 1. 17–18 : *uña ũ*

[1]

(1) *p.* 17, *l.* 24 – *p.* 18, *l.* 4 : The *Vār.* and the *Mbh.* explained in this section run as follows : 'उञ इति योगविभागः ।' (वा.) 'उञः' इति योगविभागः कर्तव्यः । उञः शाकल्यस्याचार्यस्य मतेन प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा भवति । उ इति, विति । ततः 'ऊँ' । उञ ऊँ इत्ययमादेशो भवति शाकल्यस्याचार्यस्य मतेन, दीर्घोऽनुनासिकः प्रगृह्यसंज्ञकश्च, ऊँ इति ।

The problem here is this : *u*(*ñ*) has already the name *pragṛhya* by

P 1. 1. 14 : निपात एकाजनाङ्. Now when a non-Vedic *iti* follows, three forms are optionally desired : (1) *u iti* (with the name *pragṛhya*), (2) *v iti* (without this name) and (3) *ū̃ iti* (a long, nasal, *pragṛhya* substitute). If we read the whole (*uña ū̃*) as one Sū, then, with the *anuvṛtti* of *śākalyasya* from P 1. 1. 16, we will get two forms only, *u iti* and *ū̃ iti*; we will not get *v iti*, since the force of the expression *śākalyasya*, which gives optionality to the rule, is already exhausted in making the name *pragṛhya* optional. So it is suggested that we break *uña ū̃* into two, utilising *śākalyasya* in both rules, thus making both the name *p.* and the long, nasal, *p.* substitute optional. (If we do not read *sākalyasya* in the second rule also, then the *p. u* will be replaced by *ū̃*, so that *u iti* will not be available).

This is the argument made in section [1].

As usual, Kaiy. puts forth the same argument lucidly. Read : इह रूपत्रयं साध्यम् — 'उ इति', 'विति' 'ऊँ इति'। तच्चैकयोगे न सिध्यति। एकयोगे हि उञः इति श्रुतिरादेशेन श्रुतत्वात् संबध्यते, न प्रगृह्यसंज्ञया । सा 'निपात एकाजनाङ्' इति नित्यैवास्य भवति। शाकल्यश्रुत्यनुवृत्त्या चादेशे विकल्पिते रूपद्वयं स्यात् — उ इति, ऊँ इति, न तु 'विति' इति। तदर्थमाह — उञ इति योगविभाग इति । उञः इत्यत्र 'शाकल्यस्येतौ' 'प्रगृह्यं' इति चानुवर्तते। तत्र प्रगृह्यसंज्ञैव शाकल्यस्य मतेन विधीयते, नान्येषाम्, इति स्मृत्यन्तरानुसंधानद्वारेण विभाषा संपद्यते—उ इति, वितीति । 'ऊँ, इत्यत्र च यदि 'शाकल्यस्य' इति नापेक्ष्यते तदा प्रगृह्यस्योञो नित्यमादेशः स्यात् ततश्च 'विति' 'ऊँ इति' एते द्वे एव रूपे स्याताम्। तस्माच्छाकल्यग्रहणानुवृत्त्या आदेशविकल्पे सति त्रीणि रूपाणि सिध्यन्ति।

[2]

(2) *p.* 18, *ll.* 5–7 : येषां तु ग्रन्थः ... 'उ इति' इति। After the *Mbh.* quoted above, there appears in the *Mbh.* a question : किमर्थो योगविभागः which serves to introduce the 2nd *Vār.* : ऊँ वा शाकल्यस्य. The point in raising the question : किमर्थो योगविभागः is that even if the *yogavibhāga* were accepted, only two optional forms would be available, not three. So what is its use ? The *Vār.* ऊँ वा शाकल्यस्य shows the utility of the *yogavibhāga.*

This is what the objector means : After *yogavibhāga*, P 1. 1. 17 would mean that according so Śākalya *u(ñ)* is called *pragṛhya* (but not according to others). So the resultant forms are : *u iti* (acc. to Ś.) and *v iti* (acc. to others). P 1. 1. 18 then would mean that according to Śākalya, in *u iti*, the *u* (*pragṛhya*; which alone he recognizes) is replaced by *ū̃*. So this rule gives us *ū̃ iti* (apart from *v iti*). So after all we get only two forms, *v iti* and *ū̃ iti*; the third form *u iti* is not available as it is replaced by *ū̃ iti*. Read the *Uddy.* : किमर्थो योगविभाग इति । प्रगृह्यत्वादेशयोः शाकल्यमते एव प्राप्त्या एकप्रयोग एव प्रवृत्तिः स्यात्। एवं च ऊँ इति वितीति रूपे।

The *Vār.* ऊँ वा शाकल्यस्य refutes the objection. It pleads that the purpose

of the *yogavibhāga* is to make the substitution *ū*>*ū̐* optional *according to Śākalya himself. u iti* is not totally replaced by *ū̐ iti*, but only optionally even according to Śākalya. (Read the *Mbh.*; शाकल्यस्याचार्यस्य मतेन ऊँ विभाषा यथा स्यात् । ऊँ इति, उ इति । Also Nāg. : एवं च शाकल्यमत एव विकल्पः फलितः ।) But how is the *yogavibhāga* by itself able to attribute optionality of the substitution to Śākalya ? Here the tradition says that by *śākalyasya* mere optionality is to be understood. It is not to be understood as the name of a particular grammarian (as the objector has done). Thus the word *śākalyasya* which is brought down in both the *yoga*-s merely makes the two operations of the name *pragṛhya* and the substitution of *ū̐* optional. शाकल्यश्रुतेरेव फलं वाग्रहणेन प्रतिपादयति as Kaiy. says and एवं च योगविभागसामर्थ्यात् शाकल्यानुवृत्तिसामर्थ्याच्च तन् (= शाकल्यपदम् *Chāyā*) न यथाश्रुतम्, किं तु विकल्पमात्रतात्पर्यकमिति विकल्पद्वयेन सकलेष्टसिद्धिरिति भावः as Nāg. says.

Now if we turn to the *Dīp.* we will find that the *Vār.* ऊँ वा शाकल्यस्य and also the *Mbh.* on it is entirely missing. Bhar. merely mentions a variant reading (*pāṭhaḥ*) of some others viz. किमर्थो योगविभागः ? शाकल्यविभाषा मा भूत् and explains the idea of this v.l. Here किमर्थो योगविभागः is there in the usual text of the *Mbh* also. The following words शाकल्यविभाषा मा भूत् present a big problem. They *prima facie* seem to contain a reply to the question किमर्थो... etc. But ' so that the option available by the mention of Śākalya be not there ' goes against the whole tenor of the argument. Śākalya-vibhāṣā *is* desired. So just to make the passage yield some coherent sense, we look upon the words शाकल्यविभाषा मा भूत् not as a reply to the question, but as a continuation of it by the objector himself. ' Śākalyavibhāṣā is not available, well, let it not be. Does not matter. Even if available, it is not going to be useful ' — that seems to be the idea. The following words (तेषां वावचनमन्तरेण ... ' उ इति ' इति) explain this statment, showing how the form *u iti* remains unavailable. (It is much the same as Nāg.'s statement : प्रगृह्यत्वादेशयोः शाकल्यमते एव ... वितीति च रूपे quoted above). Why Bhar. ignores the *Vār* and the *Mbh* thereon (or whether he commented on it but somehow this part is missing in our MS) we do not know.

There are certain observations of a general nature which we would like to make :

1. The *yogavibhāga* is an idea of the commentators beginning with Kātyāyana. As far as Pāṇini is concerned he must have looked upon *'uñ̃a ū̐* as one rule. Throughout this section on *pragṛhya*, the subject (i.e. the named) is mentioned in the Nominative.

2. Pāṇini is here mentioning the practice of Śākalya, the author of the Ṛgveda Padapāṭha, who replaces Ṛgvedic *u* by *ū̐* in his Padapāṭha, adding

an *iti* (which does not enter into euphony with the preceding *ū̐*) after it. Pāṇini evidently wants to record here that Śākalya in his Padapāṭha looks upon *ū̐* as a *pragṛhya*. So the whole rule *uña ū̐* should mean : *ū̐*, (a substitute) of *uñ*, (gets the name *pragṛhya* according to Śākalya, when a non-Vedic *iti* follows).

3. This raises a question. Does *u* elsewhere have the name *pragṛhya* or no? Apparently it should have by P. 1. 1. 14 : ***nipāta ekāj anāṅ***. This should bar the Saṁdhi of *u* with a following vowel.

4. But this militates against the facts of the Ṛgvedic language where the saṁdhi of *u* with a following vowel is by no means rare. P 8. 3. 33 : ***maya uño vo vā*** '*uñ* coming after a stop except *ñ* is replaced optionally by *v* when a vowel follows' will take care of the different usages in the Veda and early pre-classical literature (where mostly *uñ* is met with). To illustrate, the absence of saṁdhi in e. g. *vā́ u etán* (*ṚV* 1. 162.21) is accounted for by P 1. 1. 14 : ***nipāta ekāj anāṅ***; while the change *u* > *v* in e. g. ***ávéd v indra*** (1. 28. 1–4) and in *trír v aśvīnā* (1. 34.2) as also its absence in ***tā́n u árvāca*** (1. 164. 19b) can be accounted for by P 8. 3. 33 : ***maya uño vō vā*** which allows this change optionally when a mute (except *ñ*) precedes.

5. The fact that Pāṇini is here referring to Śākalya's practice in the Padapāṭha was missed by the commentators. Their assigning the mere sense of optionality to the word Śākalya further underlines their lack of historical sense.

6. The commentators themselves are divided as to the two forms which alone would be available if *uña ū̐* was read as one rule. They are *u iti* and *ū̐ iti* according to old commentators like Bhar. and Kaiy. while *v iti* and *ū̐ iti* according to Nāg.

This is so because the commentators differ about the relationship between P 1. 1. 14 and P 1. 1. 17–18. Bhar. and Kaiy. (also the *Kāś.*) regard the name *pragṛhya* (by P 1. 1. 14) as valid for *uñ* outside the scope of P 1. 1. 17–18, while Nāg. is of the opinion that P 1. 1. 17–18 supersede P 1. 1. 14, so that there is no name *p.* for *uñ* elsewhere. Read : अन्ये तु अनेन [=उञ ऊँ इत्यनेन] प्रकरणात् प्रगृह्यत्वस्य ऊँ-आदेशस्य च विधानेन तस्य 'निपात...' इति प्रगृह्यसंज्ञापवादत्वादेतदादेशविकल्पे ऊँ इति वितीति सिध्यति, न तु उ इति, अतो योगविभागः। Also, एवं च ऊँ इति वितीति च रूपे। ते च एकयोगेऽपि सिध्यत इति प्रश्नः ['किमर्थो योगविभागः' इति]। एवं चैकयोगे वितीति न सिध्यतीति प्रागुक्तकैयटश्चिन्त्य एवेति बोध्यम्।

(3) *p.* 18, *ll.* 7–8 : This sentence opens a new topic. It anticipates a curious objection and tries to answer it. After the *yogavibhāga*, the second *yoga* teaches a substitute (*ū̐* for *uñ*). It is therefore a *pradeśa-sūtra*, not a

saṁjñā-sūtra. As such the word *pragṛhya* should not appear here for its own sake, but it should rather denote all the named (*īdūded dvivacanam*, *adaso māt* etc.) of the name *pragṛhya* mentioned so far (P 1. 1. 11 ff.) (*rūḍhasaṁbandheṣu*) as is the usual practice. How do you prevent it here, as it is certainly not desired ?

The reply seems to be that although a substitute is taught here, still the name *pragṛhya* is not yet *rūḍhasaṁbandha* with ū̃. It is not subordinate to it, and so, because of its principal position, it is to be understood as denoting its own form (*svarūpapadārthika*), and not *īdūded dvivacanam* etc. (न संज्ञिनां संबन्धमुपगच्छति).

We have not translated the word वैगुण्यात् in the Translation because we do not know what exactly is meant by it here. Perhaps वैगुण्यात् = अगुणत्वात् = प्राधान्यात्!

* * * *

P. 1. 1. 19 : *īdūtau ca saptamyarthe*

The topic discussed under this Sū. in the *Mbh.* is the necessity or otherwise of the word *-arthe* read in the Sū. The discussion takes the form of an explanation and interpretation of two Ślokavārttikas which run as below:

ईदूतौ सप्तमीत्येव लुप्तेऽर्थग्रहणाद्भवेत् ।
पूर्वस्य चेत्सवर्णोऽसावाडाम्भावः प्रसज्यते ॥ १
वचनाद्यत्र दीर्घत्वं तत्रापि सरसी यदि ।
ज्ञापकं स्यात् तदन्तत्वे मा वा पूर्वपदस्य भूत् ॥ २

[1]

(1) This section (*p.* 18, *ll.* 10-18) refutes the suggestion (contained in ईदूतौ सप्तमीत्येव) that the wording of the Sū. as ईदूतौ सप्तमी will suffice and that *-arthe* can be dispensed with. It is true that there is no locative case-ending in *ī* or *ū*. But by the word *saptamī* in a secondary sense (सप्तमी = सप्तमीसहचरितम्): 'a word-element ending in *ī* or *ū* connected with a locative case-ending' or by means of *pratyayalakṣaṇa* etc., the Sū. will cover cases like *somo gaurī adhi śritaḥ* — that is the *pūrvapakṣa* which is refuted here.

In reply to this argument it is pointed out that the *tadantavidhi* (implicit in the above argument) is not available, in whatever way you may look upon the qualifier-qualified relation between *īdūtau* and *saptamī*. Consequently, in the absence of *-arthe*, when the locative case-ending is there then alone the name *pragṛhya* will be available (as in *sarasī*, with a lengthening of the final vowel); where the locative ending is elided (as in *somo gaurī* ...

by P 7. 1. 39), the name *pragṛhya* is not available, simply because there is no named. If one were still to insist that the name could be there somehow, it will then also apply to cases like *vāpyaśva* (where the locative has elided by P 2. 4. 71, and the stem ends in *ī*), where that name is not desired. Hence the necessity of reading *-arthe*.

[2]

(1) *p.* 18, *ll.* 19 : नात्र सप्तमी लुप्यते । This is followed in the *Mbh.* by : किं तर्हि ? पूर्वसवर्णोऽत्र भवति । The *pūrvapakṣin* denies that there is elision of locative after *gaurī*; there is only a *pūrvasavarṇa* : the ending *i* has merged in the stem-final *ī*. It exists by *ādivadbhāva*. So लुप्तेऽर्थग्रहणाद् भवेत् has no use.

(2) *p.* 18, *ll.* 19–20 : The *Dīp.* पूर्वसवर्णं दीर्घत्वं च बाधित्वा आड्भावश्च आम्भावश्च प्रसज्येते merely paraphrases the *Ślokav* पूर्वस्य चेत् सवर्णोऽसावाडाम्भावः प्रसज्यते. This refutes the *pūrvapakṣa*. In *gaurī* + *i* the *savarṇadīrgha* will be superseded by *āṭ* (P 7. 3. 112) and *ām* (P 7. 3. 116). Nāg. justifies the supersession thus : परत्वाद् वर्णादाङ्गस्य बलीयस्त्वाच्चेति भावः । He then concludes : एवं च ङ्यन्ते गौरीत्यादौ लुक आवश्यकत्वेन तदर्थमर्थग्रहणमिति तात्पर्यम् ।

(3) *p.* 18, *ll.* 21–25 : In the *Mbh.*, after the above reply of the Siddhāntin the *pūrvapakṣin* shifts his stand and advances a different argument. The *Mbh.* runs thus : एवं तर्हि आहायमीदूतौ सप्तमीति । न चास्ति सप्तमी ईदूतौ । तत्र वचनाद्भविष्यति । This is the idea : There is no example where the Locative is retained. So assigning to it the status of *pragṛhya* would be meaningless. Under these circumstances *saptamī* will be understood in the secondary sense of *saptamī-sahacaritam*. This will take care of *gaurī*. Read Kaiy : सर्वत्रैव सप्तमी लुप्यत इति वचनसामर्थ्यात् सप्तमीशब्देन सप्तमीसहचरितस्य ग्रहणान् मुख्यकल्पनाऽसंभवे गौणी कल्पना गृह्यते इत्याश्रयणात् सिध्यतीति भावः । In एवं तर्हि सर्वत्रैव ... ग्रहणं विज्ञास्यामः, Bhar. says that ईदूतौ सप्तमी results into सप्तम्यर्थम् ईदूदन्तम् by *lakṣaṇā* (for which Kaiy. has used the word *saptamīsahacarita* here). This is replied to in the *Mbh.* by the *Ślokav.* वचनाद्यत्र दीर्घत्वम्. This is explained by the *Mbh.* thus : नेदं वचनाल्लभ्यम् । अस्ति ह्यन्यदेतस्य वचने प्रयोजनम् । किम् ? यत्र सप्तम्या दीर्घत्वमुच्यते 'दृतिं न शुष्कं सरसी शयानम्' इति । सति प्रयोजने इह न प्राप्नोति 'सोमो गौरी अधि श्रितः' इति । Of this Bhar. has quoted, as a *pratīka*, only the first sentence : नेदं वचनाल्लभ्यम् ।

Here in the *Mbh.* the Siddhāntin points out that the Pūrvapakṣin's statement : न चास्ति सप्तमी ईदूतौ is incorrect. There *is* such a *saptamī* viz. सरसी (with the case-ending *i* lengthened by the Vār. *iyāḍ-iyāj-īkārāṇām upasaṁkhyānam* on P. 7. 1. 39 : *supām suluk* ... ...). So if the Sū. were framed as ईदूतौ सप्तमी, it would apply, in its own right, to cases like सरसी. The Sū. having thus found a scope with *saptamī* in the primary sense, there is no chance of understanding that term in the secondary sense (= *saptamīsa-*

hacaritam). Consequently cases like *gaurī* will remain unprovided for. (And so *-arthe* is indispensable.)

[3]

(1) *p.* 18, *l.* 26 — *p.* 19, *l.* 3 : तत्रापि सरसी यदि । ... सप्तमीसहचरितौ ताविति । The Pūrvapakṣin persists. He objects to the example *sarasī* as containing the locative ending preserved, albeit in a lengthened form (*saras*+ *i* > *ī*). No. *sarasī* in the citation दृतिं न शुष्कं ... is a feminine form ending in *ī* (*ṅīṣ*) with the Locative ending dropped. (Nāg. points out that *yadi* in the *Ślokav* is 'शास्त्राणि चेत् प्रमाणं स्युः' इतिवदसंदिग्धे संदिग्धवचनम् (*sarasī is* there.). So, the Pūrvapakṣin argues, there being no example of a *saptamī* preserved, that expression will have to be understood in the secondary sense of *saptamīsahacarita* or some such thing and will thus take care of *gaurī* etc. नार्थोऽर्थग्रहणेन, so concludes the Pūrvapakṣin.

Bhar. mentions three ways (as against two of Kaiy.) in which the proposed Sū. ईदूतौ सप्तमी could cover cases like *somo gaurī*, by resorting to figurative meaning or technical grammatical devices. They are :

(1) ईदूदन्तं सप्तम्यर्थवाचि : A word-element ending in *ī*/*ū* and having a Locative meaning.

(2) (प्रत्ययलक्षणेन) सप्तम्यां परतो यावीकारोकारौ : *ī* and *ū* followed (by *pratyayalakṣaṇa*) by a Locative.

(3) सप्तमीसहचरितौ ईकारोकारौ : *ī* and *ū* associated with a Locative. Corrcetion ! तत्रापि सरसी यदि is wrongly translated. (*p.* 58, *l.* 31)

For

" Even if (the word) *sarasī* is there ", no purpose is ... ...

Read

" Even there (the stem) *sarasī* (is there) ". No purpose is ...

(2) The text (*p.* 19, *ll.* 2–3) reads सप्तमीसहचरितौ ताविति । On closer consideration we think that the MS is better read as याविति । This matches well with याद् (ईकारोकारौ) in the preceding clause. Further, since this sentence (beginning with प्रत्ययलक्षणेन) apparently mentions two alternatives, we now supply one *vā* after सप्तमीसहचरितौ. The translation follows this emendation.

(3) *p.* 19, *ll.* 3–5 : See the *Dīp.* above, *p.* 9. *ll.* 3–5. There is the *Vār.* सप्तम्यामर्थग्रहणं ज्ञापकं which says that the reading of the word *-arthe* in P 1. 1. 19 is a clue to the absence of *pratyayalakṣaṇa* in the matter of *pragṛhya.* This wards off the name *pragṛhya* in examples like *kumāryagāram* (from *kumāryor agāram*) where that name is not desired.

(4) *p.* 19, *l.* 6 : उपदर्शनम् is a rare word. We have translated it by 'a minor view'. The alternatives III and IV under P 1. 1. 11, which are referred to here, represent not the main thesis, but a subordinate one. Or this may refer to the next part of the *Ślokav.* (मा वा पूर्वपदस्य भूत्) which is regarded as the main thesis here, the present one (ज्ञापकं स्यात्तदन्तत्वे) being a secondary one. Anyway, the construction is not quite clear.

(5) *p.* 19, *l.* 7 : अस्य सूत्रस्य = 'ईदूतौ च सप्तमी' (the Sū. in the proposed form) इत्यस्य. It cannot account for the name *pragṛhya* in *somo gaurī* ... etc.

(6) *p.* 19, *ll.* 7-8 : अथ प्रगृह्यसंज्ञां ... प्रयोजनम् ? Here अस्य should mean अर्थशब्दघटितस्य योगस्य. The whole question is about the necessity of the word अर्थे only, not about the whole sūtra. If there is no *pratyayalakṣaṇa*, what purpose is served by reading *-arthe* in the rule ?— that is the idea. But this sentence in the *Dīp.* is not clear. In the absence of *-arthe*, how is one to know that there is no *pratyayalakṣaṇa* ?

(7) *p.* 19, *ll.* 8-9 : तस्मादयम् ... प्रगृह्यसंज्ञायां प्रत्ययलक्षणे. The twofold use of the Sū. is stated here. The rule has to be framed (आरब्धव्यो), for otherwise the forms like *gaurī* will remain unaccounted for. Read with *-arthe*, it will serve to indicate the absence of *pratyayagrahaṇa* elsewhere (अन्यत्र, i. e. कुमार्यगारम् इत्यादौ); and if it is held that the *pratyayalakṣaṇa* holds good there, this rule will serve to confer the name *pragṛhya* in its own field *gaurī* etc.), We have translated and explained these two lines tentatively. The exact idea intended by the author remains uncertain.

In *l.* 9, our text reads प्रगृह्यसंज्ञा इति on the assumption that here we have a passive voice. But actually the MS reads प्रगृह्यसंज्ञामिति. With this reading (which should better have been retained) the construction is no more passive, *yogaḥ* being the subject understood.

[4]

(1) *p.* 19, *l.* 10 : The last quarter of the *Ślokav.* viz. मा वा पूर्वपदस्य भूत् is traditionally regarded as stating the Siddhānta, i. e. the final and authoritative view about the need of reading the word *-arthe* in the rule. The real purpose is to prevent the name *pragṛhya* from applying to the first constituents in compounds like *vāpyaśva* and *nadyāti*. In these compounds, after the elision of their case-endings, the first constituents *vāpī-* and *nadī-* have apparently the meaning of Locative (*saptamyarthavṛtteḥ* Bhar, *saptamīsahacaritam* Kaiy.) and they also end in *ī*. So the name *pragṛhya* becomes due undesiredly. Addition of *-arthe* prevents it successfully. The *saptamyartha* of *vāpī-* in the compound is *not* exactly the same as that of *vāpyām* in the sentence. As the *saptamyartha* (of the sentence) is not there in the

compound, there is no danger of the name *pragṛhya* in cases like *vāpyaśva*.— — The rest of the *Dīp* under this Sū, [4] A — U, explains in five different ways the difference between the two *saptamyartha*-s. Kaiy. has noted only the first two.

(2) *p.* 19, *ll.* 13-14 ([4] A) : The explanation on the *jahatsvārtha* view of *vṛtti*. Since, on this view, a subordinate constituent loses its meaning altogether in a compound, it is clear that *vāpī*- has no meaning, much less a *saptamī* meaning. Although thls central idea can be dimly seen in this passage, the literal interpretation of all words is not easy. The *Dīp* apparently means that *śakti* (capacity) is the essence of *kāraka*-s like *kartṛ*, *karman* etc. The various objects, thus named, co-operate in bringing about an activity which is primarily expressed by the verb, in the sentence. When, however, a compound is formed, the *kāraka* words, when subordinate, lose their capacity to express the actual objects as seats of different *śakti*-s. (Correction ! For तस्यानिवृत्तत्वात् in *l.* 14, read तस्या निवृत्तत्वात् — translated accordingly.) — In कर्तृकर्मैकार्थसमवायिनीनां, a word *ādi* has to be supplied after *-karma*, so as to include all the *kāraka*-s. The word *artha* here seems to have the meaning ‘ purpose, object ’. The formation of the whole compound is clumsy, unless the transmitted text is corrupt. For the association of *śakti* and *upakāra*, read :

उपकारः स यत्रास्ति धर्मस्तत्रानुगम्यते ।
शक्तीनामपि सा शक्तिर्गुणानामप्यसौ गुणः ॥
(वाक्यप॰ ३. ३. ५)

(3) *p.* 19, *ll.* 15-21 ([4] Ā) : An explanation based on the *ajahatsvārtha* view. On this alternative, a subordinate constituent like *vāpī*–, apart from conveying its own meaning, also conveys that of the principal constituent (to which latter its own meaning is subordinated). Since P. 1. 1. 19 requires pure locative-meaning while *vāpī*- conveys something additional, a sort of mixed meaning, the name *pragṛhya* does not attach to it.

The phrase संबद्धत्वादभिसंधीयमानस्यार्थस्य तिरोभूते संबन्धे (*ll.* 15–16) is obscure. It seems to refer to the circumstance that the meaning of the subordinate constituent loses its identity and becomes dim, as it is merged in that of the main constituent. — अभिसंबन्धीयमान-, if not a corruption, is rather a curious expression. (*l.* 18) After प्रधानार्थोपादानानि, we have read the MS as व्यर्थानि and have interpreted it as meaning ‘ conveyers of many meanings ’ on the authority of Nāg. who explains व्यर्थेषु in the *Vār* 52 : व्यर्थेषु च मुक्तसंशयम् on P 1. 2. 64 as अनेकार्थ-. But on second thought it appears that MS is better read as द्व्यर्थेषु, the two meanings being (उपसर्जनीभूत) स्वार्थ and प्रधानार्थ. — For the parallel of मृत्पिण्डे पांशूदकवत्, cf. Kaiy. on P 2. 1. 1 *Vār* 1 : पृथगर्थानामेकार्थी-

भावः समर्थम् : 'अथ वान्य एवावयवार्थान्वितः समुदायार्थः प्रादुर्भवति इति तदपेक्षयैकार्थीभाव उच्यते पांसूदकवदेकभावापन्नत्वात् । '

Correction ! In *l*. 19, for अनिवार्यमाणभेदस्य, read अविचार्यमाणभेदस्य. For the confusion between निवारय- and विचारय- in the MS, see above, Text, *p*. 17, *l*. 6 and *l*. 7.

(4) *p*. 19, *l*. 22 — *p*. 20, *l*. 8 ([4] I) : *one explanation* : The meaning of singular number is included in an ordinary Locative like *vāpyām*, but this numerical aspect of the meaning disappears in compounds (*vāpyaśva*). So no name *pragṛhya* for *vāpī*. This explanation being found unsatisfactory (for it will equally invalidate the name *pragṛhya* for *gaurī*), another difference is suggested : The meaning of an ordinary Locative *vāpyām* is not subordinated (*nyagbhūta*) to any other word-meaning in a sentence. But in a compound it is subordinated to that of the main constituent.

(*ll*. 22-23) For the views *pañcakaṁ prātipadikārthaḥ* and *trikaṁ prātipadikārthaḥ*, see also above Note 7 on the *Dīp p*. 11, *ll*. 23-25. The *pañcakam* stands for (i) *svārtha* i. e. *jāti* or *jātyādi*, (2) individual (*vyakti*), (3) gender (*liṅga*), (4) number, and (5) *kāraka*. According to the first view all the five aspects of the meaning are denoted by the nominal stem; they are merely indicated secondarily by the case-ending. According to the second view, only the first three are denoted by the nominal stem; the remaining two are denoted by the case-ending. — (*l*. 23) कर्मादि = कारकम्. — (*l*. 25) अकृतस्वत्वात् is rather a peculiar expression. तस्यार्थस्य is the same as अर्थराशिः mentioned earlier. न्यूनार्थवृत्तेः is *not* a Bahuvrīhi; it is Tatpuruṣa, in the Ablative. (Delete सतः, which was added wrongly in the text !). The शास्त्रीयार्थ- (*l*. 27) is number.

(*p*. 20, *l*. 1) The topic being *saṁkhyā* alone, the mention of *liṅga*- is unwarranted. — (*l*. 2) Since the reply commences with the sentence beginning with *evam*, a *tarhi* was expected after it (meaning ' Well, in that case ... '). — (*ll*. 2-5) The sentence तत्राधिकरण ... ऽनुमीयते is very much involved and even clumsy. The अधिकरणसंज्ञानिमित्तगुण is आधारत्व ' the state of being a support '. After द्रव्यस्य supply वाप्यादेः. उपात्ताधेयविशेष is अश्वादि. उपात्ताधेयविशेषत्वात् is apparently the reason of न्यग्भूतशक्तेः (which, incidentally, is a Tatpuruṣa in Ablative and not a Bahuvrīhi in Genitive). — (*l*. 4) For विशिष्टाख्य (?)-, better read विशिष्टार्थ- ' qualified meaning '. For गुणेनागृहीत°, read गुणेनानुगृहीत° (translated accordingly). गुणेन = आधेयत्वेन. The expressions अव्यपदेश्यकल्पः and आत्मन् (in आधेयविशेषात्मानम्) are typically Bhartṛharian. (*l*. 5) In Trans., delete ' its '.

Attention ! Delete question-marks after *bhāve* (*l*. 4), *avyatikīrṇe* (*l*. 5) and *vidyamāne* (*l*. 6).

(5) *p.* 20, *ll.* 9-12 ([4] Ī) : An explanation based on the assumption that for the purpose of P 1. 1. 19, by *artha* (in *saptamyarthe*) the popular (*laukika*) meaning is meant, whereas the *saptamyartha* in *vāpī* is only technical *gaurī* in *somo gaurī* ... has a popular meaning (and so it is called *pragṛhya*), but not so *vāpī–*. This is based on the grammarians' doctrine that the meaning of finished forms alone is real while that of parts arrived at by analysis is fictitious. — (*ll.* 10–11) After ये हि समुदायार्थाः, supply ते एव लौकिकाः । For समुदायाः (*l.* 11), read समुदायार्थाः, deleting [ते] added in the text. For अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ and the meaning of grammatical parts arrived at through them, read the *Mbh* (I. 219, lines 19–26) on P 1. 2. 45 *Vār* 9.

(6) *p.* 20, *ll.* 13–15 ([4] U) : This is the last explanation based on the *samudāyārtha* of the *Mbh.* The passage is not clear. The idea seems to be : In a compound (like *vāpyaśva*), the meaning understood is one and indivisible, unified into the meaning of a single *prātipadika*, in which all separateness has disappeared and which has so to say become tangible (as against a *saptamyartha* which is intangible, denoting as it does a mere relationship). For the purpose of P 1. 1. 19, a pure *saptamyartha*, which is self-sufficient and has not merged in another, is required. Read Nāg : अर्थग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् सप्तम्यर्थमात्रपर्यवसन्नार्थकमर्थग्रहणमिति भावः। गौरी इत्यादौ त्वस्त्येव गौर्यादिपदानां सप्तम्यर्थपर्यवसन्नत्वम् । समभिव्याहृतपदान्तरार्थानन्वयित्वेनोपस्थितिविषयत्वस्यैव सप्तम्यर्थपर्यवसन्नत्वरूपत्वात् ।

* * * *

P. 1. 1. 20 : *dādhā ghv adāp.*

[1]

Some part of this section is obscure and even corrupt, making a coherent and consistent explanation difficult. In the first part of this section, there is a twofold problem : (1) The Sūtra gives the name *ghu* to *ā*-roots, *dā* and *dhā*. Now, in the Dhātupāṭha, there are two *dā* roots, *dāṇ* (cl. I : *yacchati*) and *ḍudāñ* (cl. III : *dadāti, datte.*). There is one *dhā*, viz. *ḍudhāñ* (cl. III : *dadhāti, dhatte*). Let us call them primary *dā-dhā* roots, since *ā* is read in the Dhātupāṭha itself. Besides there are three more roots, *de* (cl. I : *dayate*), *do* (cl. IV : *dyati*) and *dhe* (cl. I : *dhayati*) which become *dā* and *dhā* respectively under specific circumstances (P 6. 1. 45). Let us call them secondary *dā-dhā* roots. Now, when *de, do* and *dhe* become *dā* and *dhā* respectively, there is no problem (e. g. in *praṇidātā* from *de*). They get the name *ghu.* (True, here is also a problem. But about this later.) In the circumstances where they are not reduced to *ā*, (e. g. in *praṇidayate,* where a

śit affix follows), the name is not available. But it is desired. How to get it? Kātyāyana therefore suggests that the word *prakṛti* be inserted in the rule (घुसंज्ञायां प्रकृतिग्रहणं शिदर्थम्), so that the original forms (*prakṛti*) of the secondary *dā-dhā*-s viz. *de*, *do* and *dhe* also will be eligible for this name[1] when they are not reduced to *dā-dhā* before a *śit* affix. (2) The followers of the Bhāradvāja school agree with Kātyāyana in this respect. But they have a further problem. They think that the secondary *dā-dhā* roots, even when they are reduced to *ā*-forms, will not be eligible for the name, owing to the opposition of the dictum *lakṣaṇapratipadoktayoḥ* .... So they want their originals also (*de*, *do*, *dhe*) to be specifically mentioned in the rule. This, they think, will ensure the name for secondary *dā-dhā*-s. So they read the *Vār* as घुसंज्ञायां प्रकृतिग्रहणं शिद्विकृतार्थम्[2] ।

In the initial part of section [1], Bhar elucidates the difference between the wordings of the two Vārttikas and the reasons behind them.

(1) *p.* 20, *l.* 17 : अङ्गीकृतरूपाणां दाधां = अङ्गीकृतदाधारूपाणाम् (धातूनां) !

(2) *p.* 20, *l.* 18 : दकारवतां ध[कार]वतां. Perhaps the original reading was (or at least should have been) : दकारधकारवतामाकारवतां च. — The MS घेषामुच्चारणात् न श्रयथ was read by AL as आत्वं त्वेषामुच्चारणाश्रयम्। यथा. The translation is partly based on this old reconstruction. But we are far from satisfied. But one thing seems to be certain. A यथा is necessary before पाघ्रा°.

(3) *p.* 20, *ll.* 19–22 : These lines explain the background of the *Vār* : घुसंज्ञायां प्रकृतिग्रहणं शिदर्थम् by giving two parallels. Roots *pā*, *ghrā* etc. have an *ā*, but no *d*/*dh*; *dī*, *dṛ* *dhī* have *d*/*dh*, but no *ā*. So roots from neither of these two groups get the name *ghu*. Fearing that the same may happen to roots like *de* and *dhe* — where, however, the name *ghu* is desired — because there is no *ā* when a suffix with a code-letter *ś* follows (cf. *de* + *śap* + *te* > *dayate*), the Vārttikakāra pleads for reading *prakṛti* in the rule. [In the Trans., (*p.* 61, *l.* 26) add ' Just as ' before ' The roots '; (in *l.* 28) add ' and ' before ' just as '.]

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[1] The *Mbh.* explains the *Vār* thus : घुसंज्ञायां प्रकृतिग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । दाधाप्रकृतयो घुसंज्ञा भवन्तीति वक्तव्यम् । किं प्रयोजनम् ? आत्वभूतानामियं संज्ञा क्रियते । सा आत्वभूतानामेव स्यात्, अनात्वभूतानां न स्यात् ।

[2] The *Mbh.* explains this *Vār* thus : घुसंज्ञायां प्रकृतिग्रहणं क्रियते । किं प्रयोजनम् ? शिदर्थं विकृतार्थं च ! शित्युदाहृतम् । विकृतार्थं खल्वपि — प्रणिदाता प्रणिधाता । किं पुनः कारणं न सिध्यति ? 'लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तयोः प्रतिपदोक्तस्यैव ' इति प्रतिपदं ये आत्वभूतास्तेषामेव स्यात्, लक्षणेन ये आत्वभूतास्तेषां न स्यात्। On this Kaiy : **प्रणिदातेति** । दातेर्देङो वा रूपम् । **प्रणिधातेति** । धेटः । **लक्षणेनेति** । लाक्षणिके हि लक्षणानुसंधानद्वारेण प्रतिपत्तिर्बहिरङ्गा, प्रतिपदोक्ते त्वन्तरङ्गा ।

(4) *p.* 20, *ll.* 22–24 : 'विकृतार्थमित्येतत्तु ... °ष्वविशेष' इति। Bhar. here draws attention to the difference in wording between the *Vār* of Kātyāyana and that of the Bhāradvāja school (viz. घुसंज्ञायां प्रकृतिग्रहणं शिद्विकृतार्थम्) which is going to be quoted shortly later in the *Mbh.* The word *vikṛta* is also included in their *Vār*, which was not read by Kātyāyana. Bhar. gives the reason why Kātyāyana does not read it. The reason why the Bhāradvājas added it is this : the word forms *dā* and *dhā* are *pratipadokta* in the case of roots like *dā* 'give' and *dhā* 'put', because these roots are expressly read with *ā* in the Dhātupāṭha. In the case of roots like *de* 'protect', *do* 'bind' and *dhe* 'suck', however, they become *dā* and *dhā* by the operation of P 6. 1. 45 : आदेच उपदेशेऽशिति, and are *dā* and *dhā* as such only in a *lākṣaṇika* way. Naturally, as a result of the Pari (105) *lakṣaṇapratipadoktayoḥ* ..., only *dā* and *dhā*, and not *de*>*dā*, *do*>*dā* and *dhe*>*dhā* also, become eligible for the name *ghu* taught here. That is why the Bhāradvājas thought it necessary to include *vikṛta* 'modified' also in this rule (P 1. 1. 20), so that *de*>*dā*, *do*>*dā*, and *dhe*> *dhā*, the secondary *dā* and *dhā*, could get the desired name *ghu*. विकृतार्थम् = विकृतानां दाधारूपाणां घुसंज्ञार्थम्.

The Vārttikakāra, however, looks upon the Pari. *lakaṣaṇa-pratipadoktayoḥ* as defective. It requires a supplement in the form of the Pari (106) *gā-mā-dā-grahaṇeṣv aviśeṣaḥ* which says that in the case of roots *gā*, *mā* and *dā*, the distinction of *lākṣaṇika* and *pratipadokta* does not exist. So Kātyāyana does not think it necessary to add *vikṛta* in the rule, as P 1. 1. 20 will apply equally to secondary *dā-dhā*-s as to the primary ones.

Obesrvation : The MS actually reads शेषः in both places. This also makes a good sense, in that it makes the Pari गामादाग्रहणेष्वविशेषः 'a supplement' of the Pari लक्षणप्रतिपदोक्तयोः ... . But we have emended it to दोषः in view of the *Mbh.* text.

(5) *p.* 20, *l.* 24 — *p.* 21, *l.* 2 : भारद्वाजीयाः पुनः... वचनात् घुसंज्ञा भविष्यति। Here Bhar. states the view of the Bhāradvāja school in some detail. This school apparently attached much importance to the form of a root as read in the Dhātupāṭha (*upadeśa*). According to them, the roots *de*, *do* and *dhe* show *ā*-forms (*dātā*, *dhātā*) but they are outside the Dhātupāṭha. They do not have *ā* in the Dhātupāṭha. The roots *dā*, *dhā*, on the other hand, are read with *ā* in the Dhātupāṭha. Naturally, on the basis of the *lakṣaṇa-pratipadokta* metarule, the roots *dā*, *dhā* will rob *de*, *do* and *dhe* of the name *ghu*. [In the text (*l.* 27), add इति (read in the MS, but wrongly dropped in our text) with a *daṇḍa*. A fresh sentence begins with परिभाषाशे(? °दो)षश्च. After अनौपदेशिकत्वात् (and before this इति), a predicate like दोदेङ्धेटां घुसंज्ञा न प्राप्नोति is to be supplied. Accordingly, insert in the Trans. after *p.* 62, *l.* 21

'the name *ghu* is not available for *de* etc.' Further, in *l.* 22, insert 'also' before 'there'.] Naturally one will ask : But why are the Bhāradvājīyas so worried over this? Is there not the Pari *gāmādāgrahaṇeṣu* ...... which will confer the name *ghu* equally on *de, do* and *dhe ?* The words परिभाषाशे(?°दो)-षश्चैषां नास्ति reply this anticipated question. The Bhāradvājīyas do not recognize this supplementary metarule; that is the simple answer. एषां = भारद्वाजीयानाम्.

(*p.* 21, *l.* 1) Delete इति (which is not in the MS, and which was wrongly inserted in our text). The sentence अस्यैव चार्थवत्त्वद्योतनार्थं उपक्षेप: apparently means : To indicate this very thing, viz. that the Pari *gāmādā* ... is not recognized by the Bhāradvājīyas, they resort to an insertion (*upakṣepaḥ*) of *vikṛta* in the *Vār*. For, otherwise there was no need for them to make this insertion. So अस्यैव = 'गामादाग्रहणेष्वविशेष:' इति परिभाषाया: भारद्वाजीयैरस्वीकाररूपस्य अर्थस्य. उपक्षेप: । विकृतग्रहणस्येति शेष: । But the word अर्थवत्त्व is an obstacle. It means 'significance, meaningfulness' and should refer to some expression, not to the circumstance that the Pari concerned is not recognized by the Bh. (Or was चार्थस्य the original text in the place of चार्थवत्त्व ?) This necessitates following correction in the Trans. (*p.* 62, *l.* 25) : *For* 'the meaningfulness of (*prakṛti*),' *read* 'this very thing (viz. the non-recognition of the Pari *gāmādā* ... by the Bhāradvājīyas).'

(6) *p.* 21, *ll.* 2–3 : इतर आह । किं प्रयोजनम् इति । The *Mbh.* किं प्रयोजनम् looks a very simple sentence and has all the appearance of being just an enquiry. The tradition however sees more into it than meets the eye. Bhar, followed by Kaiy, sees in it a hint of an alternative explanation which would make the insertion of *prakṛti* in the *Vār* superfluous. This alternative explanation is not given in the *Mbh.* but is supplied by Bhar. and Kaiy. See below.

(7) *p.* 21, *ll* 3-9 : अस्यायमभिप्राय: । ... प्रकृतिचोदनानुपपत्ति: । This contains the rival explanation suggested by the opponent (*itaraḥ*). It consists in a particular solution and interpretation of the compound *dādhā*. *dā* is an *ekaśeṣa* of four *dā*–s : 1. *do* > *dā* (: *dyati*[1]), 2. *dā* (: *dadāti*), 3. *dā* (*yacc*-

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[1] *Attention* ! The adopted text (*l.* 3) is प्रणिदधाति, whereas the MS reads प्रतिदधाति. The letter ति (after प्र) was emended to णि under the notion that the author wants to illustrate the working of the name *ghu*, viz. *n* > *ṇ* (P 8. 4. 17). But that was wrong. Firstly, that stage has not yet come. Secondly it would not do to prefix *praṇi*– only to *dadāti*; it would have to be prefixed to *yacchati* etc. also. Thirdly, and this is the most important point, *dyati* (√*do*), which is equally entitled to the name like *dā* and *de*, would be missing, which would be a grave deficiency. Taking all these things into consideration we have finally decided to emend MS प्रति into द्यति.

hati), 4. *de* > *dā* (: *dayate*). *dhā* similarly is an *ekaśeṣa* of two *dhā*-s : 1. *dhā* (: *dadhāti*) and 2. *dhe* > *dhā* (: *dhayati*). दाश्च धाश्च (? धौ च) दाधा as the *Chāyā* says.

But this is the last stage. Actually the process begins with forming the names of all these roots. This naming consists in just using the roots themselves by quoting them (*anukaraṇa*) in accordance with P 1. 1. 68 which says that a word is its own name. So for the roots *dā*, *de*, *do*, *dhā* and *dhe* we have the homophonous *anukaraṇa*-names *dā*, *de* ... etc. In the second stage the names *de*/*do* and *dhe* simply become *dā* and *dhā* respectively by P 6. 1. 45, which change does not require anything to follow. Bhar. incidentally tells us that since the names have a meaning (in the form of the roots[1]), they are called *prātipadika* (in *l.* 4, अर्थवदिति = 'अर्थवदधातुरप्रत्ययः प्रातिपदिकम्' इति सूत्रेण [P 1. 2. 45]) and as such take case-endings, but only after the change to *ā*, which is absolute (*anaimittika*).

Attention ! Here is a correction. In *l.* 5, for विहितैकशेषैरुपदेशादिहार्यं, read विहितैकशेषैरुपदेशात्। इहार्यं. The sentence ends with उपदेशात्. The words इहार्यं begin a different sentence. Of course we are aware of the syntactical difficulty involved here. उपदेशात् is an Ablative containing a reason. What is justified by *upadeśa* ? It is missing. (That is why the following portion : अर्थं प्रकृतिग्रहणं etc. was tagged on to *upadesāt*. But that is wrong. Actually what follows refers to the opposite view which is for inserting the word *prakṛti*.) But it is not difficult to infer and supply the main predicate which is meant to be justified by *upadeśāt*. All along the opponent is maintaining that it is not necessary to read *prakṛti* in the sūtra; *de*, *do* and *dhe* will get the name *ghu* when we understand that they are included in the *ekaśeṣa dādhā* through their transformations. If this is so then दोदेङ्धेटां घुसंज्ञा सिद्धा (or some such words) 'the name *ghu* for *do* etc. is established' can very likely supply the missing predicate. This becomes almost certain when we read Kaiy : दोदेङ्धेटामेजन्तानामनुकरणानि व्यवस्थाप्यात्वे कृते [तेषां] ददातियच्छतिदधात्यनुकरणानां चैकशेषे कृते द्वंद्वनिर्देशात् सिद्धा दोदेङ्धेटामपि घुसंज्ञा, कृतात्वानां चैषां स्थानिवद्भावेन सिद्धेति प्रश्नः [2]।

This requires a correction in the Translation. So, on *p.* 62, *l.* 4 from bottom, read a full point after '(P 1. 2. 64)'. In the following line (3 from bottom), for 'and because (the name *ghu*) is prescribed' read 'since (the originals *do* etc.) are read (in the Sū,) [the name *ghu* for them is established.]'

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[1] In *l.* 4, क्रियापदार्थेकेन = धातुना.

[2] 'किं प्रयोजनम् ? ' (in the *Mbh.*).

There is another correction to be made in the Trans. Read *l.* 30 as ' names of roots like (*ḍu*)*dā*(*ñ*,), *dāṇ*, *de*(*ṅ*), (*ḍu*) *dhā*(*ñ*), *dhe*(*ṭ*) ' instead of ' (quoting) verbal forms like *praṇidadāti* ... ' etc.

At *l.* 4 of our text the MS is corrupt. After °थैवदिति it reads प्रतिषेध-शब्द: (which we have already reproduced) which does not make any sense here. After प्रातिपदिकसंज्ञै:, the MS reads : प्रतिलब्धडत्पूर्वविभक्तिभिश्चासिशितीति-शितोत्पत्तद्विषिहितुनाश्रयणाद्विविएव विहितास्वै:. We have dropped this as we cannot make anything out of it.

The lines 5–9 : इहायं प्रकृतिग्रहणं ... प्रकृतिचोदनानुपपत्ति: continue the argument of the opponent. He says that the Vārttikakāra insists on laying down this name *ghu* for the *prakṛti*-s because that automatically ensures the name for the *vikṛti*-s also (but not the vice versa). The opponent concludes by saying that the Vārttikakāra's suggestion is superfluous when his own brilliant idea of looking upon the *dādhā* as an *ekaśeṣa* which includes the originals (like *do* ...) is there (*prakṛticodanānupapattiḥ*).

In *l.* 5, अयं=वार्त्तिककार:. (*l.* 8) विकाराणां तु प्रकृतीनां न स्यात्=विकाराणां घुसंज्ञायां तु तावतैव सा प्रकृतीनां न स्यात् । (*l.* 9) Before तासामेव स्वरूपग्रहणात्, supply : अनुकरणद्वारा.

(8) *p.* 21, *ll.* 9–12 : अयं तु दातेत्येवमादिषु...कर्तव्यतया चोदयति । Here Bhar. is clarifying Kātyāyana's (*ayam*) position. Kāt. takes *dā* and *dhā*, as far as the roots *do*, *de* and *dhe* are concerned, as their derivations which refer to such forms as *dātā* which actually occur in the language. (*-tā* is *ārdhadhātuka*, whether regarded as Nom-Sing. of the suffix *tṛ*, or as the ending, 3, sing, of the periphrastic future). Cases like *praṇidayate* (without *ā*) are not covered by the rule. Hence *prakṛtigrahaṇaṁ kartavyam*. Cf. Nāg : प्रयोगस्थदाधारूपाणामेव सूत्रेऽनुकरणादिति भाव: । Acc. to Kaiy, the *Mbh*. *ātvabhūtānām* etc. hints that the opponent's idea of the *anukaraṇa* of *dhe* etc. has no authority and that it makes the process unnecessarily cumbrous. Read : अस्याप्ययमभिप्राय:—एजन्तानुकरणत्वे प्रमाणाभावात् प्रक्रियागौरवाच्च प्रयोग एव ये आकारान्ता: प्रयुज्यन्ते तदनुकरणानामयमेकदेश: ।

In *l.* 11, the MS actually reads प्रन्याख्यानं. We have emended it to अन्वाख्यातं. What is really wanted, however, is अनुकृतं.

Observation : After प्रन्याख्यानं (? अन्वाख्यातं ? अनुकृतं) मत्वा, the MS reads : तथा कृत्सु कारितां मत्वा शब्दस्यावसायसामर्थ्यं घुसंज्ञाशास्त्रस्य संपादयिष्यन्. We have simply reproduced this in our Text, without being able to make it yield a satisfactory sense.

(9) *p.* 21, *ll.* 12–17 : न च प्रकृतिग्रहणं ... परिकल्प्य विवृणोति । In these lines Bhar. gives what seems to be his own personal opinion (for we do not find any-

thing like it in *Mbh.*) about Kāt's *Vār*. He says that Kāt. does not necessarily mean that the word *prakṛti* itself is to be inserted in the Sū. Kāt. could have equally meant that the *prakṛti*-s, i. e. the original forms of the roots in diphthongs, viz. *de*, *do* and *dhe* should themesclves be read in the Sū along with a removal of their derived forms (*tadvikārāpakarṣapūrvakam*) from it. The Sū, according to this interpretation, would read something like **dāṇ-ḍudāñ-ḍudhāñ-do-deṅ-dheṭo ghu*. Bhar. adds his explanation as to why Pat. did not interpret the *Vār* in this way. Pat. probably thought, says Bhar., that Kāt. wanted to insert the original forms of the roots in *e/o* in the Sū without removing their derived forms (*vikārāṇāṁ grahaṇānapakarṣeṇa*) from it. Pat. must have thought this impossible, since, in his view, that would obliterate all distinction between the original and the derived roots. That is why, concludes Bhar., Pat. preferred the other intepretation, acc. to which Kāt. had recommended the insertion of the word *prakṛti* itself in the Sū.

By *cūrṇikāraḥ* (in *l.* 14) evidently the Bhāṣyakāra i. e. Patañjali is meant. This is clear from the *Mbh.* on this Sū. itself where throughout Pat. discusses pros and cons of insertion of the word *prakṛti*. The other interpretation is never seen to be so much as mentioned. *Cūrṇi* seems to have been a designation of Pat's *Mbh*, as already mentioned by Itsing. Commenting on the word *bhāṣyāṇām* in *Vāk* I. 23, the *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabha says : *bhāṣyāṇāṁ cūrṇyādīnām*. For the three places where the author of the *Mbh.* is referred to as Cūrṇikāra, and other references to this name in Sanskrit literature, see Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṁsaka, *Sanskrit Vyākaraṇa Śastra kā Itihāsa*, I, pp. 235–36.

Corrections ! (1) In the Trans. (*p.* 63, *l.* 15), delete ' the word '. (2) In *l.* 27, delete ' the real form of '.

(10) *p.* 21, *l.* 17 : इतर: The opponent, the protagonist of the *anukaraṇa*-names of the roots *do*, *de* and *dhe* and their *ekaśeṣa* theory. His view has been already put forward in the *Dīp*. above (*ll.* 2–9). In प्रकृतिप्रकृतिचोदनानर्थक्यं delete one प्रकृति.

(11) *p.* 21, *l.* 18 : The text of the MS is obscure after प्रकृतिग्रहणमलभ्यं. The MS apparently reads कर्पैनिर्देशक्षद्‌भ्यतेरित्याह. It is not clear even with our addition of [मप].

(12) *p.* 21, *ll.* 19–20 : भूता: = प्राप्ता: The objector who asks the question भवतेरकर्मकत्वात् apparently ignores the Dhātupāṭha X. 300 : भू प्राप्तावात्मनेपदी, read in *ādhṛṣīya* sub-class where *ṇic* is optional. The meaning *prāpti* ' acquisition; reaching ' makes *bhū*- here transitive. Our translation of the next sentence (न चास्य...पपत्ति:) presumes that the objector himself continues here. It can equally be taken as a reply (in the form of a counterquestion) by the

defendant (particularly with the MS reading वास्य for the constituted चास्य) : " Is it not reasonable to regard this root *bhū-* transitive because of its meaning ' acquisition, reaching to ' ? "

Correction ! In the Text (*l.* 20), for सकर्मकोपपत्तिः, read सकर्मकत्वोपपत्तिः.

(13) *p.* 21, *ll.* 23–24 : महद्भूतश्चन्द्रमाः. The expression occurs in the *Mbh.* on P 6. 3. 43 [III. 160. 2].

(14) *p.* 21, *l.* 25 — *p.* 22, *l.* 1 : भूयिष्ठानि घुसंज्ञाकार्याणि such as (1) change *ā* > *ī* before a *kṅit* affix, e.g. *dīyate, dhīyate* (P 6. 4. 66). (2) Change *ā* > *e* in *āśīr-liṅ*, e.g. *deyāt, dheyāt* (P 6. 4. 67). (3) *do* > *dad* (or *dath*) before a *kit* affix beginning with *t*, e.g. *datta* (P 7. 4. 46). (4) Substitution of *i* for the radical final in *s*-Aorist, e.g. *adita, adhita* (P 1. 2. 17). (5) Formation of Root Aorist, e.g. *adāt, adhāt* (P 2. 4. 77).

कार्यतुष (*ll.* 26, 28) is a rare word. तुष means ' chaff ', hence, further, ' insignificant, minor, negligible '.

Bhar. points out (*ll.* 28–29) that the only operation which concerns the *ghu* roots (along with some others), but does not fall in the domain of Ārdhadhātuka affixes is cerebralization of *n* in the prefix *ni* preceded by *pra-* etc. taught in P 8. 4. 17 : नेर्गदनदपतपदघुमा ... etc. Forms like *praṇidayate* are meant here. And even that can be managed without reading *prakṛti* here in P 1. 1. 20. This is how it can be managed: That rule P 8. 4. 17 mentions *mā* also before which *prani-* becomes *praṇi-*. Now this cerebralisation is desired, not only in *praṇimimīte* etc. (from *māṅ*), but also in *praṇimayate* etc. (fr. *meṅ*).[1] So here there is the same problem. To overcome it, *prakṛti* will have to be read in this rule (P 8. 4. 17) for the sake of *mā* (so that it will cover *me* also). We will take advantage of it and anticipate it for the immediately preceding *ghu* also. Thus even this minor purpose is achieved (यदपि च तत् कार्यतुषं तदपि णत्वविधौ माथैस्य प्रकृतिग्रहणस्यावश्यकर्तव्यस्य पुरस्तादपकर्षात् सिध्यति) although this operation is outside the domain of Ārdhadhātuka affixes. The point is that insetrion of *prakṛti* here in P 1. 1. 20 is not necessary. That is the objection. (See below Note 1 on [6], *p.* 23, *ll.* 4–7).

Bhar. here enunciates the principle that the framing and the intepretation of grammatical rules are guided by the consideration of majority of forms to be explained. If an insignificant minority remains unaccounted for

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[1] Cf. The *Kāś* : माङ् : प्रणिमिमीते, परिणिमिमीते । मेङ् : प्रणिमयते, परिणिमयते । 'मा' इति माङ्मेङोर्ग्रहणमिष्यते ।

let it so remain. It can be taken care of by some other device (as shown just now in the case of cerebralization). You cannot allow the insignificant minority to influence the treatment of majority. The minority has to be so treated that the majority does not suffer. Bhar. gives a parallel in न हि सप्तदशसु... कल्पनमिडर्थं युक्तम् (*ll.* 27–28). This concerns P 3. 4. 77 : लस्य and 78 : तिप्तस्झि... etc. They together state that in place of *l* come in the personal endings like *ti* etc. (in all 18). The relation of the original and the substitute is clear here. But the reading of *i*(*ṭ*) (1. sing. middle) creates difficulty. Why should *i*(*ṭ*) be not prefixed to *l* (instead of substituting it) in conformity with P 1. 1. 14 : आद्यन्तौ टकितौ which says that what is furnished with *ṭ* comes to be prefixed with reference to which it is taught ? And if *lasya* is accepted as *āgamaṣaṣṭhī* for *iṭ*, it will have to be accepted as *āgamaṣaṣṭhī* for the remaining 17 endings also. No, says Bhar. The office of Genitive in *lasya* is to indicate the original-substitute relationship which is seen to apply in all other seventeen cases. It cannot be changed to the *āgama-āgamin* relationship just in the single case of *iṭ*.[1] Read the *Kāś* : इटष्टकारः 'इटोऽत्' इति विशेषणार्थः, तिबादिभिरादेशैस्तुल्यत्वान्न देशविध्यर्थः । The *Padam*. on this is more eloquent : अथ 'आद्यन्तौ टकितौ' इति देशविध्यर्थष्टकारः कस्मान्न भवतीत्याह — तिबादिभिरित्यादि । तुल्यत्वं सदृशत्वम्, तच्चैकयोगनिर्दिष्टत्वेन । 'लस्य' इत्येका षष्ठी, तत्र तिबादयः सप्तदशादेशाः स्थानेयोगं प्रयोजयन्ति, तानेको नोत्सहते विहन्तुमित्यर्थः ।

(15) *p*. 22, *ll*. 1–2 : यदा वा अर्थान्तर ... शिदर्थम् । But the above argument based on the analogy of P. 3. 4. 77–78 can be challenged. The two cases are not exactly similar. If you change the meaning of the Genitive (*lasya*) for the single case of *iṭ*, the majority suffers (*bhūyiṣṭhānām uparodho*). But the insertion of *prakṛti* here in P 1. 1. 20 does not make the others suffer. Consequently the argument based on the analogy of ' the seventeen substitutes and *iṭ* ' is not sound (*ato'yam asamādhir*) and Kāt is justified. Hence the *Vār* : घुसंज्ञायां प्रकृतिग्रहणं शिदर्थम् ।

[2]

Here also (*l*. 6) as above (*l*. 3), Bhar. mentions only *deṅ* and *dheṭ*. Why he ignores *do*, we do not know.

The rest is already explained above in [1].

[3]

(1) *p*. 22, *ll*. 8-11 : ... एवं मन्यते ... नैवं शक्यं विज्ञातुम् । Before taking up the question of whether to look upon *dādhāprakṛti*- as a Karmadhāraya or a

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1 The purpose of affixing *ṭ* to *i* in *iṭ* is to indicate the identity of this *iṭ* with *iṭ* in P 3. 4. 106 : *iṭo't* (*a* replaces *i* in optative 1 sing. mid).

Ṣaṣṭhī-Tatpuruṣa (as Pat. does), Bhar tries to present the problem of its interpretation in a different way, but ultimately gives it up as being unsatisfactory. Taking up *dādhāprakṛti* as a Karmadhāraya would imply the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*. This would give the name of *ghu* to such *dā* and *dhā* as are *prakṛti*-s; but the name will not be there for those *dā* and *dhā* roots which are (1) derivatives or (2) which are not *prakṛti*-s (having no derivatives). Acc. to Bhar, Pat must have discarded this alternative as not worth discussing, as it only led to the unnecessary curtailment of the application of *ghu* without having any compensatory advantage.

(2) *p.* 22, *ll.* 13-16 : सामानाधिकरण्यकल्पनायां ... तुल्यबलत्वाद्विचारः। Here Bhar gives, in a technical language, the analysis of what Pat expresses in a popular language as follows : अथ क्रियमाणेऽपि प्रकृतिग्रहणे कथमिदं विज्ञायते — दाधाः प्रकृतय इति, आहोस्विद् दाधां प्रकृतय इति ? किं चातः ? यदि विज्ञायते, दाधाः प्रकृतय इति, स एव दोषः — आत्वभूतानामेव स्यात्। अनात्वभूतानां न स्यात्। अथ विज्ञायते, दाधां प्रकृतय इति, अनात्वभूतानामेव स्यात्, आत्वभूतानां न स्यात्। Bhar comments that on the first alternative, *dādhā* is not subordinated to *prakṛti* and so it is the beneficiary (अपरार्थत्वादनुग्रहः); *prakṛti*, however, suffers, being subordinate. On the second alternative, on the other hand, *dādhā* suffer being subordinate; *prakṛti* is benefited. The two alternatives deserve a discussion, as both are equally powerful (तुल्यबलत्वाद्विचारः).

(3) *p.* 22, *ll.* 16-20 : ननु च दाधां ... प्रकृतिभेदप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्। A small grammatical point is incidentally raised here by Bhar. The plurality of the *prakṛti*-s is implicit in the plurality of *vikṛti*-s, the *dādhā* roots. Why should the pl. ending (*-as*) be then superfluously added after *prakṛti*- ? Bhar cites two cases in favour of his objection, one from the *Maitr-S* and the other from the *Taitt-S*.

सूर्यं चक्षुर्गमयतात् is *Maitr-S* 3. 1. 4. 3. The whole passage reads thus : "दैव्याः शमितार उत मनुष्या आरभध्वमुपनयत मेध्या दुर आशासानाः ...प्रास्मा अग्निं भरत... उदीचीनाँ अस्य पदो निदधात् सूर्यं चक्षुर्गमयताद् वातं प्राणमन्ववसृजतात् ... etc. Here the *daivyāḥ śamitāraḥ* and *manuṣyā* are addressed and they are instructed as to how the sacrificial victim is to be dealt with. It says, *inter alia*; 'Direct his eye to the sun !' Though the persons addressed are in plural, the verb is in singular (as also in *nidhattāt* and *anvavasṛjatāt*).

According to the traditional grammar, the suffix *-tāt* belongs to the singular of the 2nd (and also the 3rd) person of the Imperative. Hence the parallel cited by Bhar. According to the modern Western scholars, forms in *-tāt* are not restricted to singular and that they occur several times as 2nd pl. in the *Taitt. Saṁ* (Whitney, *Sanskrit Grammar*, 571).

The other citation is taken by Bhar from the *Taitt. S.* 3. 1. 43. The whole stanza reads thus :

यत् पशुर्मायुमकृतोरो वा पद्भिराहते ।[1]
अग्निर्मा तस्मादेनसो विश्वान्मुञ्चत्वंहसः ॥

This is one of the *Paśūpākaraṇamantrāḥ*. Here we fail to see which singular form is intended by Bhar as standing for the pl.

Observation : The *Dīp.* न वादेशभेदेऽपि ... प्रतिपत्त्यर्थम् (*ll.* 18–20) is not clear to us. The translation is only tentative.

[4]

(1) *p.* 22, *l.* 21 : नैवं विज्ञायत इति। The complete *Mbh.* text represented by this *pratīka* is as follows :

एवं तर्हि नैवं विज्ञायते— दाधाः प्रकृतय इति, नापि दाधां प्रकृतय इति। कथं तर्हि ? दाधा घुसंज्ञा भवन्ति, प्रकृतयश्चैषामिति ।

(2) *p.* 22, *l.* 22 : For अन्यतरोपरोध, see *ll.* 13–16 above.

[In the Text (*p.* 22, *l.* 24) for घु अदाबर्थे read घ्वदाबर्थे.]

[5]

(1) *p.* 22, *ll.* 24–28 : ततो वक्ष्यामि दाधा ... इति सर्वस्य भविष्यति। To understand this, it is necessary to understand the *Mbh.* passage which Bhar has skipped over. After the final interpretation of the compound (*dādhā prakṛtayaḥ*) is given [4] the suggestion of inserting *prakṛti* in the Sū is put to vote (तत्तर्हि प्रकृतिग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् ?). At this stage the opponent opposes it, putting forth a new suggestion. The word *arthe* already occurs in P 1. 1. 19. That word should be brought down here by *anuvṛtti* and be read in the Nom. (*arthaḥ*). The Sū will then read : *dādhā ghv adāb arthaḥ*. This will ultimately mean, as shown quite elaborately by Bhar, that the roots having the meanings of *dā* and *dhā* (i. e. both the *prakṛti*-s *do* etc. and the *vikṛti*-s *dā* and *dhā*) will get the name *ghu*.

The elaborate argument runs through following stages :

(i) The *anuvṛtti* here of *arthe* (P 1. 1. 19).

(ii) Its modification into Nom. sg. *arthaḥ*.

(iii) The name *ghu* becomes due for the entire meaning (*arthamātra*).

(iv) Because of the specific mention of the *dādhā* roots, only their meanings become eligible for the nomenclature *ghu*.

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1 *Correction* : In our Text (*p.* 22, *l.* 18), for °राहत, read °राहते । Similarly read the translation (*p.* 65, *ll.* 31–32) as : '(If the victim) strikes the breast, with (its) feet'.

(v) The incompatibility and the purposelessness of the name *ghu* attaching to meanings of *dādhā*.

(vi) Consequently the conveyers of the meanings of *dādhā* get the name.

(vii) This capacity of conveying these particular meanings being common to the *prakṛti*-s *do*, *de* and *dhe* on the one hand and the *vikṛti*-s *dā* and *dhā* on the other, both of them can get the name *ghu*.

(2) *p.* 22, *l.* 28 — *p.* 23, *l,* 2 : अथ वा सप्तमीनिर्दिष्ट... अनन्तरनिर्दिष्टाः संबध्यन्ते । So far the *anuvṛtti* of *arthaḥ* (1/1) was understood. Now Bhar understands *anuvṛtti* of the term *arthe* (7/1) itself, which also, he says, will do equally well. Of course, here also, although the totality of meanings is understood at first, ultimately it crystalises into ' meanings of *dā and dhā*.' So the whole meaning is : that (root) which is (*vartate*) in the meanings of *dā* and *dhā* (i.e. which conveys the same meanings as *dā* and *dhā*), gets the name *ghu*.

Observation : The reason for this twofold understanding of the *anuvṛtti* seems to be in the vagueness of the *Mbh.* text itself. The *Mbh.* where this suggestion is made (I. 74. *ll.* 12, 13) reads thus : ततो वक्ष्यामि दाधा घ्वदाप् अर्थे[1] इति । Here it will be easily seen that अर्थे इति can represent both अर्थः इति and also अर्थे इति according to the usual rules of Saṁdhi. Probably Bhar could not make up his mind as to which way exactly it was meant by Pat. So he tries both the interpretations.

It is worth noting that Kaiy. gives only the 2nd interpretation, i.e., the *anuvṛtti* of *arthe* : Read : अर्थे इतीति । एतद् द्वितीयं वाक्यम् । संनिधानाच्च दाधामर्थे यो वर्तते स घुसंज्ञकः ... । He wisely avoids the other, unnecessarily elaborate, interpretation.

(3) *p.* 23, *ll.* 2–3 : इतरः सिद्धमिष्टम्... ... नैवं शक्यमिति ।

The *pratīka* नैवं शक्यम् represents the following *Mbh* : नैवं शक्यम् । ददातिना समानार्थान् राति-रासति-दाशति-मंहति-प्रीणातिप्रभृतीनाहुः । एतेषामपि घुसंज्ञा प्राप्नोति । तस्मान्नैवं शक्यम् । न चेदेवं, प्रकृतिग्रहणं कर्तव्यमेव ।

The supporter (*itaraḥ* in the *Dīp*) of the *Vār* (recommending *prakṛti-grahaṇa*) refutes the suggestion of the *anuvṛtti* of *artha-*. True, it will solve our problem (*siddham iṣṭam*). But, by the same token, the roots like *rā* (cl. 2 : *rāti*), which are synonymous with *dā* ' give ', will also get the name *ghu*,

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1 This is how Kielhorn reads (correctly). The Nirṇ eds, on the other hand, read (incorrectly) अर्थः (1908) and अर्थे (1951).

which is not desired. So, nothing doing (*naivaṁ śakyam*). Thus the insertion of *prakṛti* in the Sū. seems to be inevitable.

[6]

[1] *p.* 23, *ll.* 4–7 : शिदर्थेन तावन्नार्थः ... संभत्स्यन्त इति। The *Mbh* beginning with शिदर्थेन तावन्नार्थः reads thus : न कर्तव्यम्। शिदर्थेन तावन्नार्थः। अवश्यं तत्र मार्थं प्रकृतिग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्। प्रणिमयते प्रण्यमयतेत्येवमर्थम्। तत्पुरस्तादपकृक्ष्यते, घुप्रकृतौ माप्रकृतौ चेति[1]। As Bhar makes it clear, even if we read *prakṛti* here, it is going to be necessary to read it again in P 8. 4. 17 : नेर्गदनदपतपदघुमास्था...etc. in connection with the cerebralization of *prani-* etc. before *mayate* etc. *ghu* is included there also. Then let us insert *prakṛti* in that Sūtra alone. We can dispense with its insertion here without any damage. Observation : Perhaps it will be better to put a *daṇḍa* after शिदर्थेन तावन्नार्थः. '[The Bhāṣyakāra] says *avaśyaṁ tatra* etc. in order to explain the statement : शिदर्थेन तावन्नार्थः।' Also भवति (Text भवतु) may be a corruption of भवता (connected with कर्तव्यम्).

For full particulars see our Note 14 above on the *Dīp*, *p.* 21, *l.* 25 — *p.* 22, *l.* 1.

(2) *p.* 23, *ll.* 7–10 : इतरो णत्वशास्त्रगते...इत्यात्वस्य विधानात्। Here इतरः, the advocate of *prakṛtigrahaṇa* here in P 1. 1. 20, who opposes it in P 8. 4. 17 on the ground of its over-extension to *pruni-mĭ*. — P 6. 1. 50 teaches the substitute *mā* for *mi* and *mī*, and *dā* for *dī* before the gerund (*l*)*ya*(*p*) and before an *aśit* affix. So they are also the *prakṛti* of *mā* (*ete api māprakṛtī bhavataḥ*).

(3) *p.* 23, *ll.* 10–13 : इतरस्तन्मुखेनैव...तर्हि अक्रियमाणे इति। Here इतरः, the advocate of reading *prakṛti* in P 8. 4. 17 (instead of in P 1. 1. 20).

The *pratīka* अथाक्रियमाणेऽपि प्रकृतिग्रहणे represents the following *Mbh.* : अथाक्रियमाणेऽपि प्रकृतिग्रहणे इह कस्मान्न भवति — प्रनिमाता प्रनिमातुं प्रनिमातव्यमिति ? Before अक्रियमाणेऽपि प्रकृतिग्रहणे, supply नेर्गदनदेति सूत्रे (P. 8. 4. 17). The question here is a sort of *pratibandī*. In the immediately preceding *Mbh*, the protagonist of the *Vār* had pointed out that inserting the word *prakṛti* in 8. 4. 17 results into an overextension of the cerebralisation and leads to wrong forms like **praṇiminoti* and **praṇimīnāti* (instead of the correct *praniminoti* and *pranimīnāti*). Now the opponent (who opposes the *Vār* and pleads for the *prakṛtigrahaṇa* in 8. 4. 17) puts a counter-question. His object is to elicit the solution of the above difficulty from the lips of the opponent—the defender of the *Vār* — himself. The latter had quoted forms of the roots *pra-ni-mi* and *pra-ni-mī* which would undesiredly undergo cerebralisation. Now the

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1 Kaiy comments : घुमाशब्दयोर्मध्ये प्रकृतिग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्, तदुभाभ्यामपि संभन्त्स्यते।

advocate of the *prakṛtigrahaṇa* in P 8. 4. 17 quotes three[1] forms (*pranimātā* etc.) which come from the same roots and asks the protagonist of the *Vār* to explain how, even if *prakṛti* is not inserted in P 8. 4. 17, he, who so tenaciously opposes the *prakṛtigrahaṇa* in P 8. 4. 17, proposes to avert the cerebralisation in *pranimātā* etc. which he too, surely, does not want.

Now the peculiarity of these forms is that the stem there ends in *ā* (substitute of *i/ī* by P 6. 1. 50 : मीनातिमिनोतिदीङां ल्यपि च). So P 8. 4. 17 can straightway apply without any difficulty whatsoever. (There is no problem of the *śit* affixes). But the point is that the cerebralisation which threatens here is not desired by either of the two parties. It is a problem for both. And the questioner is laughing in his sleeves for having managed to put the onus of finding out the solution of the common problem on the other man.

Read a *daṇḍa* after इति (*l.* 12). The subject of समाधिमाह is the protagonist of the *Vār*. आकारान्तस्य ङितः = माङ् धातोः. The idea is that by मा in P 8. 4. 17, माङ् (cl. 3. मिमीते) is to be understood (a sort of *iṣṭi*). So no danger of *mi* / *mī* (with final *ā*-substitution) being understood.

The *Mbh* यथैव तर्हि अक्रियमाणे clinches the issue. The full text is : यथैव तर्हि अक्रियमाणे प्रकृतिग्रहणे आकारान्तस्य ङितो ग्रहणं विज्ञास्यते, एवं क्रियमाणेऽपि प्रकृतिग्रहणे आकारान्तस्य ङितो ग्रहणं विज्ञास्यते ।

Correction ! In *l.* 10 and *l.* 13, for इतरः स्वमुखेनैव, read इतरस्तन्मुखेनैव. The questioner wants the solution to come out from the *other man's* mouth, not from his own. Hence the emendation. Besides, it is also attested in the *Chāyā*. Read : अथ सिद्धान्ती तन्मुखेनैव समाधातुं शङ्कते — अथेति । The Translation follows the corrected text.

After this the *Mbh* disposes of, rather summarily, the *Vār* of the Bhāradvājīyas. Bhar has already dealt with this in [1] above, *Dīp p.* 20, *l.* 24 — *p.* 21, *l.* 2.

[7]

A new topic begins here : are *dā-* and *dhā-* in *dār* and *dhār* (the Vṛddhi forms of *dṛ-* and *dhṛ-*) the same as the roots *dā-* and *dhā-* ? If so, is any provision to prevent the name *ghu* from attaching to them necessary ?

(1) *p.* 23, *ll.* 14-19 : Kāt first takes up the position that a prohibition is necessary : समानशब्दप्रतिषेधः । This is paraphrased by Pat with समानशब्दानां (= समानश्रुतीनां Kaiy) प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः । The rest of the *Mbh* (not quoted by Bhar) reads : प्रनिदारयति, प्रनिधारयति । दाधा घुसंज्ञा भवन्तीति घुसंज्ञा

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[1] Bhar mentions only two. He ignores *pranimātavyam*.

प्राप्नोति । (If the name *ghu* attached itself here, that would result into wrong forms like *praṇidārayati.*)

This stand is taken on the view that the parts *dā* and *dhā* have the same meaning as the full forms *dār* and *dhār*. This is so, since technically Vṛddhi is the name of *ā*, and the following *r* is merely an augment[1] which does not add any meaning. This, further, is based on the views that (i) either an augment is not an integral part (*abhakta-*) or that (2) if at all a part, it is a part of the following word element (*parādi*). Since the parts *dā-* and *dhā-* are fully meaningful, the Pari *arthavadgrahaṇe* ··· does not come in (*arthavadgrahaṇa eva* as Bhar says). The name *ghu* being thus undesiredly due, it has to be prohibited. Read Kaiy : दृङ्दङोर्णिचि वृद्धावाकारे कृते दाधाशब्दौ संपद्येते, तौ चार्थवन्तौ । पश्चात्तु रपरत्वं क्रियमाणमागमभूतत्वादन्यत्वं न करोतीति प्राप्तिः । On this Nāg : एतेनानर्थकत्वात् तयोर्घुत्वं नेत्यपास्तम् ।

(*l.* 18) रूपग्रहण refers to रूप in P 1. 1. 68 : स्वं रूपं शब्दस्याशब्दसंज्ञा । The अर्थवद्ग्रहण : such as the one in the Pari (14) : अर्थवद्ग्रहणे नानर्थकस्य.

(2) *p.* 23, *ll.* 20–25 [A] : Kāt. now pleads for the opposite view : समानशब्दाप्रतिषेधोऽर्थवद्ग्रहणात् 'It is needless to prohibit (the name *ghu*) in the case of homophonous (roots), for, the meaningful (*dā-* and *dhā-*) being mentioned (the name does not become due for *dā-* and *dhā-* which are parts of *dār* and *dhār*).

dār and *dhār* alone are meaningful; not so their parts (*dā* and *dhā*). An augment is an integral part of the *āgamin*, without which the meaning (of *dār* etc.) is not complete. The *abhakta* and the *parādi* views about the *āgama* do not form the final view of the grammatical science. the augment *r* here does not come subsequently, but simultaneously with *ā*. Thus the parts *dā* and *dhā* by themselves being meaningless, the Pari *arthavadgrahaṇe* steps in. There being no possibility thus of the name *ghu* coming in, its prohibition is superfluous. One more point : *r* is an augment of *ā* here; not of *dā* and *dhā*. So there is no chance for the Pari यदागमास्तद्गुणीभूतास्तद्ग्रहणेन गृह्यन्ते to intervene.

The idea of the importance of meaning and the 'meaningful form' of word expressed in *ll.* 20–22 occurs constantly in the *Dīp*. See, for instance, *p.* 11, *ll.* 10–15, *p.* 16, *ll.* 14–16.

(3) *p.* 23, *l.* 26—*p.* 24, *l.* 2 : अनुपसर्गाद्वा ... णत्वस्याभावः । An alternative explanation as to why prohibition is not necessary. According to this explana-

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[1] This comes in as a sort of necessary category when the original is *ṛ*, by virtue of P 1. 1. 51 : *ur aṇ raparaḥ*.

tion, even if the name *ghu* became due, the undesired cerebralisation will not materialise in *pranidārayati* etc. Hence समानशब्दाप्रतिषेधः। The *Dīp.* here is quite clear and requires no elucidation. [Read a *daṇḍa* after अनुपसर्गाद्वा इति (in *l.* 26).]

Correction ! In the Text (*l.* 27), for कार्यस्य भावात् दोषः, read कार्यस्याभावान्न दोषः (The MS actually reads कार्यस्याभावात्. Only न is missing there. Translation according to the emended text). — Drop इति in *l.* 28. Read १७ for १६.

(4) *p.* 24, *ll.* 2ff : An objection against the above explanation (अनुपसर्गाद्वा) and a reply to it. The *Mbh.* referred to by the *pratīka* इहापि तर्हि न प्राप्नोति runs as : यद्येवम्, इहापि तर्हि न प्राप्नोति, प्रणिदापयति प्रणिधापयतीति । अत्रापि नैतौ दाधावर्थवन्तौ, नाप्येतौ दाधौ प्रति क्रियायोगः। The point here made is that if *dā* and *dhā-* are meaningless in *dār* and *dhār* respectively, they are equally meaningless in their causatives *dāp* and *dhāp*; and if *pra-ni* are not *upasaraga-*s with *dā* and *dhā* in *dār* and *dhār* respectively because of the absence of activity-denotation in them, *pra-ni* are not *upasarga-*s equally with reference to *dāp* and *dhāp* for the same reason. How will you then account for cerebralisation in *praṇidāpayati* and *praṇidhāpayati* if you cannot secure the name *ghu* here ?

Attention ! (1) In *l.* 3 we have emended MS तिथतिवृत्ति as नित्यनिवृत्ति. However नित्य is not a happy reading here. णत्वनिवृत्ति is expected. — (2) Again, in the same line, the MS reads घुसंज्ञा न प्राप्नोति. Here, evidently, णत्वं न प्राप्नोति is expected. Homer nodding ? — (3) Put a *daṇḍa* after न प्राप्नोति (*l.* 4). उभयोः (i) the meaninglessness of *dā* and *dhā* (in *dāp* and *dhāp* resp.) and (ii) the absence of the name *upasarga* for *prani* (with reference to *dā-* and *dhā*).

एकपरिहारेण उभयोर्निवृत्तिं करोति । (*ll.* 5–6) etc. contains the reply. परिहार, the solution. This refers to the *samādhāna-Vār* न वार्थवतो ह्यागमस्तद्गुणीभूतस्तद्ग्रहणेन गृह्यते यथान्यत्र. The *Mbh.* on this reads as : न वा दोषः । किं कारणम ? अर्थवत आगमस्तद्गुणीभूतोऽर्थवद्ग्रहणेन गृह्यते । यथान्यत्र ।... क्वान्यत्र । लविता चिकीर्षितेति । The remaining entire *Dīp*, available on this Sū, is devoted to explain this *Vār* and the *Mbh.* on it. [In *l.* 5, put a *daṇḍa* after क्रियायोग इति.]

In line 6, some part of the text of the *Dīp.* seems to have been lost between करोति । and स तस्य. That includes, probably, the negative particle *na*, which is syntactically connected with *bhavati.* (*Correction* ! in *l.* 6, for व्यतिरेकं करोति read व्यतिरेककरो भवति as in the MS.) *sa* evidently refers to the augment *r*. By *tasya* (occurring twice) apparently the *āgamin-*s, — *dā-* and *dhā-* as parts of *dāp-* and *dhāp* — are meant. These latter have already secured the name *ghu.* Being *fait accompli*, the subsequent augmentation or reduction

cannot affect the designation (*ghu*) which is already established. Although some part of *Dīp.* is here missing as said above, it can be supplemented by the *Prad* of Kaiy. It reads : लब्धात्मकस्य भावस्य (cf. तस्य in the *Dīp.*) निमित्तवशादुपचयापचयौ व्यपदेशहानिं न कुरुतः, यथा देवदत्तस्याङ्गाधिक्याङ्गच्छेदौ ।

(*l.* 7) The negative particle *na* is not there in the MS. We have supplied it in consideration of the meaning intended. Before °व्यपदेशहानं, some such words as देवदत्तस्याङ्गाधिक्याङ्गच्छेदाभ्यां are understood (see Kaiy. above). Supply a *daṇḍa* after भवति. — (*l.* 8) The MS seems to read यक्सनोः, but the context evidently requires तृच्सनोः. Also the MS °दिकारादिकारादिकारवयवांतरमुपजाते is corrupt. We have constituted the text as °दिकारादिरवयवांतरमुपजायते. On further consideration, however, we now think that °दिकारादाववयवान्तर उपजाते would be the best reconstruction. It will not only dispense with the letter *ya* (which we had inserted in *upajāte*), but the construction with its Locative absolute will match well with the Locative absolute in the following clause (*akāre vā sano vigate*). (*ll.* 9–10) यदि हि स्यात्, लविता पिपठिषि[ता].[1] The sentence is left incomplete in the MS owing to a big gap (for which see below). Some such words as इत्यत्र गुण इडागमश्च न स्याताम् probably completed the sentence. यदि हि स्यात् = यदि हि व्यपदेशहानं स्यात्. लविता and पिपठिषिता are adduced to show that the coming in of an augment (*iṭ*) does not affect the designation the *āgamin* has already acquired. In *lavitā* 'cutter', the agentive suffix *tṛ(c)* (P 3. 1. 133) is designated *ārdhadhātuka* (P. 3.4.114 : आर्धधातुकं शेषः ।). Because of its designation as *ārdhadhātuka*, the suffix gets a prefixed augment *i(ṭ)* (P 7. 2. 35 : आर्धधातुकस्येड् वलादेः). Now the original suffix *tṛ* with this *upacaya* has become *itṛ*. Still this augmentation does not affect its designation *ārdhadhātuka*. That is why the root undergoes Guṇa (P 7. 3. 84 : सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः) and finally (with the substitute *av*) we arrive at the form *lavitṛ* (1/1 *lavitā*). Similarly in *pipaṭhiṣitā* 'desirous of study', the desid. augmented suffix *iṣa(n)* retains its *ārdhadhātuka* character even when it loses (*apacaya*) its final *a* (P. 6. 4. 84 : अतो लोपः). This is why *iḍāgama* persists.

Observations : (1) As mentioned above, there is a big loss of the text in the MS. After the words लविता पिपठिषि the MS immediately reads तरप्तमपौ घः [P 1. 1. 22] followed by the *Dīp.* on it. This means that the *Dīp* on the remaining part of the *Mbh* on P 1. 1. 20 : दाधा घ्वदाप् and the whole of the *Dīp.* on P 1. 1. 21 : आद्यन्तवदेकस्मिन् is lost. Since our MS does not show any sign of the gap (लविता पिपठिषि is closely followed by तरप्तमपौ घः etc. as said above), either the MS from which our MS was copied did not itself contain

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1 Actually the *Mbh.* reads चिकीर्षिता. Why Bhar. ignores it and reads पिपठिषिता instead is difficult to say.

the lost part, or our scribe may have carelessly turned more than one follio when passing on to the next folio, or some such other thing happened.

(2) There is one more point. At the end of this Āhnika and before the next one (beginning with P 1. 1. 27 : सर्वादीनि सर्वनामानि), there is (at 125. b 10–126 a 6) a passage (सति गुणे ... स्वव्यपदेश) which is neither connected with what precedes nor with what follows. On closer inspection it is seen to be a part of the *Dīp.* on P 1. 1. 20 : दाधा घ्वदाप् itself and, indeed, even if a word or two may have been lost, it probably followed लविता पिपठिषि in the original. So we have shifted it here, as was already done by Abhyankar / Limaye in their older edition.

As far as the contents are concerned, the passage does not add much new. It merely repeats once more that an augment does not affect the essential character or the name of the *āgamin.*

(*l.* 10) *Correction* ! For सति गुणेऽद्राबार्द्धधातुकनिमित्तो न स्यात्, read सति, गुणेटावार्धधातुकनिमित्तौ न स्याताम्. Our printed text does not make any sense, but this one now proposed (and it certainly follows the MS more closely than the constituted text on page 24 does) certainly does, and quite a satisfactory one. Before सति, some such words as इडागमे सनश्चाल्लोपे seem to have been lost. इडागमे would refer to लविता and सनश्चाल्लोपे to पिपठिषिता. Then गुणेटाव् is a Dvandva of गुण and इट्, गुण referring to लविता and इट् to पिपठिषिता. The whole passage यदि हि स्यात्...... °निमित्तौ न स्याताम् thus means : ' If there had been (a loss of designation), then after (the coming in of *iṭ*) in *lavitā*, (and after the elision of *a* of *sa*(*n*) in *pipaṭhiṣitā*), the Guṇa (in *lavitā*) and *iṭ* (in *pipaṭhiṣitā*), which are caused by an *ārdhadhātuka* (suffix) would not have been there '. *Correct the translation on p. 69, ll. 2–3 accordingly* !

(*l.* 12) For प्रणिद्यते, read प्रणिदापयति ! The objection to the *Vār* अनुपसर्गाद्वा concerned the forms प्रणिदापयति and प्रणिधापयति where, it was claimed, cerebralisation will not be available.

For the rest of the *Dīp*, cf. Kaiy : अनर्थकस्याप्यागमो व्यपदेशहानिं न करोति, यथा सत्यपि रेफेऽकाराकारयोर्गुणवृद्धिव्यपदेशाहानिः । इह त्वर्थवतो ग्रहणाद् 'अर्थवता' इत्युक्तम् ।

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P. 1. 1. 22 : *taraptamapau ghaḥ.*

[1]

This Sū. lays down the name *gha* for the comparative suffix *tara* (P 5. 3. 57 : द्विवचनविभज्योपपदे ... etc.) and the superlative *tama* (5. 3. 55 : अतिशायने तमबिष्ठनौ). The question discussed in this section is how to prevent

the designation *gha* from attaching to *-tara* in the word *nadītara* ; ' the crossing of a river '. This word *nadītara* is formed acc. to P 3. 3. 57 : ऋदोरप्.

Kāt, fearing that the designation becomes due here undesiredly says : घसंज्ञायां नदीतरे प्रतिषेधः। On this the *Mbh* : घसंज्ञायां नदीतरे प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः। नद्यास्तरो नदीतरः। This *Vār*. of the *Mbh*. is not found in the MS.

(1) *p*. 24, *ll*. 20–21 : In *l*. 20, we have supplied तरप्तमपौ as the subject in the first sentence. That was probably dropped hapl. in the MS. तरप्तमपाविति अनुकरणम् — Here by तरप्तमपाव् Bhar. refers to *tarap* read in P 5. 3. 57 and *tamap* in 55 and says that they quote *-tara* and *-tama* of the ordinary language. (*l*. 21) The *tarap-tamapau* in P 1. 1. 22 on the other hand, he says, quote *tara* and *tama* of P 5. 3. 57 and 55 respectively. These two words as read in P 5. 3. 57 and 55 are *anukaraṇa*, in P 1. 1. 22, they are *anukaraṇānukaraṇa*.

(2) *p*. 24, *l*. 23 : अयम् = अनुक्रियमाणः. भूतपूर्वगतिः, operating as a result of its former capacity (which the *anubandha* had before its elision).

(3) *p*. 24, *l*. 24 : तस्मात् घसंज्ञा प्राप्नोति। For the argument, cf. Kaiy : सर्वत्र चानुबन्धाः स्मर्यमाणा एव कार्यं प्रति हेतुत्वं लभन्त इति घसंज्ञाप्राप्तिः।

(4) *p*. 24, *ll*. 24–28 : Before commenting on the solution suggested in the *Vār* and the *Mbh*, Bhar. mentions two other possible solutions : (1) the principle of *sāhacarya* ' association, company ' and (2) the metarule : *lakṣaṇapratipadoktayoḥ* ... etc.

(A) The principle of *sāhacarya* would have helped thus : *tara* may be sometimes a comparative suffix and sometimes a noun ' crossing '. But the other item mentioned in this Sū, viz. *tama* is always a superlative suffix. It never deviates from this function (*atyantādṛṣṭāpacāra-*). So by the principle of *sāhacarya*, the word *tara*, which is in company with the word *tama* which is a superlative suffix, has to be understood as the comparative suffix only for the purpose of this Sū. So that alone will get the name *gha*, not the other *tara* which means crossing. Hence no necessity of an express prohibition.

The words अस्य गोर्द्वितीयेनार्थः illustrate the principle of *sāhacarya* in the ordinary language. The sentence literally means ' this bull requires another (or a second) '. Now although the word *dvitīya* thus theoretically carries a general import, in practice one understands by it specifically another or a second bull. So in grammar also. The sentence is taken from the *Mbh* (I. 279.10–13) on P 1. 3. 19 : विपराभ्यां जेः. There it is introduced to explain that *parā* is an ambiguous word, which may be sometimes an adj. in the sense of ' great, superior ', and sometimes a preverb. The other constituent of

the compound viz. *vi* is however a preverb invariably, and so in P 1. 3. 19 the word *parā* has to be understood in that capacity alone. Read : यद्यपि तावदयं पराशब्दो दृष्टापचार उपसर्गश्चानुपसर्गश्च, अयं खलु विशब्दोऽदृष्टापचार उपसर्ग एव। तस्यास्य कोऽन्यो द्वितीयः सहायो भवितुमर्हत्यन्यदत उपसर्गात् ? तद्यथा– 'अस्य गोर्द्वितीयेनार्थः' इति गौरेवोपादीयते नाश्वो न गर्दभ इति।

Bhar. observes that this principle of *sāhacarya* is not made use of here in the *Vār* and the *Mbh* (*tatra sāhacaryam anāśritam*). Kaiy. makes a general statement that sometimes *sāhacarya* is not resorted to in grammar (*sāhacaryaṁ ceha*[1] *vyavasthāhetuḥ sarvatra nāśrīyate*).

(B) The metarule *lakṣaṇapratipadoktayoḥ* ... applies where there is a particular word-form which is such as is expressly mentioned in the grammatical system (*pratipadokta*) and an exactly similar one which can be arrived at by the application of grammatical rules (*lakṣaṇa*). In such a case the former (*pratipadokta* form) is preferred In the present case, however, the two forms are not exactly alike. The *lakṣaṇokta* (P 3. 3. 57) form is (*nadī*)-*tara* while the *pratipadokta* (5. 3. 57) is *ap*. So the metarule does not apply. — अप्-शब्दः, the affix *ap* taught in P 3. 3. 57 : *ṛdor ap* । इदं रूपम् = नदीतर-शब्दावयवस्य 'तर'स्य तरप्त्वम्। – *Correction* ! In *l*. 28, for श्रायं शब्दः, read श्राप्-शब्दः. Similarly, in Translation (*p*. 70, *ll*. 6–8)

For This word (i. e. *tarap*) is directly mentioned in the rule (P 5. 3. 57) : *dvivacanavibhajyopapade tarabīyasunau*

Read The word *ap* is directly mentioned in the rule (P 3. 3. 57 : *ṛdor ap*).

(5) *p*. 25, *ll*. 1–15 : The subject of *upādatte* (*l*. 1) is *Vārttikakāraḥ*. The *ākṣepa-Vārttika* : घसंज्ञायां नदीतरे प्रतिषेधः itself serves as the *samādhāna-Vārttika*, with the insertion of *a* < *nañ*, which is dropped in Saṁdhi. As the *Chāyā* says : पूर्वपक्षवार्त्तिकमेवाकारप्रश्लेषेण सिद्धान्तपरतया व्याचष्टे।

Bhar. points out (*ll*. 1–2) that Kāt. intended अप्रतिषेधः as a predicate (न प्रतिषेधनं कर्तव्यम्), but that Pat. takes it as a substantivised (द्रव्यभूतं) noun meaning 'a superfluous prohibition'. Similarly Kaiy : न प्रतिषेध इति प्रतिषेधनक्रिया नञा निषिध्यते। भाष्यकारस्तु वस्त्वर्थं व्याचष्टे — अनर्थकः प्रतिषेध इति। (Incidentally Bhar.'s द्रव्यभूत and Kaiy's वस्त्वर्थ are evidently the same. Nāg., however, paraphrases वस्त्वर्थं by तात्पर्यार्थं.)

(*ll*. 4–5) तरब्-ग्रहणं ह्यौपदेशिकम् supplies the reason for *apratiṣedha*. With Bhar's उपदेशे प्रयुक्तम्, उपदेशे वा भवम् cf. Kaiy : उपदेशः प्रयोजनमस्य। तत्र वा भवमौपदे-

[1] *iha* = *śāstre* (Nāg).

शिकम् । — (*l.* 6) *Correction*! For अवयवार्थे इति, read इत्यवयवार्थे (as in the MS). The expression अवयवार्थे is not clear. Apart from what we have suggested in the Trans, it could mean: ' this (word) expresses the meaning of its parts (reading °यवार्थं)', i. e. the formation is significant. But, frankly, we confess our ignorance.

(*ll.* 6-16) This is the comm. on the following *Mbh*: इह हि व्याकरणे सर्वेष्वेव सानुबन्धकग्रहणेषु रूपमाश्रीयते — यत्रास्यैतद्रूपमिति। रूपनिर्ग्रहश्च शब्दस्य नान्तरेण लौकिकं प्रयोगम्। तस्मिंश्च लौकिके प्रयोगे सानुबन्धकानां प्रयोगो नास्तीति कृत्वा द्वितीयः प्रयोग उपास्यते। कोऽसौ? उपदेशो नाम। न चैष उपदेशे तरप्-शब्दः। — (*l.* 6) शब्दः सहचारिणोऽनुबन्धनार्थस्य संबन्धित is our reconstruction of the MS शब्दचारिणोनुबंधः. We admit, it is not very helpful. Could शब्दसहचारिणानुबन्धेनार्थस्य संबन्धिन be the original reading? (Still, so what, unless we supplied something like *pratītiḥ*[1]?) — (*l.* 7) ध्रुवं is our emendation of the MS ब्रुवन् in view of the *Mbh.* on P. 1. 1. 26: क्तक्तवतू निष्ठा (I. 84. 14-85.12) which expresses the same idea. Read: निष्ठासंज्ञायां 'समानशब्दप्रतिषेधः' (वा. १)। निष्ठासंज्ञायां समानशब्दप्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः। लोतः गर्त इति॥ 'निष्ठासंज्ञायां समानशब्दाप्रतिषेधः' (वा. २)। निष्ठासंज्ञायां समानशब्दानामप्रतिषेधः। अनर्थकः प्रतिषेधोऽप्रतिषेधः। निष्ठासंज्ञा कस्मान्न भवति? अनुबन्धोऽन्यत्वकरः। अनुबन्धः क्रियते सोऽन्यत्वं करिष्यति॥ 'अनुबन्धोऽन्यत्वकर इति चेन्न लोपात्' (वा. ३)। अनुबन्धोऽन्यत्वकर इति चेत् तन्न। किं कारणम्? लोपात्। लुप्यतेऽत्रानुबन्धः। लुप्तेऽत्रानुबन्धे नान्यत्वं भविष्यति। तद् यथा। कतरद्देवदत्तस्य गृहम्? अदो यत्रासौ काक इति॥ उत्पतिते काके नष्टं तद् गृहं भवति॥ एवमिहापि लुप्तेऽनुबन्धे नष्टः प्रत्ययो भवति॥ यद्यपि लुप्यते जानाति त्वसौ सानुबन्धकस्येयं संज्ञा कृतेति। तद् यथा। इतरत्रापि कतरद्देवदत्तस्य गृहम्? अदो यत्रासौ काक इति। उत्पतिते काके यद्यपि नष्टं गृहं भवत्यन्ततस्तमुद्देशं जानाति॥ 'सिद्धविपर्यासश्च' (वा. ४)। सिद्धश्च विपर्यासः। यद्यपि जानाति, संदेहस्तस्य भवत्ययं स तशब्दो लोतः गर्त इत्ययं स तशब्दो लूनः गीर्ण इति। तद् यथा। इतरत्रापि कतरद्देवदत्तस्य गृहम्? अदो यत्रासौ काक इति। उत्पतिते काके यद्यपि तमुद्देशं जानाति संदेहस्तु तस्य भवतीदं तद् गृहमिदं तद् गृहमिति। एवं तर्हि, 'कारककालविशेषात् सिद्धम्' (वा. ५)। कारककालविशेषावुपादेयौ। भूते यस्तशब्दः कर्तरि कर्मणि भावे चेति। तद् यथा। इतरत्रापि य एष मनुष्यः प्रेक्षापूर्वकारी भवति, सोऽध्रुवेण निमित्तेन ध्रुवं निमित्तम् उपादत्ते वेदिकां पुण्डरीकं वा। ...

(*ll.* 8-9,) *Correction*! In *l.* 8, put a *daṇḍa* after भवति. In *l.* 9, for °मिति, अर्थरूपवरणं, read °मित्यर्थः। रूपावधारणं. *etad* means *anubandha-sahitam*. Accordingly correct the translation on p. 70 thus: " ' where this form of it is (found) ' means the one accompanied by the code letter. — And the ascertainment of the form takes place only when there is an auditory connection. Therefore the popular use of a word is closely observed. "

(*l.* 10) *Correction*! For प्रधानार्थे read प्रधानमर्थे (translated accord-

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1 The Trans. (p. 70) presumes this emendation.

ingly). — (*l.* 11) For लौकिकानुबन्ध', read लौकिकादनुबन्ध° (as in the MS). — (*l.* 13) द्वितीय just means 'the second', not 'secondary' as wrongly translated on page 71 (line 1).

The adjectives *avyabhicārin, nitya, pradhāna* and *arthaprayukta,* all refer to the word in the actual language (as against the grammatical element — the metalinguistic word - which is *anitya, guṇabhūta* 'subordinate' (cf. *l.* 13).

The argument in *ll.* 11–15 is this : The word (*nadī*)*tarap* is not found in the actual language, where we have *nadītara.* It is also not found in the grammatical system (*upadeśa*) where (P 3. 3. 57) we have *ap.* The result is that (*nadī*)*tarap* is a figment of imagination (*kālpanike rūpe*). Cf. the *Dīp, p.* 24, *l.* 28. Why should we be worried about such a ficticious form being threatened with the designation *gha*? Similarly Kaiy. also : काल्पनिकमस्य तरप्त्वं न तु साक्षान्निर्दिष्टम् ।

[2]

In this section, a solution is offered, even on the supposition that *nadītara* gets the name *gha.*

(1) *p.* 25, *l.* 16 : With कार्यं दोषाय, न संज्ञेति, cf. the *Dīp. p.* 23, *ll.* 26–28 : अस्त्वस्य घुसंज्ञा, तत्प्रकृतस्य तु कार्यस्याभावान्न दोषः । न हि संज्ञामात्रं दोषाय ।

In the *Mbh.,* अथ वास्त्वस्य घसंज्ञा । को दोषः ? is immediately followed by the harm (*doṣaḥ*) which will result : घादिषु नद्या ह्रस्वो भवतीति ह्रस्वत्वं प्रसज्येत । The reference is to P 6. 3. 43 ; घरूपकल्पचेलड् etc. which says that when *gha, rūpa* etc. follow, the preceding feminine pollysyllabic nouns ending in *ī* are shortened. — (*ll.* 1–2) The *Mbh.* समानादिषु घादिष्वित्येवं हि तत् is a reply to it. It means that the shortening will take place only if the two word-elements (*gha* etc. and the preceding one) are coreferential (*samānādhikaraṇa*). Since *nadītara* is a *vyadhikaraṇa* expression (= *nadyās taraḥ*), there is no danger of shortening.

(2) *p.* 25, *ll.* 16–17 : The sentence प्रकर्षार्थीयौ ... समानाधिकरणौ seems to be somewhat corrupt.[1] कारकप्रकर्षे is obscure. Perhaps प्रकृत्यर्थप्रकर्षे is intended. The passage refers to the two comparative and superlative suffixes (called *prakarṣārthīya*). They are called *svārthika* because in words of comparative degree like *āḍhyatara* 'richer', the superiority (*prakarṣa*) of richness is expressed, according to the theory of Sanskrit grammar, by the stem itself; the suffixes (*tara* and *īyas*) merely help the stem to bring out that sense. Cf. *Kāś* on 5. 3. 55 (: अतिशायने तमबिष्ठनौ) : अतिशयनमतिशायनं प्रकर्षः । प्रकृत्यर्थ-

[1] The corresponding sentence in Kaiy : आतिशायनिकश्च स्वार्थिकत्वात् समानाधिकरणः ।

विशेषणं चैतत् । अतिशायनविशिष्टेऽर्थे वर्तमानात् प्रातिपदिकात् स्वार्थे तमबिष्ठनौ स्तः । The same is understood in P 5. 3. 57 : द्विवचन ... तरबीयसुनौ ।

(2) *p.* 25, *ll.* 18–22 : यदा तर्हि ... शब्दाः प्रवृत्ता इति । The opponent visualises another possibility. Supposing the word *naditara* is formed in a different way, making the two elements coreferential and thus meaning 'the river, the fordable?' Here a minor objection is raised to the form *tara* (in यदा तर्हि सैव नदी, सैव तरस्तदा प्राप्नोति) used in the objection. The correct form is *tīrṇi* (by P 3. 3. 94 : स्त्रियां क्तिन् and the *Vār* on it : ऋकारल्वादिभ्यः क्तिन्निष्ठावद्भवति ।). The *Dīp* नैष दोषः ...न तु वचनी (*ll.* 18–20) answers this objection. Acc. to this explanation the word *tara-* in the passive sense (*tīryate iti* 'what is crossed or forded') is formed first. The word *tara* thus formed has a universal sense (*sāmānyamātram*). Being not specifically feminine, it does not take the affix *ktin*, but *ap* (P 3. 3. 57). Later on *nadī*, when brought into construction with it, becomes its qualifier, and *tara* the qualified. The latter being the principal does not give up its original masculine gender. Cf. Kaiy : ननु तीर्णिरिति भवितव्यम् । एवं तर्हि तीर्यत इति तर इति सामान्येन पदं संस्क्रियते । पश्चान्नद्या विशेष्यते इति न दोषः । On this Nāg : सामान्येनेति । अनिर्धारितकर्मविशेषेणेत्यर्थः । अत एव पुंस्त्वम् । घञजपः पुंसीत्युक्तेः ।

In यथा मुखद्वितीया नासिका वचनमस्येति, न तु वचनीति, Bhar. gives a parallel where a principal word, once formed in a particular gender, does not change it in accordance with the gender of the coordinate constituent. P 1. 1. 8 reads as मुखनासिकावचनोऽनुनासिकः. The comp. which constitutes the definition is dissolved as मुखसहिता नासिका वचनमस्य. Here although मुखनासिका is in fem., one does not use the fem. of *vacana*, viz *vacanī*. This is because this word *vacana* is first formed (*ucyate anena iti vacanam*). Since this is the principal or the qualified word, its gender is not affected by that of the subordinate member *mukhanāsikā*. Read the *Mbh.* on P 1. 1. 8 [I. 60. 5] : मुखोपसंहिता वा नासिका वचनमस्य सोऽयं मुखनासिकावचनः । On this Kaiy : पदसंस्कारपक्षे तु मुखनासिकापदनिरपेक्षं वचनमित्येतत् पदं लिङ्गसर्वनामनपुंसकाश्रयेण संस्क्रियते । पश्चात् स्त्रीत्वस्य पदान्तरसंबन्धेन प्रतीयमानत्वाद् बहिरङ्गत्वान् ङीप्-प्रत्ययो न भवति । यदा तु [वाक्यसंस्कारपक्षे ... *Chāyā*) स्त्रीत्वाश्रयेण वचनीति पदं व्युत्पाद्यते तदा मुखनासिकावचनीक इत्येव भवतीति ।

(*ll.* 21–22) अथ वा रूढिः । तरो नद्या विशेष्यते । समुदायेषु हि शब्दाः प्रवृत्ता इति । This is an alternate explanation, acc. to which नदीतर is not to be analysed. It is an indivisible expression not admitting any analysis. Words are not made to order by assembling the parts according to grammatical prescription. They become current as a whole denoting a whole, indivisible meaning (*samudāyeṣu hi śabdāḥ pravṛttāḥ*).

Observation : The words तरो नद्या विशेष्यते are uncalled for here, since the explanation is given on the *rūḍhi* alternative. It is best ignored.

(3) *p.* 25, *ll.* 22-25 : स्त्रीलिङ्गेषु घादिषु and the following *pratīka* viz. ब्राह्मणी रूपमिवेति (*ll.* 24) represent the following *Mbh* : स्त्रीलिङ्गेषु घादिष्वित्येवं तत्। अवश्यं चैतदेवं विज्ञेयम्। समानादिषु घादिषु इति [=एतावन्मात्रे *Chāyā*] उच्यमाने इह प्रसज्येत महिषी रूपमिव, ब्राह्मणी रूपमिवेति।

This answers the objection raised above in the *Mbh* : यदा तर्हि सैव नदी etc. The difficulty is merely imaginary. There is no possibility of shortening acc. to P 6. 3. 43 since that rule requires a feminine word-element to follow. This is clear when we take into consideration that the word *striyām* 'when a feminine word element follows' continues in this rule from P 6. 3. 34. And *tara*, surely, is not a feminine word.

Here a question could be raised. In a form like *brāhmaṇitarā* (a superior Brāhmaṇa lady) where we see the working of the rule in question, the suffix *tara* (fem. *tarā*) is *svārthe* as seen above. That means the idea of excellence is denoted by the stem *brāhmaṇī* itself. The affix has only a *dyotaka* function. When it has no meaning of its own, how can you talk about any gender of its own, much less the specifically feminine gender ? The reply to such a question is contained in the *Dīp* : समुदायेषु हि लिङ्गयोगात् स्वार्थिकोऽपि स्त्रीलिङ्ग इति व्यपदिश्यते [*ll.* 23-24]. The gender belongs to the whole expression, which is shared by the affix *tara* also.

Pat. goes one step further and says that irrespective of what happens in *nadītara*, it is imperative that *gha* etc. be qualified by *striyām*. For, otherwise, the shortening would force itself in cases like ब्राह्मणी रूपमिव 'a form like a Brāhmaṇa lady'. When provision is made for such cases by the *anuvṛtti* of *striyām*, that will automatically take care of cases like *nadītara* even when it is interpreted as a compound of coreferential constituents.

Observation : The forms महिषी रूपमिव and ब्राह्मणी रूपमिव look strange and have all the appearance of being hypothetical forms engineered by Pat. himself. About their syntax Kaiy. remarks that although it follows *rūpam*, the word *iva* syntactically belongs to *mahiṣī* : इवशब्दो भिन्नक्रमः। तेनायमर्थः — महिषीव इयमाकृतिरिति। Bhar. also seems to look at it in the same way, since he says ब्राह्मणीवेयमाकृतिः. ब्राह्मणीरूपम् is the finished form of the compound (not mentioned by Pat.) where shortening would result.

Nāg. is at great pains to ascertain the exact nature of the construction : Whether, in the first place, it is a compound or a phrase ? He ultimately comes to the conclusion (implicit in Bhar. and Kaiy.) that here we have a *vigrahavākya* of a compound which implies a comparison. It is not a *ṣaṣṭhī*-Tatpuruṣa compound, nor a *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya* compound. It is not formed by P 2. 1. 55 : *upamānāni sāmānyavacanaiḥ*, because the common property is not mentioned. Nor is it formed by P 2. 1. 56 : *upamitaṁ vyāghrādibhiḥ* ... etc.

because in that case *rūpa* should take the first place in the compound. Read: महिषी रूपमिवेति। नन्विदमसमस्तं समस्तं वा। नाद्यः। उत्तरपदाधिकाराद् रूपशब्दस्य चातथात्वादप्राप्तेः। किं च, रूपशब्देनाकृत्यभिधानात् कस्याकृतिरिव महिषीति साकाङ्क्षं स्यात्। नान्त्यः। षष्ठीतत्पुरुषे वैयधिकरण्याद्भ्रस्वाप्राप्तेः। विशेषणसमासे तु पूर्वनिपातवैपरीत्यापत्तिः। तस्मादुपमागर्भसमासस्य विग्रहवाक्यमिदम्। स च समासो न 'उपमानानि सामान्यवचनैः' इत्यनेन, रूपशब्दस्योपमेयवाचकत्वेऽपि साधारणधर्मावाचकत्वात्। साधारणधर्मो ह्यत्र विसंष्ठुलत्वादिः। नापि 'उपमितं व्याघ्रादिभिः' इति, रूपशब्दस्योपमेयवाचित्वेन पूर्वनिपातवैपरीत्यापत्तेः। तस्योपमानवाचित्वे तु कस्य रूपमिति विशेषणस्य सापेक्षत्वाद् वृत्तिर्न स्यादत आह — इवशब्द इति, सुप्सुपेति च।

(4) *p.* 25, *ll.* 25–26: केचिदुदाहरन्ति। ... इति प्रतिविधीयते।

Another example, where the designation *gha* will result undesiredly. Here the augment *n(uṭ)* forces itself. However, this is not difficult to manage, we are told. *sāmatara* is a Vedic word and this *chāndasatva* can explain why actually the augment does not come in.

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P. 1. 1. 23 : *bahugaṇavatuḍati saṁkhyā.*

(1) *p.* 25, *ll.* 28–29 : Bhar. takes the locative *saṁkhyāsaṁjñāyām* (in the *Vār* : संख्यासंज्ञायां संख्याग्रहणं संख्यासंप्रत्ययार्थम्) in two different ways : (1) as *adhikaraṇa-saptamī*, the expression *saṁkhyāsaṁjñā* being figurative for *saṁkhyāsaṁjñāsūtra*, (2) as *sati-saptamī*. Kaiy. does not mention this twofold interpretation.

(2) *p.* 26, *ll.* 1–3 : The two different ways of inserting the word *saṁkhyā* in the Sū, illustrated by Bhar, are not mentioned by Kaiy.

(3) *p.* 26, *l.* 4: अभिप्रायोऽयम्। This sequence is rather irregular, the usual one being: अयमभिप्रायः। Actually the MS reads: अभिप्रायोयथय which we have tentatively understood as अभिप्रायोऽयं यथा. — प्राचां, उदीचां is another tentative reconstruction for the MS प्रांश्वउच (!). The corresponding passage from Kaiy: यथा पशुः, अपत्यं, देवता इति लौकिकोऽर्थो गृह्यते ... does not offer any clue.

(4) *p.* 26, *l.* 8: cf. *Mbh.* under P 1. 4. 21 (I. 321. 21–23): एतदेव ज्ञापयत्याचार्यो नानाधिकरणवाची यो बहुशब्दस्तस्येह ग्रहणं न वैपुल्यवाचिन इति। किमेतस्य ज्ञापने प्रयोजनम्? यदुक्तं बहुरोदनः, बहुः सूप इति परत्वाद् बहुवचनं प्राप्नोतीति स दोषो न भवति।

(5) *p.* 26, *l.* 10: The source of the quotation: *lebhire vāri* etc. is not known. The construction also is queer.

(6) *p.* 26, *l.* 16: कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसंप्रत्ययः। It means that when a word has two meanings, one popular and the other technical-conventional,

the word with the technical-conventional meaning is to be understood for the sake of operation. This is a popular maxim. It is not officially recognized in Nāg's *Paribhāṣenduśekhara.* Many other writers on the Paribhāṣās however give it as a Paribhāṣā, e. g. Vyāḍi's *Paribhāṣāsūcana* (6), Śākaṭāyana (7), *Bhojasūtra* (72), *Haima* (23) *Puruṣottama-pāṭha* (9), Sīradeva (101), Nīlakaṇṭha (88), Haribhāskara (103), Śeṣādrinātha (9).[1]

(7) *p.* 26, *ll.* 18–20 : इह गोपालकशब्दो ... इति जातिं वा । There is some confusion here about the text.

Of the *Mbh.* on the *Vār* : इतरथा ह्यसंप्रत्ययोऽकृत्रिमत्वाद्यथा लोके, Bhar. has quoted only कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसंप्रत्ययः. The whole *Mbh.* here reads thus : अक्रियमाणे हि संख्याग्रहणे एकादिकायाः संख्यायाः संख्येत्येष संप्रत्ययो न स्यात् । किं कारणम् ? अकृत्रिमत्वात् । बह्वादीनां कृत्रिमा संज्ञा । कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसंप्रत्ययो भवति । यथा लोके । तद्यथा लोके 'गोपालकमानय', 'कटजकमानय' इति यस्यैषा संज्ञा भवति स आनीयते, न यो गाः पालयति, यो वा कटे जातः ।

This is the argument : When some operation will be taught for the *saṁkhyā* words, it will be available for words like *bahu, gaṇa* etc. only because in grammar the name *saṁkhyā* is expressly taught for them. As a result the operation will not be available for ordinary numerals on the maxim कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसंप्रत्ययः. This is quite in keeping with the practice of the world. A word *gopālaka*, e. g. ordinarily means a cowherd. This is its etymological meaning. But it can also be a proper noun (and the man concerned may not be a cowherd). Now, under these circumstances, when somebody says : *gopālakam ānaya*, 'bring *gopālaka*', the listener understands by it the person of the name Gopālaka, and not any cowherd. The same thing happens in grammar also. By *saṁkhyā* only *bahu* etc. will be understood, to the exclusion of the ordinary numerals like *eka, dvī*. So their inclusion also is required in the present definition, it is argued.

We have to understand the *Dīp.* on the background of the above *Mbh.* It then becomes immediately clear that there is something wrong with the *Dīp.* as it is. It is difficult to believe that the words इह गोपालकशब्दोऽर्थविशेषनिमित्तमुपादाय प्रवर्तमानः are syntactically connected with प्रतिविधानं चोपाददीत यथा 'पञ्चभिर्हलैः कृषति' इति । The two have nothing to do with each other. What the author evidently meant is that the word *gopālaka* (first) becomes current (*pravartamānaḥ*) in a particular meaning (*arthaviśeṣam upādāya*) viz. 'one who tends cows, a cowherd'. This meaning is based upon the particular activity which the word denotes as a result of the meanings of its constituent

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[1] See *Paribhāṣāsaṁgraha*, by MM K. V. Abhyankar, pub. Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, 1967.

parts. But then the word may come to denote a different meaning, viz. it may serve as the name of a particular man (irrespective of his profession). So the text expected here was यथा गोपालकशब्दोऽर्थविशेषनिमित्तमुपादाय प्रवर्तमानो *पुरुषविशेषप्रतिपादकत्वरूपमर्थान्तरं चोपाददीत or some such words.

Looking at this matter from the other end, what is the subject of *pratividhānaṁ copādadīta* ? The text as it is makes *gopālakaśabdaḥ* the subject but that is impossible. The real subject is 'the root *kṛṣ*' (*kṛṣidhātuḥ* or *kṛṣatiḥ*). This is another example how there comes a change of meaning (and so यथा कृषतिर्विलेखने प्रवर्तमानः or some such thing was expected here). The etymological meaning of the root *kṛṣ* is 'to plough or furrow the land' (*vilekhane* as the Dhātup. says). But in a sentence like पञ्चभिर्हलैः कृषति, the meaning is not simply 'he ploughes with five ploughs'. What is rather meant is that the farmer concerned is rich and has the capacity to provide (*pratividhānam*) for five ploughs simultaneously.

To understand this meaning of पञ्चभिर्हलैः कृषति we have to turn to the *Mbh* on P 3. 1. 26 : हेतुमति च. Here the *Vār* (3) and the introductory *Mbh* on it read as : कृष्यादिषु चानुत्पत्तिः। कृष्यादिषु चानुत्पत्तिर्वक्तव्या। एकान्ते तूष्णीमासीन उच्यते, 'पञ्चभिर्हलैः कृषति' इति। तत्र भवितव्यं 'पञ्चभिर्हलैः कर्षयति' इति। Here it is argued that the intended sense is that the farmer makes his five servants plough his fields. The sense is causative, yet the causative suffix (*ṇ*)*i*(*c*) is not there in the language. So the grammar should contain a statement to that effect. The *Mbh.* continues :

'कृष्यादिषु चानुत्पत्तिर्नानाक्रियाणां कृष्यर्थत्वात्।' कृष्यादिषु चानुत्पत्तिः सिद्धा। कुतः? नानाक्रियाणां कृष्यर्थत्वात्। नानाक्रियाः कृषेरर्थाः। नावश्यं कृषतिर्विलेखन एव वर्तते। किं तर्हि? प्रतिविधानेऽपि वर्तते। यदसौ भक्तबीजबलीवर्दैः प्रतिविधानं करोति, स कृष्यर्थः। आतश्च प्रतिविधानेऽपि वर्तते, यदहरेवासौ न प्रतिविधत्ते, तदहरेव तत् कर्म न प्रवर्तते। [II. 33. 21–27].

The above extract from the *Mbh.* makes it abundantly clear that in line 19 of our *Dīp.* there is a hidden gap; originally after प्रवर्तमानः there must have been some other predicate for गोपालकशब्दः (like *पुरुषविशेषप्रतिपादकत्वरूपमर्थान्तरं चोपाददीत as suggested above) and the subject for चोपाददीत must have been कृषतिः (or some such word) 'the root *kṛṣ*', there being two independent sentences.

(*l.* 20) There is again some confusion here. The words कर्तृत्वं वा etc. are evidently connected with गोपालकशब्दः (which is rather distant) and not with what immediately precedes (i. e. with *kṛṣatiḥ*, as we believe).

(*ll.* 20–22) अथ वा रूढि° ... ... नियमो भवति। A different type of change of meaning is now introduced here. Previously it was a case of one etymological meaning (e.g. *pratividhāna*) setting aside another (viz. *vilekhana*). Now it is maintained that one meaning based on convention (*rūḍhi*) may set

aside another conventional meaning. A convention based on one cause may be set aside by another convention based upon a different cause. Bhar. here adds that this setting aside of one meaning by another takes place when both belong to the same category. What Bhar. probably means to say is that a conventional meaning can set aside another conventional meaning; it cannot set aside the etymological meaning.

What is the significance of these lines ?

It appears to us that Bhar. is here saying that Pāṇini's rule 1. 1. 23, making tha word *saṁkhyā* a technical name of words like *bahu*, *gaṇa* etc, cannot deprive that word (*saṁkhyā*) of its natural denotation, viz. the numbers like one, two etc.; even after receiving this additional denotative capacity, the word *saṁkhyā* continues to denote its popular meaning. A conventional meaning cannot dislodge an etymological one; it can only dislodge a previous conventional meaning.

Moral : Since the word *saṁkhyā* retains its popular meaning (which is desired here in grammar also), it is not necessary to insert another word *saṁkhyā* in 1. 1. 23, as the *Vārttika* suggests. It would be superfluous.

If our interpretation is correct, these lines do not belong here. They rather belong to a subsequent part which refutes this *Vār*. The *ākṣepa-parihāra-bhāṣya* (I. 81. 2-6) runs thus : नैष दोषः । अर्थात् प्रकरणाद्वा लोके कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे कार्यसंप्रत्ययो भवति । ... अङ्ग हि भवान् ग्राम्यं पांशुलपादमप्रकरणज्ञमागतं ब्रवीतु — गोपालकमानय, कटजकमानयेति । उभयगतिस्तस्य भवति । साधीयो वा यष्टिहस्तं गमिष्यति । Here Pat. says that the conventional meaning sets aside the natural or popular meaning only when the context, the intention of the speaker and similar other factors are known to the listener. In their absence, the listener may understand both the meanings. Indeed, it is possible that he may understand the expression in the popular meaning alone.

The concluding part of Kaiy's *Prad.* on this *Mbh* reads as : लोके च गोपालकशब्दः संज्ञिनि नियम्यमानः संज्ञ्यन्तरं निवर्तयति, क्रियानिमित्तं त्वर्थं न निरस्यति, तुल्यजातीयविषय एव हि नियमो भवति । This last sentence is clearly identical with the one in *Dīp* which we are considersing. Clearly there is some confusion in the *Dīp* here.

It is therefore reasonably certain that the *Dīp* passage अथ वा रूढि...एव नियमो भवति belongs to a later portion of the *Mbh.* where the present *Vār* is refuted and not at the present place where it is expected to be justified. This is confirmed by the last part of the *Dīp* : एवमिहापीति । — — इति भावः ।

(*l.* 22) एवमिहापीति । बह्वादय एवात्र प्रकृता इति भावः ॥

Attention । After भवति, read a *daṇḍa* in the place of the comma. Similarly the words एवमिहापि should have been in bold type since they represent a *pratīka* of the *Mbh.*

The following *Mbh.* is meant here : यथैव तद्यर्थात् प्रकरणाद्वा लोके कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमयोः कृत्रिमे संप्रत्ययो भवति, **एवमिहापि** प्राप्नोति । जानाति ह्यसौ बह्वादीनामियं संज्ञा कृतेति [I. 81. 6-7] । This *Mbh,* which here makes a fresh attempt to justify the *Vār,* follows immediatly the *Mbh* mentioned above (नैष दोषः । अर्थात्... यष्टिहस्तं गमिष्यति) which refutes the *Vār.* This again shows that the preceding lines of the *Dīp* belong to the *Mbh* which refutes the *Vār.*

In the present passage of the *Mbh* the advocate of the *Vār* turns the tables against his opponent by using the same instrument which his adversary had used, viz. the *arthaprakaraṇa* (the context and the intention of the speaker) : The opponent himself has said that the *arthaprakaraṇa* decides the meaning to be understood. Well, the same thing will happen here also (*evam ihāpi*). Here the speaker (viz. Pāṇini) has himself declared that he is making the word *saṁkhyā* a name of the words *bahu, gaṇa* etc. in his grammar. Naturally, whenever Pāṇini utters the word *saṁkhyā*, the listener will understand, on the basis of this convention, the words *bahu, gaṇa* etc. only (as undergoing the particular operation taught there). He will not know that the ordinary numbers *eka, dvi* etc. also are intended here. To make this known it is necessary to include the ordinary numerals also in the definition in the present rule. So a word *saṁkhyā* ' a numeral ' has to be inserted here in P 1. 1. 23. The *Vār* stands.

बह्वादय एवात्र प्रकृता इति भावः is Bhar's summary of Pat's argument. It means that in the absence of this addition of *saṁkhyā*, the words *bahu. gaṇa* etc. alone will be understood as the named of the name *saṁkhyā*, Kaiy. practically borrows this *Dīp.* summary of the *Mbh* when he says : बह्वादय एवात्र संख्यात्वेन प्रकृता इति भावः । Nāg's explanation of this passage is as follows : अत्र = शास्त्रे । प्रकृताः = बुद्धौ संनिहिताः । अनेनात्रापि प्रकरणमस्तीत्युक्तं भवति । बुद्धिसंनिधिरेव प्रकरणम् ।

Ultimately it would seem that here in the *Dip.* there is a gap with the result that the *Dīp* on the *Mbh* I. 80. 15 – 81. 6 is lost (apart from some portion of the *Dīp* which is missing between प्रवर्तमानः and प्रतिविधानं in *l.* 19).

Observation : After this there is one more gap in the *Dīp.* text here. It goes right up to the end of this Āhnika. Thus the entire *Dīp.* on the remaining *Mbh.* on P 1. 1. 23, as also that on the *Mbh* on P 1. 1. 24 : ष्णान्ता षट्, 25 : डति च, and 26 क्तक्तवतू निष्ठा is missing (in Kielhorn's ed. from I. 81. 7 up to 85. 17).

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ABBREVIATIONS

AL	=	Abhyankar and Limaye, *Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā*, Pune, 1976
Bhar	=	Bhartṛhari
Dīp	=	*Dīpikā*
Kaiy	=	Kaiyaṭa
Kāt	=	Kātyāyana
Kāś	=	*Kāśikā*
Mbh	=	*Mahābhāṣya*
MS	=	Manuscript
Nāg	=	Nāgeśa, Nāgojibhaṭṭa
P	=	Pāṇini
Pari	=	Paribhāṣā
Pat	=	Patañjali
Sid-kau	=	*Siddhānta-Kaumudī*
Sw	=	Swaminathan, *Mahābhāsya-Ṭīkā*, Banaras, 1965
Vār	=	*Vārttika*
कै	=	कैयट
ना	=	नागेश, नागोजिभट्ट
सि. कौ.	=	सिद्धान्तकौमुदी